



CENTRO STUDI SUL FEDERALISMO

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POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND FEDERALISM THEORIES, STUDIES, INSTITUTIONS

*edited by
Giorgio Grimaldi*

Research Paper





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
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ISSN: 2038-0623
ISBN 978 88 96 87 1355

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Special Issue/Volume

This special issue consists of 14 essays gathered in a book

POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND FEDERALISM: THEORIES, STUDIES, INSTITUTIONS

edited by Giorgio Grimaldi



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INTRODUCTION

FEDERAL PERSPECTIVES TO ADDRESS GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND NEW HORIZONS FOR POLITICAL ECOLOGY

Giorgio Grimaldi

Federalism and Political Ecology: Contributions at Crossroads

For decades environmental emergencies and in particular the complex issue of climate change have been evident political priorities. However, the political responses to the ecological crisis, especially at the global level, have so far been insufficient and fragmented. Development initiatives and local and national environmental policies are still not accompanied by cultural, institutional, social and ecological change that is able to pave the way for a future based on renewable energy resources, an improvement in living conditions in the poorest and least stable areas of the planet, access to basic public goods for all people geared more toward preserving the ecosystems on which human life, animals and plants depend.

The collection of essays presented in this book addresses society's need for profound ecological transformation, and in doing so intends to offer a look at paths, stories, perspectives and proposals from various different perspectives. All the texts examine some themes for study and discussion that are different but connected by fundamental concerns and proposals aimed at the more or less radical reformation or simple exploration of scientific paradigms, historical analysis, political institutions and policies to provide information and directions to preserve life and the ecological balance of the planet. The central thread connecting the essays, which draws on interdisciplinary studies and competences, is the research and analysis of federalist institutions and proposals in order to call attention to the policies and institutions that must be developed to create a global environmental government endowed with the

powers and instruments that many of the authors believe should replace the current weak and poor governance¹.

The aim of the essays is to analyse the specific theories, institutions and actors connected to the development of projects related to political ecology; they also intend to provide a critique of the absolute sovereignty of nation states, considered anachronistic and unable to establish the cooperation and unity necessary to decide and create effective joint actions to address major global problems, especially environmental issues. Therefore, federalism emerges as a proposal, and in some cases it is explicitly put forward as an alternative. In particular, and in contrast with the vast literature on topics related to environmental policies and political ecology, this book intends to investigate the relationship between federalism and ecology in relation to different contexts, focusing on the process of European integration and the development of political actors who present ecological demands in different ways (Green and Regionalist parties). This book does not intend to offer the most comprehensive and penetrating portrait of that relationship, which, if anything, will be the subject of further projects and future investigations, but rather a variety of ideas and in-depth examinations designed to highlight some specific and significant elements hopefully able to foster an understanding as well as more profound and incisive action for ecological conversion from the local to the global level, from a multi-level perspective, based on the belief that organisations and institutions which reflect and pursue this common goal need to be established.

¹ For a number of recent proposals for a Global Environment Plan, a World Environment Organisation and a global carbon tax, starting with a carbon tax within the European Union, see Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, *Twenty Years After the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development: the Durban Step and the Need for a Global Environmental Government on Climate Change*, Turin, Centre for Studies on Federalism, Research Paper, November 2011, p. 50, http://www.csfederalismo.it/attachments/2313_RP_Grimaldi_Palea_Eng.pdf.

Eco-historical View, Environmental History, Social Ecology

The first section offers an ecological approach to history. Luigi Zanzi provides an original historiographical perspective, an eco-historical perspective, which is innovative when compared to the exclusively anthropocentric view generally presented, and lays the foundation for a re-evaluation of the unique and varied relationship between human communities and the environment. The existence of eco-historical regions, sacrificed by the territorialisation imposed by political power, by the creation of empires and nation states, is detected here. The author broadly outlines a reinterpretation of politics, economy and society that emphasises a concept of nature that is interpreted and experienced in the changing and dynamic relationship between human beings and ecosystems. Politics, economy, culture, history and other disciplines have been faced with the dilemma of legitimising the creation of artificial “techno-systems” designed to replace ecosystems and shape human relationships, including relationships between human beings and the environment, by basing them on supremacy and power, in addition to proposing and establishing social institutions and organisations in line with the characteristics, potentials and limits of these ecosystems. The nation state is a step in the direction of hierarchy and bureaucracy designed to create and “territorialise” ecological areas. In Zanzi’s dense and comprehensive analysis, the eco-historical perspective also criticises the economic foundations of capitalism, based on economic growth, and highlights the colonial oppression of the nation states, inherent in the control and subordination of environments outside their territory. The detailed interpretative and historiographical framework of his essay suggests that the prospect of a Europe of Regions is the one most suited to enhancing the diversity of ecosystems and human communities in a unified and cooperative framework provided by a European federation that is an example of “regionalist federalism”. The theoretical implications of the perspective outlined by Zanzi, who criticises ecological movements’ disregard for institutional dynamics and their failure to offer an alternative to the nation state in their proposals and demands that is not a withdrawal into localism, also involve the need for a federal reform of the United Nations.

Moreover, federalism is presented as a possible and desirable model for a new theory of the State that can ensure peace among people as well as between people and the environment from the local to the global level, based on a union of regions and their autonomy, exercised within the limits of maintaining natural balance. The author concludes by clearly stressing the urgent need to reform the international order and the states by creating federal institutions with an ecological perspective and enhancing the different environmental regions as the only way to address the global challenges of humanity.

Robert Delort's essay offers a different approach that illustrates the evolution of the relationship between man and the environment on the European continent and highlights the various moments in a process reread in its entirety, in addition to the many different cultures and traditions that have emerged in different areas and eras. Delort traces the history of the environment in Europe from antiquity to the present, emphasising a course of civilisation in which man's prevailing tendency has been to act as the master of nature, endlessly exploiting its natural resources. This historical-cultural synthesis is a clear critical reassessment of the evolution of the West and its global effects, which have given rise to inequality, wars and conflicts at an international level. The call for a momentous change of course to stop the current overexploitation of resources and the environment is evident.

At the heart of Selva Varengo's essay is Murray Bookchin's proposal of municipal confederalism. The author explores the thought as well as the institutional and organisational implications of the social ecology proposed by the U.S. anarchist thinker, highlighting some original points. Bookchin considers the ecological crisis to be a result of a social crisis and of men dominating over their fellowmen via the nation state, economic capitalism and the hierarchical and subordinate relationship within social institutions. As an alternative, Bookchin proposes shifting to an ecological society based on libertarian municipalism, composed of many different and free communities with self-government and environmentally friendly institutions confederated with each other and characterised by decentralisation, direct democracy and a new economic morality based on a community ethics.

His reference to the development of interconnected democratic counterpowers and his strong criticism of the nation state make Bookchin's thought one of the few ecological perspectives that have emphasised the building of new political institutions in radical contrast to the absolute sovereign State. Even if his thought does not arrive at a vision of federalism, it looks to direct democracy and assemblies to build an ecological democracy.

Science, Knowledge and Economy: Present and Future Challenges for Sustainability

In the second section dedicated to science, knowledge and environmental controversies and sustainability, Giovanni Salio's essay introduces his reflections on the epistemological fundamentals of ecological knowledge as well as the dilemmas and choices regarding environmental issues. In a context of high uncertainty, a change in the cognitive approach and a predisposition to the assumption of uncertainty and risk are needed. The author explores some fundamental issues such as climate change and energy perspectives, which have been the subject of comparison between antithetical scientific positions, illustrates some principles (precaution, risk, etc.) and raises further questions and reflections on future scenarios. The complexity and uncertainty of environmental issues require the development of a post-normal science, characterised by a nonviolent and gradual approach, able to constantly self-correct and carry out a continuous comparison and dialogue among trials, processing and scientific data, on the one hand, and social as well as political orientations, on the other.

Roberto Burlando presents an important economic reflection on energy, climate change and development models for the future by identifying the various possible scenarios for future decades in the transition from a fossil fuel-based society to an eco-sustainable society. From a bio-economic perspective, the author illustrates the necessary changes, challenges and prospects, reviewing the various proposals and analyses as well as urging the adoption of new and more appropriate indicators of human well-being that include significant aspects of social and environmental relations when assessing the state of today's societies.

From an ecological perspective, Giorgio Nebbia illustrates the essential elements of water management policy. In his discussion of the Italian situation, he stresses the importance of planning an environmental federalism with the catchment basin as the political-

administrative reference unit. However, the Italian experience was a missed opportunity in terms of territorial planning for water management, inspired by federalism and solidarity in order to preserve the environment and its components (soil protection, reforestation, socio-economic restructuring, etc.). The author, therefore, believes that knowledge, education and an ecological awareness are fundamental to an integrated policy of ecosystems, in which water plays a vital role in transporting materials, establishing communications, providing energy, providing life and sustenance and shaping the landscape (valleys, basins, coastlines, etc.) and human activities.

The International and Regional Supranational Level: Reforming the United Nations and the European Union

The third section of this book is dedicated to the examination of some international and supranational institutions that since the 1970's have been gradually developing their environmental policy. First of all, this section includes an extensive essay by Giovanni Finizio on the role of the United Nations in global environmental governance, analysed in relation to the development of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and its institutional architecture as well as the competencies of the main bodies of the UN system. In this essay, the author highlights its evident shortcomings by reconstructing the debate and the major reform proposals put forward as well as by pointing out the key developments to be pursued both to make global environmental governance effective and to ensure human rights and environmental protection in addition to truly making this universal international organisation democratic and transparent. According to Finizio, the enhancement of global environmental governance is part of the greater UN reform process, also promoted by global civil society campaigns to democratise the organisation, granting it supranational powers and reorganising it on a regional continental basis. In the author's opinion, the "human security" paradigm and, above all, the "responsibility to protect" model, which define and update the concept of human rights protection based on their interdependence and indivisibility, suggest how to reform and make global environmental governance more suitable to the needs of the present.

In fact, with its uneven and embryonic multi-level environmental governance, developed thanks to the development of multilateral cooperation, regional integration processes, different types of ad hoc institutions as well as the transfer of powers to regional organisations, the author argues that the latter can and should intervene, according to the principle of subsidiarity, in the event that the states are unable to guarantee their citizens the right to the environment and access to common global goods. In addition, the UN, federally reformed, should intervene to make multi-dimensional human security effective, reorganise the coordination among international organisations, which are universal and have global goals (in particular those of an economic nature such as the WTO and the IMF) and harmonise their objectives with those of environmental protection through a renewed European Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which could become an Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council.

The subsequent contributions focus on the development of EU environmental policy and the prospects and proposals for the relaunch of a federal EU as a guide for a sustainable development model and a European global ecological society. In the first of them, Laura Scichilone reconstructs the evolution of the environmental policy of the European Community and then that of the European Union between 1972 and 1998, from the first programmes for the environment to the creation of a specific environmental competence, though shared among the Member States, under the 1987 Single European Act, and then the important step taken in the 1990s with the adoption of an outlook oriented toward sustainable development, the establishment of international action for the environment and the choice to integrate environmental protection into all EU policies.

Giorgio Grimaldi, by chronologically continuing the analysis of European environmental policy, focuses on its evolution over the past decade.

Finally, Alberto Majocchi focuses on the current crisis of the EU and the euro, stressing the need to promote sustainable development at the continental level through the adoption of a European carbon tax and the creation of a federal union.

Green Parties and European Integration Regionalists

The final section of this book addresses the relationship between environmentalism and federalism examined through the development and the actions of Green parties and with reference to the European integration process.

Franco Livorsi analyses the relationship between federalism and environmentalism, taking into account the ecological characteristics of the main ecological theories as well as their break and integration with their previous philosophical roots, and then goes on to discuss the recent federalist tendencies of the Greens in Europe.

Two subsequent essays, put together and written by Giorgio Grimaldi, broadly address the changes in the Green parties in relation first to the European Communities and then to the European Union. The first reconstructs the most important events related to the major Green parties in Europe and their stances on the European integration process during the 1980s during the Cold War. They were characterised by their rejection of the European Economic Community as an expression of capitalism, agricultural development which was industrial and non eco-sustainable and an international order based on an unbalanced relationship between North and South and loyalty to the Euro-Atlantic Western bloc as opposed to the communist bloc (also contested by the Greens for its lack of democracy, freedom and its destruction of the environment). In the following essay, the author traces the growth of European cooperation among the Green parties and the changes in their national and European positions with respect to Community institutions, also as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and other major changes on an international scale, highlighting their federalist and pragmatic turning point which occurred a few years later when they entered the European Parliament thanks to several important members of the Green Group that had been part of the EP since 1989 and predominant among the Greens since the mid-1990s.

Lastly, Mark Stolfo examines the relationships between ecologists and regionalists, highlighting their similarities and differences in a continental context and reflecting on their cooperation through the formation in 1999 of a common group, the Greens/EFA, bringing together two political groups, the Greens and the political groups related to regionalism and progressive autonomism.

They have adopted a strongly Europeist stance aimed at orienting Europe towards an eco-sustainable future and the creation of a multi-level federation enhancing the autonomy of the regions and peoples of the continent as an institutional solution. A political outlook emerges from just three elements - land, rights and Europe - and is shared by political actors who have found the European Parliament to be an appropriate arena to collect and promote their demands.

Some remarks: Ecological Federalism as a Global Multi-Level Perspective

A better future built around common federal institutions (a common house uniting peoples and affirming human rights, solidarity, respect for the environment and coexistence in diversity) may still seem like utopia. The path to ecological and federal conversion to provide space and autonomy to inter-state entities and build federated supranational realities able to adopt effective policies for environmental security, peacekeeping and conflict management and reorient the economy, placing it at the service of ecological and social transformation and basing it on more equitable and supportive relations between peoples and states as well as more oriented towards the preservation of ecological balance, seems long and rough. However, this is also the most convincing prospect in the search for a way to contribute to the development of a global society with adequate institutions, capable of bringing the world together, ensuring autonomy and freedom, promoting ecological awareness and preventing wars and other devastating consequences for the majority of the world population (difficult access to water, food, health, housing, education, status of refugees due to conflicts or destruction of habitat, etc...) resulting from the unequal distribution of resources and their inefficient use and waste, which progressively worsens the overall conditions of human existence on the planet.

Federalism and environmentalism are ideologies sharing the aim of reconciling the global perspective (federation as a guarantee for freedom, democracy, peace, prosperity, justice and the protection of terrestrial ecosystems) with the local perspective (the autonomy of the human community and the fight to protect the environmental as well as social and cultural heritage, etc..) and offers universal ideals of global solidarity, often viewed as

unattainable dreams by the majority of citizens. Because of the great amount of time needed for the implementation of its objectives, federalism and environmentalism also share the characteristic of being supported by qualified elites and not being able to constantly engage and mobilise large portions of democratic societies. However, can they integrate and offer a concrete political project? Below I would like to reiterate some common elements, already proposed in a previous paper, which at varying levels could encourage environmental federalism aimed at dealing with global phenomena as well as recovering, at the local and national level and building, at the regional and global level, political and democratic capacity for governance to protect and manage common global goods and promote conditions and services that guarantee a dignified lifestyle to the population, based on minimum shared values and public interests:

1. *Culture of limitation or self-limitation and sustainable development* (understood as eco-development or eco-sustainability) involving a careful evaluation of the production, consumption and redistribution processes of resources to ensure a harmonious relationship between societies and ecosystems as well as prioritise the primary values of survival, social justice and the rights of future generations by changing behaviors and lifestyles (awareness and rediscovery of saving, frugality and solidarity, human and natural time, etc.) so they are able to meet basic needs and enable the human population to access freedom to a decent existence, including safeguarding the cultural, historical and artistic heritage of past generations;
2. *extension of individual and collective rights/duties and active democratic participation at the local, regional, national and global level based on solid civic and ecological education*, extending individual rather than institutional freedom in private and social life (guarantee emancipation, self-responsibility, shared responsibility and cooperation, the necessary conditions to better protect and enhance the environment and living beings, recognition and protection of diversity and elimination of discrimination) and promoting a pluralist concept of citizenship;



3. *territoriality enhancement and unity in diversity* that lead ecologists to develop a non-violent attitude oriented towards the conservation of biodiversity, by applying this concept to the surrounding world as well as to human communities, to the extent of theorising and practicing a new way of living and being an active and integrated part of nature from a bio-regionalistic perspective, without losing sight of the relationships and connections to broader spatial and institutional contexts and horizons;
4. *the pursuit of a global multi-dimensional security policy (ecological security) based on a multipolar balance of power at the global level, on non-violent and 'defensive defence' methods* able to defuse the causes leading to the persistence and escalation of terrorism, traditional wars and 'new wars' (poverty, ignorance, lack of rights etc.) and develop a set of integrated economic, social, cultural and environmental policies based on the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and precaution, which can also correspond to interrelated policies for prevention and management of different types of conflict.

[...]

Political ecology and federalism could be integrated in a project capable of *organising peace* among human beings and with nature. Federalism that is non-violent and ecological is possible, on the one hand, by going beyond the logic of exclusive sovereignty, both national, which leads to international anarchy and the logic of treaties, conventions and international agreements, fragile foundations unsuitable for ensuring human environmental security, and that claimed by sub-regional entities on local and separatist grounds; and, on the other hand, by a materialistic and economic concept of society and the biosphere through the recognition of the right to environment, the unavailability of natural resources and the respect for other non-human life forms².

² Giorgio Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cited above, pp. 191-195 and pp. 200-201.

PART ONE

THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH IN THE STUDY OF HISTORY

AND IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS.

SOME THEORIES AND EXAMPLES



ECO-HISTORY AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE FROM PAST TO FUTURE

Luigi Zanzi

1. **Eco-history: a historiographic perspective centered on the historicity of “nature's” “non-human” reality (getting beyond the reduction of history to the hermeneutics of sense of the relations among “consciousness facts” alone).**

Eco-history (the word, although never or little used so far in the Italian language, is indeed much more rich in breadth, depth and complexity of meanings, in an almost identical terminology in several languages, than the more frequently used term “environmental history”) is sometimes implying, especially in some schools of “idealistic” historiographic tradition, a reductive perspective in the definition of its subject matter, because it gets limited, by a totally arbitrary and inappropriate use, to the study of the techniques and practices of environmental exploitation, and of the environmental protection policies disparately applied by various social communities in different states.

It is a totally unjustified limitation that shall be removed, also because such a limited and specialized field of research cannot find in itself autonomous and reasonable historiographic categories allowing to understand the problematic situations observed and go in-depth into the various and complex aspects of the historical reality, in which also the events are rooted pertaining to the environmental practices that are taken as the exclusive subject of its research.

In contrast to such a reductive, unjustified pretense, there is to remark that the subject matter of “eco-history” is the reconstruction of the various events of “nature's” history through the description, in a diachronic perspective, of its different evolutionary arrangements, within an irreducible variety of contexts (“landscapes”) distinctly qualified by individual peculiarities, in a comprehensive framework where man's evolution too is included, with all the contributions, both destructive and constructive, of his culture.

The main reason why that misleading reduction is usually applied in the historiographic context is to be ascribed to the common idea that history should always and exclusively concentrate itself on man, on human society, on the civilization initiatives of any kind that can in one way or other be referred to man or his culture.

That “idealistic” prejudice believes that it can differentiate historiographic researches assuming the topic “the facts of man” as its exclusive study matter, with the pretended justification that only “man's facts” can be brought to an interpretation “with sense”, which is indeed supposed to be the peculiar question that historiography should deal with.

In my opinion, we must firmly remove such a reduction of contents, and reject its principle, replacing it with a methodological and epistemological vision that acknowledges “historicity” as the inescapable feature of any reality, both “human” and “non-human”.

To that end, it is necessary to put aside any dogmatic conception that pretends to reduce history's reality to man's “consciousness facts” alone, and the ensuing pretense to reduce historiography to an activity mainly centered on hermeneutics, i.e. on working out a “sense” which would be valid for interpretation only if there is a perceptible response from one human consciousness to another (it too broadly interpreted, not only in its reflective acts of thought, but also in its expression into actions).

Here there is to stress the fact that a “sense” relation cannot become absolute in itself in man's consciousness, because it is itself, in a fundamental part, dependent on interactions with the reality “external” to “consciousness” (this must be firmly underlined, in radical contrast to the “idealistic” pretense formulated by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel together with a following of his school up to Benedetto Croce and beyond, with more or less “dialectical” traditional formulas that inspired, alas, widespread, more or less “hermeneutically”- tuned historiographical categorizations; they pretend, in some extreme cases, to be entitled to even go as far as reducing the entire reality to a mere manifestation of “consciousness”, although recognizing different forms of expressive implementation of such a spiritual resource, among which “nature” too would be included).

With the same radical strength we must state that historiography cannot be reduced to a mere elaboration of interpretations: if, contrary to Friedrich Nietzsche's absurd and dogmatic pretense, of an anti-realistic attitude, there are not only "interpretations" but also "facts", we must stress that historiography is, first of all, "reconstruction" of facts from the traces that persist of them in the reality throughout the irreversible course of time.

We must also stress, from a methodological viewpoint, that this historiographic work of reconstructing facts can be carried out independently of any requisite of "consciousness" of the facts themselves.

In fact, the "happening" aspect is peculiar to any reality, also that which has nothing to do with the interiority of man's consciousness.

Likewise, such a "factual" aspect is applicable to "nature" in an intrinsic way, and mainly to the configuration in nature of "contextual situations" in which evolutionary processes take place where variations occur in specific "individualities", which incorporate a trace of the selective effects of events.

2. "Nature" as an historical complex of "ecological landscapes". "Eco-history's" peculiar and distinctive subject matter: "nature's facts". "Dis-humanizing history": beyond "anthropocentrism", to reconstruct different "human blossomings" in different "eco-historical" regions.

"Nature's" "contextual situations" are the premise for the emerging of ordered structures of natural places as "eco-systems". So, one can see the natural formation of configurations of "ecological landscapes" whose variety and multiplicity is an irreducible element of the cosmos and, in particular, of the Earth.

One can then recognize that nature as the comprehensive context of irreducibly multiple and different "eco-landscapes" is nothing else but the factual outcome of evolutionary processes: whence it becomes immediately apparent that "nature" is a reality whose understanding requires a factual reconstruction (with all the different techniques for

recording factual traces and reconstructing contexts that have been gradually made available by several technologies, and that have been systematized through the elaboration of various scientific theories).

“Nature” is thus an “eco-historical” reality: reconstructing “nature's” history is the peculiar, comprehensive field of the “eco-history” discipline. Its distinctive subject matter are the “facts of nature”.

Given that, we must recognize that of such a factual reality we can and must attempt a “reconstruction”; which implies that the historiographic work shall turn to “nature” too, independently of man. It is necessary then that history cease to be “anthropocentric”.

Some among the still rare scholars of “eco-history” explicitly posed themselves the problem of liberating historiography from the precluding dogma of “anthropocentrism”: however, they thought they could put aside such a critical revision (like Marco Armiero and Stefania Barca¹) based on the consideration that man can be an interpretation-key not only of human facts, but also of all the situations that human initiative is gradually determining in its development, hence also of the natural situations (those authors believe, with a rhetorical formula of an idealistic flavor, that man comprehends the whole nature due to his capability of instituting a so-called “dialectical” relationship between himself and nature: in what such a “dialecticality” consists is however omitted to say, so that the expression takes on a mostly metaphorical value, implying that within the framework of “human facts” there is a confusion of natural landscapes reduced to more or less artificial, more or less unforeseeable, more or less ruined, more or less devastated conditions as a result of human intervention).

Instead, we must stress the importance of overcoming “anthropocentrism” through a veritable “dis-humanization” of history: only thus can we arrive at a scientific reconstruction of the “facts of nature” (including also those which are a consequence of the transformations caused more or less systematically by man) without predicting deterministic prospects linked to the strategies of environmental exploitation devised and carried out by man; and without

¹ See Marco Armiero, Stefania Barca, *Storia dell'ambiente*, Roma, Carocci, 2004.

expecting either implicit final aims in the natural contexts, or opportunistic judgments, or value-attributing judgments peculiar to man's "viewpoint"; or, finally, without presuming a perpetual and immutable essence in mankind that would possess virtual evolutionary capacities of its own, independently of its being rooted in natural situations which, as already mentioned, are quite different in different regions; so much so that the idea imposes itself, contrary to an "essentialist" vision of man, unique and immune to historical variations, of a multitude of different "human blossomings" (in the problematic sense also suggested by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen²), in an evolutionary process where the different "eco-historical regions" constitute an irreplaceable and unavoidable factor.

3. Man's history in an "eco-centric" perspective.

It is crucial, to that end, to choose a comprehensive context of man's history that is dependent not so much on the progressive evidence of a dominant presence of man on the planet Earth, with an increasing uniformity of established techno-cultures, in a kind of universal techno-system, but, on the contrary, one dependent on the evolution of what Vladimir Ivanovič Vernadskij defined "bio-sphere", namely, an "eco-historical" context that is the evolutionary complex of interactions between physio-chemical and bio-chemical factors acting within a system of interconnections at the planetary level, whose evolutionary course mostly prescind from any influence of programmatic plans and structuring interventions put in place by man, but includes the constructive and destructive contributions of man's "systemic" intervention³.

This contextual relativization of the history of man to the natural history of the planet Earth (which in turn is to be referred back to a history of "nature", in a cosmological vision) does not imply at all a reduction or even a negation of the constructive and destructive powers that some forms of civilization developed by man can produce upon the entire "bio-sphere".

In fact, the alterations to the eco-system that can be produced by some forms of civilization developed by man are such that they can bring about those evolutionary

² See Martha C. Nussbaum, Amartya K. Sen (eds.), *The Quality of Life*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

³ Vladimir Ivanovič Vernadsky, *Biosphere*, Leningrad, Nauch-chim-tech. isd-vo, 1926 (in Russian; English edition: London, Synergetic Press, 1986).

equilibriums in a very limited “local” area (an aspect that is generally ignored) within which man can plan his own adaptation to satisfy his need of survival in accord to his own “lifestyle”; but they can also be such as to destroy the conditions allowing a “local” equilibrium to survive within the wider evolutionary equilibrium pertaining to a “global” complexity, where man's survival is utterly incidental and irrelevant with regard to a dominance over the evolutionary course.

This means that the human kind can, through its destructive presence on the planet Earth, bring about effects in the “bio-sphere” context quite contrary to its strategies of domination over the environment.

In other words, the “nature” context will prevail again, imposing, also in the event of destructive catastrophes, its own evolutionary modalities which prove to be contrary to man's attempts to dominate, negating his exorbitant and unreasonable pretenses.

Putting the history of man in the context of the history of “nature” implies, then, to radically renounce any kind of “anthropocentrism” and imposes instead an “eco-centric” perspective.

This implies, among other things, to radically reconsider historiographical methodology and epistemology, removing any resort to the dogmatic assumption that one has to turn to procedures and methods requiring “consciousness” approaches and “sense” interpretations of human facts.

4. An “operational” approach to historical knowledge. “Nature” as historical reality.

This is perfectly possible if one chooses an “operational” approach to historiographical sciences: leaving behind any idea of history as an activity reductively and exclusively centered on an “intuitive” approach (like a work of art narrating interpretations of human events only), and committing oneself, instead, to study the factual course of reality in a way that allows, with suitable “operations”, to report in “objective” and “public” terms one's research results, so that it will be possible to share them with many researchers and to pass them on from one researcher to another with uniform research methods and scientific criteria.

In this way history becomes the result of specific “reconstructing” operations that do not depend at all on the “human” aspects more or less present in the reality under study. Those operations can be briefly resumed in “reconstructing from traces”, in configuring “contexts”, in recognizing “individualities”, in “concretizing” the idealization models.

Through the application of such operations (that can be carried out with several methodological techniques, which can be subject to learning processes consisting in specific assumptive/inductive strategies and logical procedures, or in methods of analysis of various kinds of specimens from “nature's archive”, or in archeological practices, or in several parameters of comparative/temporal relativization, and so on) it is possible to arrive at configuring historical realities consisting mainly in prospective views over process-related and evolutionary trajectories.

Reality is no longer considered as a variously “idealized” or “conceptualized” presence (with the use of “essentialist” models), but is rather recognized in its unceasing fleetingness in irreversible time, and yet it is pinned down in the prospective glance that the traces of the past allow to delineate.

“Nature” too becomes then not anymore a presence one has to make reference to out of time, but just an historical reality.

5. Epistemological problems of a “nature-centered” viewpoint. Man seen as an operator in the history of nature. Limits of a “naturalization” of culture.

With regard to the need to overcome “anthropocentrism”, we cannot omit to make a concise incidental observation, aimed at highlighting the fact that the choice of a “nature-centered” perspective does not imply per se any dogmatic and arbitrary presumption to attribute such a viewpoint to “nature” itself, as if a “revelation” would be given by it, as if we would indulge to the deceptive presumption to be able to make an historiography of nature according to a principle contravening the historicization criteria that man has been gradually setting up throughout the evolution of his cognitive capacities.

Every historiographical work is in any case dependent on critical and cognitive procedures peculiar to man: there is no possibility to get to a “nature's viewpoint” that can be postulated *in absoluto*, i.e. leaving out any elaboration performed by man, with all its ensuing and inevitable relativizations.

This observation, however, does not prevent at all the perspective presented here from taking, in considering nature, a viewpoint that does not place man at the “center” of natural reality: man himself, as a result of his experiences and his own categories used in developing theories about nature, has arrived, in fact, at configuring the natural environment as a “system of landscapes” whose evolutionary courses do not obey in any way a structural design aimed at making it possible to attain the goals that man is progressively planning and then attempting to impose on the natural world.

In other words, man has progressively arrived at working out a perspective of “eco-historical” science where “nature” is recognized in all its independence with regard to the plans of dominance that man is trying in various ways to artificially impose on it (with an inspiration to dominate which, even if it could be referred back, in a few aspects, to “Promethean” or “Baconian” reminiscences, has, however, unrestrainedly exceeded those original intentions, completely forgetting Francis Bacon's idea of a strategic cleverness consisting in trying to dominate nature through a responsible “obedience” to it).

Precisely in accordance to that perspective, a vision of man's interaction with nature can be conceived of that is no longer “anthropocentric”, but considers man as one of the many living creatures concurring to the co-evolution of nature: man, in fact, is himself nature and, therefore, he must be included as such in the comprehensive context of the evolution of the natural “eco-system”.

It is of great importance to recognize that in such a perspective “nature” is not conceived of according to a naturalism centered on a mechanic determinism; it is conceived of, instead, as an evolutionary process which, in its metamorphoses, is modifying its own structures with unceasing creative innovations, so that man too, as one of the natural creatures, can be considered within the natural environment as a natural operator with all his resources of

autonomous creativity, albeit, of course, within certain contextual constraints which, if not respected, produce a dis-natured culture, dooming it to catastrophic crises.

Thus, the bringing of man's history back into the evolution of “nature's” eco-system can be accomplished without any deterministic prejudice that would reduce man to be a predetermined result of environmental factors, with no capability on his part of any creative reaction.

In such a perspective, the crucial problem emerges of how the invention of “culture” could take place within certain constraints of natural conditions: in this regard, there is to mention the problem of the emerging of conditions of self-reproduction of “culture” within “nature”. A conscious and responsible “naturalization” of “culture” seems necessary.

This is the “eco-historical” problem that confronts man with an unavoidable choice between on the one hand his pretense to realize “technosystems”⁴ of a progressive and unlimited artificial nature, as if the “eco-system” could be completely replaced by the “technosystem”, and, on the other, the alternative of his conscious putting limits to the artificial nature of his own “technosystems”, thus renouncing the idea of an absolute dominance over “nature” through “culture”, and leaving the future survival of culture to a responsible care of the “natural” conditions of self-reproduction of “culture” within a “bio-centric” and “eco-centric” horizon.

6. Progressive definition of a perspective of “eco-historical” studies. Need to renew in an “eco-historical” direction the traditional historiography of “civilization”.

The “eco-historical” perspective has been slowly imposing itself to the attention of an ever wider number of researchers in the international arena, albeit in the absence of a preparation of research plans within a previous and well-considered definition of the idea itself of “eco-history”. It is necessary here to highlight the importance of some “eco-historical” researches in specialist academic quarters, especially archeological: for example, the important

⁴ Luigi Zanzi, *Observations on the Epistemological and Methodological Principles of Historical Technometrics*, in “History and Technology”, Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990, pp. 91-117.

historiographical findings acquired in archeo-botany, archeo-zoology, as well as in the study of geo-morphological evolution, climatic trends and territorial transformations (mainly those connected to the agricultural developments).

So, apart from explicit attempts to modify the general idea of what history is, a thoughtful consideration has in practice established itself, although within a still very “anthropocentric” vision, of the “environmental” factors as unavoidable influences also in the framework of the historical evolution of human civilization (thus contributing to enrich with contributions from specific researches the requests of history's thematic and methodological renewal in a “naturalistic” direction, already proposed in the past by some great figures of historiography like Marc Bloch⁵, Lucien Febvre⁶ and others, among whom, especially with regard to the history of climate and the history of agriculture, we want to mention here Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie⁷, Bernard Hendrik Slicher Van Bath⁸, Giovanni Haussmann⁹, who have to be acknowledged to have been more profound and more open-minded in overcoming the “anthropocentric” prejudices than how this issue has been interpreted by their disciples, like Fernand Braudel¹⁰, to whom, however, one must recognize the merit of having carefully relativized culture with respect to the natural scenarios of the “civilization” processes).

One can say, therefore, that the renewal of historiographic knowledge in the direction of “eco-history” has come more through historicization researches carried out in specific

⁵ Marc Bloch, *Les Rois thaumaturges. Étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale particulièrement en France et en Angleterre* [1924], Paris, Gallimard, 1983; Id., *Les Caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*, [1931]; Id., *La Société féodale*, 2 vol., [1939-1940], in only one volume, Paris, Albin Michel, 1998; Id., *Apologie pour l'histoire ou Métier d'historien*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1949; Id., *La Terre et le Paysan. Agriculture et vie rurale au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1999.

⁶ Lucien Febvre, *La Terre et l'évolution humaine*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1922.

⁷ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie *Histoire humaine et comparée du climat*, Paris, Editions Fayard. t. 1 Canicules et glaciers XIII^e-XVIII^e siècles, 2004 ; t. 2, Disettes et révolutions, 2006 ; t. 3, Le réchauffement de 1860 à nos jours (avec le concours de Guillaume Séchet), 2009.

⁸ Bernard Hendrik Slicher Van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500-1850*, translated by Olive Ordish, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1963.

⁹ Giovanni Haussmann, *L'evoluzione del terreno e l'agricoltura*, Torino, Einaudi, 1950; Id., *La terra e l'uomo. Saggio sui principi di agricoltura generale*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1964; Id., *Suolo e società*, Lodi, Istituto sperimentale per le colture foraggere, 1986; Ercole Ongaro, *Al servizio dell'uomo e della terra: Giovanni Haussmann (1906-1980)*, Milano, Jaca Book, 2008.

¹⁰ Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1949 (revised edition, 1966); Id., *Le monde actuel, histoire et civilisation*, in collaboration with Suzanne Baille and Robert Philippe, Paris, Belin, 1963 (reprinted with the title *Grammaire des civilisations* Paris, Arthaud, 1987 ; Id., *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XV^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, 3 volumes, Paris, Armand Colin, 1979; Id., *Les écrits de Fernand Braudel. I : Autour de la Méditerranée*, Paris, De Fallois, 1996; *Les écrits de Fernand Braudel. II : Les ambitions de l'histoire*, Paris, De Fallois, 1997; *Les écrits de Fernand Braudel. III : L'histoire au quotidien*, Paris, De Fallois, 2001.

disciplinary fields (for example meteorological sciences, pedological sciences, forestal sciences, zootechnical sciences, farming sciences, etc.) than through a reconsideration from an “eco-historical” viewpoint of the most important issues in the political and social history of man (an aspect, this one, traditionally considered as characterizing history itself as a discipline, perpetuating an error in planning out the system of scientific research coming from the above-mentioned deceptive “idealistic” idea of history as a discipline in itself essentially centered on the study of man).

We cannot omit here to mention that already in the 19th century very important works had been carried out (e.g. those by Carl Ritter¹¹, George Perkins Marsh¹², Carlo Cattaneo¹³, etc.) aimed to highlight the crucial role of the natural environment in the history of civilization.

In the last part of the 20th century, some historiographic researches have been perfected, exemplary for their significant, implicit overturning of traditional paradigms in the history of civilization, explicitly recognizing the “environmental” aspects as very important factors in the history of man: e.g. Karl August Wittfogel’s work on the role of the control of hydraulic networks in the building of the “Eastern despotism”¹⁴; and also Alfred W. Crosby’s works (among which *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*¹⁵; to this author we owe in particular the elaboration of the historiographic category of “economic imperialism”, very significant in the study of how Western Europe’s civilization methods have modified the eco-biological state of the planet Earth in their imposing themselves in a hegemonic fashion on the rest of the world); and likewise the works by Roderick Nash¹⁶, Karl

¹¹ Carl Ritter, *Die Erdkunde, im Verhältniss zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen, oder allgemeine, vergleichende Geographie als sichere Grundlage des Studiums und Unterrichts in physikalischen und historischen Wissenschaften*. 19 vols. (2nd. ed. of Vols. I. II), Berlin, 1822-59.

¹² George Perkins Marsh, *Man and Nature or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action*, New York, C. Scribner, 1864.

¹³ Carlo Cattaneo, *Scritti storici e geografici*, edited by Gaetano Salvemini and Ernesto Sestan, 4 volumes, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1957.

¹⁴ Karl August Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas, Versuch der wissenschaftlichen Analyse einer großen asiatischen Agrargesellschaft*, Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1931; Id., *The Hydraulic Civilizations* in William L. Thomas, Jr. (ed.), *Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1956, pp. 152-64; Id., *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

¹⁵ Alfred W. Crosby Jr., *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1973.

¹⁶ Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1967.

Polanyi¹⁷, Eric Jones¹⁸, Donald Worster¹⁹, Keith Thomas²⁰, Simon Schama²¹, Ted Steinberg²², Robert Delort²³, Clive Ponting²⁴, John Robert McNeill²⁵, Jared Diamond²⁶, etc.

Despite the great importance of those contributions, their methodological impact did not succeed, however, to adequately innovate the traditional conception of history: so that traditional historiography reacted to the emergence of those new perspectives by trying to reductively bring them back into an anthropocentric vision of history, placing again the history of nature into the history of “human” practices to transform it, and by avoiding to consider as problems of an “eco-historical” type some crucial issues of man's history (e.g. those regarding the creation of the State, the relations among States, the relations among environmental conditions, economic conditions and social conditions, and so on).

The missed acquisition of an “eco-historical” perspective in the body of historiographic traditions with regard to how to consider the evolution of “civilization” forms, has brought with it the persistence of a pre-judice of indifference (or “externality” and “marginality”) in regard to “natural” factors in the study of the formation of the State, its foundation and its development, as well as of its relations with other States.

Precisely the issue of questioning from an eco-historical viewpoint the inter-State arrangement of the international political order is the one I believe it is important to bring here to your attention, because it is crucial for dealing with the problem of working out in today's world an ecological policy that is consistent with the principles of “federalism” (the only political and institutional concept that can be adequate in the face of the multiplicity of

¹⁷ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, New York, Rinehart, 1944.

¹⁸ Eric Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

¹⁹ Donald Worster, *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*, San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1977.

²⁰ Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800*, London, Allen Lane, 1983.

²¹ Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.

²² Ted (Theodore) Steinberg, *Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000; Id., *Down to Earth: Nature's Role in American History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

²³ Robert Delort, François Walter, *L'Histoire de l'environnement européen*, Paris, PUF, 2001.

²⁴ Clive Ponting, *A New Green History of the World. The Environment and the Collapse of Great Civilizations*, London, Penguin Books, 2007.

²⁵ John Robert McNeill, *Something New Under The Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-century World*, New York, Norton, 2000.

²⁶ Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. W.W. Norton & Company, 1997; Id., *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, New York, Viking Press, 2005.

ecological landscapes”) and that avails itself in an efficient way of a “federalist” strategy of political action.

7. The crucial role of the “territorialization” pursued by man in the Earth's recent history.

Acknowledging an “eco-historical” perspective centered on categories no longer “anthropocentric” but “naturalist” does not imply *per se* to renounce to consider the history of man as one of the crucial moments in Earth's history, although that should be carefully placed within the limits of the short time-span of man's dominant presence and of the carrying out, on his initiative, of environmental practices that have progressively transformed in an ever more significant way the evolutionary trends of the Earth's “eco-system”.

Of course, in the “natural” domain one must also include the evolutionary events tied to the emergence of the human kind and the emergence, in man's biological development, of his “consciousness”, as well as his capability to “systematically” act in the “eco-landscapes” through the settlement of various ethno-cultural groups in different environmental locations. In the history of the “facts of nature” there is then to include also the “local” history of the interaction of different groups of the human species with different “places” of the natural environment, where progressively take shape different “eco-systems”, different “niches” for the selection of different evolutionary forms.

Therefore, it is easy to see that within such a history of “nature” there are to include also specific researches on how man has been perfecting some environmental practices (especially those regarding the “territorialization” of the natural environment) through which man has improved his various adaptation successes, thus achieving among other things a multitude of “human blossomings” (in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen's sense²⁷), different from one another according to the different interactions with the individual environmental “niches”. Among these “environmental practices” one has to include not only those concerning the exploitation of different kinds of resources, sometimes accompanied by practices of

²⁷ Cf. Nussbaum, Sen, *The Quality of Life*, cit.

environmental-integrity protection (which have been variously highlighted by some researchers in environmental history), but also, and much more appropriately, those concerning the environmental transformations that man is doing through technical contrivances using devices progressively developed with different “techno-systemic” know-hows and the ever more “systematic” drafting of action plans aimed at putting in place a strategic control of nature's evolutionary trends, with the use of more and more invasive tools.

In this way, an ever more invasive “territorialization” of the natural environment is taking place in man's evolutionary history: “nature” is gradually being replaced with more and more “territory”.

8. Multiple “local histories” of different “territorialization” modalities of different “landscapes” coming from different “environmental choices” of different human groups confronting different “environmental challenges”.

One of the crucial questions in eco-history consists precisely in the reconstruction of the events through which, in various world “sites”, such a replacement is variously taking place, with all the consequences that it implies, both with regard to nature and with regard to human society.

The main feature distinguishing a “territory” from “nature” is destining a land housing an “environmental niche” to become functional to a purpose determined by the historical and cultural situation of the community that has settled there.

That destining is carried out through specific structures realized by appropriate “territorial” practices.

In the history of any natural environment one has to devote a particular attention to the emerging in it of “territorialization processes”, which obviously vary in modality, quality and effects according to the different history of the scientific and technical knowledge-levels of the communities that make themselves the protagonists of those transformation processes of “nature” into a “territory”.

It is important, therefore, to adequately highlight the fact that, beyond the variations linked to the different scientific and technical development-levels of the different communities, different “environmental niches” virtually lend themselves to different “territorialization” projects, making some of them possible and inhibiting others, favoring some with particular resources and stimulating particular challenges of technical ingenuity, and disfavoring others, frustrating even the most stubborn attempts.

There is then to stress that different “landscapes” lead to different “territorialization” possibilities. To different “environmental challenges” follow in the reality different “environmental choices” by different human groups.

For these reasons too “eco-history” must be articulated in different “local histories”, including in the irreducible variety of environments not just the scenery variations that from one place to another originate individual environmental peculiarities, but also the variety of territorial cultures that, from one place to another, are in various ways constructed through “environmental choices” by different human groups according to the availability of resources, to the “environmental challenges” that individual sites offer at different times.

9. Criticism of the idea of eco-evolutionary uniformity of the “European continent”.

If we take these considerations in due account, we cannot accept in any way eco-historical scenarios that consider environmental scales which arbitrarily neglect this pluralistic set of “landscapes”, absolutely not reducible one to the other, other than by seriously sacrificing their distinctive “eco-historical” identities.

Therefore, I do not believe it is coherent with those categorial premises to propose a thematic scenario such as that of one comprehensive history regarding the “European continent's” environment, considered in its globality from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic. The fundamental reason for the unacceptability of such a scenario is the fact that the “European continent” entity is not a “landscape” at all, in the “eco-historical” sense of the term.

It is not just a matter of scale (that, in any case, in its “continental” measure is clearly excessive according to any conventional definition of environmental areas); it is a matter of the composition of the scenario, that is presented in terms of a generic “global” uniformity taking in no account the deep and irreducible “regional” differentiations that one can immediately perceive even at first glance looking at Western Europe²⁸.

Only a rigorous attention in reconstructing the “eco-landscape” contexts can allow us to bring into focus both the influence of the “facts of nature” on the configuration of different “environmental niches” in different times, and the effects of “anthropization” and “territorialization” processes that take on quite different modalities, qualities and factual implications in different “regional” contexts, according to different “local” opportunities, more or less favorable, more or less rich in specific resources and occasions fostering different techno-cultural situations of the communities at work there.

To that end, it is of crucial importance to highlight the different impacts that different techno-scientific situations produce in different “landscapes”, in different times, due to the initiative of different resident communities.

²⁸ For the above reasons I cannot share the layout and the development of the environmental framework proposed by Robert Delort and François Walter in their work titled *Histoire de l'environnement européen* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001 - Italian edition *Storia dell'ambiente europeo*, Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2002]. In fact, its whole reconstructive framework is seriously wanting, because it does not recognize the irreducible plurality of the different “landscapes” of Europe's different “eco-historical” regions. This serious deficiency is not remedied nor reduced by the indication of some areas pointed out as differentiating elements within the European continent only in order to consider some gradual variations of some factors (e.g. the climate) depending on latitude and longitude variations, always taken from statistical data unconnected with the actual “regional” contexts where they were recorded. Its missing recognition of different “regional landscapes” of Europe's natural environment makes it so that such an environmental history lacks one of the fundamental features of scientific historicization, i.e. the rigorous reconstruction of contexts (in this case, of “local” contexts). The lack of contextualization regards not only the evolution of different “environmental niches”, but also a more appropriate differentiation of the “territorialization processes” and, more in general, the “anthropization processes” that have gradually taken place in the history of Europe. In fact, also the different “anthropization processes” (but with little attention paid to the “territorialization processes”) are dealt with by Delort and Walter without any differentiation into multiple “regions”, hence without any study of what have been the actual different interventions of transformation of nature by man in different “eco-historical” regions in Europe. So, this type of environmental history is lacking one more distinctive trait of scientific historicization, namely that of pointing out different “individualities” (in this case, individualities of a “landscape” nature). I take the opportunity of this note to stress that, in my opinion, this work is also wanting for its use of “anthropocentric” parameters (e.g. the duration of the evolutionary events and processes is measured with time marks pertaining to social history; and the “catastrophic” events are never recorded with a truly “eco-centric” vision, thus highlighting the transformations to the “landscape” and to the co-evolutionary adaptations of the living species, also different from man, but are always referred, almost exclusively, to anthropic settlements.

10. Crucial importance, in the “eco-historical” perspective, of the pluralization of “natural places” as multiple “ecological landscapes”. Radical compliance of a “federalist” strategy with the need for an ecological policy differentiated by “regions”.

So, in the history of “nature”, irreducibly articulated into different “regions”, is also included the “local” history of the interaction processes of man with different “landscapes”, through multiple strategies of “territorialization” and realization of “techno-systems in the course of factual events whose developments are not at all unilaterally predetermined by the environmental situation, and give rise to complex results intertwining “culture” and “nature”.

The differentiation of “nature” into multiple “ecological landscapes” peculiar to different “regions” implies an irreducible pluralization of environmental “places”, as well as a differentiation of the same according to the virtual possibilities of settlement by different groups of the human species (as well as other animals): this fact implies, in itself, a pluralization of “human blossomings” too, which time after time develop in multiple “regions”, with different “lifestyles”, different ideals and “human” values, more or less detectable and translatable into each other through mediations that, in concrete terms, always require comparative confirmations in terms of environmental adaptation to different “landscapes”.

Any plan of ecological protection that wants to be appropriate to such a “regional” multiplicity of nature must contemplate a diversification on a “regional basis” of its strategies of ecological policy.

This is the profound root of the appropriateness of a “federalist” strategic choice for the institutional structuring of ecological protection policies, which must hinge on an articulated integration of various competences, powers and responsibilities at both the “global” and the “local” levels.

In order to be in a position to adequately evaluate the “regional” perspectives among which operational choices have to be made case by case, and for which “systematic” connections at the global level have to be worked out, it is of fundamental importance to

perform an “eco-historical” reconstruction of the different “regional landscapes” through multiple “local histories”.

This is one of “eco-history's” most significant issues, loaded with a variety of research themes, meaningful topics and values.

11. The economics-driven prejudice of considering “nature” as an “externality”. Inadequacy of the traditional economic science to theorize an “eco-compatible” economy.

In the processes that may altogether be comprised in the “anthropization” of nature, there is also to include specifically “territorial policy”. However startling it may be, the natural environment has been mostly neglected by the sciences that were qualifying themselves as “human” for their being focused on man, his society, his cultural practices and his environmental practices.

Among them, the economic science is the one that more openly than any other has considered the natural environment as an entity to be implicitly taken as an “external” factor with regard to the processes specifically chosen as its exclusive subject: in fact, the natural environment is mostly considered in the works of the economic science as an “externality”.

Paradoxically, while in some areas of the world the economic activity was hinging more and more on a systematic exploitation of “nature” (up to the point that Ted Steinberg, with a telling symbolic choice, thought to title his historiographic work on the history of water resources' exploitation in New England *Nature Incorporated*²⁹, highlighting the “incorporation” of domestic natural resources into the “corporation”, the socio-capitalist institution involved in that process), the economic theory, on the other hand, continued to perpetuate itself within the dogmas of an orthodoxy that can be considered, in Paul Ormerod's words, as “trapped in an idealized and mechanistic view of world”³⁰, around which economists have erected a sort of

²⁹ Ted (Theodore) Steinberg, *Nature Incorporated. Industrialization and the Waters of England*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

³⁰ Paul Ormerod, *The Death of Economics*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, p. 3.

protective barrier through the filter of a language of technical formulas hardly translatable into the many languages used by people in different fields, even in scientific research, because economists want to have absolutely no responsibility any time their impotence is shown in the face of the economic crises that every now and then upset the world.

The economics' traditional model takes capital and labor, completely neglecting “nature”, as the primary factors of the economic process, which, in turn, is conceived of as economically significant only in connection with a “growth” process that is theorized as functional, among other things, to the implicit dogmatic choice of placing economic science at the utilitarian service of a “Promethean” conception of man, able to free himself from any natural conditioning of his development (the abstraction of man as the absolute doer of himself is the ideal, more or less implicit, of such a perspective of economic and social progress, not supported by any concrete historical basis of such “progressivity”, both in natural and techno-cultural terms). As lucidly remarked by some theoreticians of the need for an ecological re-foundation of civilization, like Enzo Tiezzi³¹, Piero Bevilacqua³², Mauro Ceruti³³, Silvano Tagliagambe³⁴, Mercedes Bresso³⁵, Vittorio Silvestrini³⁶, Giorgio Grimaldi³⁷ and others,

³¹ Enzo Tiezzi, *Tempi storici, tempi biologici*, Milano, Garzanti, 1984; Id., Nadia Marchettini, *Che cos'è lo sviluppo sostenibile*, Roma, Donzelli, 1999; Id., *Tempi storici, tempi biologici. Vent'anni dopo*, Roma, Donzelli, 2001; Id., *The End of Time*, Southampton, UK, and Boston, USA, Wessex Institute of Technology (WIT) Press, Id., *The Essence of Time*, Southampton, UK, and Boston, USA, WIT Press, 2003; Id., *Beauty and Science*, Southampton, UK, and Boston, USA, WIT Press, 2005; Id., *Steps Towards an Evolutionary Physics*, Southampton, UK, and Boston, USA, WIT Press, 2006.

³² Piero Bevilacqua, *Storia dell'agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea*, 3 voll., Venezia, Marsilio, 1989-1991; Id., *Venezia e le acque. Una metafora planetaria*, Roma, Donzelli, 1995 - translated in French (L. Levi, Paris 1996) and in German (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt-New York, 1998); Id., *Tra natura e storia. Uomini, ambiente, economie*, Roma, Donzelli, 1996; Id., *L'utilità della storia*, Roma, Donzelli, 1997; Id., *Demetra e Clio. Uomini e ambiente nella storia*, Roma, Donzelli, 2002.; Id., *La mucca è savia. Ragioni storiche della crisi alimentare europea*, Roma, Donzelli, 2002; Id., *Prometeo e l'Aquila. Dialogo sul dono del fuoco e i suoi dilemmi*, Roma, Donzelli, 2005; Id., *La terra è finita. Breve storia dell'ambiente*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006; Id., *Miseria dello sviluppo*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008; Id., *Il sapere storico, la natura, la politica*, in “Historia Magistra”, Year II, No. 3, 2010, pp. 110-118 (provisional version *Il sapere storico e le minacce alla Terra*, 2007,

<http://eddyburg.it/article/articleview/6479/1/286>;

<http://eddyburg.it/filemanager/download/592/PBevilacqua%20Amb.%20e%20federalismo.pdf>); Id., *Il grande saccheggio. L'età del capitalismo distruttivo*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2011; Id., *Elogio della radicalità*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2012.

³³ Gianluca Bocchi, Mauro Ceruti, *La sfida della complessità*, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2007; Id., *Origini di storie*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2009; Id., *Una e molteplice. Ripensare l'Europa*, Milano, Tropea 2009.

³⁴ Silvano Tagliagambe, *Epistemologia del confine*, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1997.

³⁵ Mercedes Bresso, *Pensiero economico e ambiente*, Torino, Loescher, 1982; Id., *Per un'economia ecologica*, Roma, NIS, 1993; Id., *Economia ecologica*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1997.

³⁶ Vittorio Silvestrini, *Uso dell'energia solare*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1988; Id., *Ristrutturazione ecologica della civiltà: il comunismo verso il terzo millennio*, preface by Pietro Ingrao, Napoli, CUEN, 1990; Vittorio Silvestrini, Pietro Greco, *La*

as well as by economists like Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen³⁸, Frederick Soddy³⁹, Herman Daly⁴⁰, Cutler J. Cleveland⁴¹, Christian Leipert⁴² and others, today's economic science must be radically rethought and “revolutionized” from its foundations, acknowledging the priority of the “nature” factor and reducing capital and labor to roles dependent on their interaction modes with that primary factor.

Without the “incorporation” of the “nature” factor in economic science, the latter is inadequate to understand the peculiar “economic” relations taking place between man's productive and commercial practices and the evolutionary configurations of the “eco-systems” peculiar to the different “regions”.

This is one of the reasons that make the present theoretical structure of economic science inadequate to face the problems of its “eco-compatibility”.

12. Some aspects of the current perspectives for re-founding economic science on an “eco-historical” basis. The contributions by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen: self-contradiction of an infinite “growth” on a finite planet.

Recent revisions of the economic science aiming to include in it the “nature” factor too, have not yet reached such a theoretical stage as to be convincing in criticizing the traditional political economy (which neglects the “nature” factor as “external”, although implicitly presupposing it as a *de-facto* condition of any economic activity); even less have they

risorsa infinita, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2009; Vittorio Silvestrini, *Che cos'è l'entropia* [1985], new edition Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2011.

³⁷ Giorgio Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005.

³⁸ Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1971; Mauro Bonaiuti (ed.), *From Bioeconomics to Degrowth. Georgescu-Roegen's “New Economics” in eight essays*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2011.

³⁹ Frederick Soddy, *Science and Life: Aberdeen Addresses*, New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920; Id., *Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt*, London, George Allen & Unwin 1926; Id., *Money versus Man: A Statement of the World Problem from the Standpoint of the New Economics*, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1933; Id., *The Role of Money. What is Should Be, Contrasted with What it Has Become*, London, Routledge, 1934; Id., *The Story of Atomic Energy*, London, Nova Atlantis, 1949.

⁴⁰ Herman Daly, *Beyond Growth. The Economics of Sustainable Development*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1996.

⁴¹ Cutler J. Cleveland, David I. Stern, Robert Costanza (eds.) *The Economics of Nature and the Nature of Economics*, Edward Elgar, 2007; Cutler J. Cleveland, *Concise Encyclopedia of the History of Energy*, New York, Academic Press, 2009.

⁴² Christian Leipert, Federico M. Pulselli, *The Origins of Research on Defensive Expenditures: A Dialogue with Christian Leipert*, in “International Journal of Design & Nature and Ecodynamics”, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2008, pp. 150-161.

succeeded in turning themselves into operational plans able to raise a sufficient social consensus to make it so that they be implemented as leading strategies in the management of economic matters.

There is, however, to acknowledge that the revision of the “basic principles” of economic science is under way, and it has authoritatively been started by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (also following some theoretical ideas by Frederick Soddy) in a perspective where the integration into the science of economic processes of the science of ecological systems (inescapably articulated in a multiplicity of “regional landscapes”) and the science of the evolution of thermo-dynamic systems is fundamental.

That perspective implies by itself an interdisciplinary treatment of reality aspects that can only be fully highlighted through an “eco-historical” reconstruction (and this is one of the reasons that make it necessary to overcome “anthropocentrism” in the historiographic approach, because the categorizing schemes and the judgement criteria that are called into play to support such an historiographic reconstruction are defined with regard to an “eco-historical” reality where geo-morphological, physio-chemical and eco-biological factors interact in an evolutionary process characterized by some thermo-dynamic constraints and by some structural elements that are independent of any “relativization”, and even more of any “centralization” regarding man, taken as an independent term of reference for sense)

Such a revision of the economic science's foundations hinges, on the one hand, on the recognition of what Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (developing some essential theoretical ideas by Walther Nernst⁴³ and Max Planck⁴⁴) defined as “the fourth law of thermo-dynamics” that, formulated in a suitable way for what we are discussing about here, can be expressed thus: in all closed systems (as planet Earth, for many significant aspects regarding economic production, can be considered) usable matter irreversibly degrades into non-usable matter.

That principle makes it quite evident, with regard to the usage of matter (without which no work can be performed with productive results) and, in particular, with regard to its

⁴³ Walther Nernst, *Traité de Chimie Générale*, 10^{ème} éd., Paris, Hermann, 1922-23.

⁴⁴ Max Planck, *Leçons des Thermodynamique*, Paris, Hermann, 1913.

transformation starting from a state of availability of the same at low entropy, how self-contradictory it is to assume an infinite “economic growth” on a finite planet.

Hence the fundamental warning to understand that there are impassable limits beyond which “economic growth” becomes a self-contradictory concept (imposing, on the contrary, a desirable perspective of “de-growth”).

It is necessary, therefore, to replace the ideal of the economy hinged on unconditional growth with the new ideal (presented as a first approach by Herman Daly) of an economy hinged on a “stationary state”, where “growth” is rigidly limited, although the economic system is based on radical incentives to a “development” that should be as much as possible equal for all the people participating as a community to it, with a life-style adequate to the conservation and self-reproduction of “nature” from generation to generation, and taking upon oneself full “responsibility” (in Hans Jonas' sense⁴⁵) from one generation to the other. These are the crucial problems of a revision of economic science in order to make it “eco-compatible”.

Recognizing these problems should drive researchers and experts in economic science to a radical revision of the theoretical structure of the science they practice, promoting researches aiming at including the “nature” factor within the theoretical framework of economic science as an “internal” factor of the reality it considers.

Without such a critical and theoretical revision, the idea itself of “eco-compatibility” remains devoid of a rigorous translation into the terms of economic science.

In that case, the cultural struggle aimed at putting in place adequate remedies to make the economic process “eco-compatible” remains inadequate, because unable to propose an articulated economic plan capable of integrating the priority of “eco-compatibility” among the requisites of an economic structure that is efficient and satisfactory enough to be accepted by social consensus.

⁴⁵ Hans Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979.

13. Political science and the perpetuation of the idea of “nature” as “externality”. The crucial role of “territorialization” of power relations in the evolution of the “system of States”.

The “nature” factor is also considered as an “externality”, in most cases and with the same gravity, in the field of political science.

Although it may look even more surprising, any consideration of the natural environment is mostly missing in the history of political and social institutions.

Leaving aside various theoretical and historical assumptions on the origin of politics, which in any case it would be better not to conceive of as a spontaneous establishment of “institutions” aimed at the strategic control of social behaviors in the common interest, let us approach, instead, in a perspective inspired by Machiavelli's paradigmatic lesson, a careful study of the “exceptional” systems which, in most cases through violence, aim at imposing power situations capable of dominating the trends of community cohesion, in whatever historical legacy of rules it was formed, with the purpose to withstand a rivalry confrontation with other power situations of other communities. In my opinion, it is useful to stress the need and urgency of thoroughly examining the role of the natural environment in the struggles for stabilizing power situations: more explicitly, I believe that we must recognize, at the root of the institution of power relations in more or less large communities of men, a fundamental interaction between power and the territory, as well as a struggle for the possession of natural resources as the premise for the foundation, stabilization, conservation and expansion of power relations within a “system of States”.

The primary importance is thus apparent again, in this regard, of the role of the transformation of the natural environment into a “territory”, whose significance was already indicated above.

There is to consider that without a “territorial” dimension no power can be exercised; and we must recognize as well that one of the crucial ways for acquiring an adequate territorial

dimension for one's power is to conquer a natural environment and transform it into a “territory”, with the purpose of both exploiting its resources for survival reasons and of defining the borders within which that power is in force, with the subjugation, therefore, of the people of the community living within those borders, who are forced to abide by the rules that that power imposes.

In that perspective, the natural environment is no longer an “externality” with regard to politics, but, on the contrary, it becomes a crucial factor in the foundation of political institutions, their conservation, their eventual development in extension.

Usually, in the study of the history of environmental transformations carried out on the initiative of different human communities as a development of their own perspectives of civilization, people neglect to consider the significant aspect of the “territorialization” of power relations: it happens then that the historical practices of environmental transformation get extrapolated from a plurality of “places” where they are in various ways realized.

Territorial practices are considered, thus, in their generality, as if they were referred to an abstract and universal environmental space (so, for example, people speak of the invention of agriculture, of domestication, etc., without actually specifying the various “environmental regions”, the various “niches” in which those civilization events were undertaken on the initiative of different populations in different environmental places, with different power situations).

It is necessary, instead, to highlight, in the process of progressive refinement of “territorial” practices in different places, the peculiar dimension of power “territorialization”: in other words, it is necessary to highlight, at the root of every practice of transformation of the natural environment into a “territory”, the strategies for confining a community into a given “territorial” area coinciding with the area of influence of a relation of domination, dependent on the stabilization of certain power relations.

That event implies to activate “territorial” features that answer to the peculiar and exclusive needs and functions of the power relations that exercise a domination over that area.

“Territorialization” of politics consists therefore in making explicit the territorial roots of power relations and, at the same time, it highlights how every “territorial” transformation of the natural environment presupposes an order defining a power relation in what can be called its “political space”, i.e. an area with an efficient control over individuals subjected to that domination (in terms of political functionalism, we could speak of an “area of observance” of the relations between a “government” and its “governed” people).

14. Mutual interactions between different arrangements of power relations and different forcible implementations of “territorial” practices.

There is to stress the great importance, among other things, of the role of power relations in what is the process of mobilizing communities to act, sometimes with very great sacrifices, in the transformation of the “wild” conditions of some environmental places, or in putting in place exploitation practices of resources of different kinds available in different natural “niches”.

Too often, both in the history of civilizations and in the history of the activation of the most diverse territorial practices, it is neglected to say how much those processes take place forcibly, almost never from a spontaneous development (this is due to many reasons, linked also to some frequently-recurring constitutive traits of human communities, which, however, do not have any influence, if not indirectly, on the choices of different ways of exercising power through force).

In an “eco-historical” perspective, it is important to say that power relations, in turn, cannot be considered abstractly isolated in themselves, but have to be brought back, instead, to the progression of the conditions in which some communities adapt to some environmental places in order for them to survive.

And also there is to consider the role of different features of different environmental “niches” in determining the strategic choices in the expansion of power relations over the territory (so, for example, the impact of insular situations in more or less vast, more or less

navigable seas on the configuration of power relations covering several islands; or the presence or not of abundant water resources along traveling routes that determine the mobility flows of communities over a territory, in determining its transformation through the realization of distribution grids of those water resources; or the interweaving of mountain passes between different valleys in determining the activation or not of connections of political and strategical solidarity to confront invasions and domination threats coming from outside, and so on).

The “eco-historical” events of the construction of different power situations in different “territorial” areas show many actuation modes of the territorial practices of transformation of the natural environment for production purposes (sometimes hinging on the invention of periodical routes through wild areas for hunting or sheep-breeding; sometimes on imposing on nature a process of “work-sharing”, as happens with agriculture; sometimes on exploiting mines, and so on).

As the need arises, it is of crucial importance to interlace different “territorial practices” on the same territory, politically defined: in that interlacement a decisive role is played by power relations that are instituted between the different hegemonic classes that control the different practices (as the nomad shepherds, the farmers, the miners, etc.).

These processes of forming political and social establishments depend, on the one hand, on the situation of “territorial” confinement where they take place, observing the constraints imposed by power on those operating in the territorial area so defined, and, on the other, they have an influence on the power configurations that control the various classes of operators of the different territorial practices).

15. **Specific relevance of some “territorial” structures in the political control of society. “Hierarchization” and “bureaucratization” of the “territory”. The “competitive” relation between different “territorial” areas. The structural role of “urbanization”. Importance of “eco-history” in the study of the “territorialization” of politics. The emergence of the so-called “territorial States”.**

To that end, some political relations which are instituted on the territory become significant; among these there is to recall some territorial structures the control of which allows the exercising of a more efficient relation of social domination.

I wish to point out in this regard a relation that I propose to call “of territorial hierarchization”, meaning that the territory is so structured as to be transformed in a political context where a few “centers” housing the power-wielding authority attract connections that are in a variable state of tension in the “region” (which becomes kind of a “field” of political relations orientated towards an attractive pole at its summit).

Thus a hierarchy of power dependencies is translated into a hierarchy of territorial connections.

The fundamental feature of the “territory” with regard to the natural environment is the transformation of a “natural region” to purposes of fruitful activities, like those peculiar to productive work.

Such a territorial functionalization does not take place, however, in a way answering only to technical and practical needs: it also answers to the requirement of controlling structures by the hegemonic classes that are endowed with the mastery over the processes of territorial transformation through the most diverse practices.

This implies a “territorial bureaucratization” which, in turn, is inserted into a “hierarchization” process of the territory that expresses in a stable manner its configuration in a sort of “institutional body”.

These processes of “political territorialization”, with their tendency to expand themselves to wider dimensions, give origin, most of the times, to relations of a “competitive”

type between different territorial areas that have been functionalized to different productive arrangements.

These competitive rivalries perturb the stabilization of power institutions and cause different reactions in the structure of dominating relations in different “territorial areas”, either through the stiffening of “hierarchization” in an authoritarian sense, or through the increase of mediation initiatives that in different forms, by centralizing or decentralizing government functions, succeed in mitigating the conflicts between the different development structures of the “territorial areas”.

A crucial role in the ever more intensive artificialization of the “territory” is played by the progressive “urbanization” that changes a sedentary organization in a “local situation” that works as the systematic integration place of any sustenance activity, subjecting to the “urbanized” areas many other “territorial” areas in a variety of functional connections articulated according to the arrangement of the main centers of the global “techno-system”.

However astonishing it may be, all those “territorial” aspects peculiar to the history of political institutions are almost never highlighted from an “eco-historical” viewpoint: the “territorial” dimension itself of power relations is mostly considered only with reference to the history of the formation of the so-called “territorial States”, which appear in Europe starting from the 15th century, as if before that historical age the “territorial” events and all the connected systematic transformations of various “regions” of the natural environment did not have any influence on the structure of political institutions.

It is necessary, therefore, to insist in pointing out the importance of such a vision in the area of the research perspectives peculiar to “eco-history”.

To that end, it is urgent to indicate two problem areas that I consider of primary importance: the first concerns the progressive construction of ever more extensive “techno-systems” on the territory; the second concerns the conflict between the geographic situation of environmental landscapes and the abstract geometry of the relations between different territorial States.

- 16. The growth in the extension of “techno-systems”. Definition of “techno-system” and its importance in the progressive replacement of “nature” with “techno-structure” through the creation of “territorial areas” that are non-self-sufficient, but dependent on the political system supporting their functioning. “Imperialistic” aspects of such “territorial” structures.**

About the problem of the progressive creation by man of “techno-systems” implying an ever more intensive “territorialization” of the natural environment, there is to stress here the fact of the growth in extension of ever wider “techno-systemic” contexts.

A “techno-system” is defined by the installation on the “territory” of different technical devices, functional to the pursuing of various economic ends through the practice of various activities.

A “techno-system” is mainly based on a strategic connection of different technical devices aimed at the use and transport of material resources and various forms of energy for the purpose of their usage in a productive work; and on a logistic structuring of the territory not only for purposes of work sharing and the distribution of products, but also for the purpose of providing services to the “centers” of domination of the relations of community life over the territory.

A “techno-system” is of a composite nature, because different are the natural features peculiar to the different technical devices (roads, bridges, market structures, towns, water channels, furnaces, electric lines, communication and data processing networks, etc.) which are contextualized into a “system” in the territory.

The productive efficiency of a “technosystem” depends on the composition of the efficiencies of the individual devices (mechanical, thermal, electrical, etc.: each of them gives a differential efficiency) with functional connections, with different constraints of dependence from structures of strategic domination (in a broad sense) of the territory.

A “techno-system” implies the most intensive “artificialization” of the natural environment (through various forms of “de-naturalization”: among which those of modifying some “landscapes” by blocking the growth of some of its factors; or also those of putting in place an extreme exploitation of resources up to their extinction; or those of replacing some environmental factors with others, transforming eco-systemic balances, sometimes, albeit rarely, with an increase of bio-diversity but, much more frequently, with a sharp decrease of the same; and so on).

That “artificialization” causes, more or less directly, more or less in the short or long term, serious crises in the self-reproduction of environmental equilibriums (also due to the fact that “artificialization” does not care to give back to “nature” the resources it takes away and, in addition, it tends to dump in it the wastes, not further recyclable, of its production and consumption processes).

The process, in any case, tends to create a separation among “territorial” areas characterized by different functionalizations to different exploitations of resources of the natural environment.

Each area tends to a mono-culture that determines its functional dependency on the political and territorial system it is comprised in.

In other words, the “techno-systemic” expansion tends to create non-self-sufficient “territorial” areas, directly dependent on the political system that comprehensively supports the same “techno-system”.

Such an “artificialization” process finds one of its most paradigmatic expressions in the “imperialistic” economic ideas (be they functional to systems of capitalistic undertaking of productive and commercial initiatives, or dependent on totalitarian planning systems of production and trading), based on the idea of “nature” as a resource to make a “capital” from, without taking into account its finiteness, and considering it, as already said above, an “externality” to be exploited until its ultimate extinction.

“Artificialization” tends, instead, to base itself on a capacity of technological development that is arbitrarily presumed limitless in its ability to overcome any “natural” limit to growth.

The realization of “techno-systems” tends thus to build an ever more artificial world, aimed to further free itself from natural conditions of sustenance and functionality, with an inclination to an integral replacement of “nature” with a “techno-structure”.

This is the most fundamental environmental transformation that man is going to carry through in the world: and it is one of the crucial problems of the power struggles that are looming over the territory.

17. Politics and the control of “techno-systems”. Variety of cultures in the realization of different “techno-systems”: a differential feature in the evolution of the human species.

Politics then, whatever its origin, cannot but tend to take possession, in an exclusive form, of the control of the processes establishing the “techno-systems”, because they are the main feature of the establishment of man's dominance over “nature” with the aim to exploit its energy and material resources; and also because they are the most significant expression of his dominance over the “territory” and of its political implications.

So happened in fact in history: power relations, above all in the stage of the institutional establishment of state-like structures on the territory, have always been based on the strategic control of the creation of “techno-systems” of various kinds (from those mainly based on equipments connected to “ruralization” processes, to those based on the transformation of hydro-geological features, to those based on a systematic articulation of “territorial” structures for transport and communication, etc.).

The creation of “techno-systems” varies from a territory to another, with regard to both its extension and the intensity of the integration of the system's technical equipments.

Many are also the “eco-historical” outcomes that may originate from the impact of a “techno-system's” progressive creation on the environmental niche in which it is realized: in some cases the outcome may destroy some or even all the qualities and the resources of the environment, as available in one of its evolutionary stages; in other cases, the outcome may be innovative in the direction of a betterment of the qualities and resources of that environment, or even of its positive transformation (as one case among many, we can mention the transformation, between the 19th and the 20th centuries, of California from a mostly desert area to an area of great vegetation blossoming, as it has admirably been reconstructed by Donald Worster in his book *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West* in 1985⁴⁶).

Many are the environmental cultures that are variously applied in the realization of “techno-systems” in different environmental areas, in different historical ages: in that regard, there is to note that often the ideal paradigms of different environmental cultures coexist and confront each other, sometimes even in a sharply conflictual manner, within the same commitment to realize the “techno-system” (this is the case, for example, of the confrontation between a “pastoral” ideal and an “industrial” ideal in many cases of transformations of previously “ruralized” areas into “industrialized” areas).

The capacity of different human groups to realize, in different environmental places, different “techno-systems” is one of the crucial features differentiating the human species from other animal species.

I am convinced that the “techno-systemic” development of survival practices constitutes one of the main distinctive factors of the “cultural” evolution of the human species: there is to note, in this regard, within the capacity of different human groups to adapt to different environmental “niches”, the emergence of different varieties of “techno-systems” as one of the differing cultural traits of the human species compared to other animal species which, although capable of developing some peculiar “cultures”, do not show significant

⁴⁶ Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1985.

varieties of “cultural” development, and even less show features of “cultural” evolution from a “techno-systemic” viewpoint.

The “eco-historical” approach allows us, among other things, to reconstruct the factual events of such “techno-systemic” realizations, highlighting the crucial role of man's interaction with different environmental places through many unforeseeable and creative swerves of technological ingenuity that cannot be reduced to a strategy uniquely dependent on the cognitive capabilities of individual human groups, because those capabilities too shall be ascribed to an evolutionary outcome of the interaction of different human groups with different “places” in “nature”.

Environmental factors, in fact, constitute an unavoidable aspect in perfecting different “inventions” of man's exo-somatic evolution, in his adaptation to many “environmental regions”: this process, in the most recent times of “human” history, anyway in a time interval of an almost imperceptible amount in “nature's” evolutionary times, has taken on a significant, quite predominant role in man's biological evolution, because exo-somatic variations are much more significant than the endo-somatic ones.

In this framework there is to appreciate in all its importance the evolutionary outcome of a differential specificity of human culture in regard to that of other animals, precisely centered on the fact of his realization of differential “techno-systems”, a fact which makes all the difference⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ *The role of techno-systems in passing down cultural heritage and its connection with the system of parental assistance in the evolution of the human species.* It is important to stress here, although briefly, that “cultural” evolution centered on the structuring of “techno-systems” in the “territory” is able to reach remarkable results in heritage, which are handed down from one generation to the other, thus allowing to attain continuity in the generational transmission of “culture”, which, in turn, is the root of the stabilization of the selective acquisition of reproductive advantages in those communities that more than others succeed in being the protagonists of cultural heritages. From this viewpoint, the perpetuation of some cultural behaviors can be considered as a process of crucial importance for the emergence of new paths of human evolution. So, a cultural behavior (that, as it is worth repeating in order to avoid gross mistakes of Lamarckian inspiration, still present, alas, in some authors, in the interpretation of some evolutionary adaptations of some species with regard to some environments, with absurd, fanciful pretenses to see realized “the creation of an endo-somatic organ” through the practice of a behavior, as happens for example in Guido Montani, *Ecologia e federalismo. La politica, la natura e il futuro della specie umana*, Ventotene, Istituto di Studi Federalisti “Altiero Spinelli”, 2004, p. 29) does not produce any direct endo-somatic influence) gets stabilized in a significant measure within some community groups settled in some environmental places, and finds a way to be translated, deposited, conserved and handed down in a cultural heritage that takes a structural role in the evolutionary process. It seems important to me, in this regard, to observe that the “techno-systemic” structure allows to predispose the “local situation”, where a human group is settled, to make it so that the group can perform an educational activity from one generation to the other through prolonged periods of parental assistance, enriched by many “exo-somatic” instruments that multiply the variety of educational heritages that can be handed down from one generation to the other, also through the habit to particular “lifestyles” supported by the “techno-

18. Difference between the geographical features and borders of “natural landscapes” and the geometries of power relations on the territory.

Of great importance in the evolutionary development centered on differential “techno-systems” set up in different environmental places is the impact of different political control-strategies of the “techno-systemic” evolution in certain “territorial” areas.

Leaving aside, anyway, the inter-relations of various types that intervene between political factors and cultural factors, I want to highlight here in all its relevance the following fact of a crucial importance: given that the realization of a “techno-system” in a certain “territorial” area also depends on the power relations that are stably established in that area and engage in mobilizing every effort of one or more community groups aiming to progressively realize a “techno-system” in that area, the modifications of the “techno-systemic” structure of a “territorial” area with regard to other areas mainly depend on the political and institutional structure that is being established in that “territorial” area.

In other words: the “techno-systemic” expansion of man's cultural evolution on the face of planet Earth does not take place for a spontaneous expansion and intensification on the territory, considered in a kind of abstract and uniform availability of the same, but with very remarkable differences between territorial areas, depending on different establishments on the territory of different power institutions (in particular in state-like forms).

The geometry of power relations has nothing to do with the geometry of the “eco-systemic” formations: geo-politics is articulated in areas whose configuration is quite different from that of geo-ecology.

systemic” structure. I also note that inside a “techno-system” a crucial role is played by the preparation of techno-instrumental apparatuses able to record, shelve, conserve and transmit the technological information, also through procedures of adequate schooling. A “techno-system” that is unable to activate a technostructure adequate to its own maintenance, conservation and informative and educational transmission, cannot meet the indispensable requirement of its unceasing self-reproduction and renovation. On the eco-centric approach and an ecological federal perspective see also Guido Montani, *The Ecocentric Approach to Sustainable Development. Ecology, Economics and Politics*, in “The Federalist”, Year XLIX, Number 1, 2007, pp. 25-60, http://www.thefederalist.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=484&lang=en&Itemid=; <http://www.thefederalist.eu/files/PDF/EN/2000/2007-1-EN.pdf>; Id., *Europe, Federalism and Ecology*, in David Grace, Guido Montani, John Pinder, *Climate Change and Federalism*, Ventotene, The Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies, 2008, pp. 21-37, http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/gmontani/5%20camb%20climat%20interno%20ing.pdf.

The intervention for the realization of “techno-systems” sharpens the contrast between the geographic structures and borders of natural “landscapes” and the abstract geometries of power relations on the “territory”.

The tendency of the “techno-systemic” culture to expand with no limits on the “territory” (which is at the root of the globalization processes) is getting intertwined with the expansive tendency of domination relations by the different power institutions present on the “territory”.

This translates into historical and territorial choices that favor some areas instead of others, also with regard to the intensive realization of “techno-systems”.

In this way, the “techno-systemic” culture finds itself in tension between the two following, different alternatives: on the one hand, its territorial expansion beyond the territorial constraints and boundaries peculiar to power institutions, and, on the other, the differential intensification of “techno-systemic” structures in some areas having a hierarchical priority-role compared to others, as required by different balances of power.

The fact is that, with the realization of “techno-systems”, the contrast between the geographic features of the environmental landscapes and the geographic features of the relations among States becomes sharper.

Such a contrast has been addressed in various ways by politics, giving origin to different institutions, among which there is to briefly mention that of the “Empire”, that of the “national

State”, and that of a “federal State” (with unavoidable implications from its eventual expansion).

19. The “imperial” strategy in the control of the extension of “techno-systems” in different “environmental regions”. Growth and collapse of the “empire”.

With regard to the problems treated here, the “Empire” stands out as the power institution that progressively tends to extend its “territorial” domination, which may proceed in parallel with the extension of a “techno-system” (whose realization, most of the times,

constitutes one of the fundamental reasons for articulating an economic support to the “imperial” power).

Some historiographic works, which can be included, for some aspects, in the perspective of “eco-history” (“environmental history”), have recalled with particular evidence some aspects of the “Empire”, whereby the colonial expansion aims to acquire “environmental regions”, material resources, energy resources, human resources (these are the peculiar traits of the so-called “imperialism”).

This is no doubt one of the most significant aspects of the development of the “empire”, whose different evolutionary stages have to be brought back to different social and production structures (as, for example, the tight connection existing in the 19th and 20th centuries between some forms of industrial capitalism and some forms of “imperialism”).

However, there is to stress here another peculiar aspect of the “imperial” political structure in its relations with the natural environment: it is the “empire's” tendency to try to articulate, in the context of a “territorial” distribution strategically controlled by the “center”, the composition of different “environmental regions” with “techno-systemic” exploitation ties allowing, among other things, an autonomous self-reproduction of each “environmental region”, so that it can be capable of vital resistance against eventual aggressors, although situated at the “periphery of the empire”.

The fact is to be pointed out, in this regard, that some territorial structures become a priority for the construction of an “imperial” “techno-system”: among these, are a priority the urban structures (mainly the cities that become the site of the most hierarchically important power centers) and road structures (great communication roads, harbor equipments and coastal defensive works protecting sailing routes).

In that case, a “techno-system” shows “territorial” structures having an intrinsic political function as strategic control points of all the activities of environmental exploitation activated in the “empire”, with different features in different “regions”.

The political reasons functional to the “imperial” structure make it so that the power's “territorial” techno-structures (as well as the bureaucratic and administrative ones) tend to prevail over the purely techno-productive reasons.

Some significant forms of hierarchization of the “territory”, of centralization of services, of privileged polarization of the consumption destinations and so on, drive the “empire”, the more its “territorial” expansion is increased, to augment its verticalization with such a disproportionate gigantism as to produce an implosive collapse of the “imperial” power on itself.

The “imperial” structures of various forms and sizes that have been realized in history allow us to highlight, from their birth to their extinction, both the relevance of the political competition between States for the dominance and exploitation of the “territory” (with strategic plans to acquire an ever larger “territory” in an “imperial” perspective), and the emergence of the need to strategically control the inter-relations between different “environmental regions”, integrated in the same political institution, through specific “territorial” structures; and the inevitable non-convenience of State-like structures unable to create autonomous government-bodies realizing with a better efficiency the integration and self-reproduction of the “environmental regions” comprised in the “empire's” political system.

We cannot omit to mention that in history there have been several forms of “empire”, each of them centered on different strategies for the exploitation of the mineral and energy resources of different “environmental regions”, reduced more or less to a regime of “colonies”.

Various forms of “imperialism” have been put in place inside “territorial” limits corresponding to the boundaries of different “empires”, but with a prevailing tendency each time to surpass those boundaries and expand “beyond them” the “imperial” political structure that was supporting itself through such an “imperialist” practice.

The development lines of such an expansion over the “territory” vary according to different “environmental choices” (mostly driven by the localization of the natural resources they intended to exploit, as well as by the easiest and safest communication and transportation

roads) and according to the different situations of internal balances between the different “environmental regions” composing the “empire”, with a further significant dependence on the leaning of the social blocks of the classes having in their hands the domination over the exploitation processes of environmental resources.

In any case, the “Empire” meets specific limits to its development both in extension and in the intensification of the “environmental regions” firstly because, as mentioned above, beyond a given dimensional scale the internal structure of verticalization and centralization of the “empire's” control powers produces its own collapse under the weight itself of that structure; secondly because the exploitation strategies of the “environmental regions” is made functional not so much to a richer and prosperous reproduction of the same, but to the centralized accumulation of consumption goods, even though this is done at the cost of a progressive impoverishment of those “environmental regions”.

These are the deep “eco-historical” roots of the crisis of the “imperial” systems.

20. The strategic alternative of the “small State”. Europe in the Middle Ages and its “regional” structure.

In the face of many and recurring historical inclinations to institute “imperial” systems to dominate the “techno-systemic” exploitation of “environmental regions” integrated in a single “territory”, and in opposition to those, one can also find in history radically different positions regarding man's integration process with different “environmental regions”: like those suggesting the creation of “small States” (in the precise meaning historiographically defined by Werner Kaegi⁴⁸), basing themselves on a self-government of a “regional” scale and exercising a strategic control of a community's settlement in a “landscape” in which they find a “niche” for themselves characterized by an “environmental challenge”, interpreted by that community according to an “environmental choice” of their own.

⁴⁸ Werner Kaegi, *Der Kleinstaat im europäischen Denken* [1938], in Id., *Historische Meditationen*, vol. I, Zürich, Fretz & Wasmuth, 1942, pp. 249-314; Id., *Über den Kleinstaat in der älteren Geschichte Europas*, in Id., *Historische Meditationen*, Vol. II, Zürich, Fretz & Wasmuth, 1946, pp. 43-80.

This is the “eco-historical” process that found for a long time its expression in European history, mostly in the Medieval age and until the beginning of the “modern” age, in the formation of European “regions” based on different geo-political situations of institutions run by citizens and nobles, more or less coinciding with large configurations of distinct landscapes.

As Eric Jones attentively observed, Europe was showing a happy abundance of differential developments, depending on the variety of natural resources present in various “regions” (characterized, among other things, by their own peculiar climate)⁴⁹: such an opportunity found a fortunate expression in Europe's very diversified configuration of “regions”, with many inter-connections between different “civilization centers” endowed with different political and State-like institutions.

This is, in my opinion, the historical age when we can recognize, from an “eco-historical” viewpoint, the “Europe of the regions” configuration.

21. The “territorial States” system in Europe in the modern age. Their transformation in “national States” between the 18th and the 19th centuries. The “imperialism” of the “national States”.

Unfortunately, such a “multi-regional” configuration in Europe could not continue into the modern age, because it was overwhelmed in many ways by the inclination of some “territorial States” towards an expansion intensively promoted by some monarchic and absolutist power-establishments, strongly engaged in an intensive realization of “techno-systems”.

Those States did not turn into “imperial” structures only because they found themselves involved, from many sides of Europe and on many fronts, in a competition whos

⁴⁹ Eric L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981 (Italian edition: *Il miracolo europeo. Ambiente, economia e geopolitica nella storia europea e asiatica*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984).

e moments of emulative rivalry were reaching every now and then a stability in “balanced” configurations, soon subject to new unbalances due to temporary assertions of “hegemony” by one of the competing “national States”.

For many reasons, both of competitive confrontation between States, tending to build up at their dividing “frontiers” opposed fronts of subjects of the different power-centers, considering themselves as “strangers” one to the other; and of a competitive confrontation of “techno-systems”, which, in their intensification process, were showing more and more the necessity to involve a “productive people” without exacerbating the latent class-conflicts; the monarchic and absolutist States began structuring themselves, starting from the end of the 18th century, in “national States” characterized by the forcible formation of a “political race”, the “nation”, defined by the belonging of a population, albeit composed of many ethnic and cultural entities, in an exclusive allegiance to a State structure legally ruling within a territory, in opposition to any other State structure “external” to it.

For its very constitutive reasons, the “national” State has been increasing the intensification of the “techno-system”, stressing the segregation and hierarchization of the different “territorial” areas inside the “techno-system” itself, and tightening the network of its functional connections and sustenance inter-dependences by activating “national” markets, “national” currencies, “national” permanent armies (concrete manifestations of the so-called “national sovereignty”).

The “national State” shows to be, with regard to its interaction with the natural environment, a strongly centralized and hierarchicized “territorial structure”, with rigid frontiers and social structural blocks protecting an intensive “techno-system”, whose artificialization is taken to the extreme, thus reducing to the minimum any relativization of itself to its “environmental regions”.

The geometry of geo-political configurations of the “national States” in Europe is the most distant thing one can imagine from the geometry of the configuration of landscapes peculiar to the “Europe of the regions”.

The “national States” too have made themselves the protagonists in various forms of several and antagonistic “imperialisms” in extra-European areas, stressing their “colonialist” aspects much more than what was normally happening in “imperial” structures.

That “imperialistic” development of “nationalism” (i.e. of the peculiar and inevitable *raison d'état* of the “national State”) was one of the roots of the World Wars, which repeatedly brought Europe, in the 20th century, into a destructive abyss of unknown dimensions till that time

22. Post-1945 Europe in the 20th century: missed foundation of “federal” structures and missed consciousness of the destruction of “environmental regions”.

Since the new awareness arose of those destructive results and since the definitive loss of the “imperial” hegemony exercised by Europe over the rest of the world, the political perspective started to grow in the society, albeit with alternating fortune, of a Europe to be re-founded overcoming the system of conflicting national sovereignties.

Unfortunately, the political and institutional accomplishments that were born from that awareness and that realized some systemic techno-structures positioned in a “territorial” context of “continental” scale common to many “national States” (mainly the so-called “common market”, from which will progressively take origin, between the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the “single currency”), translated themselves in an injection of vital lymph that, finding no outcome in a new political institution of European dimensions (as a “federal” State could have been), ended up favoring the re-birth of the national States, with their pretenses of absolute sovereignty in the management of politics (even if their exclusive competences were reduced by the very existence of a common market and, later, of a common currency; and even if in their relations with the “rest of the world” the “national States” were by now “out of scale”, to such a degree as to be fully subordinate to the hegemony of powers like the USA and the USSR).

One of the destructive aspects that could not come to evidence in those events and that, therefore, eluded Europe's new awareness, was the one regarding the progressive structural modifications to Europe's "environmental regions" caused by the more intense competition between "techno-systems" answering to "national States".

Europe has thus progressively lost consciousness of its deepest "eco-historical" structure.

The "nationalist" perspective has prevented people from becoming aware of one of the most serious reasons of the ruin of "regional" natural environments in Europe (so much so that even some attempts at an "environmental history" of Europe, as already recalled above, completely neglected to recognize the "regional" plurality of Europe's eco-systemic landscapes and pictured an utterly abstract European environment, lacking any precise "local" description from a "regional" viewpoint and articulated in generic categorizations of functions peculiar to some environmental factors, one isolated from the other: climatic situation, hydrological situation, faunal situation, etc.).

23. Strategic flaws in the current political culture of the "ecologist" movements. Missed criticism of the "national State".

In this regard, it becomes apparent the serious flaw of the ecological policy as presently interpreted by both the political classes exercising government powers and the opposition movements, sometimes characterized by an extreme, as well as wishful, radicalism: a flaw consisting in considering the natural environment as a kind of "externality" with no influence on power structures, that can be made the object of political intervention whatever the power structures that are concretely operating on the territory.

The ecological culture, on its part, has mostly considered the political structures as a configuration dependent on the history of government balances, exclusively based on the history of the variable mixing of human groups; thus, without any appreciation of the role of

the power struggles for dominating and exploiting the natural environment as the basic factor for the rooting of power institutions on the “territory”.

In other words, while politicians tend to consider the environment as an “externality”, the ecologists tend to consider as an “externality” the political structures.

The history of politics is thus eradicated from “eco-history”: people are fooling themselves into counting on man only and on his capacity to address political decisions to anything and, therefore, among those, also to the object that politicians define “environmental policy”.

So, we can witness, on the one hand, the missed awareness of how much the progressive environmental ruin is undermining not only “life quality”, but also the capacity of the “national States” to survive; and, on the other, we witness the missed awareness of how the configurations of political and institutional structures influence the strategic possibility to aim (but not indefinitely) to possible solutions of the environmental crises.

We thus observe the sad fact that no “ecologist” movement has ever charged the structure itself of the “national State” with being one of the crucial factors of the environmental crisis; they have mostly resolved to call for an alternative in the environmental policy, always conceived of in terms of a governing element of the “national State”.

“National States”, in this perspective, are considered as eternal entities, unmodifiable, and such to be in a position to survive any environmental crisis (as if it were an event “external” to the “national State”).

They completely renounce a conception of ecology centered on the existence of “eco-systemic landscapes” having a “regional” dimension.

They also completely renounce the ensuing strategic choice of a political and institutional structure able to have its own articulated environmental policies, and with a new rooting of the State structures in “environmental regions” capable of self-reproduction.

In other words: they completely miss the only political perspective that is strategically sound for an environmental protection that takes into account, from an “eco-historical”

viewpoint, the non-renounceable and fundamental existence of “environmental regions”, that is, the perspective of “federalism”.

24. The “federalist” alternative and its adequacy to a strategy of ecological policy rooted in different “environmental regions”, solidarily connected in common institutions with a “global” impact.

The reasons for which the “federalist” structure of the State is the only one adequate for a policy of integral environmental protection are many.

Firstly, “federalism” presents, as a tendency, the same requisite as the “empire”, i.e. the possibility to expand in its political perspectives to ever wider territories.

But, differently from “imperial” institutions, “federalism” is not subject to the risk of internal collapse for an excess of centralization and verticalization of its political and territorial structures, because it gets articulated through the involvement of member States that are recognized as sovereign within their “regional” territorial contexts, and are endowed with a full self-government sovereignty for some competences, among which there should also be included that of a responsible management of the natural environment, with the aim of an integral protection of its self-reproduction.

On the other hand, the “federal” state, even if flexibly articulated in a plurality of member States, would maintain in the federal government, by awarding to it an independent sovereignty in some competences, the responsibility to determine the common strategic lines of environmental protection.

In this way, the “federal” State could allow to put in place, on the one hand, a system of States with “local” self-government, adjustable to the differential protection needs of the “environmental regions”; and on the other, it could allow to put in place a “federal” government able to take upon itself the responsibility of the political management of the “global” aspects of the protection of eco-systems, that brings together the various “landscapes” into a “global landscape”.

The “federal” structure is the only one capable of proceeding with a “double step”, i.e. with both a “local” viewpoint and a “global” viewpoint in ever wider world areas.

25. Federalism and pacification: reduction of “growth” competitions between rival “territories” and the perspective of pacification with “nature”.

Secondly, the “federalist” perspective in its progressive accomplishment implies the pacification of ever wider territorial contexts within the “federal” State.

This pacification would imply the progressive elimination of conflicts between States, by progressively eliminating the competition between intensively hierarchized, centralized and verticalized “techno-systems.

This would allow for the adoption, within the “federal” State, of a political strategy not any more of competitive “growth” between States in the “federated” territory, but of development of their “life quality”, adequately answering to the self-reproduction needs of the different “environmental regions”.

Political pacification inside the “federal” State would allow, then, for a pacification in the competition between territories and, therefore, a “pacification with nature”, in the respect of its “regional” varieties.

This is one of the most meaningful aspects of the tight connection that I believe must be stressed between the definition of a political strategy that is really committed to achieve concrete results in environmental care and protection, and the choice of “federalism” as the only political and institutional structure adequate to that goal.

26. What to do in Europe for an “ecological” policy from a “federalist” viewpoint. Inadequacy of the perspectives of ecological policy of the Community institutions centered on techno-systems competing for the increase of “growth”. Present stagnation of the constitutional development of the Union.

In reflecting, in the light of the “eco-historical” approach, over the possibility to put in place today a progressive action in the struggle for overturning the present prevailing practices of environmental exploitation, aiming at pursuing an economic growth with no limits, and for launching, instead, a strategy of economic development where the care for the integrity of the natural environment be recognized as a non-renounceable priority, there is to explore the actual possibilities that, in the course of the present evolution of the relations between States in Europe, a process could emerge of progressive “federalization”.

It seems, at first sight, that the situation of the political Community institutions in Europe can be taken as the basis for that action.

However, that first impression is, in my opinion, deceptive and misleading in many aspects, for the reasons that I believe can be briefly summed up here.

First of all, it necessary to observe that the present political Community institutions have realized some “institutional” techno-structures (mainly the common market, backed by some significant control-related norms, and the common currency, lacking some significant characteristics peculiar to monetary sovereignty) which constitute no doubt the necessary premises for unifying some modalities of economic development in Western Europe; but we cannot omit to further observe that they are hinging on the intensive integration of a “techno-system” of European dimension that arises from the unification of national “techno-systems”, all of them engaged in a tight competition of one against the other towards the achievement of “growth” levels that in any case will bring about ever more critical practices of environmental exploitation.

This inevitably implies to continue at the European level a policy of forcible artificialization of the “national territories”, with no perspective to ever adopt new political strategies of environmental care and protection.

That aspect shows by itself how any pretense of continuity between national “techno-systems” and “European techno-system” is unsustainable, if we want to launch a strategic action of ecological policy.

On the other hand, the political development of the present Community institutions has entered a stagnation period in which the “constituent” process carried out for many years is unable to find further political outcomes, because now are coming at stake in the unification process prerogatives of “national sovereignty” that no “national State” is willing to renounce.

In other words, the conflict has recently gained strength and becomes more serious between the “federalist” perspective of the European Community and the national States.

Every political movement willing to engage in a strategic action for environmental protection in Europe must take note and acknowledge that, in the first place and in principle, the framework where the struggle must be carried out is the European one, on the plane of a “federalist” perspective; while, secondly and in practice, the future of a “federalist” perspective is to be entrusted to the initiatives of political protagonists different from the “national States”, because they are wrapped in a *raison d'état* that does not allow them to renounce sovereignty, which is fundamental for taking the constitutional step of the foundation of the “federal State”.

27. The alternative of a “regionalist federalism” in the perspective of the “Europe of the regions”.

In this regard, some strategic and political indications emerge which, in my opinion, are worth being put on the table, with a view to comparing projects in the light of the considerations presented so far.

It seems reasonable to me to take note that a process is underway in many parts of Europe, within the individual “national States”, of “rediscovering federalism” while considering the breakup of the existing national States.

A perspective is surfacing to claim self-government on a “regional” scale, which can be remarkable for the “rediscovery” of experiences of environmental care and protection in individual “environmental regions” (taken, in addition, as the natural root-values of one's own “communitarian identity”) completely independent of “national” strategies.

This perspective does not have, so far at least, a federalizing strategy, no longer disruptive but aggregative at the European level.

One of the potentialities that I believe can be seen at play in the current historical situation in Europe is the emergence of the awareness that the hoped-for “regional self-government” cannot materialize unless the “national States” are forced to additional renounces of their sovereignty.

This implies a coincidence between the political interest to ask for “regional self-government” and the political interest to aggregate “regions”, in a common claim at the European level to form a federal State, endowed with sovereignties to be taken away from the “national States”, like some competences of a “global” interest; that would bring about, in place of the “national States”, many “regional States” members of a “federal State” of Europe, with some “local” competences awarded to them.

It is perfectly reasonable, in my opinion, to believe that, as far as power interests are considered, there may be fairly large camps in favor of the “federal State”, including also all the political interests of those who intend to keep the powers acquired in the political Community institutions (in fact, a kind of *raison d'état* of the Community institutions at the European level has been taking shape).

Among the social forces that could be strategically mobilized in support of such a movement, one could consider those labor forces that find themselves ever more pushed into a “global” unification of the productive and commercial “techno-system” at the European

level, without an adequate social protection at that level (due precisely to the fact that there is no government at the “federal” level).

Should the “trade unions” giving a strategic protection to workers become aware of the need of a European strategy for both the social protection of workers and the launching of an economic and social policy capable of overturning the current trends to “growth”, and should they adopt instead a new perspective focusing on “lifestyles” (eschewing the usual tactics of a “corporative” defense of jobs and incentives to growth, at any environmental cost), then one could expect that they will side with a “federalist” struggle, choosing as the path getting more easily to the goal that of the “Europe of the regions” (for it is quite difficult that, at the level of an agreement among national States, there is the possibility to find an agreement between trade unions too, as they are engaged in defending corporative conflictual reasons in the competition between different commitments to “national growth” regarding the productive and commercial processes).

In conclusion, it may be observed that, if the ecological culture will include politics too inside its horizon (by considering it no longer an “externality”, first of all with regard to establish new structural interconnections between State institutions and the transformation practices of the natural environment), and if it acknowledges that for protecting the different “landscapes” of the natural environment “federal” policies are required, then the ecologist movements in Europe shall urgently launch a political action aimed at starting a constituent struggle for the “federal State” of the “Europe of the regions”, that shall adopt as a primary value in its constitutional foundations the care and protection of the integrity of the natural environment and of its reproduction, taking full responsibility for the destiny of future generations.

28. From “federalism” in Europe to a “federalist” strategy of ecological policy towards the “rest of the world” (transforming the UN in a “federal” sense with regard to a world governance of ecological policy).

If we open up our vision from Europe to the “rest of the world”, we have to contemplate, for an adequate strategy of ecological policy in that perspective, a reform in a “federal” sense of the international relations between the great State-formations of continental reach that seem to be the protagonists of the planet Earth's future destiny (the USA, Western Europe, Russia, China, India, Japan, etc.).

One of the concrete perspectives for action in that direction can be that of a radical transformation of the UN into a “federal” system, which could have the support of the smaller States interested in an eventual cohesion among them in order to impose, through the UN, more meaningful constraints for the protection of the ecological reasons of different “environmental regions”.

In that regard, the reasons for a worrying skeptical attitude towards such an action are many, given the prevailing *raisons d'état* tending to exacerbate the competitive confrontation among States.

However, the ever more tragic emergence of some environmental questions may let us foresee, albeit with all the “pessimism of reason”, the rise of crucial crises (concerning not only a reasonable distribution of energy resources, but also the care and protection of natural resources like water and an efficient handling of demographic-growth control, and so on) which could lead to such “global” strategic agreements as entrusting the UN with the role of “federal” government responsible for the managing of ecological policies.

Perhaps the emergence of environmental crises will be a key factor towards the “world federation”, with a bigger impact than the fear of war crises, dependent on the difficult balance of the strategic and military apparatuses that are burdening the world today with a waste of resources that cannot but appear absurd and also delinquent (more precisely, it is a

crime against humanity), in particular if one calculates how useful those resources could be in realizing works of ecological restoration in many “eco-landscapes” in the world.

Anyway, whatever the supposed scenario of the future developments of international political relations, the “federalist” perspective is the only one whose proposal contains a coherent plan of a strategic action of ecological policy, starting with “federalist” initiatives in Europe and extending itself to “federalist” initiatives for the “rest of the world”.

29. From technological research an essential help for restructuring “civilization” from an ecological viewpoint.

Whatever the outcome of the political struggles for establishing institutions capable of realizing efficient policies of ecological care and protection, we must recall and stress the fact that no restructuring process of the present modes of production and consumption from an ecological viewpoint can be undertaken without the use of progressively perfected techniques, adequate to a “global” restructuring according to ecological criteria of the numerous “techno-systems” that constitute at present the main support of the political and social structures.

In other words: only with adequate technological instruments will we be in a position to answer to the problems of the increasing ecological crises.

In this regard, the ecological culture must profoundly renew itself, abandoning any chimerical sermon about a return to nature left to itself, with no human intervention: it is necessary, instead, to work out an ecological policy centered on mindful environmental practices, managed by man with a wary ability to adjust different “techno-systemic” strategies to different “environmental regions”.

Only a competent technological culture can support an efficient strategy of ecological policy (from this point of view, some prejudiced resistances and oppositions to new technological products, as those regarding the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are to be considered nothing but the result of a superstitious and culpable ignorance, and of fanatic obtuseness).

There is to observe, in addition, that among the technical and scientific advancements of which the need is urgently felt with a view to orientate an efficient action of ecological policy, the renewal of the economic science can be listed as a priority, namely a reconsideration of the paradigm of “growth” leading to the abandonment of the same and to the adoption of other strategic models carefully hinged on the awareness of the limited nature of the planet Earth's material and energy resources (paying attention to work out “techno-systems” aiming to avoid the accumulation of “energy revenues”, which produce very serious and dangerous effects on production, and a decay of “life quality”).

30. A “new Machiavelli”: a re-foundation of the State and of the international order centered on a “federalist” institutional structure able to act in a “double step” fashion, both at the “global” level and the “local” level, in the governance of ecological policy.

A reconsideration of the “techno-systemic” apparatuses and the social-economic models, to be accomplished with a view to the society of the future, has to pass anyway through a mindful political rethinking about the re-foundation of the political State-order, aimed at answering the crucial political problem of our time, i.e. the solution of the problems connected to the more and more serious crisis of the natural environment.

There is indeed a need for a “new Machiavelli”, meaning a new conception of the State and the relations between States that is capable of coping with the fundamental problem of actuating a new “bio-politics”; with the awareness that, whereas in Machiavelli's times the foundation of a new political science was hinging on the ability to understand the crucial role of the “territory” and of “war” in the State-related structuring of power relations, in our time the foundation of a new political science passes through the ability to conceive a program on how to re-found the States' political order in a “federalist” framework in order to restructure from an “ecological” perspective the forms of social life in the respect of the self-reproduction of the “environmental regions”.

In more concrete words: the “new Machiavelli” shall make the world better aware that the new “political realism” passes through the essential understanding of how an appropriate protection of the environmental factors is indeed a constitutive element of the existence itself of the States, become functional to the survival of civil life.

No ecological policy can be reasonably entrusted to the existing States and the current international political order: this is the chief error of today's “ecologist” movements.

Who wants to be a militant in the political struggle aiming at pursuing efficiency in ecological policies, must become a militant of a “federalist” struggle aimed on the one hand to re-institute “regional States” coinciding with “environmental regions”, and, on the other, to tie together, in a “federalist” fashion, those “local” States into institutions that have the competence of managing the ecological matters that can only be dealt with at the “global” level.

The “federalist” perspective is the only one that can operate in a “double step” fashion in that twofold arrangement of strategic levels.

A so-conceived strategy of “federalist” action can only be foreseen, in succession, just after the immediate goal, already for “tomorrow morning”, of a “Europe of the regions”.



CENTRO STUDI SUL FEDERALISMO

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AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO HISTORY: THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE

Robert Delort

The history of the west concerns a group of peoples, belonging to the same culture, who spread throughout Europe. Among these, a certain number of descendants more recently established themselves in America, Oceania and in Russian Asia.

Their civilisation was born at the end of the last ice age, i.e. between 12,000 and 15,000 years ago.

At that time, the western seaboard of Eurasia was gradually freeing itself from its gangue of ice, and consequently sea-levels rose by about 120 metres. Over the next 7 or 8 thousand years the oceanic waters began to force the creation of straits: in the north, the Baltic Sea was formed, enlarged by waters provided by the melting ice in Scandinavia; and in the south, beyond the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, the Black Sea. What we now know as the English Channel crossed the current Strait of Dover to reach the North Sea, thus creating the island that would become Great Britain. In contrast, the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, the remains of an immense inland sea, continued to drain away, while more recent human intervention has caused the level of the former to rise, while that of the latter has become dangerously low.

As rivers of awesome size evacuated the waters of the melting glaciers, they carved out deep valleys and flooded mountainsides, creating lakes which we can still admire today. Furthermore, such rivers permitted various transit routes from one sea to another.

The sources of the Saône (whose waters flow into the Mediterranean), the Seine (into the English Channel) and the Meuse (into the North Sea) are very close to each other.

The same is true of the Rhine (which flows into the North Sea), the Rhône (into the Mediterranean), the Inn (into the Black Sea) and the Ticino (into the Adriatic); and of the Volga (the Caspian Sea), the Dniepr (the Black Sea), the Don (the Azov Sea), the Western Dvina (the Baltic Sea), and the Northern Dvina (in the White Sea)

A great plain was bound from west to east by uplands and seas, from what would eventually become Brittany to the Ukraine and Russia, and to the south, a barrier was formed from the Pyrenees to the Alps and onto the Carpathian Mountains, if not as far as the Caucasian Mountains, a barrier emphasised by the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Free from the weight of its icy blanket, Scandinavia rose literally dozens of metres. Furthermore, the tectonics of the plates provoked the slow lifting of the Alpine massif, and also provoked earthquakes, tidal waves (tsunami, like that which devastated the island of Crete around 1450 B.C.) and volcanic eruptions (like in Pompei in 79 d.C.). While modifying coastlines, the said tectonics also provoked considerable flooding, such as that which occurred in the Gulf of Lion and along the Tyrrhenian coast, from Catalunya (remembering the Iberian-Roman port of Empuries) to the Camargue, to the mouth of the Rhône and onto those of the Arno and the Tevere, which became marshy and thus an ideal habitat for the mosquito, carrier of malaria.

Finally, the erosion of the Hercynian massifs and the siderolitic deposits led to the appearance of minerals, including native copper, which was accompanied by a plentiful stock of fuel provided by forests, which encouraged the extraction of metals.

This Europe, straddling the 45th parallel and as such positioned half-way between the North Pole and the Equator, obviously underwent a series of climatic modifications, more or less regular in its warming phases, but nevertheless with a number of fluctuations: between 6000 and 3000 B.C., there was a particularly favourable period, considered a post-ice age climatic optimum; between 2000 and 500 B.C. conditions remained favourable, while the

climate was cooler and more humid from 400 to 900 A.D.; a little drier and more tepid from 900 to 1200 (in other words, in comparative terms, 1 to 2°C warmer with respect to temperatures at the middle of the 20th century); while the 14th century was characterised by a radical transformation.

This trend intensified between approximately 1550 and 1850, and was followed by a moderate increase in temperature (with a slight decrease over the twenty years between 1950 and 1970) and then, in conclusion, there was a more rapid increase, above all towards the end of the 20th century (with very hot summers). A long and cold winter should however be noted for the 2005-2006 season.

Climate is regulated locally by the power of the sea, by hills and mountain ranges and, more generally, by the rotation of the earth on its own axis which, in the northern hemisphere, directs moving water eastwards as well as the winds, which as such arrive from the west, loaded with warmth and moisture gathered from the oceans. In the same way, the Gulf Stream improves temperatures in the Nordic countries. Particularly worthy of note are the Northern Atlantic variations, the rise of the warm and salty waters of the Tropics and the descent into the depths of the icy waters of Greenland. This *thermo halina* pump (or “heat and salt”) is one of the essential factors of the world’s climate, but it is constantly susceptible to slowing and acceleration.

A rise in temperatures causes the melting of the ice caps, releasing fresh, cold water across the surface of the oceans, disturbing the rise of warmer waters and causing a significant cold snap in the west where, moreover, the permafrost, also melting, releases enormous quantities of methane into the atmosphere, thus accentuating the greenhouse effect, with the consequent, disturbing results.

Living organisms are extremely sensitive to such variations. Vegetation, which the glacier had pushed southwards, finds itself trapped between the mountains and the sea and has largely disappeared. That which remained has reacquired the northern territories, but surviving species are few and Europe is now one of the regions where the number of native species is at its lowest.

Thanks to previous flooding and glacial deposits, the reoccupied soil is often fertile and supports leafy trees, whose deciduous leaves year after year thicken the humus layer while the grass, equipped with long roots, contributes to improving the extremely fertile *black soil* (*tchernoziom*).

Among the various species of native cereals, rye, wheat and oats constitutes the predominant crop. They are demanding plants, which offer only one harvest per year, and require a lot of work and continuous ploughing, unlike corn, rice and tubers such as potatoes, but which were born under distant skies.

Animals have also made their contribution to ricolonisation, from the earthworm aerating heavy soils to the rabbit, re-emerging from Spain. Farming has introduced and developed goats and sheep, thus significantly endangering young sprouts. Farming also introduced oxen, whose strength has ploughed almost the entire European territory. It also introduced pigs, great suppliers of all kinds of products. Animals, domestic or parasitic, have brought and spread certain diseases, for example, tuberculosis and cowpox from cattle, rabies from dogs, the plague from rodents, and more recently, AIDS from monkeys, and syphilis and influenza from pigs and from ducks. Such diseases then developed into pandemics: the plague, starting in 1347, influenza in 1918, known by the name of *Spanish Flu* and whose virus (H1 N1) was isolated as recently as 2005 by a group of researchers from Terrence M. Tumpey, while malaria, an endemia of epidemic proportions, devastated the humid regions where anopheles proliferates.

In this post-glacial Europe, alongside the men of Cro-Magnon, hunters and gatherers established themselves, as well as crop growers and farmers who arrived from the Middle East around 10,000 years ago. They were later joined by nomadic peoples, who had tamed the horse and who used the wheel and the cart, people who spread from the Ukraine between 4 and 5 thousand years ago.

So, are we talking about a conquest, domination or harmonious amalgamation?

Legend has it that the sweet and beautiful Europa, daughter of the King of the Phoenicians, was kidnapped by the powerful, brutal and lewd King of the Indo-Europeans, who had transformed himself into a splendid white bull especially for the occasion.

Initially raped and then consenting, Europa is said to have transmitted to her children the benefits of agriculture and livestock farming, and soon afterwards, the alphabet, while Father Zeus, as well as the horse, the wheel and soon afterwards iron, is said to have imposed on them the language of the gods, in other words, that which we still speak today.

Whatever the truth, the family founded over entire millenia evidently presents original blood group (A B O) and tissue group (H L A) distributions or even serum factors. Highly advanced studies on the Y chromosome recently confirmed (in early 2006) the strong correspondence of its distribution with linguistic relationships and geographic origin.

This family, on certain occasions, has undergone rapid demographic expansion: from 24 to 30 million people at the time of the Roman Emperors, from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius; 30 million again under Charlemagne (including Muslim Spain and the Slavic countries); perhaps 70 million before the black death of 1347; and certainly no more than that in 1492, the year of the discovery of the New World. However, at the end of the day, what is truly important is the proportion that Europe's population represented and represents with respect to world population. Towards 1750, such a figure was 19.2%, 20.5% in 1800; 24,9% in 1850 + 3% overseas, amounting to around 28% in total. In 1950 it was nearly 30% and in 2000 less than 17%. It should however be underlined that the representatives of this family, over the last two hundred years or more, has had $\frac{3}{4}$ of the world's resources at its disposal, while holding a monopoly over the sciences and the technologies that have enabled them to impose their way of life on the entire planet.

This type of technical superiority can only be acknowledged, and the same must be said for the prerogative of the peoples who speak Indo-European languages, whose mental structures really do appear to possess a link with the linguistic structures of this “inflected language which represents an intellectual means of high performance with respect to the previous agglutinant languages, thanks to the intellectual qualities it requires and, at the same time, develops”, as the great historian Pierre Levêque once stated.

These sister languages are the vehicles for ways of thinking, for attitudes towards others, towards nature and the environment, for largely similar and not necessarily positive behaviour.

The great linguist André Martinet states that “the conquest of the world by the peoples of Indo-European tongue, who were more able than others in applying their technical superiority to violence” concerns “the conquest of the American West, Northern Asia and colonial imperialism – right up until the armed divisions of the 1940s and the use of napalm in Vietnam” (!).

So, does all this point to the existence of an aggressive drive expressed through these languages among these populations nourished by the protein of their livestock and ruthless in their relentless working of grain and their brutal exploitation of nature? And perhaps all this is accompanied by a racist element? By pride in their own strength and contempt for peaceful and dominated peoples?

Lastly, there is the notion of competition, of doing better than others, and not only in battle where the strongest is the winner, but also in the poetry and rhetoric competitions held by the Greeks, appreciated at least as much as their Olympic contests or their wars. However, other considerations, less banal but equally obvious, can be made.

Only two groups of peoples have developed the science of reason and of the connection of propositions, studying language and founding logic: the Greeks, obviously, but also, in the same period (5th and 6th century B.C.), the Indians, who, with Pânini, attempted to perpetuate the sacred language of the Vedas: Sanscript.

The child of logic is mathematics, developed equally in India, Persia and in the West, following similar patterns. India gave the world 'zero', numbers, positional numeration and the decimal system. The muslim world returned to us Greek and Indo-European science through Al Khwarismi, Al Birûni, Al Kirmani, Ibn Sîna (Avicenna) and the great mathematician Umar Khayam, who wrote in the prevailing language of his time, in Arabic, while he composed his famous Rubayats in Persian.

The West, perhaps delayed by its excessively time consuming research into the mysteries of existence and divinity, continued this work starting from the 12th century, and developed, or created, physics and mathematics in the Latin of Copernicus, Descartes, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Leibniz and Gauss. It is certainly true that the panels of judges that award Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals are composed of westerners, but it is still amazing to note that nearly all winners are of western origin and culture.

There are however other characteristics of European thought. Paul Valéry [1871-1945] certainly saw "above all, the creator of science", but he did not forget the essential importance of Christianity and Christian-Judaic values, typical of orthodox, catholic, protestant or *para-Christian* worlds, from Russia to America. It is to Adam that God entrusted Creation, the Nature created and thus stripped of divinity, that man can consider at his complete disposal. He can study it, thanks to the intellect that God provided him with, and he can exploit it as he sees fit. Descartes [1596-1650] thought that men could "seize control of Nature, as they are masters and possessors of it". This conviction contributed to giving western people a feeling of superiority with respect to all others, their condescendence to welcome and protect those who wished to embrace their religion and their values, but also their intolerance and indifference towards those who refused it.

It certainly is not a westerner's place to judge Judaic-Christian values, even if he may consider them to be excellent, but it can be observed that not only do westerners consider such values to be the best, they also want to impose them on the rest of the world, perhaps through violence, political systems, morals and attitudes or behaviour which is completely alien to other civilisations.

But let us return to the exploitation of nature, the extensive ploughing that has replaced indigenous forests with cereals, the dense network of predator towns in the heart of agrosystems, unbalanced by the withdrawals that must serve *intrants*, the revolution of leguminous crops in the 18th century, then the advent of new crops (corn, potatoes, soy), crossbreeding, the improvements in productivity which have profoundly affected the environment, the thermo-industrial revolution, which substituted biological energy with fossil fuels (coal, petroleum), with white coal or the atom. Then there was the creation of disrupted habitats, the advent of air and water pollution and subsequently the danger and greater risks represented by the likes of Seveso, Bhopal or Chernobyl....

So, one has witnessed the continuation of the plundering of nature, and the supremacy of economics and production, if not productivity itself.

It is no use opposing either the socialist or capitalist system in favour of the other, as both of them set the same objectives. The Manifest of Marx and Engels, a Communist Party newspaper, in 1848, concentrated on technical discoveries and the fact that the society of the day was freeing itself from natural restrictions, with the consequent “subjugation of natural forces”. The Russian writer Maxim Gorky, in around 1920, spoke of creating “a ‘second nature’, that is, of culture, on the basis and with the forces and treasures of the first, the ancient nature which is disorganised and even hostile to the interests of labouring humanity”¹. The Soviet world *planned* at least as much space as the capitalist world and, for instance, restructuring the entire network of Russian rivers, thus connecting Moscow to Russia’s five seas, showed violent opposition to ecology in favour of economics and politics. This is similar to what had happened a century previously, with the planning of the Great American Prairie, or with the destruction of the majority of Europe’s marshlands and forests.

¹ Maxim Gorky, *Culture and the People*, Honolulu, Hawaii, University Press of the Pacific, 2001, p. 185.

Nevertheless, the extent of these aggressions towards the natural environment to the advantage of the *homo economicus* has, ever since the 17th century, and especially from the 19th century onwards, provoked numerous protests. One example can be found in 1809-20, when the famous Knight of Lamarck made no hesitation in declaring: “man, through his selfishness which is anything but far-sighted in relation to his own interests, due to his tendency to enjoy everything which is at his disposal, in other words due to his lack of consideration for his future and that of those around him, he appears to be working towards the annihilation of his own means of conservation and the destruction of his own species [...] Man has acted in such a way as to render large parts of the world sterile, uninhabitable and desert. Continually ignoring the advice of experience to indulge himself in his passions, man is forever at war with his own kind and destroys them everywhere and under any pretext”². In 1872, Karl Möbius, studying oysters, defined the concept of biocoenosis and demonstrated the dangers deriving from excessive fishing³. 153 years after Lamarck, in 1973, the shockwaves in the petroleum market reminded mankind that the resources provided by the earth are not limitless.

Furthermore, from the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century, the idea of a return to nature, or simply just a move in that direction, was developing, and not only through the explosion of romanticism but also through the glorification of habitat: the charm of a garden or greenery in general, of gymnastics, sport and leisure time. But also natural medicine, organic culture, frugal eating, vegetarianism, the benefits of the mountains, forests, the sea and the sun, the virtues of physical effort, sexual freedom and distrust towards sprawling, oppressive predator cities.

² Cf. Jean-Baptiste de Monet de Lamarck, *Philosophie zoologique*, Paris, Ed. Dentu 1809, vol. II, p. 48 ff (Union générale d'éditions 1968 p. 24 ff and n. 4); Id., *Meteorologie* in *Nouveau dictionnaire d'histoire naturelle appliquée aux arts, à l'agriculture, à l'économie rurale et domestique, à la médecine, etc. Par une société de naturalistes et d'agriculteurs*, vol. XX, Paris, Deterville, 1818 p. 452 ff. (pp. 451-477), <http://www.lamarck.cnrs.fr/ouvrages/docpdf/Meteorologie.pdf>.

³ Cf. Karl Möbius, *Die Auster und die Austernwirtschaft*. (tr.) Berlin, Parey Verlag, 1877 (English translation: *The Oyster and Oyster Farming*, U.S. Commission Fish and Fisheries Report, 1880, pp. 683-751); Lynn K. Nyhart, *Modern Nature: the Rise of the Biological Perspective in Germany*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009; Astrid Schwarz, Kurt Jax (eds.), *Ecology Revisited. Reflecting on Concepts, Advancing Science*, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2011.



These ideas gave rise to a number of ambiguous trends and actions, for example, in Germany where the concept of *Heimatschutz* developed, the glorification of the farmer and the shepherd as opposed to the middle or working classes, and with connotations of a nationalistic, xenophobic, if not outright racist, nature. The *Blut und Boden* was to benefit aggressive Nazism which, dredging up ancient themes already present in the Germanic world and then developed through dreaming, pacifist and aesthetic romanticism, would go on to confer it with a particularly violent form⁴.

However, such tendencies emerged in the 1940s, in a defeated country which wanted to regenerate through an earth that does not lie, work, family (numerous and united) and the (xenophobic) motherland. They also emerged, somewhat surprisingly, in Switzerland, a country that one would never have suspected of fascism, or of submission to orders from above.

Ecological problems found solace in the unease of the economy. In 1913, Berne saw the gathering of the first international conference for the Protection of Nature. In 1923, the first congress in Paris took place. In 1946-1947 in Basel and in Brunnen. Zurich, in 1961, witnessed the creation of the *World Wildlife Fund*, adopting the panda as its symbol, and in 1972, Stockholm gathered representatives of no less than 113 states in order to study, from a multidisciplinary perspective, environmental problems on a world scale, and no less importantly, scientific problems related to the countries of the so-called Third World. But it was at the Rio Summit in 1992 that the idea of sustainable development, first mentioned in 1987, began to spread, and the said summit was followed in quick succession by meetings in Berlin (1995), Kyoto (1997), the Hague (in 2000), Montreal (in 2005) and so on.

⁴ Cf. Anna Bramwell, *Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler's 'Green Party'*, Abbotsbrook, Bourne End, Buckinghamshire, Kensal Press, 1985; Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Mark Cioc, Thomas Zeller (eds.), *How Green Were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich*, Athens, Ohio University Press, 2005; Frank Uekoetter, *The Green & the Brown. A History of Conservation in Nazi Germany*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

References to the environment contaminate all ideological arguments, from the far right to the far left. Awareness raising campaigns are run in schools, while the media relentlessly addresses television viewers and internet users. The various interrogatives are fundamental to politics, administration and resource management, and now they can no longer be avoided.

The Green movements were born in 1972, coinciding with the Stockholm Conference, and have been politically active ever since. However, collective distrust grew after the acid rain issue, which was blamed on motor vehicles rather than industry and domestic heating in order to be able to exploit the monopoly on catalytic converters to the full. A similar thing happened as a result of the welcome ban on chlorofluorocarbides (commonly known as CFCs), which originally came about because of the fierce competition between producers of refrigerators and producers of aerosols.

Each and everyone of us knows about the hole in the ozone layer, about the damage caused by pollution of our own making, the greater risks of another Chernobyl, climate change and we are now starting to ask ourselves questions about our *plundered planet*⁵, which is influencing the future of our children.

A historian and naturalist can not put forward conclusions about the future, especially given that all the predictions offered in the past have turned out to be wide of the mark. He must simply attempt to reconstruct the past, to establish and ascertain facts, sometimes explaining them with the tools and concepts of time, subjecting them to the consideration of his contemporaries. He knows that in the past, even in the recent past, a number of significant climatic changes have taken place, and at times they have even been instantaneous: that caused by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo being less devastating than that which occurred in 1815 following the eruption of Mount Tambora, whose ashes, in the several years that they floated around the earth, formed a veil over the sun and prevented cereals from ripening during the “years without summer”.

⁵Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet*, Boston, Little Brown, 1948 (Italian edition: *Il pianeta saccheggiato*, Milano, Bompiani, 1950).

He knows that the rapid melting of the Greenland ice sheet would release too much fresh water onto the surface of the North Atlantic, thus disturbing the northward flow of warmer waters and causing a cold snap in Western Europe.....

In the same way, the melting of the permafrost would release enormous quantities of methane into the atmosphere, a much more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.

History does not allow us to guess the future but it does nevertheless warn us: in 1913, all economists *knew*, at the end of a series of highly advanced and perfectly precise scientific studies, that Russia would become the most powerful state in the world, on an economic, political, demographic and military level. However, they had not bargained for the crisis of 1914, or the revolution of 1917 ... and neither had they considered, in such a short term forecast, the importance of petroleum, biotechnologies, atomic fission, quantum mechanics or, more simply, computers and information technology which, in exactly 1930, would be initiated by a young professor from the University of Hamburg Johann von Neumann.

The history of the West is endless, and is continuously being written, together with that of the environment.

Born in a temperate environment, recently liberated from the ice and whose vegetation is alien to the exuberance of tropical regions and where the essential grasses are constituted by cereals, European civilisation united men who had survived the cold periods, hunters and gatherers, with the crop growers and farmers who had arrived from the Middle East, accompanied by their goats, sheep, pigs and cattle, who in turn had been influenced by violent nomadic peoples who had tamed the most rebellious creature of all, the horse, and users of the wheel, and then iron. This fusion, sometimes peaceful, sometimes less so, was marked by the adoption of new languages, the exercising of effort, by competition, logical reflection, the creation of mathematics and physics (of nature), by the calm persuasion to be masters of a nature which could be exploited without restraint and, above all, without sharing the benefits with the majority of the planet's inhabitants.

And, despite some attempts at moderation due to well defined interests, the exploiter continues his plundering unabashed, trusting in the continual aid of new discoveries, capable of concealing irreversible damage.



MURRAY BOOKCHIN'S LIBERTARIAN MUNICIPALISM

Selva Varengo

1. Introduction

The originality of Murray Bookchin¹, the theorist of “social ecology”, lies in particular in having brought the ecological crisis back to its social roots: in his opinion, the ecological problem is actually a social problem, and must be attacked starting precisely from that basis, as the cause of the crisis is to be found in the broken equilibrium between nature and human beings brought about by the emergence of a *logic of domination*². Bookchin believes that the human domination over nature derives from the dominance of man over man, and that the exploitation of the environment originates from the advent of social hierarchies, emerged for the first time with the birth of the family institution based on patriarchy and arrived at its

¹ Murray Bookchin - born on January 14, 1921, in New York from parents of Russian origin and deceased on July 30, 2006- was, in addition to an important libertarian thinker, a pioneer of the ecologist movement. In particular, he was one of the first to anticipate the dawning of a serious ecological crisis, already writing in 1952 his first essay on the environmental question (under the pen-name of Lewis Herber, *The Problem of Chemicals in Food*, in “Contemporary Issues”, Vol. 3, No. 12, June/August 1952, pp. 206-241) and publishing in 1962 his first book (under the pseudonym Lewis Herber, *Our Synthetic Environment*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). In reconstructing Bookchin's human, intellectual and political biography, it becomes evident how his intellectual activity has, all along the course of his life, gone hand in hand with a militant praxis, actively participating in the trade-unionist, ecologist and social struggles of his time, in the conviction that “thought without the act, the theory without the practice, would be an abdication of all social responsibility” (Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, Edinburgh, San Francisco, A.K. Press, 2005, p. 449). It is then quite difficult to find a single definition for Bookchin's personality: metal worker, autodidact, trade unionist, social ecologist, notable figure of American counterculture, university professor, militant activist passed from his juvenile activity in communist organizations to anarchical positions, political philosopher, libertarian municipalist ... Bookchin is the author of hundreds of articles and tenths of books translated in many languages, of which we mention here: *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, San Francisco, Ramparts Books, 1971; *The Limits of The City*, New York, Harper and Row Colophon Books, 1974; *Toward an Ecological Society*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1980; *The Ecology of Freedom*, Palo Alto, Cheshire Books, 1982; *The Modern Crisis*, Philadelphia, New Society Publishers, 1986; *Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1989; *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1990; *Social Anarchism versus Lifestyle Anarchism. An Unbridgeable Chasm*, San Francisco, A.K. Press, 1995. Of the volumes entirely devoted to Bookchin's figure and thought we may mention: Janet Biehl, *The Murray Bookchin Reader*, London, Cassell, 1997; Selva Varengo, *La rivoluzione ecologica. Il pensiero libertario di Murray Bookchin*, Milano, Zero in condotta, 2007. To see a brief profile cf. John Barry, *Murray Bookchin*, in Joy A. Palmer, David E. Cooper, Peter Blaze Corcoran (eds.), *Fifty Key Thinkers on the Environment*, London/New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 241-245.

² It is evident here how Bookchin does not agree with the Marxist theory that justifies the class society and the existence of hierarchical structures as the consequence of the scarcity of material goods: the dominance of man over man derives, for Marx, from the necessity to dominate nature, cruel and miserable; on the contrary, Bookchin argues that the logic of domination originates first of all from within human relations and not from the work-organization modes. For this reason, while Marxists deem it sufficient to eliminate the class society, Bookchin deems it necessary to also eliminate the wider ideas of hierarchy and dominance.

climax with the establishment of the capitalist society. Due to this link between environment exploitation, logic of domination and hierarchical organization of society, the restoration of the equilibrium between human beings and nature, necessary for the survival of mankind, must necessarily pass through a radical change of social organization, that shall bring about the elimination of hierarchy and domination. For Bookchin, the only solution possible for averting the approaching ecological catastrophe is therefore a radical social transformation that shall replace the present capitalist society with an *ecological society*³. Besides this, an important role in Bookchin's social ecology is played by a harsh criticism of the national State, considered as the main responsible for the present ecological crisis, and the overcoming of which he advocates through the creation of municipal confederations.

In the reflection that Bookchin devotes to the organization of the new society, an important place is given to the elaboration of a new popular politics, strongly inspired by Athenian democracy, in which there is a clear distinction between decision-making power and its administrative execution: while the former must be an exclusive competence of popular assemblies, the latter may be entrusted to a delegated administrative body, elected with a revocable mandate. Ecological society must be characterized by the practice of *direct democracy*, based on popular assemblies endowed with full decision-making power; in addition, the new society cannot do without a radical economic change that replaces the present market economy with a municipal and moral economy, characterized by the principles of reciprocity and interdependence.

The most interesting aspect of the political application of social ecology is perhaps its *libertarian municipalism*, which contemplates the development of free municipalities of limited dimensions, decentralized, self-management, characterized by direct democracy, perfectly in tune with the ecosystem they are located in, and confederated with each other.

³ "But there are dramatic signs that capitalism, as I have emphasised elsewhere, is producing external conditions for an ecological crisis - that may well generate a general human interest for radical social change"; Murray Bookchin, *Radical Politics in an Era of Advanced Capitalism*, in "Green Perspectives", No. 18, November 1989, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/gp/perspectives18.html (a revised version of *Society, Politics, and the State*).

2. Decentralization

Already in his article *The Problem of Chemicals in Food* in 1952, Bookchin proposed decentralization of society as a possible solution to the ecological problem: “in decentralization exists a real possibility for developing the best traditions of social life”⁴. This idea, thoroughly studied since his book *Our Synthetic Environment* where he asserts the necessity of decentralization in order to realize a lasting equilibrium between society and nature, essential for the survival of mankind⁵, will remain a constant in Bookchin's theoretical work.

In his later works, the decentralization proposal finds an ever better definition: among them stands out *Ecology and Revolutionary Thought*⁶, in which Bookchin underlines the importance of a deep transformation of social organization on decentralized and regional bases, for providing both a solution to most of the practical problems of our time - like the necessity to bring agriculture back to a family-based activity, and the application of ecological principles to the exploitation of energy resources- and for restoring harmony between human beings and nature, for appreciating and promoting variety, and for creating genuine human communities which could be the bases of a municipalist and libertarian project:

Today there is plainly a need to reduce the dimensions of the human community—partly to solve our pollution and transportation problems, partly also to create real communities. In a sense, we must humanize humanity. Electronic devices, such as telephones, telegraphs, radios, television receivers, and computers should be used as little as possible to mediate the relations between people. In making collective decisions—and the ancient Athenian *ecclesia* was, in some ways, a model for making social decisions during the classical period—all members of the

⁴ Murray Bookchin, *The Problem of Chemicals in Food*, in “Contemporary Issues”, Vol. 3, No. 12, June/August 1952, p. 240.

⁵ “Some kind of decentralization will be necessary to achieve a lasting equilibrium between society and nature. Urban decentralization underlies any hope of achieving ecological control of pest infestations in agriculture. Only a community well integrated with the resources of the surrounding region can promote agricultural and biological diversity. [...] What is equally important, a decentralized community holds the greatest promise for conserving natural resources, particularly as it would promote the use of local sources of energy”; Murray Bookchin, *Our Synthetic Environment*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, p. 71.

⁶ *Ecology and Revolutionary Thought*, written in 1964 - one of the most important essays in *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* [San Francisco, Ramparts Books, 1971] – is the first manifesto of radical ecology: in it a synthesis of anarchism and ecology is proposed, i.e. *social ecology*, with the objective to create a different society, that is to be ecological, libertarian, decentralized and mutualist.

community should have an opportunity to acquire in full the measure of anyone who addresses the assembly⁷.

It is important to recall here the distinction Bookchin makes between physical and institutional decentralization, essential to allow power to stay in the hands of individual citizens even where it is impossible to realize decentralization in a physical way: big metropolises, according to Bookchin, do have to decentralize at the institutional level through district assemblies, but they shall not break up territorially, as institutional decentralization is, he asserts, more important than physical decentralization, the former being perfectly realizable even if it will take years to realize the latter⁸.

Decentralization constitutes, for Bookchin, one of social ecology's most important contributions; in fact, it adds an essential element to the road towards the realization of libertarian municipalism, and, he underlines, giving a smaller dimension to human communities is a *sine qua non* condition for mankind to continue to exist. Social ecology brought an original and also imperative facet to the need of a libertarian municipalist movement, because the need to give a new dimension to human communities has become today unavoidable from an ecological point of view, being the condition for mankind to continue to exist in harmony with the natural world⁹.

However, it is important to stress that decentralization is for Bookchin a necessary but insufficient condition for the creation of an ecological and rational society, because it can coexist, as happened in the past, with hierarchical institutions:

⁷ Murray Bookchin, *Ecology and Revolutionary Thought*, in *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, San Francisco, Ramparts Books, 1971, p. 53. See also Murray Bookchin, *The Limits of The City*, New York, Harper and Row Colophon Books, 1974, where in the conclusion Bookchin asserts the necessity of decentralization in order to build *ecocommunities* that could be the basis for a new culture and a new society, where urbanism is considered again as the proper ground for associationism and the community, thus making possible the union of city and countryside, mental and physical work, individual person and community, and above all the careful insertion of every community in the ecosystem it is part of.

⁸ "Even before we confront the ecological imperative of *physical* decentralization (a necessity anticipated by Frederick Engels and Peter Kropotkin alike), we need feel no problems about decentralizing them *institutionally*"; Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, introduction to *Readings in Libertarian Municipalism*, Burlington, Social Ecology Project, 1991, published with one addition in "Green Perspective", No. 24, October 1991, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/gp/perspectives24.html.

⁹ See Murray Bookchin, *Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1989.

It is a troubling fact that neither decentralization nor self-sufficiency in itself is necessarily democratic. Plato's ideal city in the Republic was indeed designed to be self-sufficient, but its self-sufficiency was meant to maintain a warrior as well as a philosophical elite [...] Similarly, decentralization in itself provides no assurance that we will have an ecological society. A decentralized society can easily co-exist with extremely rigid hierarchies. A striking example is European and Oriental feudalism, a social order in which princely, ducal, and baronial hierarchies were based on highly decentralized communities¹⁰.

For this reason, it is important that decentralization go together with the realization of a truly ecological society based on the practice of direct action, mutual aid, self-management, direct democracy and libertarian municipalism¹¹.

3. Libertarian Municipalism

Municipalism is the form that, according to Bookchin, society must assume for it to be ecological and rational. Future society shall be based on the development of small communities of a municipal character, which will lead to the establishment of a totally new reality where a truly radical politics can be built; libertarian municipalism constitutes in fact the foundation for making politics in the Greek sense of the term, i.e. of popular participation to public life:

The living cell that forms the basic unit of political life is the municipality, from which everything - such as citizenship, interdependence, confederation, and freedom - emerges¹².

¹⁰ Murray Bookchin, *The Meaning of Confederalism*, in "Green Perspectives", No. 20, November 1990, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/gp/perspectives20.html, also published in "Society and Nature", Vol. 1, No. 3, 1993, pp. 41-54, http://www.democracynature.org/vol1/bookchin_confederalism.htm. This statement is followed by a polemical hint to the work of Ernst Fritz Schumacher, *Small is beautiful. A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, London, Blond & Briggs Ltd., 1973: "With all due respect to Fritz Schumacher, small is not necessarily beautiful".

¹¹ See for example Murray Bookchin, *The Future of the Anti-Nuke Movement*, in "Comment", Vol. 1, No. 3, 1979.

¹² Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: The New Municipal Agenda*, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/libmuni.html; This article consists of excerpts from *From Urbanization to Cities. Toward a New Politics of Citizenship*, London, Cassell, 1995, (new edition with revisions of *The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship*, San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1987; with the addition of *The Meaning of Confederalism*, cit. and *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit.

Bookchin believes that the most natural communitarian scale for self-management is the town dimension: this type of small-scale politics would allow individuals to become active citizens and take democratic decisions concerning the problems of their life in common. If revolutionary institutions are to be created, popular assemblies must be formed in all municipalities; small self-sufficient communities of a municipal character must be created, where manual work and intellectual work integrate with one another.

Libertarian municipalism is also considered by Bookchin as the highest form of direct action, because it allows people to directly act on society and to personally shape their own destiny, thus making a real self-determination possible¹³. It is also important to observe that libertarian municipalism does not represent a mere propagandist stratagem or a political tactic, but on the contrary it is indeed the form that the new society must assume and at the same time is the praxis for achieving such a transformation.

Janet Biehl, in the interview given to Chuck Morse in 1998 on the occasion of the presentation of her book *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*¹⁴, explains with these words what Bookchin and the social ecologists mean by libertarian municipalism:

libertarian municipalism calls for the creation of self-managed community political life at the municipal level: the level of the village, town, neighborhood, or small city. This political life would be embodied in institutions of direct democracy: citizens' assemblies, popular assemblies, or town meetings. Where such institutions already exist, their democratic potential and structural power could be enlarged; where they formerly existed, they could be revived; and where they never existed, they could be created anew. But within these institutions people as citizens could manage the affairs of their own communities themselves - rather than relying on statist elites - arriving at policy decisions through the processes of direct democracy¹⁵.

¹³ "Direct action would mesh with this new politics in the form of community self-management based on a fully participatory democracy - in the highest form of direct action, the full empowerment of the people in determining the destiny of society"; Murray Bookchin, *Radical Politics in an Era of Advanced Capitalism*, in "Green Perspectives", No. 18, November 1989, <http://www.social-ecology.org/1989/11/radical-politics-in-an-era-of-advanced-capitalism/> (a revised version of "Society, Politics, and the State"). The relation between direct democracy and direct action is also the reverse: direct action directly derives in fact from the assembly practice; see Murray Bookchin, *The Future of the Anti-Nuke Movement*, in "Comment", Vol. 1, No. 3, 1979.

¹⁴ Janet Biehl, *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997.

¹⁵ Chuck Morse, *Radical Cities and Social Revolution: An Interview with Janet Biehl*, «Perspectives on Anarchist Theory», Spring 1998, p. 1 and pp. 6-8, <http://www.negations.net/?p=51>.

Bookchin places the origin of the municipalist idea in the era of the American and French revolutions and in the important experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, historical phases when that proposal was supported by a great part of the population, and in which it seemed on the point of materializing¹⁶. However, those historical examples do not represent applicable models in our time for realizing a free society, because, Bookchin says, in no place and in no epoch there has ever been an accomplished model of libertarian municipalist society.

If anything, the municipalist idea coincides to a large extent with the anarchical ideal of a society organized in a confederation of decentralized communities, devoid of a State institution and collectively managed with forms of direct democracy:

the anarchic ideal of decentralised, stateless, collectively managed, and directly democratic communities - of confederated municipalities or 'communes' - speaks almost intuitively, and in the best works of Proudhon and Kropotkin, consciously, to the transforming role of libertarian municipalism as the framework of a liberatory society¹⁷.

More specifically, Bookchin shares with classic anarchism the opposition to the nation-State and the search of libertarian alternatives. For the theorist of *social ecology*, in fact, the existence of free municipalities is not compatible with the existence of a nation-State, as it is not possible to have side by side a State power and a municipal power; actually, municipalities must wield such an alternative power to become competitive with the State power, up to becoming non-compatible with it:

¹⁶ "In the urban democracies of Central Europe and Italy, as well as in the Greek *poleis*, municipal self-determination in the cities, properly dimensioned for human needs, flourished, although for a short time, in its fullest meaning. The bases were thus laid down for that socially-committed individualism that will characterize, a few centuries later, the spirit of the American and French revolutions, and will define, in our era, the most advanced ideas of individual autonomy, sociality, and self-ruling"; Murray Bookchin, *Self-Management and the New Technology*, speech at the international conference on self-management, Venice (Italy), 28-29 September 1979, published in "Telos", No. 41, Autumn 1979: Janet Biehl on the sources of libertarian municipalism writes: "Libertarian municipalism draws on historical communalism, both in its anarchist and Marxist theoretical forms, as well as its concrete tradition in revolutionary history, going back to the French Revolution of 1789"; in Chuck Morse, *Radical Cities and Social Revolution: An Interview with Janet Biehl*, cit.

¹⁷ Murray Bookchin, *Theses on Libertarian Municipalism*, September 1984, (<http://habitat.aq.upm.es/boletin/n40/ambo.en.html>) published in "Our Generation", Vol. 16, No. 3-4, Spring/Summer 1985.

In fact, libertarian municipalism gains its life and its integrity precisely from the dialectical tension it proposes between the nation-state and the municipal confederation. Its "law of life", to use an old Marxian term, consists precisely in its struggle with the State. Then tension between municipal confederations and the State must be clear and uncompromising. Since these confederations would exist primarily in opposition to statecraft, they cannot be compromised by the State, provincial or national elections, or much less achieved by these means. Libertarian municipalism is formed by its struggle with the State, strengthened by this struggle, indeed defined by this struggle¹⁸.

Libertarian municipalism wants to eliminate, in addition to the nation-State, capitalism too, through the development of a municipalized, moral and cooperative economy. In an interview that Bookchin gave in November 1996¹⁹, answering those who deem it impossible for confederated municipalities to successfully oppose capitalism because at the moment even the national State seems to be declining and powerless in the face of globalization, he argues that, on the one side, obviously the transformation cannot be instantaneous, but will require a gradual and constant effort, and that, on the other, the libertarian municipalist movement shall work at the international level and on a global scale like the capital is doing. In the same interview he rejects the idea of a slow but unstoppable decline of the national States imposed by the increasing expansion of multinational companies and by the global economy, and asserts that the States and the multinational companies operate in mutual and total agreement trying to expand the markets and increase their profits.

In a paper written for the international Conference on Libertarian Municipalism held in Vermont in 1999, Bookchin underlines the distinction between communitarianism and libertarian municipalism²⁰. The first term refers to those movements and ideologies that aspire to transform society by creating alternatives in the economic and person-related fields, like food cooperatives, district farms, the squats, etc.

¹⁸ Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: The New Municipal Agenda*, cit.

¹⁹ Janet Biehl, *Interview with Murray Bookchin*, 12 November 1996, now in Janet Biehl, *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997.

²⁰ See Murray Bookchin, *Thoughts on Libertarian Municipalism*, statement to the Conference on Libertarian Municipalism, Plainfield, Vermont, 26 August 1999, in "Left Green Perspectives", No. 41, January 2000. See also Murray Bookchin, *From Urbanization to Cities. Toward a New Politics of Citizenship*, cit., pp. 2-3.

Communitarianism, or cooperativism, then, does not aim to create an alternative power center leading in the future to tearing down the capitalist system, but is a practice, often limited to small groups, that hopes to make the ruling political system crumble little by little without having to confront it directly. Libertarian municipalism instead constitutes a real anti-State policy, a revolutionary path aimed to build a truly ecological and rational society²¹.

4. Confederalism

Besides municipalism, an important role is given by Bookchin to the principle of *confederalism*, which makes it possible to realize the *non-authoritarian Commune of communes* and to put in place a really alternative power to that of the State and in strong opposition to it. The municipalities' popular assemblies shall form confederations with one another, creating large associative networks enabling them to both deal with their problems on a large scale, and prevent a selfish closing-in of individual communities, thus acting as an antidote to localism and ethnic parochialism²².

Confederalism implies the interdependence of communities both from the cultural viewpoint, thus averting particularism, and from the economic viewpoint: «Through confederation, a community can retain its identity and roundedness while participating in a sharing way with the larger whole that makes up a balanced ecological society»²³.

Confederalism is then realized by creating a cooperation network between the various municipalities, which the delegates, elected by the local popular assemblies with a revocable mandate and an exclusively administrative function, partake in directly:

²¹ In his last writings especially, Bookchin uses the term “communalism” instead of “libertarian municipalism”, better stressing the distance from the simple “communitarianism”: “By communalism, I do not mean communitarianism, in which people establish food cooperatives, communal living arrangement, community health clinics, and the like. Communalism, rather, is an attempt to *empower* the community – municipalities, towns, and neighborhoods. It is basically the same political system that I call libertarian municipalism, another term I often use, but *communalism* is simply an older word that comes from the vocabulary of revolutionary libertarian socialism. To the best of my knowledge, it emerged out of the Paris Commune of 1871, although the content of the idea is older than the name”; Doug Morris, *The Left: Past, Present, and Future*, interview to Bookchin, in Murray Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left. Interviews and Essays, 1993-1998*, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press, 1999, p. 312.

²² “If we lack a clear understanding of what confederalism means - indeed, the fact that it forms a key principle and gives fuller meaning to decentralism - the agenda of a libertarian municipalism can easily become vacuous at best or be used for highly parochial ends at worst”; Murray Bookchin, *The Meaning of Confederalism*, cit..

²³ Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: The New Municipal Agenda*, cit. Just before that, Bookchin writes: “Confederalism is thus a way of perpetuating interdependence among communities and regions--indeed, it is a way of democratizing that interdependence without surrendering the principle of local control”.

«It is above all a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies, in the various villages, towns, and even neighborhoods of large cities. The members of these confederal councils are strictly mandated, recallable, and responsible to the assemblies that choose them for the purpose of coordinating and administering the policies formulated by the assemblies themselves. Their function is thus a purely administrative and practical one, not a policy making one like the function of representatives in republican systems of government»²⁴.

It is not sufficient that only one municipal and libertarian community is established, but rather that a lot of communities be born and that they confederate with one another, so that an ever bigger power is created that is really alternative to that of the State. In fact, only by growing to a large movement can confederalism constitute a significant challenge to State centralism, as already happened in the past “from the American Revolution through the French Revolution and the Spanish Revolution of 1936, confederalism constituted a major challenge to state centralism”²⁵.

Municipal confederation plays then a crucial role for the establishment of the future society, because it leads to the creation of alternative powers capable of becoming competitive with the power of national States²⁶; Janet Biehl, on the occasion of the “International Conference on the Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism” held in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1998, explained with these words the importance of libertarian municipalist confederations in the struggle against the centralist State power:

²⁴ Murray Bookchin, *The Meaning of Confederalism*, cit. Therefore, also at the confederal level, as well as within the individual municipalities, there must be a neat and clear distinction between political function and coordinating and administrative function. See Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit.: «Many arguments against libertarian municipalism - even with its strong confederal emphasis - derive from a failure to understand its distinction between policy-making and administration. This distinction is fundamental to libertarian municipalism and must always be kept in mind. *Policy* is made by a community or neighborhood assembly of free citizens; *administration* is performed by confederal councils composed of mandated, recallable deputies of wards, towns, and villages»; see also Murray Bookchin, *The Modern Crisis*, Philadelphia, New Society Publishers, 1986, where he vigorously stresses how the possibility that from free municipalities some forms of authoritarian coordination emerge cannot be ruled out a priori, merely relying on good will.

²⁵ Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit..

²⁶ See Murray Bookchin, *Preface* to the third Italian edition of *L'ecologia della libertà*, Milano, Elèuthera, 1989, p. 14: «I believe in the possibility of a confederation of free municipalities becoming a grass-roots counter-power that counters the growing centralization of power by the nation-State».

The larger and more numerous the municipal confederations become, the greater would be their latent power, and the greater would be their potentiality to constitute a counterpower to the nation-state. As they realize this potentiality, tension would likely grow between themselves and the state. Citizens must clearly recognize that this tension is highly desirable - indeed, that their confederated municipalities constitute a potential counterpower to the state. In fact, the confederated municipalities may eventually gain enough support to constitute a *dual* power to the state. This situation would likely be highly unstable, and resolving it could well involve a confrontation. It is possible, too, that our direct democracy will institutionally "hollow out" the state power itself, delegitimizing its authority and winning a majority of the people over to the new civic and confederal institutions. With or without a confrontation, however, power will have to be shifted away from the state and the professional practitioners of statecraft and entirely into the hands of the people and their confederated assemblies²⁷.

5. Moral economy

The new society cannot do without a radical economic change also; in fact, the present capitalist economy must be radically transformed because non-compatible with the communitarian ethic:

The maxim "from each according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her needs" would seem a bedrock guide for an economically rational society, provided to be sure that goods are of the highest durability and quality, that needs are guided by rational and ecological standards, and that the ancient notions of limit and balance replace the bourgeois marketplace imperative of "grow or die"²⁸.

It is not possible, according to Bookchin, to bring about that change through a choice between equally unsatisfactory alternatives like a discredited concept of nationalized economy and a greedy system of private property: the question is not whether to nationalise or privatise the economy, given that both choices are fundamentally incompatible with a genuine libertarian municipalism. Instead, the realization of the latter is tightly connected to the *municipalisation* of the economy, i.e. with the control of the means of production by the whole community:

²⁷ Janet Biehl, *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997.

²⁸ Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit.

It remains to emphasize that confederal municipalism is not merely an evocation of all traditional antistatist notion of politics. Just as it redefines politics to include face-to-face municipal democracies graduated to confederal levels, so it includes a municipalist and confederal approach to economics. Minimally, a confederal municipalist economics calls for the municipalization of the economy, not its centralization into state-owned “nationalized” enterprises on the one hand or its reduction to “worker-controlled” forms of collectivistic capitalism on the other²⁹.

It is evident then that libertarian municipalism advocates a radically different form of economy, where the territory and the enterprises are entrusted to the management of citizens meeting in free assemblies and of their representatives in the confederal councils. This leads to a new form of economy, profoundly different from the market economy, that Bookchin defines “*moral economy*”, being founded on the values of mutual aid and mutual care, responsibility and engagement³⁰.

Applying morality to the economy means for Bookchin to transform the economy into a culture, replacing competition and the fake independence of the market economy with reciprocity and interdependence, which give origin to a true communitarian economy based on the principle “from each according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her needs”:

The second step [after decentralization] is that of developing an alternative to the lunatic competitive, antagonistic system, to this systematic education to antagonism and egotism, towards a new mutualism, a new reciprocity, a mutual aid; we must develop the so-called underground economies: a moral economy [...] and not a market economy³¹.

²⁹ Murray Bookchin, *From Urbanization to Cities. Toward a New Politics of Citizenship*, cit., p. 264.

³⁰ See Murray Bookchin, *Market Economy or Moral Economy?*, in *The Modern Crisis*, Philadelphia, New Society Publishers; Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1986.

³¹ Murray Bookchin, *La crisi ecologica: le sue radici nella società. Problemi e soluzioni*, in “Umanità Nova”, n. 37, anno 64, 18 November 1984, p. 5, (text of a lecture given in Carrara, Italy, October 1984).

As confederation is important between the various municipalities as a principle of social organization, likewise it is important that the economy too be confederated, so as to overcome the forced choice between self-sufficiency and the merchant system, in favor of a redistribution system capable of giving to the communities according to their needs.

The moral economy must, in addition, allow to overcome the particular interests of individual working categories to the advantage of the community's general interest, so that the workers cease to be workers and start to act as citizens:

In such a municipal economy - confederal, interdependent, and rational by ecological, not simply technological, standards - we would expect that the special interests that divide people today into workers, professionals, managers, and the like would be melded into a general interest in which people see themselves as *citizens* guided strictly by the needs of their community and region rather than by personal proclivities and vocational concerns. Here, citizenship would come into its own rational as well as ecological interpretations of the public good, and would supplant class and hierarchical interests³².

Finally, there is to observe that such an economy has no historical precedents to be taken as models, and that it can take inspiration from the organic (preliterate) societies and their principle of usufruct; for the rest, it can only be created by its own practice and experience³³.

6. How to get to the new society

The establishment of this political model requires a big educational effort, keeping in mind that for Bookchin libertarian municipalism is not just a movement to create popular assemblies, but also, and perhaps to a greater extent, a process for creating a political culture: for this reason one must not confuse the libertarian municipalist movement with the libertarian municipalist society, even though the aim of the movement is to create such a society. It will be a long and difficult process that could not deliver immediate results:

³² Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit.

³³ See Murray Bookchin, *The Modern Crisis*, Philadelphia, New Society Publishers, 1986.

If people today think that politics should be like a vending machine, where you put in your quarter and out comes a candy bar - if that's what they think, then I would recommend that they go back into private life. People have to be prepared, to be steeled, to have the character - they themselves have to embody the political culture of the future in their character to create a movement that might someday change society so that it is libertarian, communalist, and political in the best sense of the word³⁴.

We cannot imagine what form the future ecological society will specifically take, because the mind set of human beings to come will be probably different from ours:

Any institutional relationship of which we could conceive would remain a hollow form until we knew the attitudes, sensibilities, ideals, and values of the people who establish and maintain it. As I have already pointed out, a libertarian institution is a peopled one; hence its purely formal structure will be neither better nor worse than the ethical values of the people who give it reality. Certainly we, who have been saturated with the values of hierarchy and domination, cannot hope to impose our "doubts" upon people who have been totally freed of their trammels³⁵.

It is therefore impossible to give any precise information on the new society's structure, also because in so doing one would violate one of the key principles of social ecology: the respect of diversity, i.e. the right that every society has to find the form best suited for itself.

According to Bookchin, the passage from the old to the new society will not occur through a sudden collapse of the established order, nor through exemplary actions; on the contrary, it will be a long and difficult process and will require an adequate period of ethical and intellectual preparation³⁶:

³⁴ Janet Biehl, *Interview with Murray Bookchin*, 12 November 1996; <http://www.athene.antenna.nl/ARCHIEF/NR02-LibertairMunicipalisme/BIEHL%20-%20Bookchin2%20.html>; also in Janet Biehl, *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997.

³⁵ Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press, 2005, p. 445.

³⁶ "The anarchism inspiring bio-regionalism and social ecology is however of a Gandhian style. The change brought about by a swift and bloody revolution is put aside in favor of a strategy of wearing out the adversary. Like nature, from which it takes inspiration, bio-regional eco-anarchism works over long times"; Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso, *Pensare ambientalista. Tra filosofia e ecologia*, Torino, Paravia, 2000, p. 124.

To move “from here to there” is a demanding process, not a dramatic gesture. It will always be marked by uncertainties, failures, digressions and disputes before it finds its sense of direction³⁷.

It is not a question then of starting a revolutionary process of an insurrectionary type, in a confrontation that Bookchin considers uneven and ruinous, but of building up counter-powers, or counter-institutions, able to increasingly oppose the nation-State's power. Consequently, Bookchin believes one must start by creating and developing local municipalist movements leading to a growing disintegration of the centralist power and to the realization of a genuine “bottom up” power³⁸:

Nor are we obliged to expect these changes to occur immediately [...] Minimal steps that can be taken now include initiating Left Green municipalist movements that propose popular neighborhood and town assemblies -- even if they have only moral functions at first -- and electing town and city councilors that advance the cause of these assemblies and other popular institutions. These minimal steps can lead step-by-step to the formation of confederal bodies and the increasing legitimation of truly democratic bodies³⁹.

³⁷ Murray Bookchin, *Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1989, p. 200. Bookchin also underlines how the reflections on emergency and the dissolution of hierarchy need not necessarily contain a recipe for social change; see Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, Palo Alto, Cheshire Books, 1982.

³⁸ Of course, the development alone of structures where a grass-roots politics can be exercised is not sufficient for the creation of the ecological society, unless they go hand in hand with a new empowerment of the citizens, the growth of a strong libertarian movement and the spread of coherent and self-conscious practices and theories; see Murray Bookchin, *The Modern Crisis*, Philadelphia, New Society Publishers, 1986.

³⁹ Murray Bookchin, *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*, cit. Francesco Berti rightly observes how in actual fact the roads for realizing libertarian municipalism that Bookchin indicates are two: “concerning the modes of a municipalist action, Bookchin seems to indicate two roads, in some aspects quite different: the first would consist in creating municipal assemblies, alternative and antagonist to the city's, which little by little succeed in turning their initial moral authoritativeness into political authority, voiding the existing institutions of any function; a second assumption would be to enter the existing city administrations through municipal elections and, later, transform those into areas of direct democracy opposed to the State and to the parliamentary policy; this action is being carried out by many US eco-libertarians since several years in their country”; Francesco Berti, *Anarchismo e municipalismo: un matrimonio difficile*, in “A - Rivista Anarchica”, No. 205, December 1993/January 1994, p. 26. In particular, the possibility to act “also at the local electoral level” emerged, for Bookchin, since the 1990s: see for example Murray Bookchin, *Occhio al bioregionalismo*, “A - Rivista Anarchica”, n. 185, ottobre 1991, pp. 40-41.

It is fundamental, for Bookchin, to abide to the famous anarchical precept that the means be coherent with the purposed end⁴⁰; hence, the primary objective of the society transformation process must be the construction of the community and the assembly⁴¹:

Assembly and community must arise from within the revolutionary process itself; indeed, the revolutionary process must be the formation of assembly and community, and with it, the destruction of power. Assembly and community must become 'fighting words,' not distinct panaceas. They must be created as *modes of struggle* against existing society⁴².

⁴⁰ "The treacheries and failures of the past half-century have made it axiomatic that there *can be no separation of the revolutionary process from the revolutionary goal*. A society whose fundamental aim is self-administration in all facets of life can be achieved only by self-activity. [...] A libertarian society can be achieved only by a libertarian revolution. Freedom cannot be "delivered" to the individual as the "end-product" of a "revolution"; the assembly and community cannot be legislated or decreed into existence"; Murray Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press, 2004, p. 11.

⁴¹ See Murray Bookchin, *What Is Communalism? The Democratic Dimension of Anarchism*, in "Green Perspectives", No. 31, October 1994, <http://flag.blackened.net/liberty/wic.txt>: "Capitalism will not generously provide us the popular democratic institutions we need [...] A revolutionary people must either assert their control over institutions that are basic to their public lives--which Bakunin correctly perceived to be their municipal councils-- or else they will have no choice but to withdraw into their private lives, as is already happening on an epidemic scale today".

⁴² Murray Bookchin, *The Forms of Freedom*, in "Anarchos", No. 2, Spring 1968; now in *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, San Francisco, Ramparts Books, 1971, pp. 167-168.




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PART TWO

SCIENCE,
ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE,
ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABILITY



COMPLEXITY, GLOBAL ASPECTS AND IGNORANCE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASES OF ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Giovanni Salio

1. Controversies, environmental conflicts, techno-science

Techno-science has become one of the main sources of controversy and conflict¹. It is interesting to observe that, for some time now, on complex enough problems scientists, technologists and experts are always in disagreement. Scientific controversies turn into social conflicts when issues move from the stage of research to that of application, and citizens are involved in the decision-making process.

Although they have always existed, from the 1980s on environmental conflicts have become significantly frequent both in rich, highly-industrialized countries, and in poor ones still farming-dependent². In the first case, it may happen that conflicts degenerate into episodes of violence on a local scale, usually of relatively low intensity. In the second, they often turn into veritable armed conflicts or even wars, so much so that people currently talk of “water wars”³, “oil wars”⁴ and, more in general, “resource wars”⁵.

¹ Cf. Daniel Sarewitz, *How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse*, in “Environmental Science and Policy”, Vol. 7, Issue 5, October 2004, pp. 385-403, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901104000620>.

² See Joan Martinez Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002.

³ Cf. Vandana Shiva, *Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution, and Profit*, Cambridge, South End Press, 2002.

⁴ Cf. Ugo Bardi, *La fine del petrolio*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2003; Benito Li Vigni, *Le guerre del petrolio*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2004; Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2004; Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, Yahia Said (eds.), *Oil Wars*, London/Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press, 2007.

⁵ Cf. Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, New York, Owl Books 2002; and also by the same author “*Is Energo-Fascism in Your Future? The Global Energy Race and Its Consequences*” (Part 1), <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/157241/>; “*Petro-Power and the Nuclear Renaissance: Two Faces of an Emerging Energo-Fascism*” (Part 2), <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/157744/>.

Soon conflicts of this type became the subject of specific studies that have produced a large and complex literature, enlivened by theoretical controversies among various schools of thought that give different interpretations both to the dynamics generating those events, and to how to manage, transform, intervene in and mediate those conflicts.

Tobias Hagman, a researcher at the Swisspeace Institute in Bern, highlights the inadequacy of the expression “conflicts induced by the environment” because actually there is no “causal paradigm”, i.e. a strong, deterministic causal relation between the environment and inter-groups violence⁶. As Ivan Illich had already observed in his pioneering studies, “resource scarcity or abundance is a property of a relationship between social groups and their ecosystem”⁷. That relation can be manipulated through the entrepreneurial policies and the influence exerted by the dominant classes pursuing political ends, that are often linked to an illegitimate appropriation of those resources. Hagman observes that “**environmental conflicts are by definition** phenomena situated at the interface between the natural and social spheres”⁸ and proposes therefore to speak more appropriately of “conflicts over the use of natural resources”. It is not so much scarcity or environmental degradation that predispose to violent conflicts, as the use of resources getting into a dynamic of relationships which may be cooperative or conflictual.

⁶ Cf. Tobias Hagman, *Confronting the Concept of Environmentally Induced Conflict*, in “Peace, Conflict and Development”, Issue 6, January 2005.

<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/Environmental%20conflict%20final%20version%20edited.pdf>.

⁷ Cf. Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality*. New York, Harper and Row, 1973; Id. *Towards a History of Needs*. New York, Pantheon Books, 1978. See also Giorgio Barberis, *Il pensiero di Ivan Illich tra patogenesi della modernità e possibili vie di fuga*, in Pier Paolo Poggio, (ed.), *L'Altronovecento. Comunismo eretico e pensiero critico. Vol. II: Il sistema e i movimenti. Europa 1945 -1989*, Vol. II, Milano, Jaca Book, 2011, pp. 771 -785.

⁸ Hagman, *Confronting the Concept of Environmentally Induced Conflict*, cit., p. 17.

2. Case-study: the climate and energy

Two of the most controversial and complex environmental questions, tightly intertwined, concern the global climate change (also called climatic chaos) and energy problems.

As to the climate, in addition to the difficulty of forecasting the temperature rise, we are faced with a big uncertainty about forecasting local effects in specific areas. In fact, the climatic system includes the interactions between the atmosphere and the oceans, and the gradual thawing of polar ice caps could produce a sudden, drastic change in the Gulf Stream with an ensuing lowering of temperatures in North America and North Europe.

Although no one completely rules out a man-made cause for climate change, somebody has put forward a minimalist theory. Among the supporters of such a position, Bjorn Lomborg's contribution stands out, as his book *The Skeptical Environmentalist*⁹ has aroused a heated controversy which has generated an endless quantity of materials. Lomborg's thesis can be resumed with his own words: "actually, global heating is a limited problem, because sooner or later we will stop using fossil fuels... Probably we will stop doing so at about the end of the century... Maybe the temperature will not rise more than two or three degrees..., but that rise... will affect mostly the Third World... At this point, the question is: are we attacking the problem of global warming in the most sensible way? The important thing to understand is that the Kyoto protocol will not stop global warming. At a much lower cost we could achieve a much better result, and could spend the rest for doing something advantageous for the Third World".

In a study commissioned by the Pentagon and published in October 2003, with the very telling title *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario And Its Implications for United States National Security*¹⁰, Peter Schwartz (well-known and esteemed writer of future scenarios) and Doug Randall, who, as Lomborg, are not professional scientists, launch an uncompromising appeal:

⁹ Bjorn Lomborg, *The Skeptical Environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

¹⁰ Peter Schwartz, Doug Randall, *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security, Imagining the Unthinkable*, October 2003, <http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/Abrupt%20Climate%20Change%20February%202004.pdf>.



“Imagine the unthinkable. **There is substantial evidence to indicate that significant global warming will occur** during the 21st century. Because changes have been gradual so far, and are projected to be similarly gradual in the future, the effects of global warming have the potential to be manageable for most nations. Recent research, however, suggests that there is a possibility that this gradual global warming could lead to a relatively abrupt slowing of the ocean’s thermohaline conveyor, which could lead to harsher winter weather conditions, sharply reduced soil moisture, and more intense winds in certain regions that currently provide a significant fraction of the world’s food production. With inadequate preparation, the result could be a significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the Earth’s environment”. The authors do not limit themselves to raising the alarm, but formulate also an ambitious plan named *A Project to free US from Oil*, focused on an hydrogen economy.

The other great controversy concerns, in fact, the energy solutions that may allow to comply simultaneously with the need to drastically reduce, up to 80%, all climate-adverse gas emissions, and with the just aspiration of millions or even billions of people to live in more equitable and dignified conditions.

Once again we are faced with quite different forecasted scenarios. The first great uncertainty concerns the amount of available resources of oil, the fossil fuel *par excellence* of the world's present energy system. The estimates by independent scholars, as C.J. Campbell, lead us to conclude that we are now entering the peak of the geophysical production of oil, known as “Hubbert's peak”¹¹. Other estimates by institutional sources or big oil companies are more optimistic, and postpone the “end of cheap oil” by a few decades.

It is the global nature of these problems that makes forecasts quite uncertain. The studies on the energy or climate scenarios are not based on laboratory tests or on instruments allowing direct measurements to be taken, but rather on a sequence of analytical steps often implying quite arbitrary assumptions. As stated by John Holdren, author of famous counter-reports on the civilian nuclear issue, having a sufficient length of time and amount of money

¹¹ Cf. Richard Heinberg, *The Party's Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Society*, Gabriola Island, New Society Publishers, 2003 (synopsis: *Oil Depletion and the Fate of the World*, http://www.postcarbon.org/files/EndOfOilBooklet_0.pdf).

it is always possible to work out a seemingly rigorous report supporting whatever preconceived theory. To do that, it is sufficient to choose in the estimates the values most useful to the theory one wants to demonstrate. The most classical example is the life-cycle evaluation of a product through the technique known as LCA (Life Cycle Assessment), applied to the most diverse situations to calculate the total energy content of a product. Except for cases where the result is obvious, in general it is difficult to make a rigorous comparison between the energy content of a product obtained with one or another production cycle. The uncertainty may be so high that no definitive conclusions can be drawn.

In the case of macro-systems embracing the whole planet we are confronted with a different way to make science compared to the traditional, experimental one made in a laboratory. As observed for a long time by several authors, among whom Günther Anders (*Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* [*The Antiquity of Man*])¹² stands out for his farsightedness, the final passage from local to global has occurred: “The nuclear “experiments” are no longer today experiments... What are called “experiments” are portions of our reality, are historical events”. The same observation has been expressed by other authors in different times. Since 1957, in an article published in the well-known scientific revue *Tellus*, two geophysicists, Roger Revelle and Hans Suess, used an expression similar to Anders' to express the big changes brought about by our species: “human beings are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment of a kind which could not have happened in the past, nor be reproduced in the future”¹³. And more recently John R. McNeill, in his important contribution to the history of the environment, observes: “humankind has subjected the Earth to a non-controlled experiment of gigantic proportions. I think that, as time passes, this will turn out to be the most important aspect of the history of the 21st century: more than World War II, the establishment of Communism, mass schooling, the spread of democracy, the progressive emancipation of women”¹⁴.

¹² Cf. Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Seele im zweiten technischen Zeitalter*. München, Beck, 1956.

¹³ Cf. Roger Revelle, Hans Suess, *Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO₂ during the Past Decades*, in “*Tellus*”, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1957, p. 19 (pp. 18-27); abstract: <http://www.tellusb.net/index.php/tellusb/article/view/12715/1484>; full text: <http://www.tellusb.net/index.php/tellusb/article/download/12715/14484>.

¹⁴ Cf. John Robert McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun. An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 2000. See also John Robert McNeill, José Augusto Pádua, Mahesh Rangarajan, (eds.),

To sum it up, we have passed from laboratory experiments, which allowed to test a limited section of the real world, to experiments carried out directly in the world-laboratory, on the entire planet, with mankind used as a guinea pig. While traditional science originated in laboratories and grew up by trial and error, learning from the mistakes that were made, now we happen to be in need of a new science, which does not exist yet, a “post-modern” science. We do not have a second, spare planet on which the global experiments we are carrying out can be performed, and see what happens if we continue to discharge greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and to alter the energy flow entering the biosphere, seizing it to a much greater extent than other living species. Today, the power engaged in the entire worldwide industrial system has already reached a not-negligible value of the order of one hundredth of the solar-flux power. Assuming that that power will no longer be provided by fossil resources, but come entirely from solar sources, one cannot think that a transition of that magnitude will have no influence: it would trigger a non-negligible perturbation.

3. Living with uncertainty

We have, then, quite different scenarios, with schools of thought leading to conclusions that often are diametrically opposite, and supported by “experts” who almost always disagree with each other. All this is not new, but today it is even more noticeable than in the past, and poses serious difficulties to political decision-makers and more in general to anyone willing to responsibly participate in the decision-making processes. How can one decide in such conditions of uncertainty and, even worse, of ignorance? How to govern scientific and technological innovations in order to minimize risks and maximize advantages?

A classification of the conditions in which one is called to decide has been proposed by David Collingridge¹⁵, one of the first to deal with the issue; he defines as decisions in *deterministic* conditions those where we are in a position to anticipate and calculate with certainty the outcome of each choice; decisions in *hazardous* conditions those where for at

Environmental History As If Nature Existed: Ecological Economics and Human Well-Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010 John Robert McNeill, Corinna R. Unger (eds.) *Environmental Histories of Cold War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.


¹⁵ Cf. David Collingridge, *The Social Control of Technology*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

least one of the choices we can make probabilistic forecasts; decisions in *uncertainty* conditions those where all the final results connected to every single decision are definable, but it is not possible to formulate a probabilistic forecast; decisions in *ignorance* conditions those where we are not in a position to estimate not only the probabilities of each of the final results, but not even all the possible results, that come as “unexpected events” taking us by surprise, unprepared (like in the case of the CFC-gases' impact on the ozone protective layer).

Most decisions on the most controversial questions (GMOs, climate change, energy policies, nanotechnologies) belong in the last two categories, the most problematic, and are to be made in conditions of uncertainty and ignorance.

4. Paradoxes

Today's scientific and technological research generates a paradox: as it progresses, both our knowledge and our ignorance widen. The nature of this paradox has led Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry Ravetz to introduce the notion of “post-normal science”.



In the figure, the horizontal and vertical Cartesian axes represent, respectively, the systems uncertainty and the stakes, both comprised between low and high values. The figure allows to single out three main situations. *Applied science* corresponds to the area defined by low uncertainty and low stakes.

When both variables have an intermediate value, we are in the domain of *professional consulting*. Finally, when both variables become high we enter the field of *post-normal science*, a methodology for dealing with STS (Science, Technology, Society) problems in the exploration phase; a science that does not exist yet in a fully defined form, an alternative science

still in the very early stages of development, [that] could be called 'precautionary', since it is usually concerned with reacting to the unintended harmful effects of progress. Its style is 'post-normal'; it lies at the contested interfaces of science and policy. It addresses issues where, typically, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent... The traditional twin goals of science, the advancement of knowledge and the conquest of nature, are insufficient to guide inquiry in these post-normal situations. There is instead a medley of issues from ethics, society and ecology, which might be summed up in two terms: safety and sustainability¹⁶.

Applied science is essentially laboratory-science, in which a great deal of experience has been accumulated and people work in conditions of controlled and foreseeable risk, on a statistical probability basis. When stakes and system scale go up, also uncertainty grows and in this field scientists often play the role of consultants, asked to offer an informed advice to the political decision-maker, in order for him to find the most rational and responsible solutions on controversial questions.

Further raising scale, uncertainty and stakes, decisions have to be made on questions that by their very nature are irreducibly complex, where conditions of ignorance are preeminent. This is the field of post-normal science, a subject of research and cautious experimentation aiming to find criteria for managing scientific controversy and ensuing social conflicts.

These issues are also being studied by other authors with a non-scientific background, and among them the contribution stands out of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck¹⁷, who emphasized the structural condition, intrinsic to modernity, of our societies, defined by him

¹⁶ Jerry Ravetz, *The Post-Normal Science of Precaution*, in "Futures", Vol. 36, No. 3, 2004, pp. 347-357, <http://www.nusap.net/downloads/articles/pnsprecaution.pdf>; <http://www.iris.ufsc.br/projetopar/docs/RAVETZ.PDF>.

¹⁷ Cf. Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.

“risk societies”. While, in the past, scientific and technological knowledge played a progressive role only, gradually reducing risks and discomforts of the human condition, today we are confronted with three paradoxes generated by science's success: “One: In the global knowledge economy, constantly accelerating innovation buys temporary safety for firms against their competition, but cannot guarantee the safety of their innovations in the environment. In the face of these possible dangers from innovations, governments lose public trust by reassurances of their safety and regain public trust by admission of their danger. But by admitting danger and thereby inhibiting innovation, governments lose safety in the politics of the global knowledge economy”¹⁸.

Those three paradoxes form a vicious circle from which it is difficult to get out applying the classical schemes of traditional science based on certainty. Beck states that “the risks of modernization are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate; therefore, so is also managing them along traditional scientific lines”.

5. Learning from mistakes

It seems that there is no other way, at the moment, but to learn from mistakes, cautiously, slowly, not in a hurry, in such a way as to make those mistakes corrigible and decisions reversible.

Christine von Weizsäcker created the term *error-friendliness*. The concept of *error-friendliness* includes the ideas of *error-production*, of *error-tolerance* and of a “friendly” cooperation of those two ideas for exploring new opportunities. And it is in that cooperation that *error-utilization* is placed, which is an absolutely general characteristic of all living systems, whatever the hierarchical level one wants to consider¹⁹.

Contrary to what is stated in many debates, “we shall not go back!”, corrigibility makes it possible to retrace our steps. Using a metaphor, mankind finds itself in the same situation as

¹⁸ Cf. Jerry Ravetz, *Paradoxes and the Future of Safety in the Global Knowledge Economy*, 2004; <http://www.nusap.net/downloads/articles/safetyparadoxes.pdf>. For a general introduction on these issues see, by the same author cf. Id., *The No-Nonsense Guide to Science*, Oxford, The New Internationalist, 2006.

¹⁹ Cf. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Christine von Weizsäcker, *How to Live With errors*, in “World Futures: The Journal of Global Education”, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 1987, pp. 225-235.

an alpinist who is climbing along a precipitous, unexplored route. A clever alpinist, in addition to being brave, must always be in a position to turn and go back, to avoid remaining stuck, unable to both go up and descend to the valley.

When we operate and make decisions in conditions of ignorance, we are unable to foresee the future, so we must explore it with caution, step after step, ready to correct our course in case of error.

David Collingridge gave significant contributions to define what is meant by corrigibility of a decision: “A decision is easy to correct, or highly corrigible, when, if it is mistaken, the mistake can be discovered quickly and cheaply and the mistake imposes only small costs which can be eliminated quickly and at little expense”. The philosophy of corrigibility and reversibility of decisions has found a more general formulation in today's precautionary principle: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of a full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.

The precautionary principle derives from the more general *responsibility principle*, formulated, among others, by Hans Jonas²⁰. It echoes Pascal's famous reasoning on the existence or non-existence of God. If we believe in God, we lead a virtuous and scrupulous life. In case, after our death, we should discover that God does not exist, we would have paid a price for our mistake, not very high. If, instead, we do not believe in God, we lead a dissolute life and after death we discover that God does exist, the error we made will result in a very high price to pay, the torments of hell for eternity. The same reasoning can be applied to global climate change: the worst scenario is to be taken for good, as suggested by the authors of the report for the Pentagon, and contrary to what is asserted by other authors like Lomborg.

A similar reflection has been made by Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin with regard to the loss of bio-diversity. They pose themselves many questions on the state of our knowledge about eco-systems, and they systematically have to answer with a laconic “we do not know”;

²⁰ Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age*, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984 (originally as *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979 and *Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität? Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Vorfeld des Prinzips Verantwortung*, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1981).

hence they state: “The degree of ignorance about the natural world upon which we depend is frustratingly large”²¹. So they conclude with a reasoning similar to Pascal's:

“In the face of ignorance about how much of current biodiversity we need in order to sustain a healthy Earth's biota, is it more responsible to say (1) because we don't know if we need it all, we can safely assume we don't; or (2) we recognize the complexities of the system, and assume we do? The answer is obvious, because the costs of being wrong on the first count are enormous. [...] Through continued destruction of biodiversity in the wake of economic development, we could push the natural world over a threshold beyond which it might be unable to sustain, first, itself and, ultimately, us. Unrestrained, *Homo sapiens* might not only be the agent of the sixth extinction, but also risks being one of its victims²².

It seems, then, that it is wiser to continue to act as prophets of calamity, as Gunther Anders suggests in a beautiful parable:

Noah was tired of acting as prophet of calamity and continuously announcing a catastrophe that did not arrive and no one was taking seriously. One day, he wore an old sack and strewed ashes over his head. That act was only allowed for mourning one's beloved son or spouse. Wearing the dress of truth, actor of sorrow, he went to town, determined to turn to his advantage the curiosity, wickedness and superstition of the citizens. Soon a small crowd of onlookers gathered around him and started questioning him. He was asked whether someone was dead and who the dead was. Noah answered that many were dead and, to the amusement of the listeners, that those dead were them. When they asked when the catastrophe occurred, he replied: tomorrow. Taking advantage of their attention and consternation, Noah rose with all his presence and started to speak: the day after tomorrow the deluge will be something that will have been. And when the deluge will have been, it will never have existed. When the deluge will have dragged away all there is, all there will have been, it will be too late to remember it, because there will be nobody. Then, there will be no more difference between the dead and those who mourn them. The reason I came in front of you, is for inverting the times, is for mourning today the

²¹ Richard Leakey, Roger Lewin (eds.), *The Sixth Extinction*, New York, Doubleday, 1995 - London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996 (extract: <http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/6thext2.htm>.)

²² *Ibidem*.

dead of tomorrow. The day after tomorrow it will be too late. After that, he went back home, got rid of his dress, and went to the workshop. In the evening, a carpenter knocked at his door and said: let me help you to build the ark, so that what you said becomes false. Later, a roof-maker joined the two of them saying: it is raining in the mountains, let me help you, so that what you said becomes false²³.

But also with regard to the precautionary principle and to those who, like the prophets of calamity, propose to use it in decision-making processes, a harsh controversy has arisen. On the one hand, it has been taken by the European Union as the leading principle of its environmental and health policy, and in France they discuss over whether to include it in their constitutional Chart²⁴. On the other, some call it derogatively “principle of non-experimentation”²⁵ and explicitly call for repealing it. In many of those stances we can see a puzzling “politicization of science”, with poor argumentation levels, almost to the point of asking whether science is a matter “of the right or of the left”. Often, very qualified studies are ignored, as in the case of the European Environment Agency's wide-ranging report²⁶, which, through the analysis of 12 case studies, lays sufficiently rigorous bases for timely interventions, evaluating the risks of both action and inaction. But, as it was to be hoped for and perhaps inevitable, the field of studies has been widening thanks to the works of those who, like Mariachiara Tallacchini, contributed to introduce in our universities the studies on “science, technology and law”, involving the juridical sciences²⁷.

²³ Text quoted by Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *Petite métaphysique des tsunamis*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2005.

²⁴ Cf. Gilbert Charles, *Qui a peur du principe de précaution?*, “L'Express”, 29 Mars 2004, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/environnement/qui-a-peur-du-principe-de-precaution_490161.html.

²⁵ Cf. Henry I. Miller, Gregory Conko, *The Frankenfood Myth: How Protest and Politics Threaten the Biotech Revolution*, foreword by Norman Borlaug, Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2004.

²⁶ Cf. European Environment Agency (EEA), *Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896-2000*, Environmental Issue Report No. 22/2001, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22; Poul Harremoës et al (eds.), *The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century. Late Lessons from Early Warnings*, London, Earthscan, 2002.

²⁷ Cf. Maria Chiara Tallacchini, *Principio di precauzione e filosofia pubblica dell'ambiente* [Precautionary Principle and Public Philosophy of the Environment], in Cosimo Quarta (ed.), *Una nuova etica per l'ambiente*, Bari, Dedalo, 2006, pp. 95-115. See also her contribution on Sheila Jasanoff's thought: Id., *Politiche della scienza e ridefinizioni della democrazia* [Policies of science and redefinitions of democracy], http://www.fondazionebassetti.org/it/focus/2008/04/politiche_della_scienza_e_ride.html (first part) and http://www.fondazionebassetti.org/it/focus/2008/04/politiche_della_scienza_e_ride_1.html (second part).

It may be interesting to observe that even in the discussions on human rights a line of thought that we could define as precautionary is striding ahead. In his reflection on the origin of rights, Alan Dershowitz expresses his opinion in favor of a “bottom-up” approach, based on strictly inductive reasoning, and comes to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: right derives from error²⁸. It is from the big errors in history, like the Shoah, that we have learned a system based on the protection of certain fundamental rights. But it is necessary that from big errors mankind could still be able to learn. The biggest errors, like a generalized nuclear war or a very-large-scale global change, would not for sure allow to learn, and many societies of the past collapsed for that very reason, as Jared Diamond reminds us²⁹.

A further widening of such a reasoning leads us to reflect, although very briefly, on the “epistemological bases of non-violence”, meant as the capacity of creative (and not destructive) transformation of conflicts³⁰, a theme that has been dealt with by Jerry Ravetz also, and that shall certainly be touched again and widened³¹.

A peculiar characteristic of non-violence is its “omeostatic” nature, that allows to pursue truth without destroying that of our adversary, by learning from errors and acting with highly reversible behaviors. We will never know whether we are right, we will never know whether the course of action we embarked upon, even with the best intentions, will produce the expected results; therefore, we commit ourselves to follow a methodology that allows for the search of truth to fully unfold, following that philosophical and epistemological attitude which, as we saw, is at the root of the scientific-research procedures in conditions of uncertainty and ignorance, well aware that in the social field non-corrigible errors are life-or-death questions.

²⁸ Cf. Alan Dershowitz, *Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights*, New York, Basic Books, 2004.

²⁹ Cf. Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, New York, Viking Press, 2005. See also a critique of this perspective in Patricia A. McAnany, Norman Yoffee (eds.), *Questioning Collapse: Human Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

³⁰ Cf. Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Oslo, International Peace Research Institute – PRIO/London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, SAGE Publications, 1996.

³¹ Cf. Jerry Ravetz, *Towards a non-violent discourse in science*, in Georg Frerks, Berma Klein Goldewijk (eds.), *Human Security and International Insecurity*, Wageningen, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2007, pp. 249-264, <http://www.jerryravetz.co.uk/essays/e05nonvio.pdf>.

6. What future?

Today's science policy is characterized by a complexity level without precedents and by a series of paradoxes that require to proceed with caution, not in a hurry, defining with a participative method the priority levels with a dialogue-based process that Jerry Ravetz so describes:

This is the 'post-normal' world of science policy, in which scientific demonstrations are complemented by stakeholder dialogues. In these, all sides come to the table with full awareness that their special commitments and perspectives are only a part of the story, and with a readiness to learn from each other and to negotiate in good faith. Such a process may indeed seem paradoxical to those raised on the verities of traditional natural science, in which every problem has one and only one correct answer. It would be equally paradoxical to those whose politics assumes that their own side has the unique possession of reason and morality. But it is only through grasping all such paradoxes that we can resolve the riddles of safety in the global knowledge economy, develop a politics of policy-critical ignorance, and move forward to a new creativity in science and governance alike³².

To proceed in the analysis, we can try to ask ourselves which our future will be, starting from some reflections by the well-known British astrophysicist Martin Rees, to be found in his excellent book *Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning*, where he honestly states: "any forecast for the middle of the century is in the realm of conjectures and scenarios"³³. However, he does not refrain from examining, very cautiously, the possible and multiform threats, of a natural or man-made origin, that endanger the future of our planet and of mankind. For those of a natural origin, it is possible to formulate a probability based on the historical series of events, be they of a cosmic (asteroids, comets) or terrestrial nature (volcanoes, earthquakes, draughts). Man-induced events (wars, economic or environmental impact) are more non-forecastable. Summing together the probabilities of the two orders of events, Rees arrives to estimate that mankind has a 50% total probability to survive till after the 21st century.

³² Ravetz, *Paradoxes and the Future of Safety in the Global Knowledge Economy*, cit.

³³ Martin Rees, *Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning. How Terror, Error and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in this Century – On Earth and Beyond*, Cambridge, MA, Basic Books, 2004.

7. Scenarios

In order to give ourselves a direction in the difficult task of outlining and evaluating possible and plausible future scenarios, like the one forecasted by Rees, let us start from a relatively simple model, proposed by Barry Commoner, Paul R. Ehrlich and John Holdren in 1973, known as the IPAT³⁴ model or more explicitly IMPACT according to a later, updated version.

The model is characterized by the functional relation $I = I(P; A; T)$, that takes into account three main variables. It is a model of an intermediate complexity, neither too simple nor too complex, usually written in the form $I = P \times A \times T$, where the impact I on the planet depends on its population P , on the lifestyle A , i.e. the per capita consumption, and on the technology factor T .

Considering some important indicators, as the ecological footprint³⁵ and the NPP (Net Primary Production, calculated by Peter M. Vitousek, Paul R. Ehrlich, Anne H. Ehrlich and Pamela A. Matson in 1986³⁶), the impact I has already gone above the planet's sustainability threshold and it is necessary therefore to reduce the impact I by at least 20%, if we want to come back within the limits of environmental and social sustainability (social justice, equitable distribution of resources). To that end, we propose an arithmetic exercise, that lends itself to many variants depending on how much one wants to reduce the impact and correct the distribution of resources, supposing it is possible to act on each of the three main variables.

³⁴ "Generally credited to ecologist Paul Ehrlich, the IPAT formulation arose from a dispute in the early 1970s among the most prominent environmental thinkers of the day about the sources of environmental impact. Ehrlich and John Holdren identified population size and growth as the most urgent IPAT factor, whereas Barry Commoner argued that post-World War II production technologies were the dominant reason for environmental degradation"; Marian Chertow, Cutler Cleveland, John Felleman, *IPAT Equation*, in Cutler J. Cleveland (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Earth*, Washington, D.C., Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment, 2008, http://www.eoearth.org/article/IPAT_equation.

³⁵ Cf. Mathis Wackernagel, William E. Rees, Phil Testemale, *Our Ecological Footprint. Reducing Human Impact on Earth*, Gabriola Island, BC; Philadelphia, PA, New Society Publishers, 1995.

³⁶ Cf. Peter M. Vitousek, Paul R. Ehrlich, Anne H. Ehrlich and Pamela A. Matson, *Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis*, in "BioScience", Vol. 36, No. 6, June 1986, pp. 368-373, http://www.rachel.org/files/document/Human_Appropriation_of_the_Products_of_Photosy.pdf.

8. Population

Since the beginning of the last century, the planet's population has increased by a factor of 4 and will continue to increase, although less than anticipated two years ago. The most reliable estimates foresee that around the middle of the present century P will stabilize at around 9 billion people, with an increase of 50% over the present values, and will then start to decrease slowly.

9. Consumption

It is more difficult to estimate the variation of the per capita consumption, which depends on lifestyles and the general economic trends of society. Instead of assuming what will happen, we can estimate what would be necessary to do for bringing *I* back within sustainability limits. The question of consumption, moreover, presents differences depending on regional areas and social classes. It is not only desirable, but necessary, to have a decrease for the richer strata and regions, and an increase for the poorer ones, in other words a greater equality. Such a rebalancing could be obtained, at least partly, with the following changes of the factor A: a gradual 30-50% reduction for the richer strata of the world population (20%), a doubling for the intermediate strata (60%), and a 4-times increase for the absolutely poorest strata (20%).

Actually, we are witnessing an inconsiderate consumption growth by a consumer class that by now includes not only the almost complete totality (80%) of the industrialized world population, but is widening to the richer strata of the population of other countries, in particular China (240 millions, or 20% of its population) and India (120 millions, or 10%). Between 1960 and 2000, the growth of global private consumption has increased almost four times, passing from 4800 to 20000 equivalent billion dollars³⁷.

³⁷ Cf. Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2004. Special Focus: The Consumer Society*, Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute, 2004; Pietro Greco, *Pianeta acqua*, Padova, Franco Muzzio, 2004.

The forecast is coming true, it seems, that the authors of *The Limits to Growth* reformulated twenty years after their first book³⁸. That is stressed by the drafters of the *Factor Four* project: “the Meadows are right, although in the meantime new raw materials have been discovered and new knowledge and changes to old models are available: the limits to growth are being approached at a worrying pace”. And they sum it up drastically: “we have only fifty years, that is, little time to lose”³⁹.

In conclusion, we can reasonably state that, of the three main variables, population *P* looks heading today to stay under control, while the two critical variables are *A* and *T*. Whilst in the past people thought that the growth of *A* could be compensated for by efficiency improvements of the factor *T*, “the truth is that not even technology innovation and environmental efficiency of production systems are able to keep up with the demand of goods by the now-globalized consumer class”⁴⁰.

10. Technology

As to the third variable, the technology factor *T*, uncertainties are even greater. There is a general agreement on the possibility to significantly improve the efficiency of production systems so that energy amount per production unit, hence emissions and environmental impact, are reduced. Estimates made by researchers at the Wuppertal Institute on this matter vary from a “factor 4” to a “factor 10”⁴¹.

In more general and qualitative terms, there is a very large variety of positions. A hyper-optimistic expectation is the one we may trace back to, among others, Edward Teller, who underlined the importance of knowledge growth, arguing that “if each century produced a doubling of knowledge compared to the preceding one, at the end of the next millennium

³⁸ Cf. Donella H. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, Dennis L. Meadows, *Beyond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse, Envisioning a Sustainable Future*, White River Junction, Vermont, Chelsea Green Publishing, 1992; Dennis L. Meadow, *Evaluating Past Forecast: Reflection on One Critique of “The Limits to Growth”*, in Robert Costanza, Lisa J. Graumlich, Will Steffen (eds.), *Sustainability or Collapse? An Integrated History and Future of People on Earth*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2007, pp. 399-415.

³⁹ Cf. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Amory B. Lovins, L Hunter Lovins, *Factor Four. Doubling Wealth - Halving Resource Use*, London, Earthscan, 1997. On Meadows Report see a recent analysis in Ugo Bardi, *The Limits to Growth Revisited*, New York, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, Springer, 2011.

⁴⁰ Greco, *Pianeta acqua*, cit.

⁴¹ Weizsäcker, Lovins, Lovins, *Factor Four. Doubling Wealth - Halving Resource Use*, cit.

human knowledge will have increased about thousand times over the present, whatever such a statement could mean”⁴². In that case, one could expect that, at a parity of lifestyle and per capita consumption, the technology variable T would produce a reduction of impact I of at least 100 times. Such an optimistic approach is basically shared by those who believe that new technologies, the so-called high-tech (bio-technologies, robotics and nanotechnologies), will allow Earth resources to be used through nano-robots, capable of operating on a molecular scale in conditions of extraordinary efficiency.

Just of the opposite opinion are those who see in the very advent of those technologies a risk of potential dangers that would jeopardize the survival of mankind. Well-known scientists and technology experts like Bill Joy and Eric Drexler raised the alarm on the dangers of such new technologies, that in an extreme case could lead to the realization of self-replicating robots which, slipping away of man's control, could take on an eco-destructive behavior and eat up the surroundings till the entire bio-sphere will be destroyed⁴³.

The debate between the two opposing camps is still taking place in some of the best-known magazines of the sector. In particular, Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley have been supporting opposite theses, each putting forward new, although not conclusive, arguments. Smalley, Nobel Prize winner, argued, availing himself of his experience as a chemist, about the impossibility to build self-replicating machines on a molecular scale, citing three obstacles that call to mind Maxwell's demon and the second law of thermodynamics, without succeeding, however, to change Drexler's opinion.

It looks reasonable to assume that the technology factor could lead to an increase of efficiency, that can be cautiously estimated to be between 4 and 10. Compounding the forecasted variations of the three factors (population P increase, resources redistribution in factor A and efficiency increase in factor T), one can calculate that it is possible to reduce the impact I by a factor ranging from 3 to 4, thus bringing it back within the general limits of

⁴² Edward Teller, *Sull'importanza della scienza e dell'etica* [On the Importance of Science and Ethics], in AA.VV., (eds.), *Scienza ed etica alle soglie del terzo millennio*, [Science and Ethics at the Threshold of the Third Millennium] Società Italiana di Fisica, Città di Castello, 1993.

⁴³ Cf. Bill Joy, *Why the Future Does Not Need Us*, in “Wired”, April 2000, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html>

sustainability. This gross exercise in “arithmetic of sustainability” leads us to a cautious hope, provided we act in a timely fashion in each of the three main directions⁴⁴.

11. Making plans for a transition: a change of paradigm and scale

As we saw in the above exercise, the environmental matter confronts us with questions we cannot elude with expedients or ambiguity. It is the entire set of our scientific, ecological, economic, ethical and political knowledge that must undergo an in-depth revision. We are faced with what systems scholars call a bifurcation. What route shall we choose? In addition to our doubts and ignorance in scientific knowledge, we are in a state of ignorance, even more serious and shocking, also about what concerns ethical principles and economic and political systems: which are the ones that could give us a more efficient governance of the environmental question? Can we use the same criteria we found for analyzing the state of our scientific knowledge, for settling the controversies and conflicts of a social, economic and political nature that arise from the environmental problems?

The variables present in the IPAT model are to a lesser or greater extent connected to the development models, the ethical principles and the economic theories which were devised and became predominant in the course of time without taking in due consideration the constraints of the bio-sphere. It is as if the world of academic culture were split in two, the ecologists and the economists. The first ones study the biosphere system and the constraints it poses to human activity. The second ones continue to believe in the possibility to operate with no constraints, beyond any limit.

That split in our knowledge of social and environmental systems led two well-known supporters of those opposing theses, Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon, an ecologist the former and an economist the latter, to confront each other in a famous “bet”. Ehrlich was forecasting that in a few years time the price of some metals will increase, while Simon was stating the opposite. At the expiration of the forecast period, in 1990, Ehrlich, the loser, paid the agreed-upon sum of the bet.

⁴⁴ Cf. Pietro Greco, Antonio Pollio Salimbeni, *Lo sviluppo insostenibile*, Milano, Mondadori, 2003.

But the story does not end there. Ehrlich chose fifteen issues to bet on, comparing their trends of 1994 with those of 2004. Ehrlich was forecasting... that there will be an increase of CO₂ and nitrogen oxide, of the polluting ozone in the lower atmosphere, of the sulphur dioxide released by the Asian industrializing countries, of the erosion of cultivated land, of AIDS mortality, and of the income gap between the richer 10% and the poorer 10% of mankind... This time, however, Simon did not accept the challenge⁴⁵.

The ecologists think that the conditions of the environment shall be taken into account, while the economists rely on the possibility that progress will solve everything. But are we in a position to bet on the future of our planet, or shall we follow a more rational and less risky decision-making procedure?

Four main schools of economic thought can be singled out that deal with the environmental question, classified according to whether they are focused on a techno-centered/antropo-centered dimension, or an eco-centered/bio-centered dimension, and whether in turn they take extremist or moderate positions:

1. *extreme techno-centrism/antropo-centrism*: confidence in progress solving every problem, in limitless economic growth, and in innovation
1. *high-tech, moderate techno-centrism/antropo-centrism*: introduction of the idea of sustainable development, regulated by policies of global governance and eco-efficiency
2. *moderate eco-centrism/bio-centrism*: policies of environmental conservation, assumption of a stationary-state economy
3. *extreme eco-centrism/bio-centrism*: recognition of the intrinsic value of nature, assumption of decreasing economy and population.

The main differences between the techno-centric and the eco-centric schools are essentially two: on the plane of values, the first two schools attribute to nature a basically instrumental value, while the other two give it an intrinsic value, independent of mankind's economic interests. From a scientific point of view, the key point consists in acknowledging or not the different characters of the living systems compared to the technological ones.

⁴⁵ Cf. Franco Carlini, *Scommesse sul pianeta inquinato*, "Il Manifesto", 5 October 2003.

As Pignatti and Trezza observe, while the bio-sphere is a self-organizing system if far from the equilibrium kept by the solar energy flow, and able to self-regulate as required to maintain itself in a stationary condition,

there is now a production system created by man that can expand itself without restraint, because it can create money in unlimited quantity. An energy flow is activated that is entirely of a technological origin, unrelated to the bio-sphere, which can absorb without damage only a minimal part of it. So the energy, almost in its totality, is modifying in a traumatic way the bio-sphere... The man-made systems forming the industrial productive system are thermodynamic systems close to equilibrium, unable to self-organize; they are fed by an energy reserve coming from fossil fuels or from other energy sources different from the chlorophyll synthesis, and from those sources they can draw off with no limits; they have no self-regulation system available⁴⁶.

While the supporters of the first two schools believe that there are a number of compatibility degrees between the present economic system and the environment, and propose precautionary reform measures, which however do not affect the core of the system's basic structural conception, other authors (Georgescu-Roegen, the main representative of a new body of studies known as *bio-economy*; Arne Naess, founder of the *deep ecology* school, which has been indicated here with the term *extreme bio-centrism*; Pignatti and Trezza, already mentioned, and Serge Latouche, the theoretician of *degrowth*) firmly propose to exit from the capitalist economy, considered incompatible with the need to safeguard the bio-sphere. According to that vision, the exit from industrialism (of both the capitalist and the socialist kind) should take place gradually through a transition process that should broadly follow these steps, in order to ensure security and stability conditions to the bio-sphere: "population stabilized at around 1,5 billion inhabitants, and ensuing abandonment of the agriculture based on synthetic fertilizers; progressive elimination of the gap between industrialized and Third World countries; energy consumption of the order of 10^{10} Gcal; forest area increased by 50%

⁴⁶ Sandro Pignatti, Bruno Trezza, *Assalto al pianeta. Attività produttiva e crollo della biosfera*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000.

over the present; decomposition of industrial products after their use, and generalized recycling systems for wastes”⁴⁷.

This is basically a “low-power” scenario, both in the energy-content sense of the term and from the viewpoint of its density, load capacity and ecological footprint. It portrays a society at a small, decentralized scale, with forms of direct and participated democracy, and appropriate technologies. There are already significant examples of communities oriented in that direction.

Which of the various models will prevail over time, and which should be the most rational and wise policy to follow? Once again we are faced with a decision-making process in conditions of ignorance. Should we follow the precautionary principle, we would be led to choose the model which, in case of errors, will allow us to correct them without serious damages and costs, in conditions of maximum security: great projects and great scale are synonymous with great uncertainty, great risks and great errors. Vice versa, small projects and small scale imply to be exposed to small uncertainty, small risk and corrigible errors. Will we be so wise and rational to follow the philosophy of “small is beautiful”, as suggested by Ernst Fritz Schumacher, or will our *hybris* be that of letting us be dazzled by the sirens of mega-projects and mega-risks?

⁴⁷ Cf. *Ibidem*.

**BIO-ECONOMICS, ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS:
PRE-ANNOUNCED CRISES VS. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS¹**

Roberto Burlando

*In science, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by
resistance, against a background provided by expectation.*

Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962

*If the only tool you have is a hammer,
you will see everything around you as nails.*

Old Irish Saying

**1. Introduction. The new environmental constraints: climate change, fossil fuels
exhaustion, and economic and technological choices.**

Recognition of the problem and concerns over climate change have found at last a
widespread coverage in the international press, just before the burst of the financial crisis, due

¹ As usual, the responsibility of what is written is exclusively mine, but many people have made possible, even encouraged in many ways, this work. I, therefore, thank my colleagues of other disciplines (many now also friends of mine) Gianni Tamino, Luca Mercalli and Rossana Becarelli, from whom I learned crucial elements of matters and themes that until not long ago had only fascinated me, and Mauro Bonaiuti, Angelo Tartaglia and Dalma Domeneghini, who at times have succeeded in the difficult task of letting me see things as they see them. With them, in turn, I participated in several public meetings where these themes have been debated and from each of them I learned a lot. Thanks also to the School for the Alternative of the *Missionari della Consolata* in Turin (Italy) - and in particular to Father Antonio - who, few years ago, urged me to organize within their activities a cycle of meetings on these topics, and to the Piedmont's Social and Work Pastoral Office (*Ufficio Piemontese della Pastorale Sociale e del Lavoro*) - in particular Don Daniele Bortolussi and Dino Cassibba - that gave me the opportunity to further discuss these themes in open and constructive environments. The same did, more recently, both the Department of Economics of the University of Pisa and the Theological Faculty of the Venetias. Not less warmly felt are my thanks to the organizers of the current Conference, both for the project relevance and for their kind invitation to contribute.

also to the nowadays very large convergence of assessments on that matter². Unfortunately, so far this seems to have caused many declarations of commitment but only few and quite limited initiatives, without opening any serious debate over the route that economic and social development has followed up to now and particularly in the most recent decades. There is not yet any significant discussion – at least within the mainstream – on the necessary structural changes to the present production choices and consumption habits³ – hence to our very lifestyle – that need introducing. On the other hand, many scientists dealing specifically with these problems in warns that in order to modify the situation in time for the present and/or the next generations changes of that sort ought to be immediate and radical.

Even the modest (with respect to the problems) Kyoto Protocol objectives are largely disregarded and not even the threat of heavy fines for the contravening countries and companies seems enough to induce more responsible behaviours⁴. No greater effect seems to have been produced by the conclusions of the authoritative Stern Review, which states that “the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting”⁵.

More serious concerns (surely anger) are being brought about by the rise of fossil fuels prices – still central in today's production, exchanges and consumption patterns – and by those of other raw materials. In this cases however, there are clearly two components, often not easy to differentiate in their effects: basic trends and speculative manoeuvres: the formers are due to the progressive exhaustion of those resources while the latter ones take advantage of the

² Although there is not unanimity in the interpretation of the data and in the perspectives presented – due also to the relatively relevant level of uncertainty affecting many variables – the convergence of opinions on the climate trend is by now staggering, as we will see. It is worth noting that among the dissenting voices very few are independent and/or authoritative (not to say informed). There is consistent evidence of several attempts at hiding (and even opposing with tendentious or outright false arguments) data on climate changes by both the Bush Administration and several multinational companies (mostly US ones), sometimes through the creation of pretended “independent research centers” and even NGOs.

³ There are, though, single papers pointing in this direction. See for instance Juliet B. Schor, *Prices and Quantities: Unsustainable Consumption and the Global Economy*, in “Ecological Economics”, Vol. 55, Issue 3, 15 November 2005, pp. 309-320.

⁴ To the contrary some countries – Italy in particular – are looking for all possible reasons and excuses to avoid both the limits and the fines, often adopting a very myopic and populist approach.

⁵ *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Summary of Conclusions*, London, HM Treasury, 2006, p. 6;

http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/CLOSED_SHORT_executive_summary.pdf.

See also *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change*,

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm;

Nicholas Stern, *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

condition of progressive scarcity and of the market's dubious transparency, producing huge gains to the detriment of the consumers.

The issues of fossil fuel scarcity and the progressive exhaustion of minerals and exhaustible raw materials emerges every now and then (in comments over the rise of their prices or on the progress in the development of alternative sources, in discussions on the reasons of political and military interventions in different areas of the world, in particular in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East⁶) but this is not producing the large-scale investments and the radical changes in energy policies (both in energy saving measures and in developing alternative sources) that would be necessary.

A relevant divide on these issues is that between those who assume that the market will find suitable solutions, based on technological progress, for these problems when the scarcity will become so severe as to produce greater effects on prices and those who maintain that this is just a hope (more precisely, many of these critics consider it as merely an act of faith) and there is a urgent need for significant policy interventions⁷.

There are also scientists (of various disciplines) who are convinced that not even the classical instruments of economic policy could suffice⁸ and point to the necessity to invest the “still” available reserves of those goods in solving the more cogent and worrying problems without waiting for the provision of the “right” signals from the market. This means, in their opinion, huge investments in the developing of alternative energy sources and to change today's productive structures and lifestyles in order to lower – and then stabilize at a much lower level than today's – energy consumptions. What they call for, in order to perpetuate at least what we collectively consider the most important aspects of our current civilisation,

⁶ We have no intention to deal with such discussions; we limit ourselves to observe that the aspects not so much of the price as of a partial control of the availability of oil resources cannot but be, even more so in the present conditions, one of the strategic variables to be considered when evaluating interventions of any type in those areas.

⁷ Among the others, certainly the Stern Review is the more authoritative supporter of such a vision. Progressively it seems to be gaining more and more recognition and support also at the various international political meetings on these issues, but without generating, as yet, relevant concrete steps.

⁸ Such a view is clearly stated, for instance, in the Report *Great Transition* by the Stockholm Environment Institute (<http://www.sei-international.org/>) and it seems more in line with the statements of various national ASPO groups (Association for the Study of the Peak of Oil&Gas - <http://www.peakoil.net/aspo-organizations>); cf. Paul Raskin, Tariq Banuri, Gilberto Gallopín, Pablo Gutman, Al Hammond, Robert Kates, Rob Swart, *Great Transition. The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead*, A Report of the Global Scenario Group, Boston, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) – Tellus Institute, 2002, http://www.world-governance.org/IMG/pdf_0090_Great_Transition_-_ENG.pdf.

is a structural change also in the way of thinking and, accordingly, in the measures we uses to calculate progresses and achievements, both with respect to the economy and to society at large.

The recognition of the inadequacy of currently used measures and indices was also the starting point of a recent initiative promoted by the French government that appointed an extremely well-qualified international Commission to look into the matter and propose amendments and alternative measure. The Commission's works concentrated on three main issues: classical GDP shortcomings, measures of environment quality and degradation that need to be included in the more general indices and measures of the quality of life.

The global picture that emerges, even form just these few recognitions, is one of a significant change in perspective: in a past that looks now rather distant in time (cultural if not historical), there were discussions – often with harsh confrontations – over the desirability of contemporary economic model, its perspectives and the possible alternatives. Today, instead, we find ourselves – for the first time in human history – in the condition to have to seriously consider the eventuality that continuing along the lines of such a development model is *not a possibility any more*⁹, as opposed to less convenient or desirable. Keeping our present living standards (with their consumption levels), in particular on the part of some significant components of the world population (the USA in the first place, and then Australia and Europe) might simply be impossible in an already foreseeable future.

Quite a number of people (and even of scientists) seem to be trying to reject even the vague idea of such a possibility¹⁰ and in such an attempt associate this well-founded evidences and analysis with the (generally superficial, if not downright superstitious) “predictions” about the dangers and collapses that were popular during the passage to the new millennium.

⁹ These issues are the subject of an instructive book by Simone Borghesi, Alessandro Vercelli, *La sostenibilità dello sviluppo globale*, Roma, Carocci, 2006.

¹⁰ Economic and cognitive psychology provide plenty of explanations for the refusal to consider such worrying prospects of changes to the status-quo. The cases of excessive optimism and over-evaluation of the reference to the present when considering the future are just some of the well-known cognitive “biases” (commonly used by modern behavioural economics) characterizing our everyday lives. In this case, though, the problem is made worse off by the deep and radical changes required by the anticipated scenarios for people's current frame of mind, their reference values and their way of looking at facts and life.

Unfortunately the more recent worries cannot be easily dismissed as superstitions or “irrational attitudes”, and the “a priori sceptics” need to differentiate between the two levels.

Nor can it be ignored that many interests (short-sighted as they may be) are actively working to keep the status-quo (in a dynamic meaning, i.e. as further progress along the same unsustainable model) from which they enjoy high returns.

Certainly important changes imply costly (not only in economic terms) adaptations, but useful and interesting perspectives have already been sketched¹¹ that could help to face the needed transition in a positive and progressive way. A real difficulty would be turning around the consumerist and materialistic approach that have become more and more dominating and deeply built-in in the public approach in the recent decades: however history, included the recent one, has shown that what looks almost impossible in democracies in “normal” times can easily become reality in periods of crises. Does this imply that the needed changes cannot be pursued by democratic governments in order to minimize the negative impacts that are waiting for us if we continue on the current unsustainable path and that we need to face even consequences that could be avoided because the consumerist majority will not change until forced by dramatic events?

Certainly not all the countries are the same and have been taking the same attitude, despite the fact that the two problems we are considering are in their very nature global ones. Germany, for instance, has been steadily progressing toward being a lesser consumer of traditional energy sources: extensive improvements in the insulation of building and widespread adoption of alternative energy sources have made the country relatively less vulnerable and much more competitive in terms of energy costs of production in face of further increases in fossil fuels prices.

Great Britain does not seem to have been that much active in this direction but has taken seriously the menace of local effects of climate change and has devised and is

¹¹ See Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, *Natural Capitalism. Creating the Next Industrial Revolution*, Boston, New York, London, Little, Brown & Co, 1999; information and extracts available at <http://www.natcap.org/>.

implementing plans to adapt to possible (or likely) dramatic changes in natural conditions (floods etc)¹².

As the many recent analyses referred to, that have highlighted harsh perspectives and the necessity of urgent and in-depth measures with respect to the specific risk considered, are usually each focused on a single aspect, here we will try to consider them all together and sketch (though very briefly and tentatively) the overall picture that seems to emerge from them.

We seem in need to critically consider various aspects and dimensions:

1. the planet's health and the conditions that make life possible on it and/or in many areas on it; hence, the relevance of the climate changes and the ensuing damages (but also the possible advantages) to the life of millions of people and to their economic activities, first of all production. Some analyses¹³ cast doubts over the fact that those risks (the level of global environmental degradation, the global warming caused by the greenhouse effect, the thinning – colloquially called “hole” – in the ozone layer, the scarcity of water and other resources necessary to life in general) are by now jeopardizing the very survival of the great majority of the human population if not of the entire planet;
2. the state of natural resources (fossil fuels, but also minerals and raw materials) that make possible the lifestyle we (in the industrialised countries) are used to and which some other billions of people living in developing countries (in particular China and India) want to come closer to;

¹² Cf. Gabrielle Walker, David King, *The Hot Topic: What We Can Do about Global Warming*, Orlando, Florida, Harvest Books 2008 (Italian edition; *Una questione scottante. Cosa possiamo fare contro il riscaldamento globale*, foreword by Luca Mercalli, Torino, Codice, 2008). See also Peter Newell, Matthew Paterson, *Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

¹³ Also in this case they are not just the idle ideas of a lay person but the doubts of a well-known independent (perhaps too much independent?) scientist, James Lovelock, the author of the hypothesis, underestimated for a long time and then risen to international fame, of Gaia; cf. James Lovelock, *The Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth Is Fighting Back – and How We Can Still Save Humanity*, Santa Barbara, California, Allen Lane, 2006; Id., *The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning: Enjoy It While You Can*, Santa Barbara, California, Allen Lane, 2009.

3. the ways and intensity of the exploitation of environmental resources by the human race, hence both the technological choices and the patterns of demand (lifestyles and therefore consumption styles) and the approach (broadly speaking the “cultural” one and its economic counterpart) that determines and supports them, which keep trying to ignore the by now obvious shortcomings it has manifested.

2. Climate change and its social and economic effects

On the first point, the planet's overall health and the conditions that make possible our life on it, there are no longer real doubts¹⁴ about how serious the situation is and about what is, at the moment, the fundamental cause of it: man's activities. Even the very recent IPCC¹⁵ reports and the Stern review highlight a general convergence of opinions, at least among scientists, although in the presence of different approaches and despite the disregard shown for years towards scientists who were pinpointing the pending environmental disasters¹⁶.

The Stern Review literally states: *“An overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth climate is rapidly changing, mainly as a result of the increase in greenhouse gas caused by human activities.”*¹⁷

¹⁴ Despite nowadays almost isolated attempts by various interested parts to keep denying it.

¹⁵ See also the press accounts on the report by Nicholas Stern (a British economist, well-known at both the academic level and for his work for the World Bank) and on the Paris meeting (which started on Jan. 29, 2007) of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) experts, to discuss on the 4th Report on Climate. For a more general picture of the environmental, and not only, problems that mankind has to face at the beginning of the new millennium, I suggest instead Ervin Laszlo, *Third Millennium: The Challenge and The Vision*, London, Gaia Books, 1997.

¹⁶ For certain by the Bush administration towards many US scientists, but also and the “disinformation” operations mounted by some big companies, which believe that their interests are threatened by the concerns on the future of many people. Among the recent evidence of that, there is the statement (reported in the *New York Times* of January 29, 2006 and then by the international press, e.g. “La Repubblica”, January 30, 2006) by the climatologist James E. Hansen - who worked for NASA for almost thirty years - confirmed by his supervisor, the Italian Franco Einaudi. Also several multinational companies (in the oil sector, but not only) have tried to silence troubled voices or to present misleading evidence. At the beginning of 2007, the British Royal Society censured Exxon's conduct of financing with considerable amounts of money the spreading of false news on climate conditions, through NGOs set up for that purpose. Actually, the debate on false NGOs, financed by big companies in order to produce and spread ad hoc studies to protect their own interests, had already surfaced some years ago in several Anglo-Saxon countries. There is to mention also the public denouncement of the US Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) by Professor Curt Davis (of the University of Missouri-Columbia) for having put in place “a deliberate effort to confuse and mislead the public” in presenting the results of its research in the Antarctic in a series of TV ads aiming to rule out negative climatic effects. Such maneuvers and many others have created, of course, a climate of distrust and suspicion that makes a comparison between different parties more difficult. As we will see, the ASPO scientists point out that the non-reliability of the data presented by many oil companies is a significantly difficult element to consider when perspectives have to be thoroughly evaluated.

¹⁷ *Stern Review*, Part I: Climate change – Our approach, p. 2.

The same report highlights how climate change will influence the basic elements of people's life all over the world, including the availability of water and food, health and the environment. *“Hundreds of millions of people could suffer hunger, water shortages and coastal flooding as the world warms.”*

In the May 2007 Summit in Bangkok, the IPCC experts spelled out the guidelines that could allow us to slow down the growth of greenhouse gases causing the rise of our planet's average temperature and climate change. The key element is still the stabilization first and then the overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (the critical threshold could be reached between 2015 and 2030), in order to avert an increase of gas concentration above the safety limit for the planet's atmosphere (there are various levels corresponding to different changes in the climate. 450-650 parts per million is what nobody wants even to imagine). From this general framework, the specific goals for the reduction of emissions were derived, as recognised in various international treaties and agreements, e.g. the 20% reduction by the year 2020 agreed in Kyoto Protocol treaty.

Getting over the first of the concentration safety-limits would cause increases of average temperatures higher than two degrees centigrade. This could appear - to an uninformed person – as just a possibly unpleasant climatic evolution but certainly a non-dramatic one, while in reality it can cause an upsetting of the Earth's chemical composition, with the disappearance of the terrestrial crio-sphere (polar caps and glaciers) and the rising of seas and oceans. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario, pictured among others by Lester Brown (in his book, significantly titled “Plan B”, as Plan A is no longer practicable, in which he suggested that the safety goal would be an 80% reduction by 2020¹⁸), in which Asia's greater rivers (the Ganges in the first place) will be reduced to have only seasonal flows and in which the waters of seas and oceans will rise by several meters, submerging cities and lands in all the continents.

¹⁸ Cf. Lester R. Brown, Lester, *Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization*. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009 [available on-line at http://www.earth-policy.org/images/uploads/book_files/pb4book.pdf as well as the book's supporting datasets at www.earth-policy.org/books/pb4/pb4_data]. See also Id., *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*. New York, London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011 [available on-line at http://www.earth-policy.org/images/uploads/book_files/wotebook.pdf].

Such perspectives imply enormous human costs, so large that they can only be estimated with great difficulty, but it is easy to forecast that they will also cause huge material costs, which can instead be estimated, although only very roughly.

Estimates of this kind are presented in Stern Review, that defines them as the **costs of not-acting**, and presents a scenario that can be summed up as follows:

1. The estimated damages of climate change will amount to at least 5% of the world's global GDP, every year and forever, but considering a wider set of risks and impacts that figure is more likely to increase to more than 20% of the world's GDP, every year and forever from now on.
2. Every Country and everybody will be involved, but of course the most vulnerable (in particular the poorer countries and populations) will suffer first and more.
3. The industrialized countries shall take more responsibilities for achieving net reductions of their emissions – both because of their larger possibilities and greater historical responsibility, but the developing countries shall also do their part, without renouncing to grow.

Instead, the estimated **costs of interventions** could be estimated as follows:

- Aiming at averting the worst, reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases and stabilizing their concentration: about 1% of the global GDP, every year and forever.
- There can be, however, positive aspects on the side of efficiency gains and indirect advantages, for example from the reduction of pollution.
- In addition, the activities connected to the struggle against climate change *“will also create significant business opportunities”*.

The Stern Review's overall perspective is expressed in very clear terms in the following sentences:

1. *The world does not need to choose between averting climate change and promoting growth and development.*
2. *Changes in energy technologies and in the structure of economies have created opportunities to decouple growth from greenhouse gas emission. Indeed, ignoring climate change will eventually damage economic growth.*
3. ***Tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor nations.***

According to the Stern Review, climate change is the greatest “market failure” that the world has ever known, and in order to correct the situation efficient global intervention is needed, focussing on three key elements:

- Raise of the price of hydrocarbons through taxation, exchanges and regulations (thus bringing inside the costs of the producers' outside-effects), so that the market mechanisms themselves can work towards a reduction and better rationalization of their use.
- Support of energy-saving innovations and the use of technologies requiring a lower content of hydrocarbons.
- Removal of barriers to energy efficiency, also through better information, education and persuasion at the individual level to undertake concrete actions.

Although such perspectives may already appear rather worrying, there is more to take into consideration. The Stern Review is an impressive resume of a very large documentation¹⁹ but, even so, its scope is limited with respect to the provision of a comprehensive picture within which the possible future evolutions can be projected. A first limit is simply due to the scope of the investigation (right from the start it was concerned “only” with the issue of climate change), others have to do with the economic and social “vision” it embodies and with its explicit purpose to constitute a guide to the policy-makers and the public opinion.

¹⁹ As normally are that kind of exercises, traditionally entrusted by the British government to a panel of experts who collect and work upon the opinions of scientists from all over the world.

Very briefly, in the opinion of some authors it presents:

- An analysis exclusively focused on climate change, not taking into consideration in the perspectives drawn the concerns over raw materials exhaustion and future energy shortage. It is a chosen and clearly declared limit, to be kept in mind just to avoid to consider the report as providing a complete picture of the present situation.
- A prudent consideration of the risks connected to climate change²⁰ incorporated in a rather positive and optimistic view of the present and the future (certainly so if compared with the scenarios presented further on in this paper).
- An analysis firmly rooted in the prevailing economic theory, without questioning any of its many – and by now evident – limits, including some that appear crucial for a more realistic assessment both of the necessity to intervene and of the definition of the main targets.

Some of the perspectives that need integrating with those in the report are dealt with in other analyses and documents. As already mentioned, they relate to the future shortage of natural resources. Let us start with water and observing that the world situation of water availability²¹ does not seem to be less serious than the climate one; but soil availability is also beginning to raise strong concerns and clearly the two constitute fundamental elements for supporting life on our planet²².

Scarcity and, noteworthy, price dynamics (sharp increases of trends, sometimes with worrying oscillations) plague many mineral markets too, but those that are causing the greatest concerns and that have made the most profound impression in recent times on the public opinion are those of oil and fossil fuels in general.

²⁰ Prudent, for instance, because of the very low discount rate it uses in the evaluation of future costs. This choice has been criticized by some economists and defended by other.

²¹ See on this matter, among others, the analyses proposed by Vandana Shiva, *Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution, and Profit*, New York, South End Press, 2002; Ervin Laszlo, *Third Millennium: The Challenge and The Vision*, cit. pp. 19-20.

²² We will not deal with these issues here, simply referring the interested reader to the already mentioned works and their references. On the use of soils, we refer also to recent analyses and discussions on the scarcity of fundamental agricultural products, their prices and the use of soils for producing bio-fuels.


3. Oil peaks and the exhaustion of fossil fuels

In the current productive system and general organization of developed societies fossil fuels have widespread usage and are for sure the resource that is contributing more to shape the lifestyle we are used to. In many international meetings activists first and more recently also some politician have discussed the need for energy saving measures and for developing alternative and renewable sources of energy but, as usual, this is done belatedly and in the face of price movements that are causing strong tensions all over the world. Italy seems to be (also in this case) among the countries that are moving with the greatest delay and the least determination in the direction of necessary changes, still indulging in a sterile debate and in the illusion that the solution to the problem could come from the construction of an undefined number of nuclear plants. Once again we seem to come late to consider solutions that others are now abandoning and that look unmistakably out-of-date, barring possible but certainly still distant in the future technological “revolutions” in that sector.

In the following discussion we will concentrate on the hydrocarbons situation, but similar considerations apply also to other resources, and in particular to several minerals that are becoming more and more scarce.

Figure 1. World Oil Projected Supply and Demand

World Supply Shortfall – Billions of Barrels



- From the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) 2002
- All liquid hydrocarbons

Source: ASPO.

The constantly rising prices of gasoline and other fuels in all countries (even if in a quite differentiated degree) have evidenced their scarcity and the growing gap between their supply and demand (both real and potential). There is no doubt that in the oil market there are huge speculations resulting in enormous profits, not only for the producers; but they arise from a situation of objective and progressive scarcity, made more critical by an increase in demand coming from both the industrialized and many recently-industrialized countries. Figure 1 gives a clear and impressive representation of the situation.

The demand for hydrocarbons is driven, as it is well-known, by the increasing demand of fuel for transport and energy for industrial and consumption use. The access to markets and goods by wider strata of the world population, in particular in such massive realities as China and India – whose production and demand grow at very high rates – produces a dynamic that even the current, considerable price increases seem unable to restrain.

On the side of supply, the real situation of fossil fuel reserves, both those already known and those expected to be discovered in the near future, is still the subject of debate. In particular, the ASPO (Association for the Study of Peak Oil²³) highlights the great uncertainty and the low credibility of the data provided by oil companies, whose quotations directly depend on the amounts of their reserves.

The history of independent studies on oil peaks and of the birth of that association is rather interesting and long. We will limit ourselves here to mention the most famous pioneer of such researches, the US geologist Marion King Hubbert, who in the 1960s predicted that the US production of oil would have reached a peak in the 1970s²⁴, and since would have been irreversibly diminishing.

His studies and predictions were taken with great scepticism and he was considered by many in the field as more or less insane, but in time his predictions proved to be right (as

²³ ASPO is a non-profit organization composed to a large extent of mining engineers, geologists, physicists and oil-sector experts. Many of its founding members spent their working career in oil companies.

²⁴ See Ugo Bardi, *La fine del petrolio*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2003, pp. 98 ff. See also <http://www.theoil Drum.com/>; Ugo Bardi, *A Simple Interpretation of Hubbert's Model of Resource Exploitation*, in "Energies", Vol. 2, No. 3, August 2009, pp. 646-661, <http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/2/3/646/pdf>; Id., *La Terra svuotata. Il futuro dell'uomo dopo l'esaurimento dei minerali*, Roma, Editori Riuniti University Press, 2011.

shown in Figure 2, representing the profile of the oil production in the USA). The US peak was reached at the beginning of the 1970s and the oil production decrease was only slowed down by new fields of extractions in Alaska and from submarine sources (generally at more than 500 meters below sea level, which means that they present higher extraction and refining costs).

Of course, the analyses of the amounts of fossil fuels reserves have not been limited to the US situation, and reasonably accounted for data and projections of the overall situation have progressively emerged.


On the one hand, in time there has been a definite drop in oil discoveries, finally leading to the so-called “discovery deficit”, a situation where new discoveries in a year were lower than the oil quantity used up in the same period of time. This has progressively lead to the overall reduction in accumulated and projected reserves and the inversion point is what has become famous as the “peak”.

Many recent disputes turn around:

- a) the exact time when the world reserves will reach their peak and start declining and
- b) how steep the slope of the declining curve will be. The steeper it is the less time there will be to use the remaining reserves.

A crucial point is that the discovery deficit – and therefore both the peak location in time and the steepness of the declining curve do not depend only on the discoveries realised in a certain unit of time but also on quantity of oil used in the same period. Reducing the intensity of fossil fuels consumption per unit of time will give us more time to develop alternative energy sources to substitute for the diminishing ones.

Figure 2. The (predicted and later verified) US Oil production peak



Source: ASPO-USA

It is worth noting (and Figure 3 gives an illustration of that) that the prospects of world oil resources are by now essentially in the hands of the OPEC member countries²⁵.

On the other hand, the estimated situation and the projections relative to the demand side are much more uncertain, though it is pretty clear that they keep rising. The usage forecasts are strongly influenced by both economic and technological variables; first of all by:


- a) the growth rate of production and consumption and
- b) the “energy intensity” of production and consumption activities.

The current overall trend emerging from both the forecasts of reserves and the estimates of future demand is the worrying one already seen in Figure 1.

²⁵ It is not a case that several analysts observed how figure 3 contains more relevant evidence about the Iraqi war – and in general on tensions in that geo-political area – than those presented in entire books analysing other aspects of the reality of those territories.

Figure 3. Past and projected Oil production by Opec (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and non-Opec countries.

World Oil and the Middle East



- Line 1 – Red: Total Oil (sum of lines 2 and 3)
- Line 2 – Black: Non-OPEC oil
- Line 3 – Green: OPEC oil
- Non-OPEC oil will peak soon – OPEC will dominate

Source: ASPO-USA


A complementary view of the situation is provided by the diagram of the per-capita energy availability in the near future (see Figure 4). The slope of the declining part of the curve appears rather steep, but we need to consider that it is affected by the usual problem of average values, i.e. they are simply the results of the division of the total amount, in our case (decreasing) energy availability, by the (rising) number of individuals who constitute or will constitute the world population. The real distribution among individuals will hardly be equalitarian and therefore the individual lines (for instance by country) might look rather different, but nevertheless the figure clearly indicates the relevance in the near future of both the problems of the sharp decline in per-capita energy availability and of the rising likelihood of the emergence of appropriation disputes and even open wars.

4. Technological choices and composition of demand: which development model?

The various estimates (even those of various oil companies) of future availability of fossil fuels present differences that are certainly relevant to us but not huge: they all position the world oil peak in the near future. We are certainly better to face such a difficult prospect without further delay and move to the real issue: what can we do with respect to such a perspective?

Figure 4.

All Energy per Capita Projected Decline



- 1930 and 2030 – Energy/capita at 30% of 1979 peak value
– 3.32 boe/c – Barrels of oil equivalent per person per year
- High Energy Civilization lifespan – about 100 years.
- Will revert to “energy” life style of 1930, not the stone age
- Will not lose scientific advances e.g. medicine

Source: ASPO-USA

Clearly there are various variables we can work on and two of them look rather crucial:

1. Future energy demand, in particular the use of the remaining fossil fuel reserves;
2. The production of energy from alternative, possibly renewable, sources.

Both these variables contribute in a decisive manner to the definition of the future “development model” and the future life-styles (starting from their production and

consumption aspects) of the world population (or of large portions of it), and the choices made in each one of them have an effect on the other.

A significant reduction (with respect to the present trends) in energy consumption will make it available energy resources that can be used for a faster, intensive and better-organized development of alternative sources, hence the possibility of a “softer” transition to a different “energy model” that we shall in any case start to build.

Such a future “energy model” could take quite different forms (although looking closer to them the real and virtuous possibilities appear fewer than those that many policy-makers are discussing today) and will have an influence on several crucial aspects of the organization of human future societies and ultimately on the very level of our civilization.

The margins for increasing the energy efficiency of our homes (both in the construction and in their usage - heating features in first place), of transports and production (both agricultural and industrial) are quite large but, according to various experts, just sufficient in many cases (certainly in Italy) for meeting the target of an average 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, after which emissions would start rising again and at a very rapid pace, unless quite remarkable changes will take place in the composition of demand and hence in production (i.e. what will be produced in addition to how it will be produced) at the national level.

Similar conditions apply to many industrialized countries, although in the last years (or decades) some of them have adjusted in a faster and more efficient way to the new energy conditions and are therefore enjoying greater efficiency margins (and hence also greater competitive margins as energy costs contribute more and more to the final production costs).

In face of such perspectives, it is not strange to witness a growing number of scientists and lay people seriously considering the impossibility to go on along the present development lines, and posing the problem of the definition of a “new life-model”, whose key feature shall be a significant reduction of the production activities devouring fossil fuels and non-renewable resources²⁶.

²⁶ One significant modification of development lines, which however remains well within the present logic, is that of the already-mentioned “natural capitalism”, proposed a few years ago by Hawken, Lovins, Lovins: cf. Paul Hawken, Amory

Others, instead, believe this not to be feasible within the current world view and values and invoke a deeper and more widespread shift, promoting very different production and consumption patterns not only with respect to the technologies they employ but also in their ends and in the ways they satisfy human needs.

The theoretical proposals regarding the development model to be pursued by the various national communities – although with large differences between already industrialized and developing countries – can be roughly divided in four main currents: all of them suggest pursuing a number of similar goals but differentiate with respect to other ones and here we will look, for heuristic purposes, at their overall features, concentrating on a set of antithetical proposals.

A relevant number of economists and politicians propose to **continue with the present** model, obviously with the various adjustments needed to face what they see as the “current problems”, not different in nature and scale from those of other periods.

The alternative proposals, instead, suggest the pursuing of:

1. a **sustainable development** (where the definition of development is crucial),
2. a **stationary state** of material production, accompanied by qualitative improvements in all aspects of life,
3. a **de-growth** program, “guided” and confidently defined as “serene” or “happy”.

The first proposal appears as the less radical one, on the one side recognising the exceptional challenge mankind is facing today but on the other still convinced that traditional measures can suffice and therefore oriented to maintain living conditions similar to the present ones. The previously mentioned Stern report clearly falls within this category. However, two contrasting aspects are important for defining the features of proposals within such approach: on the one hand, the definition of **sustainability** used – characterized by some assumptions as to what degree the “natural capital” (the natural environment where life developed and the

Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, *Natural Capitalism. Creating the Next Industrial Revolution*, cit. Also the Stern Report's indications are essentially in a framework of significant changes, but within the present logic.

natural receptacle of bio-diversity, even today) can be replaced with an “artificial” or industrial capital – , and, on the other hand, the proposal's suitability to cope with the difficult task of averting natural disasters and assuring life on the planet to the great majority of its present-day population (human and otherwise). The divide between advocates of a stronger definition of sustainability (and hence of a lesser degree of substitution) and a much softer one is already a very relevant one.

The proposal of pursuing the path of a **stationary state** certainly moves from the belief that we will soon arrive (if we are not already there) at a level of material production that cannot rise anymore without imposing unacceptable and unsustainable environmental and human costs. Our planet is, from a thermodynamic viewpoint, a closed system (it exchanges with rest of the Universe only energy - notably that it receives from the sun - and not materials), and closed systems are, by definition, incompatible with the infinite development of any of their subsystems (like any animal species, including the human one, or industrial production). Therefore, we must recognize the limits we are subjected to, and respect them: we can still pursue great qualitative improvements to our lives, but we must do so without increasing the material production (H. Daly, 1996, page 7) and without going beyond the Earth's capacity to assimilate our wastes.

At present, the third approach – the **de-growth** proposal – seems to be less defined in concrete terms than the others, although for some aspects it recalls features present also in the proposals of a strong sustainability and of the stationary state (reduction of the ecological footprint, to be maintained within the natural limits that allow a good functioning and conservation of the biosphere conditions). At the moment it appears more as a bold attempt to attract the general attention to the environmental and energy issues than a well defined and articulated proposal or approach, but it has already had the merit of having stimulated the public imagination to think of something which almost everybody was trying to evade.

Despite such theoretical discussions, the current reality of everyday life seems not to move much from the usual tracks.

The concept of **sustainable development**, beyond its unquestionable merits, seems to have become since long time and for many people simply a way²⁷ to pursue the classical “business as usual” approach²⁸. At the theoretical level such a comfortable position has been given a respectable base through the “soft” interpretation of the sustainability concept, which contemplates a high degree of substitution between natural capital and man-created capital. Stretched to the limit and out of the economists' jargon, it means believing that sustainability does not imply at all to assure to future generations the present-day natural-capital stock (forests, cultivable land, meadows, etc.), but a stock of total capital in the computation of which the destruction of the natural capital can be fully compensated for by the simultaneous creation of capital goods created by man (for example sheds, roads, shopping centres, etc.)²⁹.

In general, in such attitudes there appears to be a very superficial over-estimate of the real possibilities given by technological development (which requires investments, in particular energy-wise) to modify, almost like magic, the present conditions. Alternatively they can be thought of as the product of a self-interested propaganda, declared-only goals like the struggle against poverty - proclaimed decades ago as the priority goal in the statements of distinguished international institutions, like the World Bank.

²⁷ Herman Daly has declared that there is nothing more unsustainable than sustainable development. Even a non-specialized magazine, and one of general culture and with a religious background (“Rocca”), commented in those terms; cf. Pietro Greco, *Sviluppo sostenibile: chi ci crede più?*, in “Rocca”, n. 16-17, 15 agosto-1° settembre 2006, pp. 26-28. In Great Britain a sensation was caused by the public statement of one of the most respected public figures, the scientific journalist and documentarist David Attenborough who, after many years of doubts and skepticism, said he was by now convinced that climate change is today's greatest challenge; David Attenborough, *Attenborough: Climate Change is the Major Challenge Facing the World*, “The Independent”, May 24, 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/attenborough-climate-change-is-the-major-challenge-facing-the-world-479459.html>.

²⁸ Involving both enterprises and consumers. In Great Britain it has been reckoned that in 2006 five big local factories produce more carbon dioxide pollution than the entire vehicular traffic, and the biggest corporation producing CO₂ (EON UK, an electricity producer) is producing more of it than the entire Croatia; cf. David Adam, Rob Evans, *New figures Reveal Scale of Industry's Impact on Climate. Five Biggest Polluters in UK Produce More CO₂ than All Motorists Combined*, in “The Guardian”, May 16, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/may/16/pollution.uk>.

²⁹ For a more in-depth discussion of the concept of sustainable development see Borghesi, Vercelli, *La sostenibilità dello sviluppo globale*, cit.

In this context, Serge Latouche's intellectual provocation with his de-growth slogan³⁰ seems to really be a last resort in the attempt to shake the attention of those who go on basking in indifference or in an easy but reproachable illusion that the problem does not exist or that it can be solved by technological progress alone (the market response) or by that plus the traditional forms of intervention in the social and production systems (the political-economic response)³¹. From many quarters now people call for a rigorous consideration, at least, of the precautionary principle but also, more and more often, of the risk we have to face some forms of collapse of the global system we live in and a future of progressive barbarization³².

5. Perspectives from a scenario analysis

A quite complex exercise but one ever more sought after and at the same time dreaded is the carrying out of a scenario analyses, putting together into a well-articulated framework the various trends (once popular with the name of “megatrends”) currently at work in our societies. Venturing to forecast a unique and definite direction that the forces at work will impart to our societies seems frankly hazardous and, in the serious efforts to analyze

³⁰ Cf. Serge Latouche, *Décoloniser l'imaginaire: La Pensée créative contre l'économie de l'absurde*, Lyon, Parangon, 2003 (Italian edition: *Decolonizzare l'immaginario*, Bologna, EMI, 2004); Id., *Survivre au développement: De la décolonisation de l'imaginaire économique à la construction d'une société alternative*, Paris, Fayard/Mille et Une Nuits, 2004 (Italian edition: *Come sopravvivere allo sviluppo. Dalla decolonizzazione dell'immaginario economico alla costruzione di una società alternativa*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2005); Id., *Le pari de la décroissance*, Paris, Fayard, 2006 (Italian edition: *La scommessa della decrescita*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2007); Id., *Petit traité de la décroissance sereine*, Paris, Fayard/Mille et Une Nuits, 2007 (Italian edition: *Breve trattato sulla decrescita serena*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008); Id. (with Didier Harpagès), *Le temps de la décroissance*, Paris, Thierry Magnier, 2010 (Italian edition: *Il tempo della decrescita. Introduzione alla frugalità felice*, Milano, Eleuthera, 2011); Id., *Sortir de la société de consommation*, Paris, Les liens qui libèrent/Actes Sud, 2010 (Italian edition: *Come si esce dalla società dei consumi. Corsi e percorsi della decrescita*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2011); Id., *Vers une société d'abondance frugale: Contresens et controverses sur la décroissance*, Fayard/Mille et une nuits, 2011 (Italian edition: *Per un'abbondanza frugale. Malintesi e controversie sulla decrescita*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2012). See also Mauro Bonaiuti (ed.), 2005, *Obiettivo decrescita*, Bologna, EMI, 2005; Id., *From Bioeconomics to Degrowth. Georgescu-Roegen's "New Economics" in eight essays*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2011. See also the website of Research & Degrowth, an academic association which “in the degrowth process [...] is concerned with democracy, international cooperation and understanding as opposed to societal closure, fragmentation and authoritarianism”: <http://www.degrowth.eu/>.

³¹ On the inadequacy of both options in the present crisis, I refer the reader to the analyses in the essay *Great Transitions* by the Global Scenario Group.

³² I refer to the already mentioned works by Laszlo and by the Global Scenario Group of the Stockholm Environment Institute, to the forecasts (catastrophic indeed) of Lovelock's late works, but also to the very numerous works, less comprehensive but not less alarmed and alarming, that we can find more and more often in more or less specialized journals and even in newspapers and magazines. To be noted also the publication of some books, among which the one titled “*Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York, Viking Press, 2005) by the scientist Jared Diamond (a physiologist, evolutionist biologist and bio-geographer), on the reasons and the choices that led to collapse or to survival several human societies in history.

trends, experts in the field usually prefer to first define several possible perspectives, corresponding to several “visions” of the forces and of the possibilities of the various trends, and then proceed to determine probabilistic evaluations regarding their feasibility.

The (already mentioned) Global Scenario Group (GSG) proposed recently an exercise of this kind, giving it, and not by chance, the name of “Great Transitions”.

The GSG scenarios are based on a double hierarchy: on the one hand there are three fundamentally different “visions”, defined as:

- Conventional Worlds
- Barbarization
- Great Transitions

Then, within each of them, are considered two different variants, so as to form six main possible scenarios.

Conventional Worlds

Market Forces. Such a perspective is based on average projections of population increase and economic development, and on the assumption of substantial technological changes induced by market forces. Its main difficulty lies in solving the social and environmental tensions due to demographic and economic growth and the solution is left to the self-corrective capacity of the market's (competitive) mechanisms.

Policy Reforms. This perspective is based on the same projections of the previous one, but it adds to the picture the possibility/necessity of ample and coordinated public interventions (like those called for in many discussions on sustainability) in order to achieve higher levels of environmental protection and social equality. In this scenario, political reforms shall evolve with the aim to strengthen the managing of the natural and social systems and to rapidly spread “green” technologies in the context of a strategy that aspires as its priority to the search of sustainability.

Barbarization

Breakdown. In this perspective, crises add up on to the other leading to conditions of complete loss of global control, driving to large-scale conflicts, institutional disintegration and generalized economic collapse. High risk of an unceasing struggle for survival, local dictatorships and anarchy are envisaged.

Fortress World (New Middle Age). This perspective emphasizes the role and spread of authoritarian answers to the growing risks (and perceptions) of collapse. It forecasts that the elites will take shelter in militarily-protected enclaves, in order to safeguard their privileges. They will handle the key natural resources and will keep an impoverished majority under control. Outside of the “fortresses” there will be environmental destruction, misery and repression. Incidentally, it may be recalled that such a vision has been represented in several movies for a few years now (incidentally many were Hollywood ones, like the Postman).

Great Transitions

The great transitions perspective foresee greater changes than the conventional worlds approach but depict less dramatic evolutions than the barbarizations scenarios.

Eco-Communalism. This perspective share the prospect of a divided world but it embodies the “green” vision of bio-regionalism, localism, direct democracy, adequate technology and economic autonomy (or autarchy).

New sustainability paradigm. This approach has some aspects in common with eco-communalism, but it is characterised by strenuous attempts to modify the characteristics of the industrial and urban conditions in order to meet up the new challenges. Rather than replacing those features this “optimistic” perspective foresee the building up of a more humane and equitable civilization, without enclosing itself in dangerous localisms. The needed evolution is only (nor mainly) technological but cultural, focussing on new widespread human values.

The last scenario is the one the authors of this group explicitly point to and to it is dedicated the second part of their work.

In their opinion, the possibilities to continue on the present path towards any version of the “conventional worlds” look dim indeed, and rest on a devotee hope in technology advancements and in the well-functioning of markets and/or today's policies. To them the risks of barbarization, instead, look significant and they point to a number of structural and recently worsened situations in our present world that hint to such a direction.

The two Great Transitions perspectives are, in their view, the best we can hope for but they are not easily achievable, especially the last and more positive one. The solutions to the current problems, we are advised, cannot lie only in technology advancements (or not so much), although they are certainly necessary. There is the need of a profound cultural change, to begin with the acknowledgment of the systemic complexity of the world we live in.

The need of a systemic vision has also been stressed in recent years by other authors, like Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers who in *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue With Nature*³³ state: “the new epistemology has to pass from a knowledge of manipulation of nature, which selects and simplifies the systems it studies, to a knowledge aiming to investigate the complex intertwinements among different systems in the light of the time-coordinate”.

The “knowledge of manipulation of nature, which selects and simplifies the systems it studies” is peculiar not only (and certainly less than in the past) to natural sciences, but also and even more so to some of the social ones, in particular to economics, which has made of methodological individualism, reductionism and even of the simplifying assumption of the “representative agent” its theoretical cornerstones.

That is why the ASPO, in its evaluation of the chances of realizing badly-needed changes, has listed among the main obstacles, in addition to the non-reliability of the publicly available data (for sure those about fossil fuel reserves), also “a dangerously doctrinaire economic theory” founded on (at least) three incorrect beliefs: 1) Man is the lord and master of his environment, 2) We live on a planet with infinite resources, 3) The market will always create valid alternatives, and a “good life” can only be procured through increased consumption.

³³ Cf. Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue With Nature*, New York, Bantam, 1984 (Italian edition *Tra il tempo e l'eternità*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1989).

The same association also suggests, broadly, some necessary measures:

- Substantial energy cuts
- A change of inclinations of the present human species (of its “heart”) or a new human species.

The point is, in their opinion, to cut loose from the competitive hydrocarbon-man, and give rise to a form of sustainability-oriented, cooperative human.

Luckily, there are already many reflections by economists (like Alfred Marshall and John Maynard Keynes, to name just two of them), philosophers and natural scientists along these lines, although they did not get, especially after World War II, the wide resonance they deserved, possibly precisely because of the questions they posed and the analyses they presented.

Perhaps the new times and the new challenges will urge people to look for new and more appropriate indicators of wealth and well-being, which in turn will require more comprehensive theoretical reflections.

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WATER, TERRITORY AND FEDERALISM

Giorgio Nebbia

1. The relations between human activities and waters

The analysis of the events that had and have an impact on the Italian territory shows that many phenomena of environmental degradation -pollution, soil and coast erosion, landslides, floods, etc.- can be described by taking into consideration the flow of matter and energy moving across a given geographical region.

Those phenomena can be observed all along the eight thousand kilometers of Italian coasts, and can be seen in lakes and rivers used as receptacles of slag and urban, agricultural and industrial wastes. For reducing sea, lake and river pollution, it is not enough to build a few sewer depurators in some coastal cities: it is necessary to modify the goods-consumption pattern of millions of people living in plains and valleys.

Ecologists know the complex networks of the relations connecting vegetal, animal and human living creatures to the territory and the final receiving-bodies: air, internal waters, soil, sea. Even who has to take decisions on the use of the territory and on the economic and commodity-related choices, however, must know in detail those connections and intervene at the proper level; otherwise, money and natural resources are wasted, and nothing is corrected or improved. These ideas start at last to be acknowledged, although with difficulty.

2. The centrality of the hydrographic basin

Having in mind a policy for the territory, the only correct and meaningful geographic and ecological dimension is represented by the “hydrographic basin”, delimited by the watershed line and, to the bottom, by a river's confluence-point into another basin or into the

sea; in that area, all the meaningful phenomena from an ecological, and therefore economic¹, viewpoint take place.

One can ideally describe an hydrographic basin as a kind of big “sack”, closed by a narrow and almost point-shaped door, through which a continuous exiting flow takes place. Through many apertures, water from rains and snows and solar energy get into the “sack”, but many other materials too enter it. Rains dissolve and carry down the soil-erosion products. Some of these are deposited on the bottom of the river, some are carried by the river out of the basin. On the transport of suspended solid materials depends the structure of the river bed, but also the structure of the littoral both near the estuary -if it flows into the sea- and at a great distance from it.

Flood plains, sometimes fertile, were created by the transport of solid substances along hydrographic basins; beaches grow or recede depending on the quantity of solid materials transported by rivers. The quarrying of sand and gravel for the building industry -i.e. the quarrying of “environmental goods” with economic value- beyond certain limits reduces the transport of solid materials to the sea and causes the beaches to recede; the material carried away by the erosion due to sea motion is thus greater than that reinstated by river transport.

Into the basin enter raw materials and goods, necessary to urban centers and for productive activities, from agriculture to livestock breeding, to factories: animal food, fertilizers, fuels for cities and industries, and the countless matters - food, paper, cement, etc. - necessary for the everyday human life. Out of the basin, through the “door” that gives access to another basin or to the sea, goes the water of the river that contains the result of many transformations of the materials that ended up in the basin due to ecological cycles or economic activities.

¹ Cf. Giorgio Nebbia, *Il bacino idrografico come unità di analisi economico-ecologica*, Lecture at *Italia Nostra*, Rome, 20 February 1975; Id., *Il bacino idrografico come unità per l'analisi economico-ecologica. Un'applicazione al bacino del Magra*, in ISGEA, *Ecologia e disciplina del territorio*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1976, pp. 211 – 215; Id., *Il bacino idrografico come unità economico-ecologica*, in “Quaderni del Sile” Treviso, Year 3, No. 16, December 1982, pp. 48-51; Id., *I bacini idrografici come unità di analisi economico-ecologica*, in AA VV., *La risorsa fiume. Il bacino idrografico come unità di analisi economico-ecologica*, Ancona, Il Lavoro Editoriale, 1983, p. 26 – 34; Id., *L'acqua da natura a merce*, <http://gaiaitalia.it/home/campagne-e-iniziative/proposta-letture/scripta-minima/146-lacqua-dalla-natura-a-merce.html>

In addition, some economic goods go out: manufactured articles from industries, animals bound to butchery, agricultural products sold outside of the basin. But part, probably the greatest part, of the result of all of the human and natural activities remains inside the hydrographic basin changing, more or less rapidly, its features. All the wastes of human activities remain inside the basin. The materials present in the solid or liquid wastes put in the soil, in underground strata or in the river end up, sooner or later and more or less modified, into the river water that flows down. In the soil and in the river water complex reactions of chemical and physical transformation take place. The organic substances from urban and animal-breeding wastes and from many industrial processes are partly oxidized and mineralized, and come out of the hydrographic basin with changed chemical characteristics. Inorganic and mineral materials are partly chemically transformed and partly deposited on the river beds. One can say with rather good approximation that also a great part of the substances emitted in the atmosphere fall down inside the basin. The watershed works to some degree as a barrier to air movements.

An hydrographic basin has energy flows too, in addition to the entering solar energy and to the energy radiated back by natural causes. The unused heat from human activities “warms up” the waters and the atmosphere. In addition, the water's down-motion has a potential-energy content that may amount to large numbers: a water flow of one cubic meter per second that falls for one meter in height has available “inside” it every year an energy of about 90.000 kilowatt-hours. The flow of all of the Italian rivers has a potential “energy content”, renewable, of about 350 billion kilowatt-hours per year; of these, only 40 billion kilowatt-hours are exploited every year as hydroelectric energy.

The point where the water of a river of a hydrographic basin flows into another river or into the sea -the “door” of that virtual “sack” we mentioned above- works in the same way as the “customs” of political borders. One can thus speak of “export” of environmental goods - water, sand, dissolved or suspended substances- from a basin to another basin or to the sea.

In the case of international rivers -the Danube, Rhine, but also the Italian Ticino and Isonzo - there is a veritable import and export of water and wastes from one country to another, so that it has been necessary to develop an economic and juridical theory of trans-border pollution.

3. Hopes and disappointments of Law 183

The solution to many environmental problems has to be found in the management of a territory, considering what is happening in each hydrographic basin, which can thus become the new administrative unit in order to act according to the federalist and solidarity principles². Unfortunately, a river has always been, since the most ancient times, the easiest and most defendable military barrier, and states, big and small, have established their borders mainly along rivers, rather than along mountain crests.

Perhaps the French Revolution has been the first to recognize the centrality of rivers in the governance of a territory, and to split up the French territory in departments denominated after the name of their main river (although their borders did not generally coincide with those of the hydrographic basins). Napoleon, when he applied in Italy the model of the French river-centered departments, gave to Italian departments the names of the rivers, even if in most cases he left untouched the borders of the previous states³.

² Cf. Giorgio Nebbia, *Il bacino idrografico come nuova unità amministrativa?*, in "Federalismo e Società", Year 3, No. 1, 1996, pp. 105-109.

³ On the division of the French territory in Departments named after the rivers see: Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier, *De l'universalisme constituant aux interet locaux: le debat sur la formation des departements en France (1789-1790)*, in "Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales", Year 41, No. 6, Espace et Histoire. Hommage a Fernand Braudel - November - December 1986, pp. 1193-1213.

It may be interesting to mention that, following Napoleon's conquest, from 1802 to 1815 North and Central Italy too were divided in Departments. From 1810 to 1815, when North-East and Center-East Italy were incorporated in the Italic Kingdom and North and Center-West Italy were incorporated in the French Empire, there were the following Departments: in the Italic Kingdom (from West to East): Agogna; Lario; Olona (capital Milan); Adda; Serio (capital Bergamo); Alto Po; Mella (capital Brescia); Mincio (capital Mantua); Adige (capital Verona); Bacchiglione; Piave; Tagliamento; Passariano; Brenta (capital Padua); Adriatico; Basso Po; Crostolo; Panaro; Reno (capital Bologna); Rubicone; Metauro; Musone; Tronto. In the Italian territory under the French Empire (from North to South): Sempione; Dora; Sesia; Po; Marengo; Stura; Montenotte; Genova; Taro; Appennino; Arno; Mediterraneo; Ombrone; Trasimeno; Tevere. See, for example: Evgenij Viktorovič Tarle, *La vita economica dell'Italia nell'età napoleonica*, Torino, Einaudi, 1950.

As the borders of today's regions often coincide with those of old states, if one wants to work in terms of hydrographic basins finds himself confronted with many delicate problems of institutional and administrative nature.

Great hopes were aroused by the approval in 1989 of the law on the protection of soil called “the 183”, which established some fundamental principles⁴. The first is that any territorial, soil protection and water management planning must be based on geographically defined and ecologically sensible territorial units. The second is that when hydrographic basin borders do not coincide with administrative borders -which is what generally happens- the administrative authorities (regions and provinces) competent for the various basin territories have to take, for each hydrographic basin, common decisions through “basin authorities” or “committees” or other bodies coordinating the regional basins or groups of basins.

The law was prescribing to carry out surveys about the situation of each hydrographic basin, and to write down “basin plans” containing the programs and actions to be initiated for the protection of soil and coasts against erosion, a rational and solidarity-oriented use of waters, the limitation of pollution, etc., according to the solidarity principle in the area of each basin and among neighboring basins linked by physical, geographical and ecological considerations; a solidarity principle broken up by Italy's arbitrary division into regions whose borders, as we said, are still those of the warring principalities and of the pre-unitary Italy.

The situation is so arbitrary from a geographic and ecological viewpoint that somebody suggested to redraw the borders of the current regions and make them coincide with those of the hydrographic basins of the rivers present in each of them.

The point was to get over the wrong sense of belonging to an administrative region or province and create instead a new sense of belonging to the river and its hydrographic basin. It would have been necessary to develop in the “people” of each basin an awareness of the collective property of the territory and its waters, stretching from the sources of the river and each of its tributaries to its mouth, and comprising the valleys and the nearer coasts; each

⁴ Law 18 May 1989, No. 183, “Norme per il riassetto organizzativo e funzionale della difesa del suolo”; Giorgio Nebbia, *Dichiarazione di voto in favore dell'approvazione della legge sulla difesa del suolo*, Senato della Repubblica, Rome, April 1989.

citizen of that “people” has common interests and is tied by a common solidarity, in spite of the fact that he is administratively “under” one region or the other, one province or the other.

Law 183 could have offered the unique opportunity of a genuine institutional reform based on the only thing that counts, the safeguard of the territory, the protection of health, the supply of fresh water, the fight to pollution, the fight to landslides and floods. All of them conditions that are the only true premise to a real economic development and to an increase of jobs. In this context, it is perfectly lawful and even desirable that, in a spirit of solidarity and good planning, one hydrographic basin will “export” water to another. Always, however, when decisions have been agreed between the authorities of the different basins, and they are based on correct information and clear plans.

Law 183 and its spirit have remained, for eighteen years, not-implemented, or more precisely rejected, although basin authorities have been constituted and money has been spent, until its repeal with the so-called “frame-law on the environment”, approved in June 2006 (legislative ordinance 152/2006), at the end of the mandate of the third Berlusconi government, later modified with the legislative ordinance number 4 of 2008, a little before the end of the mandate of the second Prodi government. The norms contained in that “frame law” are quite far from the prophetic and solidarity-inspired spirit of the “183”.

The failure of implementing the law on soil protection is witnessed by the recurring disastrous landslides and floods, the authorized or tolerated building activity in fragile and hydro-geologically dangerous areas, the persisting occurrences of disastrous pollution cases of internal waters and of the sea, the advancing of beach erosions. There is no need to say that water management and planning are the fundamental premise for a correct policy of soil protection against landslides and floods, not limited, as many people would like, to merely making levees higher, or to covering with cement torrent- and river-beds; a policy, instead, that rules and prevents the speculative attacks to river banks and to the rivers' controlled-inundation areas and an indiscriminate quarrying of sand and gravel.

The reasons for the inertia and opposition of Law 183's many enemies are to be found, in my opinion, in the fact that the obligation, imposed by law, to devise plans considering hydrographic basins in their entirety forced local authorities to give up part of their power and to decide together with others, with no intervention by the central government, on what could or could not be done in a shared hydrographic basin. Instead of a unitary, but decentralized, basin policy, there have been activities according to "piecemeal" plans for works and expenditures over small areas of hydrographic basins, breaking up the administrative unity contemplated by the original principles of that law.

Indeed, in order to deprive even more of significance the principles of Law 183, the Regions and the powerful lobby of water-service companies managed to have a law approved (no. 36 of 1994) authorizing water to be drawn for economic and company-convenient purposes, that have nothing to do with hydrographic basins.

Law 36 starts with a noble declaration of principle, of a high ethical and political value: "All surface and underground waters, even if not extracted from the subsoil, are public and represent a resource that shall be safeguarded and used according to solidarity criteria". After two or three other articles of a general significance, it passes immediately to practical things, i.e. to share out the water to several subjects named "water services, organized according to optimal territorial areas delimited in compliance with the following criteria", listed thereafter. Subdivisions of hydrographic basins were thus made in "optimal territorial areas" for the purpose of water-service management and interests, useful for the companies and their eventual privatization. So, the opportunity has been lost for democratically and intellectually mobilizing the forces of Universities and culture, outside of business committees and the companies that so far, thanks to the public administrators' distraction and favors, have made the policies of the territory and of the waters in many regions.

4. Water as a commodity

They have turned down the chance to concentrate, for each hydrographic basin, the decision-making activities concerning water supply for drinking, industrial and irrigation use, essential also for overcoming the misunderstandings that led some waterworks to supply water not only to cities, but also to industries and to irrigation, with a very confusing situation of management and rates; they have turned down the chance to coordinate the activities concerning the management of used waters, with a view to their partial reutilization, and to the depuration of waters poured again into the environment.

A coordination about water's different uses should also overcome the inadmissible discrepancies whereby some irrigation uses are practically at no cost, thanks to an inequitable system of “concessions” at ridiculous prices for great quantities of water to reclamation agencies, and whereby a resource, a common and essential good like water is paid at so different prices in various parts of Italy.

This inequitable situation is confirmed by Art. 13 of Law 36/1994, which provides that water tariffs shall be established on the basis of the coverage of management costs. In the South and in the Islands, where water is available in smaller quantity, water supply costs are inevitably higher for water companies; no matter which compensation mechanisms are introduced for mitigating rates differences, citizens, entrepreneurs and farmers of the Southern regions and the Islands will continue to pay water more than what is paid in other areas of Italy, a heavy obstacle to tourism, to new industrial areas, to agriculture in that Mezzogiorno that, just to pay lip-service, everybody says he is willing to help.

To restore an equitable situation, it would be necessary that water companies make their accounts known, making possible a public control by the local communities on the real supply- and management-costs; thus the usual practice will be overcome by which the great works are paid by the State and tariffs cover personnel costs and day-to-day management: one will see then what is the water's true industrial cost, and it will be possible to redress the price differences of this essential good.

5. The need of knowledge and culture

To the successful application of the true and federalist spirit of a law on the management of the territory according to a hydrographic-basin criterion, a further obstacle is represented by ignorance. Should a far-sighted administrator propose initiatives against pollution and floods, for the protection of beaches against erosion, for soil protection, reforestation and so on, taking into account what is taking place in the hydrographic basins of his and his neighbors' territory, he would soon realize how little known the information is about matter and energy exchanges and flows within an hydrographic basin; that is, how deficient the information on the economic and ecological “accounting” is at a basin level. Just have a look at the omissions in the “environmental statistics” by ISTAT or APAT (transformed by Law 133 of August 2008 into the High Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, ISPRA), or in the volumes on the “State of the Environment”.

It is necessary, therefore, to build and make known an adequate knowledge about the accounting of economic goods (raw materials, commodities and products) and ecological goods (energy and matter flows) at the level of hydrographic basins. There is to devise methods, techniques and models and to collect ecologically meaningful data -ecological and geological data on production cycles, on the economy, etc.- in order to find out what is taking place in each hydrographic basin, so as to foresee and avert bad consequences.

For example, it is necessary to measure, in the course of one year, the water volume carried by each tributary and by the main river, the quantity of suspended and dissolved substances that cross each “door” or customs-gate where a river flows into another river and then to the sea; to calculate the soil loss due to erosion, and to take into account its human and animal inhabitants, their excrement and wastes, its factories, for each of which raw materials, production cycles and scraps shall be known, as well as how these solid, liquid and gaseous wastes are distributed in the various parts of each hydrographic basin and sub-basin. A federalism of environmental knowledge.

There is to keep in mind that many of those flows vary in the course of the year. Several surveys, and also some model-preparation studies, have been carried out on some hydrographic basins, but no one of them has so far attempted to draw up a real economic and ecological “accounting”, as indeed is necessary to do.

When there is correct knowledge, it shows, in particular in the case of inter-regional hydrographic basins, that one cannot deal with building permits, roads management, hunting, water usage, excavation of river banks with two different yardsticks on the two sides of a regional border line, traced on a map but with no sense from an ecological viewpoint, unless one wants to doom to disaster the entire area to be administered, with monetary costs and damages and pains at the territorial level -for large parts of our country.

A federalism involving hydrographic basins is essential for soil protection too. In the case of reforestation, so far there has generally been action by sector: on the one hand reforestation for soil protection against erosion; on the other, reforestation for cellulose production. Success depends on the possibility to plan reforestation for both functions at the same time. The first objective must be to protect the soil against erosion, with the aim to harness the soil's tendency to slide, and against the removal of fertile land which, dragged away by rains over an unprotected soil, goes to clog up the river bed downstream, reducing its capacity to retain swollen waters, so that at the first heavy rainfall the water floods over the adjacent areas. And floods are made even easier and more frequent by the fact that the land along the rivers, the most sought after for buildings, has been covered all over by concrete and cut across by roads and railroad tracks. Lacking an integrated planning, every “authority” acted in an autonomous way: who builds roads does it without taking into account what happens upstream; who builds houses does it without taking into account water flows.

Soil protection against erosion made by reinstating and conserving forests and spontaneous shrubs represents also an opportunity to get ligneous-cellulosic materials, “fabricated” through photosynthesis, hence solar energy “embedded” into organic molecules, suitable for being used as raw materials.

The growing attention to energy resources and raw materials that can be produced from vegetable “biomass” is giving reforestation a new role in addition to that of soil protection, according to the “tree integral utilization” movement which is spreading at international level. Of the plants, mostly their cellulosic part is “exploited” commercially, but also their lignin fraction, their small branches and their bark provide materials that can be utilized by industrial processes. In Hungary, a research center has been created for the integral utilization of black locust (*Robinia pseudoacacia*), an important tree for soil protection against erosion, which has a leaf apparatus that lends itself to stock feeding and whose wood is valued as a construction material.

When one talks like this, he runs the risk of being accused of wishing to go back to the times of charcoal slack; instead, with the knowledge of “green chemistry” available today, it is possible to think of the vegetable biomass, of all the vegetable matter fabricated by the Sun, as an energy resource for the production of automotive fuels too. The obstacle met so far is due to the fact that it is more difficult to apply science and technology to the utilization of local natural resources than to the transformation of imported raw materials -which, by the way, are bound to cost ever more in the future, because of the current changes in the trade relations between the North and the South of the world.

I would like to mention that a project for rebuilding internal and eroded valleys by using water and hydroelectric resources and by industrially transforming agricultural products and by-products, was the basis of the New Deal, the project President Roosevelt devised in the 1930s to lift America out of the economic crisis of 1929. The creation of a special Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) allowed for the launch of reforestation and soil protection works, the creation of factories for transforming local resources, with new jobs; it allowed to stop emigration and to give new life to ailing agricultural and breeding activities.

Not to mention that what takes place in each hydrographic basin has an influence on the transportation of solid substances to the sea and then on the coastline; on the other hand, what happens on the coast has an influence on the possibility to continue to have people living on the coast, e.g. tourist and fishing activities, put in jeopardy by the erosion caused by the sea.





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PART THREE

INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT



THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Giovanni Finizio

1. Introduction

More than thirty-five years after the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the first attempt by the international community to coherently shape modern global environmental governance, people's awareness of the need to reform the system is widespread throughout the States, in academic circles and in civil society.

Equally shared is the conviction that global environmental issues must be addressed within the context of the United Nations, the only organisation endowed with the suitable legitimacy and scope for this purpose. The most common approach to analysing and evaluating the Global Environmental Governance (GEG) as well as to proposing its possible reform is, however, sectorial, as it separates the GEG from the more general UN system, into which it is naturally integrated. This approach primarily concerns the community of States, which, in those rare cases where holistic proposals are discussed for the reform of the UN, chooses to actually implement only some (a few...) parts, postponing the rest of the reform to more favourable times¹. However, it also involves the scientific community too, which, afraid of envisioning something impossible, in most cases discusses the necessity of reforming the UNEP or the GEG without bothering to reform the entire UN system.

¹ The most recent example is the debate on the UN reform held on the occasion of the 60th session of the General Assembly, in September 2005. In agreement with most of the Report commissioned to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan had proposed to the States a comprehensive plan for reforming the United Nations system, presented in his Report "In larger freedom. Towards development, security and human rights for all". At the close of the inter-governmental debate, the international community decided to institute a Council for Human Rights and a Peacebuilding Commission, postponing, however, any decision on the GEG and, for example, on the reform of the Security Council, limiting itself in both cases to hope for better results in the future.

As will soon be made clear, however, the present reality of economic, social and cultural processes requires quite a different approach. Indeed, the GEG system shares the qualities, faults and perspectives of the UN system, and discussing or reforming it apart from that system would not lead to any substantial improvement with respect to the present situation.

This essay aims at helping to rectify those limits, addressing the problem of GEG reform within its natural context, i.e. the reform of the United Nations. To that end, I will make use of the category of “human security”, a perspective particularly suitable both to interpreting today’s context and the long-term dynamics affecting international relations, and to proposing, at the normative level, a sufficiently holistic reform of global governance to ensure for the community of States and that of human beings the global public good of environmental protection.

2. Environmental Degradation, Interdependence and Globalisation

People started drawing attention to global environmental issues in the 1960s and 1970s, as a consequence of the evident impact of economic growth on resources and the environment. It was above all the social movements in the United States that attracted the attention of public opinion and politics to environmental protection, initially with a mostly local focus². The amplification of the problem over the following decades is intrinsically connected to globalisation, seen as a “growing global interconnectedness”³, i.e. a multidimensional process - with implications for the economic, social, cultural and, in particular, environmental fields -, initiated by the advent of the scientific mode of production⁴. Phenomena such as acid rain, the ozone hole and the Chernobyl disaster have fully placed the environment as one of the

² Cf. James Gustave Speth, *The Global Environmental Agenda: Origins and Prospects*, in Daniel C. Esty, Maria H. Ivanova (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance. Options and Opportunities*, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 2002,

<http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/o-u/speth.pdf>;

<http://environment.research.yale.edu/publication-series/782>.

³ Anthony McGrew, *Globalization and Territorial Democracy: An Introduction*, in Id. (ed.), *The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p. 7.

⁴ Lucio Levi, *Globalization, International Democracy and a World Parliament*, in Saul H. Mendlovitz, Barbara Walker (eds.), *A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals*, New York, Center for UN Reform Education, 2003, pp. 54 ff.

most typical features of “interdependence caused by risks”, brought about by the unexpected consequences of modernisation.

As Ulrich Beck explains, one of the main features of modernisation is a certain degree of democracy because it does not distinguish between countries or social classes, thus creating a common destiny for all mankind in the face of global threats, which can hardly be controlled by individual countries, even by the most powerful ones⁵. Consequently, environmental protection should be viewed as a global public good which political authorities are called to take responsibility for, through global policies and adequate institutions. But which political authority and which institutions? These two questions are at the centre of the debate about the limits and the reform of the GEG that has been developing over the last 15 years.

3. The Acknowledged Limits of the Present System of Global Environmental Governance

Global environmental governance began to take shape to some extent in 1972, when, in accordance with the recommendations of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the UNEP was founded with the goal of becoming the key institution of the entire system. It was not conceived as an international *organisation*, but as a *Programme*, i.e. an institutional instrument which, as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, was ranked third and last in the UN hierarchy, as far as authority and autonomy are concerned, after organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the one hand, and the specialised agencies on the other⁶. Acknowledging the complex nature of environmental issues, the governments devised a slim, flexible and agile institution with a very small Secretariat that could stimulate the development of environmental projects within the other institutions of the UN system as well as catalyse their available expertise and efficiently utilise it. These features would also prevent the UNEP from competing with the other institutions, at the same time allowing it to coordinate their activities in the environmental field.

⁵ Cf. Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.

⁶ Maria H. Ivanova, *UNEP as Anchor Organization for the Global Environment*, in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüber, Anna Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 161.

The objective was to create an institution not saddled with the bureaucracy and centralisation typical of other traditional inter-governmental organisations, then considered a source of ineffectiveness, in particular by the United States.

Finally, this institution, thanks to its agility, could manage an issue such as the environment, which many considered to be cross-cutting compared to other issues⁷.

“Coordination without competition” is still considered one of the UNEP’s essential tasks in order to make the GEG more coherent and efficient. In fact, the GEG is crowded by a network of organisations and conventions - the so-called Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), many of which are equipped with their own autonomous Secretariats - that have multiplied over the course of time. In addition, competences in the environmental field have been developed by many different institutions, from the World Bank to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to the WTO (World Trade Organization). In other words, the UNEP was devised as the institutional cornerstone of the GEG in the process of complexification⁸.

However, the overall experiment of the GEG has failed so far and the specific reasons for that have been accurately pointed out by the extensive literature on the subject.

1. The general problem of the GEG is its ineffectiveness, caused precisely by its lack of a central institution, which would make it more coherent through the adequate coordination of the actors involved. Even though there are also those who consider the UNEP a success⁹, most scholars agree that, although it has worked wonders with the resources made available to it (for example, in the scientific field) it has not fulfilled the objectives set out by the international

⁷ Maria H. Ivanova, *Moving Forward by Looking Back: Learning from UNEP’s History*, in Lydia Swart, Estelle Perry (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance. Perspectives on the Current Debate*, New York, Center for UN Reform Education, 2007, pp. 35-36, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/251>.

⁸ Cf. Ivanova, *UNEP as Anchor Organization for the Global Environment*, cit., pp. 150 ff.

⁹ Among them, see Adil Najam, *Neither Necessary, Nor Sufficient: Why Organizational Tinkering Will Not Improve Environmental Governance*, in Frank Biermann, Steffen Bauer (eds.), *A World Environmental Organization. Solution or Threat for Effective International Environmental Governance?*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, pp. 243 ff (235-256). In particular, Najam argues that the UNEP has been efficient in promoting the establishment of the environment as a global issue, the progress and dynamism of the global environmental agenda as well as the development of environmental international law. In addition, it must be considered one of the most legitimate and open to civil society institutions. For a condensed summary of the volume see Steffen Bauer, Frank Biermann, *Does Effective International Environmental Governance Require a World Environment Organization? The State of the Debate Prior to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Reforming the United Nations*, Global Governance Working Paper No 13, Amsterdam, Berlin, Oldenburg, Potsdam: The Global Governance Project, 2004, <http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP13.pdf>.

community. The result is that today the GEG is characterised by its disorganization¹⁰ and treaty congestion: in the last four decades it has been getting more and more complex and is now composed of more than 600 agreements and institutions, some of which overlap¹¹ and conflict with one another, making the system chaotic and inefficient. On the other hand, the fragmentation and proliferation of institutions within the GEG have fuelled competition among institutions over resources that certainly have not increased proportionately. The UNEP itself has been compromised by having to compete with institutions created subsequently, which also have coordination responsibilities, such as the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Global Ministerial Environmental Forum (GMEF) and the Environmental Management Group (EMG)¹². In such conditions, coordination is a mere illusion, because only the States can voluntarily coordinate their own activities within the bodies that they themselves have created¹³.

2. The second issue concerns the poor implementation of the norms of environmental international law. This branch of international law is probably one of the most developed, regulating a wide range of aspects related to environmental protection. Its norms, however, are often scarcely observed. The problem undoubtedly concerns international law in general, as its observance is ultimately entrusted to the States.

¹⁰ Cf. Steve Charnovitz, *Toward a World Environmental Organization: Reflections Upon a Vital Debate*, in F. Biermann, S. Bauer (eds.), *A World Environmental Organization*, cit., p. 104.

¹¹ Among the supporters of the UNEP and the present system of global environmental governance there are even those who believe that institutional overlapping is an advantage, because it allows for the mitigation of the system's systematic inefficiency; see Martin Landau, Redundancy, *Duplication and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap*, in "Public Administration Review", Vol. 29, No. 4, July-August 1969, pp. 346-358.

¹² The CSD was created following the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (1992) with the objective of facilitating the integration of environmental and development matters in the UN system and in the relations among governments. The Conference, also a regime lacking executive and sanctioning powers, has faced the same problems of ineffectiveness as the UNEP, but has at the same time weakened its already precarious role as an *anchor organisation* in the GEG context, because it has created misunderstandings regarding coordination competences. The GMEF was established by the General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, UNGA, Resolution 53/242) following the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002) as an annual meeting of the Environmental Ministers, with the aim of discussing the different political positions on the environment and favouring mutual understanding. The EMG is a body composed of the UN specialised agencies, programmes and bodies, and was created in order to strengthen inter-agency coordination in the sector of the environment and human settlement. Rather than improving global environmental governance, such initiatives have favoured the multiplication of actors and institutions involved, consequently making the problem worse.

¹³ Cf. Mark Imber, *The Environment and the United Nations*, in Mark Imber (ed.), *Environment, Security, and UN Reform*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1994, p. 149.

However, it must be acknowledged that the norms relating to the environment are among the least respected, because environmental protection is, by its very nature, prone to the irresistible temptation of State free riding, as they are inclined to enjoy the fruits of a (albeit modest) collective commitment without covering their individual costs.

The UNEP, which does not have the power to directly adopt binding norms for the States, has been very active in promoting the development of international environmental law, for example, through its drive to create new treaties but, since it is an inter-governmental institution and also lacks legal personality, it does not have the instruments to oversee compliance with the norms and has even less coercive power to impose it.

3. On the other hand, emphasis has often been put on the need to make the demand for “environmental protection” more of a priority compared to other, potentially conflicting, public goods, such as the free circulation of goods and services and economic development. The solution that has been devised so far has been neither systemic nor systematic in nature, aiming haphazardly at “the greening” of the policies and activities of a wide range of different international organisations, such as the WTO, the World Bank and the ILO, or at creating inter-institutional instruments such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which involves the UNEP, the World Bank and the UNDP to finance sustainable development projects. These extemporaneous and uncoordinated instruments cannot solve the problem of the systematic subordination of environmental demands to other goods deemed more significant, which is reflected in the UNEP's relative institutional weakness within the general framework of global governance. As noted by several authors, these weaknesses are born of the very characteristics that should constitute the Programme's strength: on the one hand, its underpowered legal status has prevented it from both exerting the necessary influence on fully-autonomous institutions, which are reluctant to accept external coordination (such as the MEAs), and counterbalancing properly much more powerful organisations, such as the WTO.

On the other hand, the fact that its headquarters are in Nairobi has marginalised the UNEP with respect to both the GEG and the overall UN system instead of helping it to be better accepted by developing countries.

4. Last but not least, one of the GEG's limits is its lack of democracy, which can be interpreted in two different and complementary ways. First of all, there is a lack of democracy in the relations among States, barely masked by the formal sovereign equality, which is recognised as a basic principle in international organisations.

In fact, it should be noted that the fragmentation, decentralisation and proliferation of the instruments of the GEG have created serious problems for developing countries, as they have been unable to regularly participate in this institutional and regulatory network due to their lack of economic resources and adequate expertise. In addition, and paradoxically, as scholars of international institutions know all too well, the legal principle of sovereign equality itself paves the way, in international organisations, for power politics and hence for the negation of democracy. As the case of the UN General Assembly well demonstrates, it is evident that giving equal decision-making power to countries such as the USA and San Marino will deprive the institution of effective powers in favour of extra-institutional decision-making spaces, competing institutions or simply the unilateralism of the most powerful countries. However, the true meaning of democratic deficit is denying or limiting individuals' right to control and take part in the decisions affecting them. Within the GEG context, that problem has been stressed by many, along with the need to overcome it by creating a system which is able to meet people and their needs through the quality of its policies and decision-making process¹⁴. A fragmented decision-making process, scattered over many institutional sites and often not institutionalised, works against democracy because civil society participation requires only a few institutional references, which should be clear and well-defined.

The democratic deficit in its twofold form described here ultimately damages the legitimacy of the GEG system and hence undermines its effectiveness as well.

¹⁴ See for example: Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. The Rio Declaration of 1992, Principle 10, states: "environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level".

4. The GEG's Limits Are Also the UN's Limits

Environmental issues were not on the table of the planners who set up the architecture and the principles of the United Nations between 1942 and 1945¹⁵.

Although the GEG developed at a later stage, over time it has nevertheless come to resemble the more general UN system, including all its limits.

The creation of institutional instruments, adequate to manage the phenomena and problems that go beyond national borders and which the States cannot manage alone, started as early as the mid-19th century with the international organisation process, i.e. the ever more sophisticated development of functional bodies operating separately from individual subjects that are part of them¹⁶. This process results in the proliferation of inter-governmental institutions – regimes or organisations – at the global, regional and inter-regional level, which generally reflect the Westphalian conception of the international system, based on the legal equality of the Member States and on the intangibility of their sovereignty¹⁷. The result was a system of governance without government¹⁸, which the creation of the UN tried to give order and coherence to, with disparate results.

1. In fact, the structure of the UN system although ideally based on the principle of the interdependence of peace, development and human rights, was virtually built assigning a privileged position to the pillar of peace and international security. It is characterised by the attempt to centralise the monopoly of force and the executive as well as security functions¹⁹, which has involved both a horizontal dimension, i.e. the relations between the UN and the

¹⁵ Moreover, we may state that the Charter established a series of principles and values whose realisation implied increasing pressure on ecological capital and that, in addition, through it history has assigned a key role to the least environmentally aware powers – China, the USSR/Russia – marginalising those that were the most aware – Germany, Italy and Japan: John Kirton, *Generating Effective Global Environmental Governance: The North's Need for a World Environmental Organization*, in Biermann, Bauer (eds.), *A World Environmental Organization*, cit., p.155.

¹⁶ Antonio Papisca, Marco Mascia, *Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'interdipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, CEDAM, 1997, p. 116.

¹⁷ A different case is that of the regional organisation process, which, to a quite varying extent, has been affected by the development of an increasing level of supra-nationality. In this regard, the European context represents the most advanced experience. See Paul Graham Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and Global Process*, London, Pinter, 1994.

¹⁸ Cf. James N. Rosenau, Ernst Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance Without Government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992; see also Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*.

¹⁹ Cf. Richard Falk, *The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order*, in Richard Falk, Cyril E. Black (eds.), *The Future of International Legal Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 32 ff.; Antonio Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 40 ff.

other organisations with a global scope, and a vertical one, i.e. the relations between the UN, on the one hand, and the States and regional organizations on the other. The Charter, in fact, entrusts the UN and its Security Council with the primary responsibility of guaranteeing peace and security, whereas it does not give similar competences to any other international organisation (horizontal dimension).

Regarding the vertical dimension, the Security Council, which combines inter-governmental (the right of veto) and supra-national (majority vote and binding force of decisions) features, is the only authority that can authorise the use of force by the States, while the creation of an international police corps, as provided for by the never-applied Article 43 ff., would have allowed the UN to directly intervene in the event of violations of peace, threats to peace or acts of aggression²⁰. Moreover, the Charter (Chapter VIII) recognises the fundamental role of regional organisations in maintaining peace and security while making intervention conditional on the Council's authorisation power (Art. 53)²¹.

2. However, a similar centralisation process has never been attempted in economic, social and environmental security matters, fields where the UN has not taken on a primary role because in 1945 they were deemed secondary to military and political security. On the contrary, the Charter left open the possibility of incrementally building up new sectors of global governance as soon as hot issues started gaining importance in the international agenda.

As a result, international and regional institutions with an unclear division of labour and radically different paradigms have sprung up. Global governance in the economic, social and environmental fields has developed without a centre strong enough to make the system coherent and coordinated. In fact, the competences in those fields have been assigned, on the one hand, to organisations like the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the

²⁰ Art. 43: "All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call [...], armed forces [...] necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security".

²¹ The development of military and civilian capacities to manage crises by regional organisations and their role in maintaining peace and security are today creating problems for the primacy of the UN and the Security Council, as demonstrated by the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, authorised only *ex-post* by the Council, or the ongoing debates within the European Union context. See for example Funmi Olonisakin, Comfort Ero, *Africa and the Regionalization of Peace Operations*, in Michael Charles Pugh, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), *The United Nations and Regional Security. Europe and Beyond*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 233 ff. This in no way detracts from the principle sanctioned in the UN Charter but rather raises, with some urgency, the issue of the reform of the Security Council, to make it more effective and legitimate.

International Monetary Fund, endowed with some elements of supra-nationality and relatively powerful, but rather distant from UN control, obscure to public opinion and with rather undemocratic relations among the Member States; and on the other, to several institutions with heterogeneous legal status, like the UNEP (environment), the CSD (environment and development), the ILO (labour), the UNDP (development) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD (trade and development). These institutions are more democratic because they are based on the principle of sovereign equality and majority vote²²; they are more concerned about the demands of developing countries and more open to public opinion; they have developed very different paradigms from the *Washington Consensus*. However, for those very reasons they have been given insufficient powers and competences. In essence, over time the deep asymmetries in the relations among States have been reflected in the hierarchical antagonism among the various international organisations²³, without there being a centre capable of harmonising and rationalising activities, approaches and priorities.

The same may be observed in the vertical dimension. Over time, regional and sub-regional organisations have proliferated with objectives such as free trade, economic development, human rights protection, environmental protection and monetary integration, meeting divergent principles and paradigms²⁴ or overlapping partly or completely, getting in the way of one another²⁵.

²² The ILO shows greater democratic qualities, since its General Conference and its Administration Council are composed not only of representatives of governments, but also of representatives of employers and workers.

²³ Kemal Derviş (with Ceren Özer), *A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform*, Center for Global Development, Washington, 2005, <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2808>.

²⁴ Consider the different ideas of development adopted by the EU, more attentive to protecting a model of social market economy, and by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which simply promotes free trade and freedom of investment, making the protection of workers and the environment secondary. In matters of environmental protection, see the different approaches of the EU compared to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN): see Koh Kheng Lian, Nicholas A. Robinson, *Regional Environmental Governance: Examining the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Model*, in Daniel C. Esty, Maria H. Ivanova (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities*, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies 2002: <http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/h-n/koh.pdf>. See also Lorraine Elliott, Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2011.

²⁵ Consider the relations between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA in French) or Southern Africa, where as many as five sub-regional organisations are active, with task-sharing that is rather unclear.

Above all, a clear distribution of competences does not exist among the State, regional and global (the UN plus its agencies) levels, functional to a coherent and effective governance project able to provide the public goods that humanity has the right and the necessity to have.

The UN Charter assigns to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the task of organising economic, social and environmental governance, giving it, however, totally inadequate powers: Art. 63 establishes that the ECOSOC “*may co-ordinate the activities of the specialised agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies*” (italics added), while not even mentioning regional organisations.

Therefore, it may be noted that what the UNEP is not in the GEG context, the ECOSOC is not in the more general context of global governance, and that the limits of the GEG are the same as those of the whole UN system, which ultimately, derive from the centrality still granted to State sovereignty. The lack of coordination, fragmentation and overlapping common to the whole system are the result of the States' desire to be in a position to freely choose, according to the circumstances, which institution to use in order to better pursue their own interests. The “default solution to international problems within the UN system”, which has always been “to add – never subtract or consolidate – bureaucratic layers”²⁶, is nothing but the inertia deriving from the lack of supra-national and democratic management able to give cohesion to a wide-ranging reform of the entire system inspired by a shared and common paradigm and a comprehensive vision.

Therefore, the reform of the GEG must be included in a more general UN-reform project that can hardly be implemented with any useful purpose unless in its entirety. The next paragraph will sum up the main options for a reform of the GEG presently on the table.

²⁶ Thomas G. Weiss, *What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It*, Foreword by Brian Urquhart, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008, p. 101.

5. The Options on the Table

The issue of GEG reform has been on the table for decades, but a shared solution is not yet on the horizon²⁷. In tackling the limits of the GEG, the States and the scientific community have focused their attention on the UNEP's role, on its reform and on its replacement. That means tackling the key issue of coordination, which, as we have seen, has deep implications in terms of sovereignty. It is precisely the role to be given to State sovereignty that makes the fundamental difference among the options presently on the table. Similar to what can be seen in the case of the UN reform²⁸ debate, the positions have settled along the following lines.

The conservatives. Similar to those who believe that people should renounce significantly reforming the UN, leaving it “to do what it can do”, there are those who propose modest reforms of the UNEP and the GEG, maintaining more or less the present configuration. In the inter-governmental sector, besides the hostile US approach to the environment during the George W. Bush Presidency, this applies firstly to many developing countries, which are afraid that deep reforms, especially those leading to a certain degree of supra-nationality, could strengthen the predominance of the most powerful countries in environmental global governance, thus weakening their autonomy in managing the quality and speed of their own development. In the academic circles, there are several scholars who, although recognising the problem of the excessive proliferation and fragmentation of governance instruments, do not believe that the UNEP should be reformed, but propose, for example, a clustering of the existing MEAs, so as to reduce their overlapping and redundancy²⁹. Other scholars, who consider the creation of a new international organisation for the environment utopian, aim at maintaining a very decentralised GEG system like the present one, and a network of actors and institutions capable of guaranteeing the necessary flexibility and redundancy, so that the

²⁷ Amazingly similar to what happened because of the thorny issue of the reform of the Security Council, in 2001 the UNEP Governing Council created (Decision 21/21) the *Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their Representatives to examine options for strengthening international environmental governance*, which, however, like its homologous created in 1993 for the reform of the Security Council (which has been nicknamed the *Never ending working group...*) did not produce any significant results.

²⁸ Antonio Papisca, *Il futuro delle Nazioni Unite: dalla parte della società civile globale*, in “Pace, Diritti dell'Uomo, Diritti dei Popoli”, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1993 (1995), pp. 19-47, http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/93_02_019.pdf.

²⁹ See for example Konrad Von Moltke, *Clustering International Environmental Agreements as an Alternative to a World Environmental Organization*, in Biermann, Bauer (eds.), *A World Environmental Organization*, pp. 175 ff.

malfunctioning of one or more institutions will not harm the entire network³⁰. It is clear that this position is the result of a circular reasoning based on resignation: as the system cannot be anything but the present one, based on national sovereignty and therefore inefficient, its flexible and redundant nature must be preserved in order to contain its malfunctioning, which, however, depends on its very nature... However, the suggestion has been made that a clearer and better-organised division of labour should be ensured among the involved actors - not only the institutions, but also the NGOs, enterprises and scientific networks.

It has also been argued that complex problems such as the environment would require flexibility, and not plethoric and centralising institutions. The legitimate question is, however, which institutional actor should be charged with ensuring that all the other actors work together in a coordinated way?

As regards civil society, several non-governmental institutions oppose more courageous projects, afraid of increasing the democratic deficit that already affects global governance. This issue is of particular concern due to the political contradiction of our time, where “everything has been globalised except our consent”³¹ and international organisations acquire powers and competences without simultaneously developing democratic qualities. As Beck has noted, a similar attitude has characterised some fringes of the Green parties (the so-called “green protectionists”) that consider the national State a “political biotope threatened with extinction which upholds environmental standards against world- market forces, and is thus as deserving of protection as nature itself”³².

More generally, it is the party of the *status quo*, in which we may also include all those who, instead of aiming at the reform of the system, use its inefficiency to entrust

³⁰ Cf. Peter M. Haas, *Addressing the Global Governance Deficit*, in Andreas Rechkemmer (ed.), *UNEO – Towards and International Environment Organization. Approaches to a Sustainable Reform of Global Environmental Governance* Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005, p. 51 (47-61).

³¹ George Monbiot, *The Age of Consent*, London, Harper, 2003, p. 1.

³² Ulrich Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – Antworten auf Globalisierung*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997, pp. 150-151.

environmental governance to even less democratic fora outside the UN, such as the G7/8, the G20 and all their variants³³.

The “radicals”: the supra-national solution. A small minority of scholars calls for the replacement of the UNEP with a “super-organisation” endowed with enhanced influence and resources, to which many of the functions regarding the environment currently scattered throughout the entire UN system could be entrusted³⁴. It would be responsible for drafting global policies for the environment and sustainable development, and could avail itself of the resources necessary to check their actual implementation by the States as well as of the coercive powers to sanction non-compliant countries. It would also have a staff and the legal authority to adequately represent environmental demands in WTO dispute-resolution proceedings or even to take it upon itself to issue judgment on such disputes. In addition, the GEG would be centralised within a single organisation, charged with the unitary management of all the environmental regimes endowed today with their own secretariats, and would have great autonomy compared to the UNEP. In this way, the system could be made more democratic, for two reasons. First, it would allow for the true participation of developing countries, now facing serious difficulties due to the dispersion of seats and the massive proliferation of agreements to keep track of and obligations to abide by; secondly, it would represent a single reference point for global civil society, so that, in turn, the new organisation could start virtuous consultations and participation-enhancing mechanisms.

³³ Similar to the advocates of democratic peace who, according to the thesis that democracies are intrinsically peaceful, are calling for the replacement of the UN or the creation of a parallel *League (or Concert) of Democracies*, likewise some GEG scholars suggest entrusting the global handling of the environment to an organisation based on the G8, due to the great inclination of its members to virtuous internal environmental governance: John Kirton, *Generating Effective Global Environmental Governance: The North's Need for a World Environmental Organization*, in Biermann, Bauer (eds.), *A World Environmental Organization*, cit., pp. 164 ff. However, upon closer examination the premises of this position are all but certain: Russia, a member of the G8, is not known for its concern for the environment within its boundaries. Moreover, the correspondence between a State's domestic structure and its international behaviour must still be demonstrated, as the critics of democratic peace have pointed out. For a criticism of the *League (or Concert) of Democracies* see Daniele Archibugi, *A League of Democracies or a Democratic United Nations?*, in “Harvard International Review”, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008.

³⁴ Daniel C. Esty, *The Case for a Global Environmental Organization*, in Peter B. Kenen (ed.), *Managing the World Economy. Fifty Years After Bretton Woods*, Washington DC, Institute for International Economics, 1994, pp. 287-310; Frank Biermann, *The Case for a World Environmental Organization*, in “Environment”, Vol. 9, No. 42, November 2000, pp. 22-31; Id., *The Emerging Debate on the Need for a World Environmental Organization*, in “Global Environmental Politics”, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 2001, pp. 45-55, <http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/BiermannWEOGEP2001.pdf>.

The progressives. A large and qualified number of observers are calling for a reform of the UNEP in order for it to overcome its historical limits and be in a position to do “what it must do”, i.e. fulfill the tasks it was originally given which justify its existence. The positions of the progressives can be placed in a continuum ranging from those who propose a gradual reorganisation of the UNEP, which should remain a Programme and should not be abolished in favour of more institutionalised solutions, to those arguing that it be transformed into a new UN Specialised Agency, with adequately increased functions and powers. Different from the radicals' proposals, a common feature of such positions is the preservation of State sovereignty and the rejection of supra-national solutions, considered utopian and counterproductive³⁵.

In particular, the idea of transforming the UNEP into a UN Specialised Agency (United Nations Environmental Organisation, UNEO) has been put forward by a transnational group of scholars that has developed around the Global Environmental Governance Project of the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, and apparently has achieved a certain degree of consensus among the States. In institutional circles, this solution was proposed by the Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements, created in 1997 by the then UN Secretary-general Kofi Annan³⁶; at the inter-governmental level, it was put forward firstly by Jacques Chirac in his speech at the 58th General Assembly Session, and then by the European Union's Council³⁷. The proposal later converged with the conclusions of the “Delivering as one” Report by the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment (November 2006)³⁸, and of the

³⁵ Cf. Sebastian Oberthür, Thomas Gehring, *Reforming International Environmental Governance: An Institutional Critique of the Proposal for a World Environment Organization*, in in Biermann, Bauer (eds.), *A World Environment Organization: Solution or Threat for Effective International Environmental Governance?*, cit., p. 208 (205-234) [also in “International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics”, Vol. 4, No. 4 December 2004, pp. 359-381].

³⁶ Cf. United Nations General Assembly, UNGA, A/53/463, *United Nations Reform: Measures and Proposals. Environment and Human Settlements. Report of the Secretary-General*, 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-463.htm>.

³⁷ The proposal was submitted during the Council in preparation for the UN World Summit of September 2005, which was to focus on UN reform. See EU Council Presidency Conclusions, June 17th, 2005, Para. 39, 10255/1/05 REV.1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/85349.pdf

³⁸ <http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf>.

fifty-two countries forming the coalition *Friends of the United Nations Environmental Organisation*³⁹.

According to its supporters, the transformation of the UNEP into the UNEO would provide the institution with a universalist foundation, thus increasing its legitimacy (today the UNEP Governing Council is composed of fifty-four countries only). The new institution would avail itself of a solid financial structure, freeing itself from its dependence on the voluntary and unpredictable contributions of its member States. Thanks to its legal personality, it would enjoy the autonomy typical of specialised agencies, and most of all it would finally be in a position to carry out the fundamental task of coordination, something it has never been able to do.

Two positions in particular can be identified within this group. On the one hand, there are those who are calling for a hierarchical reorganisation of the GEG, while respecting national sovereignties and centralising all the functions so far fulfilled by the thousands of MEAs in the new organisation; on the other, there are those who consider institutional centralism obsolete and instead favour a network that keeps the MEAs alive, still hoping for a better coordination of it by the new organisation. In both cases, the UNEP would come to resemble be similar to the other UN specialised agencies, such as the ILO or the WHO, i.e. independent international organisations with their own membership, their own budget and their own structure to manage autonomously.

What will the functions of the new organisation be? First of all, coordination that is finally effective, obtained by housing a Secretariat for the MEAs, which will then merge into an organic “global environmental law code”⁴⁰, overseen by monitoring and dispute-resolution systems like those which have been set up in the field of the universal protection of human rights⁴¹.

³⁹ As of April 2007.

⁴⁰ Frank Biermann, *From UNEP towards a World Environmental Organization*, in Swart, Perry (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance*, cit., p.107.

⁴¹ In particular, with the so-called “human rights internationalisation” process originated by the universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a normative system was developed - the so-called International Code of Human Rights- and a protection system composed of political, judicial and quasi-judicial institutions defined as “the international machinery of human rights”. See Gerd Oberleitner, *Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and Ritual*, Cambridge, Polity Press 2007.

The second function would then concern the promotion and implementation of International Environmental Law, through unitary monitoring and reporting mechanisms that should put an end to the duplication and useless overlapping of instruments among the various conventions.

The third function would concern transferring funds and technology to the Southern hemisphere: overseeing capacity-building and the technological and financial support of global environmental policies that would then be entrusted to an independent organisation, strong enough to put an end to the fragmentation presently characterising the funds allocated for these purposes.

However, the question is whether the proposed solutions are adequate to remedy the GEG's deficiencies, which are nothing but the limits of a governance system that, being international, i.e. based on the States, has not been capable of keeping pace with problems which are trans-national and therefore require the response of a global authority. The sovereignty problem can no longer be eluded, and this is, in my opinion, the main limit of the "progressives". They believe that a new specialised agency can achieve the same results as organisations like the ILO and the WHO, but neglect the fact that those too, in turn, do not solve the global problems they are dealing with (just think of HIV, for example, or the protection of the rights of workers in the context of globalisation). The reason lies in their present state-centric configuration, which leaves it to their shareholders, i.e. the States, to decide case by case and according to their interests whether to commit themselves to solving problems. This kind of global governance does not work⁴², and the model of a specialised agency is not the most adequate to exert an influence on the course of events, i.e., in the case of the GEG, on environmental degradation. The supra-national proposal, instead, focuses on what is necessary, but it is not yet sufficient, because no environmental organisation, despite its being supra-national, could tackle alone the problem of the interdependence of issues brought about by globalisation. The UNEO supporters state that it would be able to make the environment "count" more in the context of global governance, for example compared to free

⁴² Cf. Thomas G. Weiss, *What Happened to the Idea of World Government?*, in "International Studies Quarterly", Vol. 53, Issue 2, June 2009, pp. 253-271.

trade, protected by the WTO. But which authority should be responsible for regulating the relations between the UNEO and the WTO, between the environment and trade, even supposing that the former had gained influence? The relations between issues and organisations can no longer be left to inter-institutional power politics.

To be more useful, supra-nationality should be located in the United Nations rather than in the individual specialised agencies, which, from that perspective, could be seen as ministries of a central and democratic authority. The entire UN system should be involved in such a transition towards supra-nationality, because the destiny of the GEG cannot be separated from the more general destiny of global governance.

In order to examine this aspect more thoroughly, it would be useful to discuss the concept of *human security*, developed in the 1990s.

6. Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect... the Environment

Among the many changes brought about by globalisation, in particular after 1989, one is the progressive obsolescence of the Westphalian concept of security. According to the traditional state-centric paradigm, the Hobbesian State was responsible for guaranteeing the security of individuals within its borders through its monopoly of the legal use of force and, at the same time, defending its own national security and its own survival in the anarchical international arena. Consequently, security, understood as resistance to aggression, became the primary concern of all foreign policy, national interest and the primary objective of the State in its international relations.

Globalisation makes that paradigm inadequate. During the 1970s, some scholars suspected that the States' agenda was starting to no longer be dominated by political and military security, that the hierarchy among issues and between high and low politics was vanishing, as well as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy⁴³. Today the political and military dimension no longer exhausts all the security implications and globalisation brings

⁴³ Cf. Robert Owen Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Boston/Toronto, Little Brown and Company, Boston 1977, pp. 24-25. Nowadays, few people doubt, for example, that any EU member country also does foreign policy through its Minister of Agriculture or of the Environment during meetings with his/her colleagues in the EU Council.

with it not only the interdependence between States and peoples, but among issues too: political and military security, economic and social security as well as environmental security are all closely interrelated issues.

Today, the multi-dimensional nature of security is not only an empirical reality, but an increasingly important perspective from which scholars and politicians can observe international relations, so much so that nowadays even realist political scientists accept these developments while keeping the State at the centre of their analyses⁴⁴.

However, the processes connected to globalisation have also helped further the evolution of security. The emergence of new types of war inverts the ratio of civilian and military victims, from 1:8 to 8:1⁴⁵, thus making peremptory the need to protect all human beings involved in conflicts, *in primis* civilians. Moreover, in most cases wars are no longer fought among States, therefore, continuing to talk about State security is proving to be useless and inappropriate, especially in contexts where the State itself fails or collapses? As a consequence of such processes, the concept of human security as opposed to that of State security has been developed and focuses on the human being and is connected to the enjoyment of all human rights in their interdependence and indivisibility - civil, political, economic, social, cultural and third-generation rights, such as the right to development and to the environment- thus being multi-dimensional in and of itself. Human security means guaranteeing the enjoyment of all rights to all human beings, wherever they are. This change of paradigm implies overturning the logic of sovereignty: sovereignty does not belong to the State, but to the individual, who cedes it to different levels of governance in order for his/her vital needs to be satisfied.

The conceptual and philosophical bases of human security were laid down by the United Nations, which started the internationalisation process of human rights with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and particularly since the 1970s, has asserted that development, human rights, democracy and peace are indivisible⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ Buzan, for example, takes into consideration the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors: Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.

⁴⁵ Cf. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 107.

⁴⁶ The UN Declaration on the Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights - A/RES/32/130 of Dec. 16th, 1977 - dates back to 1977;

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0313/65/IMG/NR031365.pdf?OpenElement>

Later on, the debate took two different but converging paths⁴⁷. The first, which could be defined as the “freedom from want approach”, was laid down by the the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) through its Human Development Report of 1994, entitled “New Dimensions of Human Security”. This report contributed to redefining security through the categories of sustainable human development, leading to the incorporation of the latter into human security⁴⁸. The issue was later brought up again by the report “Human Security Now”, published in May 2003 by the Commission on Human Security, which made the category of empowerment part of security and emphasised the protection of *economic welfare* as a fundamental component of human security⁴⁹. The second path, which may be called the “freedom from fear approach”, focuses on the physical protection of human beings, rather than development. It was promoted by Canada, which sponsored the creation and the activities of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which finally published the Report “The Responsibility to Protect”⁵⁰. Although the two approaches seem different, from a philosophical and theoretical perspective they are complementary in so far as they are based on the same paradigm of human rights, while enhancing different aspects of it.

What role is given to the environment in the debate on human security? It also underwent the same evolutionary process, determined by globalisation, as the security paradigm, although this process was delayed because environmental protection emerged late as a global issue.

(see later . *Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and Political Rights* A/RES/44/130 of December 15th, 1989, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r130.htm>. In the 1990s three documents were issued by Boutros-Ghali that marked his mandate as Secretary-General - *An Agenda for Peace* (UN doc. A/47/277, June 17th, 1992; <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>), *An Agenda for Development* (UN Doc. A/48/935, May 6th, 1994; <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agdev.html>) and *An Agenda for Democratisation* (UN Doc. A/51/761, December 20th, 1996, [http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/An_agenda_for_democratization\[1\].pdf](http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/An_agenda_for_democratization[1].pdf)). These documents affirmed the interdependence of democracy, security and peace on the basis of the common paradigm of human rights. Subsequently, Kofi Annan restated the interdependence of *freedom from want*, *freedom from fear* and *freedom to live in dignity* in his Report *In Larger Freedom. Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, presented at the Summit of September 2005: <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>.

⁴⁷ Cf. S. Neil MacFarlane, Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN. A Critical History*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006.

⁴⁸ Cf. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*, New York, UNDP, 1994, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>.

⁴⁹ The Commission on Human Security, chaired by Amartya Sen and the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata was sponsored by Japan and created by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan; see full report: <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1250396>

⁵⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the ICISS, December 2001, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

In particular, in the 1990s scholars started to become aware that environmental dangers - especially the depletion of non-renewable resources (oil) and the destruction of renewable resources (water) - could possibly pose a threat to States' security⁵¹. Under the pressure of issues such as population growth, scarcity of resources and environmental degradation, environmental security became a constitutive element of multi-dimensional security, which was becoming a growing concern of statesmen and in political science⁵². Simultaneously, a debate was formally initiated in the Security Council to ascertain whether environmental changes created a threat to peace and international security⁵³. Environmental security, however, has not yet been seriously considered in the shift of focus from multi-dimensional (but State-centric) security to human security. In fact, if it is true that some environmentalists were the first to state that the language of national security was ill-equipped to address the problems of common global goods, which required cooperation instead of unconnected national responses⁵⁴, neither of the two approaches to human security so far considered focuses explicitly on environmental protection⁵⁵. The "Freedom from Fear Approach" adopted by the ICISS largely neglects the environmental dimension in defining human security, while in the

⁵¹ See for example Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999.

⁵² Cf. Norman Myers, *Environment and Security*, in "Foreign Policy", Vol. 74, Spring 1989, pp. 23-41; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, *Redefining Security*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 68, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp.162-177; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Global Dangers. Changing Dimensions of International Security*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995; Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, cit.; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), *New Global Dangers. Changing Dimensions of International Security*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004.

⁵³ On April 17th, 2007, the Security Council met to discuss the problem of global warming, an obvious sign of the acknowledged link between environmental protection, on the one hand, and threats to peace and international security on the other. On that occasion, that link was affirmed many times, for example as a reply to those - in particular developing countries - who were saying that the appropriate forum in which to discuss environmental matters was not the Security Council but the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. The theme of global warming and the threats it poses to security have been recently found more and more throughout scientific literature: see among others Oli Brown, Robert McLeman, Robert, *A Recurring Anarchy? The Emergence of Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security*, in "Conflict, Security and Development", Vol. 9, No. 3, October 2009, pp. 289-305 http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/recurring_anarchy_climate.pdf.

⁵⁴ World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), *Our common future*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 290 ff; <http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm>.

⁵⁵ Cf. Janos. Bogardi, Hans Günther Brauch, *Global Environmental Change: A Challenge for Human Security. Defining and Conceptualising the Environmental Dimension of Human Security*, in Rechkemmer (ed.), *UNEO – Towards an International Environmental Organization*, cit., p. 91.

Freedom from Want Approach” it is mentioned by the UNDP among the components of human security⁵⁶, but has not been considered by the Commission on Human Security.

Although recent analyses have highlighted that in the speeches of international officials, diplomats and politicians the term “security” is more and more frequently used along with an explicit reference to the link between environmental degradation and human well-being⁵⁷, environmental degradation is still excluded, in general, from a holistic discussion of human security, due also to the fear that an excessive widening of the “human security basket” could make impossible to operationalise the concept, hence it would not be very useful from an analytical and political perspective⁵⁸.

Yet, from a conceptual and philosophical perspective, there is little doubt that human and multi-dimensional security depends on the paradigm of human rights, and the right to the environment is now an integral part of this paradigm. From that perspective, the individual is the main beneficiary of “the public good of human security”, and, regardless of the citizenship or the geographic origins of the individual, he/she should be guaranteed security as a human being. By which political authority and with what powers? The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine developed by the ICISS provides us with some useful indications. This doctrine was proposed as a contribution to the redefinition of the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in the era of globalisation, and interprets sovereignty as responsibility, stipulating that it is the State that has the primary responsibility of safeguarding the physical security of individuals. However, the R2P stipulates that in the event that the State is unable to do this (because, for example, it is a “failed State”) or if it commits gross violations of human rights, this responsibility shall be transferred to regional organisations or to the international community, whose intervention in the internal affairs of that State thus becomes not only legitimate, but an obligation⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ Cf. UNDP, *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, pp. 25-33;
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf

⁵⁷ Cf. Nicole Detraz, Michele Betsill, *Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts*, in “International Studies Perspectives”, Vol. 10, Issue 3, August 2009, p. 310 (303-320).

⁵⁸ Fen Osler Hampson, Jean Daudelin, Holly Reid, John B. Hay, Todd Martin, *Madness in the Multitude. Human Security and World Disorder*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 15.

⁵⁹ Cf. ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, cit.

The human rights paradigm, therefore, implies a transfer of sovereignty to the different levels of governance according to the logic of the subsidiarity of responsibility, because sovereignty belongs first to the human being and then to the State⁶⁰. The ICISS' position is in line with that approach, but by limiting itself to focusing on physical security, it does not grasp its multi-dimensional character. Therefore, it is only a matter of extending the logic of the "Responsibility to Protect" to all aspects of human security, including the environment, with the resultant institutional implications.

7. Institutional Implications

According to one scholar "the concept of human security is not just an argument about securing basic human rights. It is a conception that goes much further in its understanding, [...] about the conditions and kinds of institutions and governance arrangements required to sustain human rights"⁶¹. From an institutional perspective, it is a matter of devising a multi-level governance system which applies the principle of the subsidiarity of responsibility and simultaneously meets the needs of the multi-dimensional nature of human security.

A brand new system certainly does not need to be created: an embryonic multi-level governance system already exists in the environmental field as well as the institutions that could ensure that the requirements of environmental protection, free trade and development are consistent with the paradigm of human security values.

a) The subsidiarity scale and the distribution of competences. In fact, over the last two decades in addition to the States and the global dimension of global governance there has been the emergence of so-called "neo-regionalism", i.e. the proliferation of new regional cooperation and integration experiments in Africa, Asia and Latin America, accompanied by a significant relaunch of existing institutions⁶². Several of these regional organisations (first of all the EU, but also the SADC – Southern African Development Community - , the EAC – East African

⁶⁰ Antonio Papisca talks in this regard about "sustainable statehood"; Antonio Papisca, *Democrazia internazionale, via di pace. Per un nuovo ordine internazionale democratico*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1995, pp.167 ff.

⁶¹ Hampson, *Madness in the multitude*, cit., p.15.

⁶² Louise Fawcett, *Regionalism in Historical Perspective*, in Louise Fawcett, Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 9 ff.

Community - , the ASEAN, the Mercosur, the Andean Community, the NAFTA...) have developed competences in the environmental field for many reasons⁶³. First of all, the trans-nationality of environmental problems, which make entire regions of the world equally vulnerable, is recognised. Secondly, as with other regional public policies, the regional approach to environmental protection is an attempt to compensate for the ineffectiveness of global multilateral institutions. Lastly, there is the decline of US hegemony, well evidenced by its diminished role as a provider of public goods, including environmental protection, to the global political system. This has opened up new opportunities for the EU, which has become a leader in this area⁶⁴. Thanks to its promotion of regionalism throughout the world⁶⁵, it supports, directly or indirectly, the development of similar competences in the environmental field by other regional organizations.

The development of a multi-level environmental governance system is therefore under way. In order for it to be truly effective, however, it is necessary for sovereignty to actually be transferred to the different levels of governance, i.e. for the regional and global political authorities to actually be endowed with the necessary supra-nationality to bind (and coerce, if necessary) the States and to autonomously produce environmental policies in the general interest of their citizens. A coherent and well-defined distribution of competences based on subsidiarity is also needed. In other words, when and to what degree can and must a regional and political authority intervene, in lieu of the United Nations?

Once again, the “responsibility to protect” can help us understand. In fact, according to that doctrine, it can be said that if and when the State cannot or does not want to protect the right to the environment of its own citizens either because it does not have the ability to do so or because the problem is trans-national, then the responsibility is transferred to the regional authority, which is obligated to intervene as a complement to or in substitution of that State's

⁶³ Concerning the ASEAN, for example, see Lian, Robinson, *Regional Environmental Governance: Examining the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) model*, in Esty, Ivanova (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities*, cit. See also Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit.

⁶⁴ Regarding the United States, suffice it to recall the opposition to the Kyoto Protocol by the George W. Bush Presidency, based on the idea that the USA will sidestep any obligation liable to limit or threaten the American way of life. About the EU, see Sebastian Oberthür, *The Role of the EU in Global Environmental and Climate Governance*, in Mario Telò (ed.), *The European Union and Global Governance*, New York, Routledge, 2009, pp. 192 ff.

⁶⁵ Cf. Mario Telò, *Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European Union*, in Id. (ed.), *European Union and New Regionalism*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2007, pp. 1-20.

authority, even if it interferes with its sovereignty. A similar argument should apply to relations between the regional organisations and the UN system. As a matter of fact, the principle of subsidiarity stipulates that problems shall be addressed by the authority closest to the citizen, but that whenever this is not possible, responsibility is transferred to a higher level.

An integral part of the R2P logic is also the need to coordinate governance authorities and institutions active in the environmental field. Each level of governance must be endowed with the powers and supra-nationality necessary to coordinate the lower levels according to a pyramidal scheme, in which the States are at the base, the UN is at the top and in between are the sub-regional (the ECOWAS, the SADC, etc.) and regional (the African Union, the European Union, etc.) organisations. Therefore, the responsibility of regional organisations is to control the environmental policies of the member states, coordinate them according to common principles and intervene alongside or in lieu of the States when necessary. The responsibility of the global authority - the United Nations - will be to coordinate and control the regional organisations and the States, harmonising their activities according to shared principles, so that the policies they implement are effective, efficient and consistent with the paradigm of human security.

In the last years, an academic debate has been initiated between those who believe that a new specialised agency for the environment should only deal with “global” environmental problems⁶⁶ and thus concerning the whole of mankind, and those who instead argue that its competence should cover all the issues related to the environment, including local issues like urban pollution and waterway poisoning⁶⁷.

The principle of subsidiarity embedded in the “responsibility to protect” offers a possible solution. On the one hand, it suggests that the right to the environment shall be safeguarded by the political authorities at all levels, each addressing the problems of its own competence; on the other hand, however, it suggests that when a governance authority cannot or does not want to intervene, the higher ranking authority shall be called into action,

⁶⁶ Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Maria H. Ivanova, *Making Environmental Efforts Work: The Case for a Global Environmental Organization*, Working Paper 2/01, New Haven, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, 2001.

⁶⁷ Cf. Biermann, *From UNEP towards a World Environmental Organization*, cit., pp. 111 ff.

and shall facilitate the transfer of funds and technologies needed by the institution concerned. In addition, it shall exert an appropriate amount of pressure on the institution and in extreme cases shall intervene on its behalf.

b) Horizontal coordination in global governance. The multidimensional nature of human security recalls the fundamental problem of how to handle horizontal coordination among the universal organisations (from the World Bank to the WTO, the FAO and a UNEO-to-be), each with its own paradigms, principles, values and policies. This problem can only be managed by the United Nations and in particular by the ECOSOC, which may become the guardian of the values, principles and multi-dimensional nature of human security. The paradigm of human security emphasises the analogy between the area of competences of the Security Council (political and military security) and the area of competences of the ECOSOC (economic, social and environmental security). The current imbalance of powers to the detriment of the ECOSOC is clearly inconsistent with the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. Contrary to what is happening today, the ECOSOC should indeed be placed at the same level as the Security Council as far as goals and powers are concerned, and be “hooked” to it⁶⁸. To this end, some political figures like Jacques Delors and several scholars have proposed the strengthening of the ECOSOC and its transformation into a kind of Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council⁶⁹ that would be able to balance the Security Council's competences and provide the necessary institutional dimension to the liaison between political and military security, on the one hand, and economic, social and environmental security on the other. This would help carry out an organic global policing as well as provide effective political direction, binding for both the UN specialised agencies and the regional organisations, consistent with the multidimensional paradigm of human security.

⁶⁸ Cf. Antonio Papisca, *La sfida del “coordinamento” nel sistema delle Nazioni Unite: riequilibrare i capitoli della Carta riguardanti il Consiglio di Sicurezza e il Consiglio Economico e Sociale (ECOSOC)*, in “Pace Diritti Umani/Peace Human Rights”, Year 1, No. 3, 2004, pp. 110 ff.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 111; Susan George, *The Political Demand for Change*, in Maurice Bertrand, Daniel Warner (eds.), *A New Charter for a Worldwide Organisation?*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 149 ff.; Frances Stewart, Sam Daws, *An Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations*, QEH Working Paper No. 68, University of Oxford, March 2001, <http://www3.geh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/gehwp/gehwps68.pdf>; Derviş (with Özer), *A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform*, cit.

Therefore, the relationship between the UN and the universal organisations would be, after all, constructed on the model (*mutatis mutandis...*) of the executive power organisation at the national level, where the general political line emerges in the Council of Ministers, overseen by the Parliament, and the Ministries (the specialised agencies) govern accordingly.

To sum up, a new UNEO should be endowed with coercive powers and the competences that are now scattered throughout the MEAs and should be centralised within it in order to ensure consistency and coordination for the GEG. The latter should then be placed in a supranational context, i.e. in a global governance system reformed from the top (the UN) down, with the same UN providing it with coherence and consistency.

c) The democratisation of the GEG. Political science literature, in particular that dealing with the case of Europe, has highlighted how the institutional strengthening of international organisations, especially if it tends towards greater supra-nationality, may well give rise to problems of democratic deficit. This is certainly also true for the GEG. On the other hand, many authors state that if a reform of the GEG is ever prepared, it should contribute to its democratisation. Also in this case the reform should not be limited to the creation of a democratic UNEO. Rather, democratisation should involve all the institutions of multi-level governance and be accompanied by their strengthening, starting from the centre of the entire system, i.e. the UN.

At the regional level, a general democratisation process is actually under way: several organisations have already created (among others the EU, the Mercosur, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Central American Intergration System, the Central African Economic and Monetary Union) or are creating (for example the Economic Community of Central African States) first-degree and second-degree legislative assemblies, with increasing powers and competences⁷⁰, as well as mechanisms for civil society participation.

⁷⁰ On this issue, see Giovanni Finizio, Lucio Levi, Nicola Vallinoto (eds.), *The Democratization of International Institutions. First International Democracy Report 2011*, London Routledge, 2012, <http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/tools/the-international-democracy-report/idw-report-2011>; Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Anna van der Vleuten, (eds.), *Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007.

At the global level, the UNEO should be made open to civil society in both the ascending and descending phases of decision-making, i.e. permeable to the demands of civil society and transparent to public opinion in its activities. The most important challenge concerns, however, the main UN bodies, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the ECOSOC. Democracy among States could be ensured through the transformation of the two Councils into Chambers of the regional organisations. This proposal was initially presented with regard to the Security Council and boasts a distinguished tradition, as earlier suggestions to that effect can be found in the works of authors such as Bertrand Russell⁷¹. The proposal contemplates the entry of regional organisations in lieu of the States (or alongside countries that already possess regional dimensions, such as the USA and China), so that every country in the world can be represented in the two Councils through its own organisation⁷². The two bodies, democratised in that way and composed of subjects with a relatively homogeneous “weight” in terms of population and economic and political power, could make decisions by majority voting and simultaneously be endowed with effective coercive powers and a political orientation. In fact, the regional path to reform is the only instrument able to break the trade-off between representation and effectiveness plaguing international organisations today, for example, the General Assembly is a highly representative body but lacks powers, whereas the Security Council is endowed with greater powers but is not very representative⁷³.

⁷¹ Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959; Id., *Has Man a Future?*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1961; see also Hans Köchler, *Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International Democracy*, Lecture delivered at the International Seminar on “Reforming the United Nations: Democracy, Justice, and Security in the Age of Globalization”, Turin, 8 June 2007, http://www.hanskoechler.com/Koechler-Security_Council-Reform-CSF-TurinV3-25Aug07.pdf, also in Giovanni Finizio, Ernesto Gallo (eds.), *Democracy at the United Nations. UN Reform in the Age of Globalization*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2012.

⁷² The first step should be the entry of the EU in the two Councils, an operation legally permitted now by the Lisbon Treaty, which granted legal status to the EU. As has occurred many times in the past, the European example could trigger a virtuous process, i.e. the gradual consolidation of regional cooperation experiences in other places throughout the world, up to the entrance of other organisations in the Council: see Giovanni Finizio, *The Security Council Reform as a “Sustainable Process”: The Role of the European Union*, in Finizio, Gallo (eds.), *Democracy at the United Nations*, cit.

⁷³ For a more comprehensive discussion see Giovanni Finizio, *Il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU: un inventario critico delle proposte di riforma*, CSF Research Paper, Turin, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, 2008, pp. 72 ff, http://www.csfederalismo.it/attachments/027_1A_finizio_ago_2008.pdf.

To complete the picture, we could contemplate the creation of a World Parliamentary Assembly which, based on the model of the historical example of the European Parliament, would initially be composed of representatives of the national Parliaments (second-degree representation) and endowed with consultative powers, and would later achieve direct election and co-decision powers alongside the Security Council and the ECOSOC⁷⁴.

8. Conclusions

The truly efficient reform of the GEG must first involve the comprehensive reform of the United Nations, and both of them must be based on a break with the State-centrism that presently characterises global governance. The debates of the last fifteen years have generally overlooked this and instead have focused on the reform of the UNEP or the creation of a new specialised agency for the environment, still based on the usual State-centric logics. Human security and the responsibility to protect doctrine, both based on the paradigm of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, highlight the limits of these proposals and at the same time outline a comprehensive project which develops along two trajectories, one vertical and the other horizontal. Concerning the former, a system should be built based on multi-level governance in the environmental field that involves the States, the regional organisations and the United Nations, assigning to each subject precise responsibilities, i.e. adequate powers at last and well-defined limits according to the logic of the subsidiarity of responsibility. This involves the State as the first actor of environmental governance, but in the event it lacks the capacity or the will to act, or in the case of the trans-nationality of the issues involved, the highest level authorities shall intervene and each of them should be endowed with effective powers of coordination and political direction with respect to the institutional actors placed at the lower level.

⁷⁴ On this subject see Saul H. Mendlovitz, Barbara Walker, (eds.), *A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals*, New York, Centre for UN Reform education, 2003. The need for a World Parliament is particularly felt by civil society, which today has organised itself in an organic "Campaign for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly" (CEUNPA), (official website: <http://www.unpacampaign.org/>; see also <http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/campaign-for-the-establishment-of-a-united-nations-parliamentary-assembly>). See also Andreas Bummel, *Developing International Democracy. For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations. A Strategy Paper of the Committee for a Democratic UN*, Stuttgart, Horizonte Verlag, 2005.

Regarding the horizontal trajectory, the problem of the relations among the many universal organisations emerges, hence the need to balance different and potentially conflicting demands, such as environmental protection, development and free economic trade. This must be managed by a strong centre, able to exert binding coordination over institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the UNEO to-be-created, on the basis of the holistic paradigm of human security. The body that could ideally fulfil that function is the ECOSOC, which should be strengthened accordingly and linked to the Security Council in order to give more importance to economic, social and environmental security than political and military security, which is currently being given priority.

Expanding GEG reform to include the entire UN system and strengthening all the institutional intersections of global governance with supra-national powers and democratic rules: this is the path to attaining the effectiveness and legitimacy which, starting from false premises, scholars, civil society and States are expecting from a reform that has never seen the light of day. The correct premises are beginning to take shape: regional organisations are, being involved in a process of consolidation and democratisation also thanks to the EU, while global civil society is developing a growing interest in the strengthening and democratisation of the United Nations. It is not a matter, therefore, of building everything from scratch, but of accelerating, reinforcing and making more concrete and holistic the dynamics already under way.

**THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
BETWEEN NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND WORLD ECOLOGICAL PARTNERSHIP (1972-1998)**

Laura Scichilone

The institution and development of the European Economic Community/European Union (EEC/EU) are tightly intertwined with the economic, political and social transformations that, between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, took place not only at European scale but more generally in the international context. The Community/Union has given constant attention to the world dimension of the current ecological crisis, which represents “a problem with no boundaries” and therefore is to be necessarily seen as “a trans-national question”. In the face of industrial pollution, in particular the one originating from chemical plants and become chronic since the end of the 1950s¹, the national States have shown their weakness. In Western Europe and in particular within the Community, an example of the limits that prevented the States from coping with pollution by adopting autonomous and efficient measures was the border-river Rhine, whose degradation was a common problem of France and the Federal Republic of Germany².

After the signing of the Rome Treaties (1957) and the progressive integration of national markets, the EEC issued regulations about a series of economic policies that implied a transfer of the decision-making process from the national to the European level. Such a process was still based on the inter-governmental methods of the Community's Council of Ministers and,

¹ Cf. Piero Bevilacqua, *La terra è finita. Breve storia dell'ambiente*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006, pp. 71-72; Robert Delort, François Walter, *Storia dell'ambiente europeo*, Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2002, p. 335.

² About some peculiar features of the Rhine, see Maurizio Garuti, *Il romanzo del Reno: storia di un fiume inquieto*, Bologna, Pendragon, 2004. About the cross-border pollution of the river, see Isabelle Romy, *Les pollutions transfrontières des eaux: l'exemple du Rhin. Moyens d'action des lésés*, Lausanne, Payot, 1990.

therefore, was subject to a series of obstacles coming from possible disagreements between the member States. However, the issuing of regulations concerning the consequences to the environment, in particular in the industrial sector, became a side effect of economic integration. In fact, economic rules and competition protection had to take into consideration the necessity to manage the pollution problems in a uniform fashion in all member-States. For these reasons and despite the EEC Treaty was not contemplating any explicit reference to environmental protection, the Community found in the generic aims of Articles 100 and 235³ the basis for giving legitimacy to some occasional measures.

While a first reason for acting at the Community level originated from the economic integration itself, a second thrust to define a European-wide environmental policy was given by the Stockholm Conference organized by the United Nations in June 1972. The Community was listed among the “bodies at regional level”⁴ and was represented at the Summit by Sicco L. Mansholt, President of the European Commission. He was chosen not only for his official position, but also for his strong interest in ecological matters, which led the Conference's Secretary General, Maurice P. Strong, to ask for his presence⁵. The Stockholm Conference authoritatively gave the environmental question an international dimension, and put pressure on the States to manage in a trans-national way the problems of common interest. To that end, the Community could start from a favorable position, because it already had common institutions and, although the inter-governmental level was pre-eminent in decision-making, that fact in itself was helpful in providing an efficient management of environmental problems to the EEC.

Also, its listing among the “regional bodies” was a recognition of the Community's potential role, as it was considered not only as the summation of its member States (which were also individually represented at the Summit), but also as an intermediate subject between

³ The two Articles state, briefly, that the EEC can adopt measures in additional matters if they aim to ensure the good functioning of the internal market. So ruled also the Court of Justice easing the solution of the question of the juridical basis of the Community action in environmental matters. Giovanni Cordini, *La protezione dell'ambiente nell'Unione europea*, in Vincenzo Pepe (ed.), *Politica e legislazione ambientale*, Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1996, p. 61.

⁴ See the report *Third Session of the Preparatory Intergovernmental Conference in Stockholm (1971)*, in Historical Archives of European Union (HAEU), Fondo Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (CSM) 24.

⁵ Maurice P. Strong, Secretary-General of the Conference, *Letter to Mr Mansholt*, 28 April 1972; Sicco L. Mansholt, President of the Commission of the European Communities, *Letter to Mr. Strong*, Brussels, 23 May 1972, in Archives Historiques de la Commission Européenne (AHCE), BAC 28/1980, n. 656.

international institutions and the States. Geographical interdependence and the necessity to give global answers to the ecological question were becoming more and more evident due to a remarkable increase of environmental damages, that were requiring to step up multilateral actions and international cooperation⁶. In that context, the European Community was representing, above all, a model for overcoming the exclusive nature of the national dimension. In addition, starting from the Stockholm meeting, the Community will constantly relate itself to the international actors and in particular to the United Nations. This aspect has been a characteristic feature of the evolution of the Community's environmental policy, contributing to create a wider field of action with respect not only to the national borders of its member States, but also in the international arena.

The months preceding the official institution of the Community's environmental policy were marked by a political climate which saw the first international meeting on the environment, while the noxious effects of its economic and industrial development were more and more upsetting the environment, as well as the living and working conditions of its citizens. In October 1972 the European Summit in Paris formally invited the Commission to work out an action plan on environmental matters⁷. Following the Paris Summit, the first results were achieved after an inter-ministerial Conference held in Bonn on October 31, 1972, which gathered the EC Ministers of the member States responsible for environmental protection, including the Ministers of the countries that had to join it as members in 1973 (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark)⁸. In Bonn they decided to hold regular meetings between the Ministers responsible for the environment, and to institute an “environmental group” composed of national delegations and a representative of the Commission: the group's mandate was to draft the first action program⁹.

⁶ Cf. John Bellamy Foster, *The Vulnerable Planet. A Short Economic History of the Environment*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1999; Pier Paolo Poggio, *La crisi ecologica. Origini, rimozioni, significati*, Milano, Jaca Book, 2003.

⁷ Speech by Hans Edgar Jahn, *Verbal Question n. 23/72 with discussion: Measures on Account of the Results of the Conferences of June 1972 on Environment Protection*, European Parliament, Session of Tuesday 12 December 1972, in Official Journal of the European Community (OJEC), Discussions of the European Parliament, n. 156 December 1972, p. 41.

⁸ General Secretariat of the Council of European Communities, *20th Summary of the Council activities*, Luxembourg, Office of official publications of the European Communities, 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1972, p. 232.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232. Communautés européennes, Le Conseil, *Lettre de M. Genscher, Ministre de l'Intérieur de la République fédérale d'Allemagne en date du 6 novembre 1972 à M. W.K.N. Schmelzer, Président du Conseil des Communautés*

The member States were in agreement that the environmental problems were trans-national, but they were determined to get a political control in that sector too -through the pre-eminent position of the Council of Ministers in the preliminary phases and in the decision-making process- that could prevent a complete or even partial transfer of their sovereignty to the Community. The inputs for the creation of a new policy were basically coming from the Commission and from the peculiar activism of some of its members, among others Mansholt and Altiero Spinelli, then Commissioner to industry, research and technology¹⁰. However, the typical inter-governmental cooperation method was still noticeable, yet again and in this matter too.

In January 1973, after the Frenchman François-Xavier Ortoli took over the Commission presidency, the Italian Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza¹¹ was given the responsibility of the newly-born environmental policy. The Commissioner's priority objective was the approval of the first action program, and he knew very well he could not ignore the action line suggested during the Bonn Conference. The burden of following the inter-governmental method was great. On the other hand, the environmental sector was at its first “community experience” and it would have been difficult to expect an action context with a limited influence from the member States.

“Environment” meant above all “territory” and hence “State”. The European policy was meeting with difficulties in compounding the need to cope with the most important environmental problems in a trans-national perspective and the need to carry out, in order to do that, significant sovereignty transfers from the governmental to the Community level. Yet, in November 1973, the Council finally approved the first action plan for the period 1973-1976¹².

européennes. Objet: Transmission d'un communiqué de la Conférence des Ministres chargés des problèmes de l'environnement, Bruxelles, 5 Décembre 1972, in AHCE, BAC 244/1991 n. 6.

¹⁰ Altiero Spinelli, *Una sfida per l'Europa: lo sviluppo industriale e il problema ecologico*, in “Il Mulino”, year XXI, n. 221, May-June 1972, pp. 397-406.

¹¹ Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, member of the Christian Democratic party, joined the Community institutions as a member of Parliament (1961-1972), taking in particular the post of President of the political commission. He was then Vice-President of the European Commission under the presidencies of Sicco L. Mansholt (March 1972-January 1973) and François-Xavier Ortoli (January 1973-January 1977). In 1973, following the start of the first action Program, Scarascia Mugnozza became the first commissioner to the environment, a post he kept until 1977. See Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, *Schede di archivio*, 1999, in ASUE, CSM 85.

¹² General Secretariat of the European Communities Council, 20th *Summary of Council activities*, p. 22.

Despite all the reserves, the States had to face new unknowns with old means, i.e. the borderless ecological crisis with the peculiar instruments of the national governments. In the case of the Community, although the States could put in place forms of traditional cooperation of the inter-governmental type, that could not solve the problems in a definitive and efficient way, because the EEC economic integration was posing the dilemma of a joint management of the effects deriving mainly from its own industrial development. The degradation itself of the Ruhr and Saar territories¹³, the mining center of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), constituted by its “direct effect” a “Community question”.

Under the aspect of transfer of powers, the first action plan was contemplating an interesting interaction between several political and institutional levels: local, regional, national, Community, international¹⁴. In addition, criteria were defined for the choice of one or the other action level: it was to be based upon the evaluation of the type of pollution and the characteristics of the geographical area to be protected¹⁵. This point of the action program did show a broad political will concerning the need of an institutional handling of the environment, that allowed for a spreading and sharing of responsibilities among the actors involved in carrying out the Community decisions.

As to the starting up of the Community's environmental policy and in particular with regard to the first action plan, two aspects have to be underlined. On the one hand, the Paris Summit of 1972, and hence the member States, had recognized the convenience to go beyond the competences given to the Community by the Rome Treaties, acknowledging the new economic, political and social requirements originating from the very development of the EEC, and showing their will to provide answers to them at the Community level. On the other hand, the biggest difficulty was the decision-making process based on the unanimous vote in the Council.

¹³ Delort, Walter, *Storia dell'ambiente europeo*, cit., p. 333.

¹⁴ Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, *Programma delle Comunità europee in difesa dell'ambiente. Intervento dell'on. Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, Vicepresidente della Commissione delle Comunità europee al Convegno di studi indetto dall'Ente Studi Antinquinamento*, Milano, 14-16 giugno 1973, pp. 9-11, in ASUE, CSM 64.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

According to the consultation procedure, the European Parliament, which had shown an *avant-garde* attitude with regard to the newly-born environmental policy¹⁶, did not have a substantial influence on the decision-making process.

Also Spinelli expressed himself in favor of a widening of the Community powers. In fact, in his capacity of Commissioner, he was told to participate in the preparation of the Summit¹⁷. Spinelli had indicated the Paris Summit as the venue where a series of Community's "unsolved questions" should be discussed¹⁸. The Commissioner believed that, after the success of the EEC, crowned by the breaking down of the custom barriers ahead-of-schedule¹⁹, the Community had to move towards "a social policy that, availing itself of suitable harmonization tools, of Community laws and common initiatives, shall define and enforce the non-deferrable priorities concerning the quality of life (...) and also a correct equilibrium between society and its environment"²⁰. A common environmental policy was clearly called for by Spinelli and by a sizable majority of the Commission and the Parliament, but also the member States, especially those lacking an adequate political knowledge in the environmental field, had to admit to their ever more apparent "incompetence" in handling the new ecological problems originating from the economic and industrial development.

The differences between member States in their ability/political competence in the field of environmental matters have been seen as a "North-South dichotomy"²¹. According to this interpretation, there was a difference of opinion, and consequently a friction, between some States in the North of the EC and others mostly in the South. The former tried to progressively include in the European agenda their own national measures on the environment, generally more demanding than the average level in other member States; the latter followed the

¹⁶ It has been observed how, following the later widening of its powers, the European Parliament's influence manifested itself with generally more "environmentalist" positions than both the Council and the Commission. See Núria Font, *La politica ambientale*, in Sergio Fabbrini, Francesco Morata (ed.), *L'Unione europea. Le politiche pubbliche*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, p. 176.

¹⁷ Altiero Spinelli, *Note de M. Spinelli*, Bruxelles, 20 March 1972, in ASUE, Altiero Spinelli Fund (from now on: AS) 30.

¹⁸ Altiero Spinelli, *Préparation de la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement. Note du Secrétariat Général du 17 janvier 1972. Passage suggéré sur la politique industrielle, technologique, scientifique et de l'environnement*, Bruxelles, 23 Février 1972, in ASUE, AS 30; Id., *Note de M. Spinelli*, cit.; Id., *Voce, indipendenza e personalità dell'Europa*, in "Il Mulino", year XXI, n. 222, July-August 1972, p. 588 (587-598).

¹⁹ In 1968, eighteen months ahead of schedule, the EEC accomplished the full custom union between its member States.

²⁰ Spinelli, *Voce, indipendenza e personalità dell'Europa*, cit., p. 588.

²¹ A picture of this vision is cleverly given by Núria Font, *La politica ambientale*, cit., pp. 180-183.

Community developments, having difficulties sometimes in changing their national policies to meet them²².

The reasons driving the “green countries” to such a transferring of domestic environmental protection levels to the Community's are essentially two. The first lies in the influence of domestic public opinion (in this case the ecologist movements) and follows the dynamics of domestic politics; the second comes from the pressure exerted by some national industrial sectors, aspiring to ensure their competitiveness in the environmental field over the “late-coming” member States²³. A common attitude in the Southern countries, instead, has been to see the introduction of the Community's environmental measures as a risk for their competitiveness, considering such measures as based on the needs of the Northern countries to the detriment of the Southern, hence as being imposed on them by the former²⁴.

In such a perspective, the Community's enlargement steps represent an important factor in reconstructing the evolution of the European environmental policy²⁵, but they also constitute a useful element for understanding the dynamics of national interests and the construction of a potentially trans-national dimension for such a policy. The development of the European Community/Union's ecological action was depending, at least partially, on the divergence or the equilibrium between the “green” and the “late-coming” countries. Of the founder States, Germany and The Netherlands were among the first, Italy and partly France among the second. Following the first enlargement of 1973, the green countries got stronger thanks to Denmark's stiff attitude; in line with its general disaffection with most of the integration process, Great Britain's attitude was essentially “lukewarm”.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181. Font speaks of a process of *policy-givers* e *policy-takers*: “the development of the Community's environmental policy has been, to a large extent, the result of a tension between the countries with very advanced protection policies, which have transferred their domestic agendas to the Community arena (*policy-givers*), and the countries with no or nascent environmental policies, which have progressively built their domestic agenda as a consequence of Europeanization (*policy-takers*). The first ones comprise Germany, Denmark and The Netherlands (the *green troika*), and recently Sweden and Austria, while the second group comprises Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and, to a lower degree and for different reasons, the United Kingdom.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

²⁵ On this aspect see Laura Scichilone, *La politica ambientale comunitaria e gli allargamenti della CEE/UE (1973-2004)*, in Daniele Pasquinucci (ed.), *Dalla piccola alla grande Europa. Gli allargamenti della CEE/UE*, Bologna, CLUEB, 2006, pp. 39-59.

Although there is to make a distinction between the level of the debate within the European Parliament and the member States' level of representation and decision in the Council, one may observe that in the first half of the 1970s the discussions on environmental issues saw the German and Dutch MEPs, all across the political groups and hence with different positions, among the most active in the political debate²⁶. Just to make some examples, we could mention the German Popular Hans Edgar Jahn²⁷, the Dutch Socialist Adriaan Pieter Oele²⁸, the Dutch Popular Jacob Boersma²⁹. However, in the start up and first development phase of Europe's environmental policy, in the face of Germany's and The Netherlands' positive attitude, the “less-green” countries did not obstruct the definition of new community competences in this sector. This general orientation to favor the birth of the new policy was also made easier by the willingness to transfer to the community level some environmental responsibilities, due to both the difficulty to manage them domestically, and the better efficiency of measures taken by the European Community.

At the end of 1973, the EEC was put to the test by the energy crisis caused by the fourth Arab-Israeli war. The oil shock posed not only the question of the relations between exporting and importing countries, but also some problems connected to the environmental policies, from energy saving to the scarcity and insecurity of resources. Actually, the member States' and the Community's concerns were in regard to the security of supplies and the cost of oil. However, the ecological arguments became part of the political and institutional debate over the possible solutions to the situation of generalized energy insecurity that was present within

²⁶ See *Discussione su “Politica in materia di ambiente – Possibilità offerte dai trattati comunitari in materia di lotta contro l'inquinamento ambientale”*, European Parliament, Session of Tuesday 18 April 1972, in GUCE, Discussions of the European Parliament, n. 149, April 1972; *Interrogazione orale n. 23/72 con discussione: provvedimenti a seguito dei risultati delle conferenze del giugno 1972 sulla protezione dell'ambiente*, cit.

²⁷ See Speech by Hans Edgar Jahn, *Interrogazione orale n. 23/72 con discussione: provvedimenti a seguito dei risultati delle conferenze del giugno 1972 sulla protezione dell'ambiente*, cit.

²⁸ See Speech by Adriaan Pieter Oele, *Discussione su “Interconnessioni tra la politica sociale e le altre politiche della Comunità”*, European Parliament, Session of Tuesday 6 October 1970, in GUCE, Discussions of the European Parliament, n. 129, October 1970, p. 27.

²⁹ See Speech by Jacob Boersma, *Discussione su “Preservazione delle acque interne”*, European Parliament, Session of Thursday 19 November 1970, in GUCE, Discussions of the European Parliament, n. 130, November 1970, pp. 151-152.

the Community³⁰. To that end, in 1974 the Commission admitted that “as a general rule, the measures tending to limit energy consumption favor the protection of the environment”³¹.

As far as the coordination between member States and the possibilities of a joint action are concerned, the crisis showed how much the States were still tied to their national logic in managing energy problems, and made it apparent how far the Community was from putting in place a European policy in that sector. Also, still remote was the possibility to compound, in the short term, energy-related and environmental needs through actions at the European level. Those weaknesses had been clearly denounced by Commissioner Spinelli³². He was regretting the failure of the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973³³, the Summit that should have dealt with the energy policy problems, which unfortunately gave rise to dismay in most of the member States confronted with the oil shock.

The insecurity of supplies and the other negative effects of the crisis had been caused by the lack of a European strategy in the energy sector. As the German Popular MEP Gerd Springorum observed, when confronted with the crisis the member States limited themselves to apply the rule “every man for himself!”³⁴. Instead, the member States and the Community should have moved quickly towards coordinating their national energy-policies and above all towards a common energy policy. The oil shock, in fact, had determined a point of no-return in the world management of fossil resources³⁵. Such an inability by the Community's member States to meet the challenge of a common energy policy will persist when, soon afterwards, the problems connected to energy and the environment will intensify.

³⁰ Cf. Walter Laqueur, *A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970–1978*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979 (Italian edition *Europa: un continente smarrito*, Milano, Rizzoli, 1979).

³¹ Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, *Il problema dell'ambiente. Intervento di Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, vice-presidente della Commissione delle Comunità europee, davanti al Consiglio dei ministri*, Bruxelles, 4 November 1974, p. 1, in ASUE, CSM 64.

³² Altiero Spinelli, *Copenhagen – L'ora della verità*, 14 December 1973, in ASUE, AS 31.

³³ Altiero Spinelli, *L'Europa cerca a Copenaghen una politica comune per l'energia*, in “Corriere della Sera”, 14 December 1973.

³⁴ Speech by Gerd Springorum, *Approvvigionamento di energia nella Comunità*, European Parliament, Session of Thursday 13 December 1973, in GUCE, Discussions of the European Parliament, December 1973, n. 169, p. 172.

³⁵ Cf. Clive Ponting, *Green History of the World*, Torino, SEI, 1992, p. 443; Vandana Shiva, *Resources*, in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), *Dizionario dello sviluppo*, Torino, EGA Editore, 2004, p. 264.

A few years later, the Community was confronted with yet another test, which, however, as regards political cooperation, will have a different outcome than the oil crisis. In July 1976, an accident at the Icmesa plant in Seveso, Italy, caused an extensive dioxin contamination, and political authorities were confronted with serious and urgent problems³⁶. Although it happened in Italy, the accident immediately involved the Community, which had addressed its environmental action in particular against the noxious effects of the industrial system. The Community's intervention was called for by the Italian authorities themselves, who in particular asked the Commission to subsidize the land reclamation and the protection measures in the contaminated area³⁷. The Seveso events gave rise to a heated debate in the Parliament and in the Commission, leading to a progressive regulation at the European level of some industrial products, and of the transport and marketing of some substances dangerous to people and the environment, starting from some chemical products.

Although some years had to pass, in June 1982 the Council issued a specific directive aimed at regulating the industrial products deemed dangerous³⁸: the measure was renamed “the Seveso directive”. It constitutes an exemplary case in favor of the strengthening of the community dimension of the European environmental policy. First of all, in the situation of free circulation of goods created by the common market, it was indispensable that the Community be the one in charge of the regulations for the production, transport and marketing of dangerous substances. Only through measures adopted at the community level, in fact, could the uniformity be guaranteed between the regulations and the parameters in force in the member States. Secondly, the Community could guarantee a better control of the observance of competition laws, and assure that prevention measures and the control of industrial risks reach the same standards in all member States.

³⁶ Cf. AA. VV., *Icmesa. Una rapina di salute, di lavoro e di territorio*, Milano, Mazzotta, 1976; Laura Conti, *Visto da Seveso. L'evento straordinario e l'ordinaria amministrazione*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1977; Daniele Biacchesi, *La fabbrica dei profumi. La verità su Seveso, l'Icmesa, la diossina*, Milano, Baldini&Castoldi, 1995.

³⁷ Commissione delle Comunità europee, *Comunicato stampa: L'azione della CEE per Seveso*, 1976, in ASUE, CSM 65. See Achille Cutrera, Giuseppe Pastorelli and Barbara Pozzo (ed.), *Seveso trent'anni dopo: la gestione del rischio industriale*, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 2006. In particular, on the behaviour of the Italian authorities, see in the volume Bruno Ziglioli's essay, *La commissione parlamentare di inchiesta "Icmesa"*, pp. 43-86.

³⁸ Consiglio delle Comunità europee, *Direttiva del Consiglio del 24 giugno 1982 8/501/CEE sui rischi di incidenti rilevanti connessi con determinate attività industriali*, in GUCE, n. L 230/1982.

In terms of the balance between economic/commercial interests and environmental/health requirements, the Seveso directive represented the first important compromise of a series bound to grow in number. The prevention of industrial risks³⁹ became a priority in the Community, which was starting to extend the sphere of community laws in environmental matters, harmonizing national norms and in practice gradually enlarging the “European environmental right”. In the ceding of “normative sovereignty” a few factors were involved: the inconsistency of managing at the national level the effects of economic policies that were integrated at the European level; the convenience to delegate to the Community the responsibility of taking measures, in the presence of a growing public-opinion's attention to environmental issues, a political attitude quite noticeable in some member States. In this regard, Seveso had shown how delicate a matter it was to handle the public opinion's reactions, in the presence of evident damages and concentrated attention by the mass media.

In the second half of the 1980s, the evolution of the Community environmental policy got entangled with the general development of European integration coinciding with Jacques Delors' presidency of the Commission⁴⁰. The impulse to Community building promoted by Delors through the crucial role of the Commission included the strengthening of some important sectoral policies, among them the environmental one. Moreover, the project of actively pursuing some community policies was tightly connected to his will to promote a European model of society, involving the citizens in the integration process. Delors' desire was, however, to make a quality leap based on a comprehensive vision of Europe, where the social dimension constituted the cement of European citizenship. He argued that “through the social Charter we build the Europe of men and women, and not simply a Big Market”⁴¹. In such a context, environmental protection represented the indispensable challenge for reconciling the economic and the social development.

³⁹ Cf. Bruna De Marchi, Luigi Pellizzoni, Daniele Ungaro, *Il rischio ambientale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001.

⁴⁰ Cf. George Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1995.

⁴¹ See Claudio Giulio Anta, *Il rilancio dell'Europa. Il progetto di Jacques Delors*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2004, p. 171. The author quotes some sentences of a speech by Delors in favor of “a social Europe” and its Chart.

The activity of the Delors Commission, and in particular of the British Commissioner Stanley Clinton Davis, who was given the responsibility of the environmental policy, was incorporated in the framework of the institutional goals of the Community agenda at the beginning of 1985. Between May and June, in fact, the Council of Ministers of the Environment and the OECD dealt with the issue of the new challenges of the European ecological policy. The European Parliament, instead, brought to the attention of the Council some important questions regarding environmental protection, aiming to fill with substance the discussions of the European ministers. The integration process had a new impulse, and the environmental policy took advantage of the favorable climate for politically strengthening some Community competences.

In addition, the Delors Commission's works were marked by the adhesion to the Community by Spain and Portugal, which on June 12, 1985, signed the adhesion Treaties and on January 1, 1986, became full members. Spain and Portugal strongly tipped in a negative sense the balance between green and late-comer countries, placing themselves among the latter. Also the joining of Greece in 1981 had produced an unbalance in the negative sense. However, the strengthening of the environmental policy promoted and realized by the Delors Commission was taking place in the context of the enlargement to Spain and Portugal, actually demonstrating how important the Community activity was for not reducing the standards already reached by the Community, and providing instead incentives to the new member States to raise theirs. To that end, the Community environmental law was a fundamental glue for preventing an ecological downgrading dictated by particular interests, whose detrimental effects could have spread to the whole community, due to some direct effects of the common market. In fact, the Spanish and Portuguese press were attentively treating, sometimes with apprehension, the issue of integrating in their legislation the Community's environmental rules⁴².

⁴² With regard to Spain, see François Roelants du Vivier y Humberto da Cruz, *España, la CE y el medio ambiente*, in "El País", 7 March 1986, in ASUE, CPPE, file 1630; Concepción Sáenz Laín, *La integración en la CEE y el medio ambiente*, in "El País", 30 June 1986, in ASUE, Coupures de Presse du Parlement Européen Fund (from now on CPPE), file 763; [ib.], *La CE reconoce las dificultades de España para adaptarse a la normativa comunitaria*, in "El País", 5 November 1986, in ASUE, CPPE, file 742. With regard to Portugal: [ib.], *Europeus tem preocupação por questões ambientais*, in "Diário de Notícias", 23 July 1987, in ASUE, CPPE, file 405.

In 1985, the Delors Commission engaged in working out the Single Act, finally signed in February 1986. The Single Act rearranged the regulations contained in previous treaties and provided new regulations bound to relaunch the European integration. The environment was one of the sectors falling in that category. Through its “Title 7 – Environment”, the Community gave a juridical framework to its environmental policy⁴³. The inclusion of the environment into the Community's sectoral policies system was rooted in Delors' innovative approach to European construction. He wanted to put in place an integration which had to go beyond the economic dimension and had to be able to penetrate into the everyday life of European citizens. In such a context, the environment started on his own right to be a part of the Community's fields of interest.

In parallel with defining the EEC competences within its borders, the possibility was sanctioned to operate in the international plane, both for the Community and for its member States, in cooperation with third countries or international organizations, for achieving common goals in environment protection⁴⁴. Another article allowed individual member States to adopt measures aiming to get a better protection than that established by Community rules⁴⁵. In a decision-making system based on unanimity, that article not only allowed for the possibility to raise the protection standards, but probably represented also a meager comfort to the green countries, that would hardly have accepted the prevalence of Community norms over their national ones, should they be below the protection levels assured by their own.

Just then, Europe was upset by the accident occurred in April 1986 at the nuclear plant in Chernobyl (Ukraine)⁴⁶, that confronted the national governments and the Community institutions with the necessity and urgency to provide immediate and efficient answers to the emergency of radioactivity. Contamination, as a matter of fact, did not stop at the Ukraine borders but extended itself to a much wider area.

⁴³ European Single Act, in GUCE, n. L 169 del 20 June 1987.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Art. 130 R, para. 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. 130 T.

⁴⁶ AA. VV., *Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, 1986: the Global Impact of Chernobyl Reactor Accident. The Lessons of Chernobyl*, Paris, Tristan Mage, 1994; Peter Bunyard, *L'energia nucleare dopo Chernobyl*, in Edward Goldsmith-Nicholas Hildyard (ed.), *Rapporto Terra*, Roma, Gremese, 1989; Alla Yarochinskaya, *Tchernobyl, vérité interdite*, La Tour-d'Aigues, Artel/Éditions de l'Aube, 1993; Grigorij Medvedev, *Chernobyl: tutta la verità sulla tragedia nucleare*, Milano, SugarCo, 1990.

In addition, the Community had the problem of importing many products coming from countries where the contamination risk was high: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union⁴⁷. Chernobyl was thus becoming an obvious demonstration of the necessity to work out nuclear prevention measures at the supra-national level⁴⁸.

A direct consequence of the accident was the signing of two international documents: the “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident”⁴⁹ and a second multilateral agreement, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”⁵⁰, both signed in Vienna in September 1986 at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Community's member States signed the agreements, but on some points their attitude was not unanimous. Out of a total of 59 signatory countries, as many as 27 refused to agree to the possibility, provided for by paragraph 2 of Art. 11 of the first Convention, to be subject to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice in case of controversy between States or between States and the IAEA concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention⁵¹. Reservation clauses with regard to that article were invoked by all of the socialist countries, but also by some Western European countries, like France and Spain, as well as other extra-European States, like China and the United States.

In 1985 nuclear energy constituted one fifth of the electric energy consumed in the European Community, with a much higher percentage in those member States that had developed big programs of electricity production through nuclear energy, as Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom⁵².

⁴⁷ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities, *34th Summary of the Council activities*, Luxembourg, Office of official publications of the European Communities, 1 Jan.- 31 Dec. 1986, p. 187.

⁴⁸ Mauro Politi, *International and Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: Some Recent Developments of State Practice*, in *La réparation des dommages catastrophiques*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1990, pp. 319-337; Id., *The Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on the States' Perception of International Responsibility for Nuclear Damage*, in Francesco Francioni, Tullio Scovazzi, *International Responsibility for Environmental Harm*, London, Graham & Trotman, 1991, pp. 473-498.

⁴⁹ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, IAEA, September 26, 1986,

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna.html>.

⁵⁰ Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA, September 26, 1986,

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare.html>.

⁵¹ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, IAEA, cit.; see “Reserves and declarations”.

⁵² European Documentation, *Nuclear security in the European Community*, Luxembourg, Office of official publications of the European Communities., 1985/1, p. 9.

These data make it easier to understand the reasons leading some governments to want to protect, preventively, their national nuclear-energy production from possible disturbing elements deriving from the Convention. Such non-homogeneous behaviors of some States with regard to the Vienna agreements were inconsistent, among other things, with what had been decided by the EEC Council of Ministers itself, hence by all the States. The Council admitted that the IAEA represented the suitable venue to promote the mechanisms of information, consultation in the nuclear sector, and the issuing of regulations over safety criteria; therefore, the member States should discuss and take initiatives first and foremost within that international Agency⁵³.

After having institutionalized the environmental policy through its introduction into the Single Act, the Community chose 1987 to be the “European Year of the Environment”, and decided that it shall run from March 1, the first day of Spring, to the same day of the next year⁵⁴. The initiative was promoted by the Commission with the aim to awake public awareness and step up in particular the Community actions. The Single Act was then an arrival point, but also a starting point. In the second half of the 1980s, in fact, the number of initiatives for the environment increased, getting intertwined with both the developments in the international plane, and the acceleration given to the European integration process, which will lead to the Maastricht Treaty.

Starting from 1987, the Community was involved in the debate on the idea of sustainable development, worked out by the World Commission on Environment and Development instituted by a UN General Assembly resolution at the end of 1983⁵⁵, presided over by the Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland. The final text drafted by the UN Commission, the so-called Brundtland Report, titled *Our Common Future*⁵⁶, emphasized the necessity to define “the ecological bases of development” proposing a new approach in considering the environmental problems.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Council resolution (...) concerning the pursuance and realization of a policy and action program of the European Communities in environmental matters (1987-1992) (87/C328/01), para. 7.1.16., p. 37.

⁵⁵ Resolution 38/161 by the UN General assembly, adopted in the 38th session (1983). See World Commission on Environment and Development, *Il futuro di noi tutti*, pp. 426-441.

⁵⁶ World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

According to the report, they were not a damage to be checked (*a posteriori*) or to be averted (preventively). The environmental factor had to become a component of development, deserving to have a profound impact on government policies, on choices and behaviors affecting life, production and consumption, which shall put the respect of ecological balance at the base of economic and social development.

One of the salient points of the Report was the integration of the environmental issues into other political areas, so as to arrive at a complementarity between, in the first place, ecological and economic objectives. In the Community, the Council responded positively to those suggestions, that became known to the public just in the European Year of the Environment, and its President said: “another aspect that must in the future be given an absolute priority is the integration of the measures concerning the environment into other political areas, which by the way constitutes the *leitmotiv* of the European Year of the Environment. At the same time, this is also (...) one of the main messages contained in the Brundtland Report”⁵⁷. As recalled by the Commissioner to the Environment Clinton Davis, the sitting Lady-President of the Council, the Belgian Miet Smet⁵⁸, energetically engaged in strengthening the Community's environmental policy, although the Council was “a rather hesitant ...body”⁵⁹ in taking a firm line on those matters. The integration of the suggestions contained in the Report into the Community's programmatic framework became a priority of the President, who even took a very clear position before the European Parliament⁶⁰.

Another aspect of the Report regarded the limits of the “traditional forms of national sovereignty”, which “are ever more often left behind by the realities of ecological and economic interdependence; this is true in particular for shared ecosystems and for the so-called “common global goods”, i.e. those zones of the planet that are outside of national jurisdictions.

⁵⁷ Speech by Miet Smet, sitting-President of the Council, Debate on the Environment, European Parliament, session of Wednesday 13 May 1987, in GUCE, European Parliament Discussions, n. 2-352, May 1987, p. 141.

⁵⁸ Miet Smet was at the time Secretary of State to the Environment and Equality, a post she had from 1985 to 1992. From 1992 to 1999 she will be Minister of Labour, Employment and Equality, and from 1999 to 2004 she will be a member, in the group of the European Popular Party, of the European Parliament.

⁵⁹ Speech by Stanley Clinton Davis, member of the Commission, *Ambiente* cit., p. 143.

⁶⁰ Speech by Miet Smet, sitting-President of the Council, *Ambiente* cit., p. 143.

In such areas a sustainable development can only be assured through international cooperation and agreed-to regimes of supervision, strengthening and management of the resources in the common interest”⁶¹. The European Community could start from a favorable position, as it constituted a model as to the overcoming of the “traditional forms of national sovereignty” and, with regard to the environmental policy, its position was one of overture and cooperation with third countries and international organizations. In fact, the Council underlined the necessity to realize “a more effective cooperation with countries and institutions outside of the Community”⁶².

Starting from 1992, the Community oriented its environmental policy to the general goal of sustainability. At the community level, the theory presented by the Brundtland Commission had its highest recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, where the goal of sustainable development has been included among the general goals of the European Union⁶³. The new treaty reiterated the goals of environmental policy, but above all it formally adopted sustainable development as the “guiding principle” to be included in the series of economic and social growth objectives of the Union.

In the wake of the Brundtland Report, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992, redefined some important principles concerning the environmental policy and its coordination at global level⁶⁴. If one considers the Rio Summit as the starting moment, on the international scale, of the policies for a sustainable development, as far as the European Union is concerned many doubts remain about the efficiency of the actions launched since then. The title of the 5th Action Program (1992-2000), “For a durable and sustainable development”⁶⁵, makes a clear reference to the Brundtland Report and the Rio Conference. The Community/European Union has therefore chosen to continue its course in line with the United Nations' plans.

⁶¹ World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, p. 321.

⁶² Speech by Miet Smet, sitting-President of the Council, *Ambiente*, cit., p. 141.

⁶³ Treaty on the European Union (signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992), Title I, Art. B.

⁶⁴ Giulio C. Garaguso, Sergio Marchisio (ed.), *Rio 1992: vertice per la terra*, Milano, Angeli, 1993; Pietro Greco, Antonio Pollio Salimbeni, *Lo sviluppo insostenibile. Dal Vertice di Rio a quello di Johannesburg*, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2003.

⁶⁵ Commission of the European Communities, *Per uno sviluppo durevole e sostenibile. Programma politico e d'azione della Comunità europea a favore dell'ambiente e di uno sviluppo sostenibile*, Brussels, 12 June 1992.

Domestically, the Union must take into account its economic growth together with the environmental aspects, “which shall not be considered as an obstacle to development, but rather as an incentive for a better efficiency and competitiveness, in particular in the larger context of the international market”⁶⁶. On the world scale, the Union has the objective to improve the quality of life “of the whole planet thanks to a more equitable distribution of natural resources (...) being aware that, together with the other industrialized countries, its 340 million inhabitants presently consume an absolutely disproportionate amount of the planet's resources”⁶⁷.

In such an international and European context, the EU's 5th Action Program for the Environment represented a large container of objectives aimed to further sustainability, but it also seemed to raise many doubts about a true willingness and the existence of political chances to realize its goals. However, the 5th Program constitutes in the first place the input by which the European Union has inaugurated a new phase of its environmental policy. It is characterized by the will to develop in parallel a domestic policy and a sort of international mission in the ecological field that, although in concrete terms still shows several limits, represents an essential component of the world role that the European Union aspires to play.

At the end of the 1990s, thanks to the formal innovations brought about by the Maastricht Treaty and by the endorsement of the sustainability principle in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Community's environmental policy was fully incorporated in the institutional treaties. However, that formal progress has not always led to an automatic embodiment in the legislation and to an effective execution of regulations by the member States. In fact, their economic systems are more or less strong, and able to become more sustainability-oriented, and show a varying level of environmental sensitiveness.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

This has sometimes produced a sort of discontinuity in putting into effect the Community policy, while in other instances that policy has helped the harmonization and - generally speaking- an improvement of the national levels of environmental protection⁶⁸.

The reduction of the gap between formal progress and actual realization has become one the main challenges the Union has to face in this sector⁶⁹. Following the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the pro-environment majority in the European Parliament was reinforced, while within the Council the so-called “green troika” widened further⁷⁰. So, the European Council's pledge of an across-the-board integration of environmental protection into all of the community policies, advocated in Amsterdam, can also be interpreted as an outcome of that “green enlargement”. In June 1998, the European Council in Cardiff accepted the Commission's communication and launched a specific action aimed at horizontally integrating environmental protection, which was given the name of “Cardiff process”⁷¹.

The Cardiff European Council drew attention also to another question, that was binding the Union at the world level. Its Presidency Conclusions⁷² explicitly mentioned the significance now given to the Protocol attached to the Convention on climate change endorsed in Rio de Janeiro, that too signed in Kyoto under the auspices of the UN on December 11, 1997, (but entered into force only in 2005⁷³), and for that reason commonly known as the Kyoto Protocol⁷⁴, the last stage of a series of international agreements on atmospheric pollution⁷⁵.

⁶⁸ With regard to those differences, Rodolfo Lewanski argued that in this sector the community action has helped the convergence of national politics and the thrust to ecological modernization, in particular in the countries less advanced in the environmental sector. See Rodolfo Lewanski, *Governare l'ambiente*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, pp. 220-222.

⁶⁹ “The so-called implementation deficit represents one of the challenges of the EU environmental policy, as it requires the member States, with different economies and environmental sensitiveness to take upon themselves high environmental costs and to put in place wide-ranging political and structural changes”. See Núria Font, *La politica ambientale*, cit., p. 188.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Commission of the European Communities, *Integrating Environmental Considerations into Other Policy Areas – A Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process*, Brussels, 1 June 2004, COM (2004) 394 final, p. 3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0394:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁷² Cardiff European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cardiff, June 15-16, 1998, point 35, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/54315.pdf.

⁷³ Art. 25 of the Protocol, in fact, says that it “will enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date when at least 55 Parties to the Convention, (...) whose total emissions of carbon dioxide amount to at least 55% of total emissions as of 1990 (...), have registered their instruments of ratification, approval, adhesion, acceptance”. Although that obstacle has been overcome by attaining the *quorum* and it has entered into force on February 16, 2005, in 141 States, including the whole European Union, Japan and Russia, it remains seriously belittled by the non-participation of the United States, one of the countries most involved in the production of noxious emissions and hence responsible for atmospheric pollution.

⁷⁴ Organization of the United Nations, *Kyoto Protocol of the Convention on Climate Change*, Kyoto, 11 December 1997.

Also with regard to the international action, then, the Cardiff European Council contributed to strengthen the Union's commitment by assuming a positive general attitude with respect to the Kyoto Protocol⁷⁶.

There is to note that the environmental issue is not the only one to be significant in the EU's commitment to support the Protocol, but so is also its determination to reduce the fossil energy sources, explicitly criticized in the Protocol. After the crisis of 1973, this option had become a fundamental component of the Community's energy policy, aiming to reduce the centrality of oil (strongly dependent on imports) in the European system, unlike the United States where oil continued to have a vital importance for the national production of energy, and where that habit was showing no tendency to change⁷⁷. These observations help explain the different attitudes kept from 1997 to the present day by the European Union and by the United States with regard to the fate of the Kyoto Protocol⁷⁸.

As an “inspirational principle”, the Cardiff Process represents the last step in the evolution of the EU environmental policy. The measures of horizontal integration of ecological protection into all of the EU sectoral policies require a continuous strengthening due to the exponential growth of the problems and their severity; just consider the question of climate change and the ensuing energy choices that confront the international community.

⁷⁵ The Community/European Union took part in a series of international agreements on the problem of atmospheric pollution, among which: the Geneva Convention adopted on November 13, 1979, and aimed at preventing the long-distance trans-national atmospheric pollution (ratified through the Directive 81/462/EEC); the Vienna Convention signed on March 22, 1985, for the protection of the ozone layer, and the Montreal Protocol -attached to the Convention- approved in 1987 and modified many times in the course of the 1990s for the substances that deplete the ozone layer (ratified through the Council Directive 88/540/EEC).

⁷⁶ Cf. Andrea Molocchi (ed.), *La scommessa di Kyoto. Politiche di protezione del clima e sviluppo sostenibile*, Milano, Angeli, 1998; Stefano Nespore, *Oltre Kyoto. Che fine faranno gli accordi sul clima?*, in “Il Mulino”, n. 4/2004, pp. 795-802.

⁷⁷ Cf. Michael Economides, Ronald Oligney, *The Colour of Oil. The History, the Money, and the Politics of the World's Biggest Business*, Katy (TX), Round Oak Publishing, 2000.

⁷⁸ For a comparison between the European Union, the United States and the international community with regard to environmental policies, see Richard L. Revesz, Philippe Sands, Richard B. Stewart, *Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable Development. The United States, the European Union and the International Community*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

The globalization process⁷⁹ and its acceleration have been of key importance in the worsening of the ecological crisis, exacerbating some features of an economic and social model that has taken in little or no account the environmental aspect, and that in addition has introduced new mechanisms of resources exploitation and of geographical distribution of ecological degradation that contributed to worsen the conditions of the ecosystem⁸⁰.

The EU's international vocation in the field of civilian external action⁸¹, like aid to development and cooperation in environmental matters, has been strengthened in the 1990s, together with the will to take a more incisive role on the world stage. This aspiration makes explicit reference to the activity framework set up by the UN. In the document on the Cardiff Process results drafted by the Commission, among the "Challenges and future opportunities for environmental integration" there is the initiative called "Green Diplomacy", formulated "to give more voice and influence to the EU on the operational plane in international processes and negotiations in the environmental field"⁸². In the document, the Commission deals also with the global problem of climate changes, of the future struggle for natural resources, firstly water⁸³, of the role that the EU and its member States should play with regard to the simultaneously commercial and environmental matters in the negotiations at the WTO⁸⁴.

Although many limits remain for a fully effective environmental action, the course initiated by the Community/Union in this sector represents an exemplary case of transfer of competences and powers from the member States to Brussels.

⁷⁹ Cf. Jacques Adda, *La mondializzazione dell'economia*, Roma, Datanews, 2000; Jacques Luzi, *Miseria della mondializzazione*, Roma, Strategia della Lumaca, 1997; Corrado Malandrino, *La globalizzazione, le istituzioni, il federalismo*, in Giovanna Cavallari (a cura di), *Comunità, individuo e globalizzazione: idee politiche e mutamenti dello Stato contemporaneo*, Roma, Carocci, 2001, pp. 279-296; Alberto Ramasso Valacca, *Considerazioni sulla "Globalizzazione" mondiale*, in "Affari sociali internazionali", anno XXVII, n. 4, 1999, pp. 55-57; Joseph E. Stiglitz, *La globalizzazione e i suoi oppositori*, Torino, Einaudi, 2002.

⁸⁰ Cf. Franz J. Broschimmer, *Ecocidio. Come e perché l'uomo sta distruggendo la natura*, Roma, Carocci, 2003, pp. 125-146; Wolfgang Sachs, *Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflicts*, London, Zed Books, 1993; Id., *Ambiente e giustizia sociale: i limiti della globalizzazione*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2002, pp. 141-174.

⁸¹ Cf. Mario Telò, *L'Europa potenza civile*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2004.

⁸² Commission of the European Communities, *The Integration of Environmental Considerations in Other Policies*, p. 25.

⁸³ Cf. Robin Clarke, *Water: The International Crisis*, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 1993; Marq de Villiers, *Water: The Fate of Our Precious Resource*, New York, Houghton Press, 2000.

⁸⁴ Commission of the European Communities, *The Integration of Environmental Considerations in Other Policies*, p. 25.

The endowment of environmental competences to the Community/Union was characterized by some difficulties, often due to contrasting national interests, but also by requests to relaunch the Community's action, for example when the member States called for the EEC/EU intervention in order to meet specific needs. In the present world context, however, the most interesting and useful perspective for the strengthening of Europe's environmental policy remains the international arena. Although the road to an ecological economy⁸⁵ is still long and tortuous, no one of the big environmental challenges that confront today the international community can be solved unless it will be attacked at the global level. In this regard, the European Union aspires to play an important role of world partnership, contributing to insert environmental protection in the international political agendas in an indissoluble conjunction with the other world issues⁸⁶.

⁸⁵ See Mercedes Bresso, *Economia ecologica*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1997; Lester Brown, *Eco-economy. Una nuova economia per la Terra*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2002; Hans Immler, *Economia della natura. Produzione e consumo nell'era ecologica*, Roma, Donzelli, 1996; Juan Martinez-Alier, *Economia ecologica*, Milano, Garzanti, 1991.

⁸⁶ "Europe's force as "cooperative super-power" will consist in the building of alliances and networks". See Wolfgang Sachs, Tilman Santarius (eds.), *Per un futuro equo. Conflitti sulle risorse e giustizia globale*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2007, p. 250.

DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SINCE THE LATE 1990S: INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION AND REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROJECTION

Giorgio Grimaldi

1. EU Environmental Policy: Major recent developments

The environmental policy of the European Union (EU) has made considerable progress over the last decade of the 20th century and in the early 21st century¹. Two special events have prepared the way for Europe's engagement in international environmental negotiations² and their backing of the improvement of environmental conditions in neighbouring areas and throughout the world³: the end of the Cold War followed by the prospect of opening EU

¹ For a historical reconstruction of EU environmental policy until the late 1990s cf. Laura Scichilone, *L'Europa e la sfida ecologica. Storia della politica ambientale europea (1969-1998)*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008.

² Since the late 1980s the European Community has been taking action to promote environmental treaties and multilateral agreements. The European Council of Dublin on environmental issues, held in June 1990, particularly stressed the European Community's role in negotiations for the resolution of international environmental issues (the greenhouse effect and the depletion of the ozone layer, climate change, biodiversity protection), as a moral, economic and political authority; cf. European Council, *The Environmental Imperative Declaration of the European Council – Annex II*, Dublin, June 25th-26th 1990, pp. 20-25, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/dublin/du2_en.pdf.

³ In June 1991 at Dobris Castle near Prague the Conference "Environment for Europe" (EfE) took place, the first meeting of all European Environment Ministers, initiating pan-European cooperation in the environmental field, initially among 34 countries; <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/efe/history%20of%20EfE/Dobris.E.pdf>. In fact, as a result of this Conference a process was set in motion, creating a partnership promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) that currently includes 56 national governments of Europe, international organisations, private and public bodies, inter-governmental organisations and other groups with activities, programmes, projects, funding and international agreements aimed at improving the environment through initiatives addressed to specific sub-regions (<http://unece.org/env/efe/welcome.html>). The Ministerial Thematic Conferences are key phases in the process (up to now seventeen have been held and the last took place from September 21st to 23rd, 2011 in Astana, Kazakhstan). The EU participates actively in this regional environmental governance process, which has achieved positive results by establishing flexible institutions that are open to several different actors and a variety of the most significant environmental issues, and acts as an interface between national and global governance levels, playing the role of guarantor to preserve regional public goods through binding multilateral environmental agreements such as the Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) and the Carpathian Convention (Framework Convention on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Carpathians) as well as the specific protocols of other international environmental treaties and disseminating information, acquiring capacity-building and finding funds; cf. Ralf Nordbeck, *Pan-European Environmental Cooperation. Achievements and Limitations of the "Environment for Europe" Process*, in Lorraine Elliott, Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 37-55. For the most

membership to Central and Eastern European countries, which regained full sovereignty with the collapse of Soviet rule, and actions for sustainable development launched globally by the Rio de Janeiro Conference in June 1992. This latter event also relaunched global environmental governance⁴ and opened a new phase characterised by efforts to address major environmental emergencies and reconcile free trade and environmental protection, as well as by the emergence of new approaches and criticism⁵.

The environment is still a shared competence between the EU and the Member States (Art. 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU - TFEU), upon which a wide-ranging Community law has been established and a still ongoing process of harmonising the domestic laws of the now 27 member states⁶ has taken place. The impact of EU environmental law on

important environmental studies conducted on the European region specially commissioned by the EfE that can be found online (<http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/regions/pan-european/>) cf. David Stanners, Philippe Bourdeau, *Europe's Environment. The Dobris Assessment*, Copenhagen, European Environment Agency (EEA), 1995; EEA, *Europe's Environment. The Second Assessment*, Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998; EEA, *Europe's Environment. The Third Assessment*, Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003; EEA, *Europe's Environment. The Third Assessment*, Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007; EEA, *Europe's Environment. An Assessment of Assessments*, Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 2011.

⁴ "Global environmental governance exemplifies this: regimes, often centred on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), address environmental degradation and the management of the commons at local, national, regional and international levels". Susan Park, *Socialization, the World Bank Group and Global Environmental Governance*, in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner, Anna Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, London/New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 91. Regimes are understood as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations"; Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca, New York/London, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2, cit. in Park, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Examples of more developed international environmental regimes with their own rules and procedures are related to the following issues in particular: stratospheric ozone, climate change, biodiversity (species protection, habitat and biosecurity), Antarctica, desertification, hazardous waste and toxic chemicals. For an introduction to key issues and major developments in international environmental policy cf. Stefano Nespor, *Il governo dell'ambiente. La politica e il diritto per il progresso sostenibile*, Milano, Garzanti, 2009.

⁵ Furthermore, a significant amount of criticism has emerged regarding the supposed neutrality of science and its responses to the ecological challenge: "From the standpoint of environmental policy we can look at the decade of the 1990s as a long march toward doubt and uncertainty. In place of confidence in the power of science to silence controversy, awareness grew in many quarters that science is neither complete nor univocal [...], and that its ability to bridge deep ideological and normative divisions is correspondingly limited"; Sheila Jasanoff, Marybeth Long Martello (eds.), *Earthly Politics. Local and Global in Environmental Governance*, Cambridge MA/London, MIT Press, 2004, p. 337. For a critical approach to sustainable development and global governance aimed at emphasising the adaptation of sustainable development to economic globalisation and marketisation of environmental policy-making cf. Jacob Park, Ken Conca, Matthias Finger (eds.), *The Crisis of Global Environmental Governance. Towards a New Political Economy of Sustainability*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2008.

⁶ Article 3 of the TFEU, which follows in full, lists among the EU exclusive competences some significant areas in need of environmental protection (especially the conservation of marine biological resources and common commercial policy), which has indeed enabled the EU to legislate and acquire or orient the policy-making of some areas of action (air quality and pollution, bio-safety and GMOs, integrated coastal zone management, hazardous chemicals, waste management, noise abatement and water quality): "Art. 3 - 1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas:

- (a) customs union;
- (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market;
- (c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;

national policies has been evident while important areas of environmental action have remained the exclusive competence of the states⁷. In the 1990s some of the most important tools designed by the EU to promote stronger action and support the environmental policies of the Member States were:

- the European Environment Agency⁸ (EEA) based in Copenhagen, founded in 1993 and operating since 1994, responsible for the Environmental Information and Observation Network⁹ (Eionet) and charged with collecting and treating the quality of environmental data, providing information, studies, measurements and controls to the States and third countries, which now includes 32 member states – all the EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey - but does not have the powers to control and supervise that characterise an authority;
- the Ecolabel brand, created in 1992 and applicable to products and services of businesses that have successfully undergone a process of environmental certification on a voluntary basis, after which the official logo depicting a daisy with star-shaped petals is awarded¹⁰;

(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy;

(e) common commercial policy.

2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2010/C 83/01, in “Official Journal of the European Union” C 83, Volume 53, March 30th, 2010, p. 51, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF>.

⁷ On the Europeanisation of national environmental policies cf. Andrew Jordan, Duncan Liefferink (eds.), *Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National Environmental Policy*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2004. For a study that analyses the role played by some European states in influencing EU environmental policy from its inception until the mid-1990s cf. Michael Skou Anderson, Duncan Liefferink (eds.), *European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers*, Manchester/New York, Manchester University Press, 1997.

⁸ Official website: <http://www.eea.europa.eu/>. In support of the development of EU Environmental Law through the valuable interpretative contribution of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, it is worth mentioning the action of the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), an organisation which has been gathering the European national authorities since 1992 and counts among its participants 45 institutions from 32 countries, including all EU Member States, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Iceland and Norway; <http://impel.eu/>.

⁹ For more information: <http://www.eionet.europa.eu/>.

¹⁰ For more details: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/>.

- the LIFE Programme (*L'Instrument Financier pour l'Environnement*), launched in 1992, the only EU programme solely responsible for supporting environmental initiatives¹¹;
- the EMAS eco-management and certification system (Environmental Management and Audit System Regulation – EMAS), initiated in 1995 and revised in 2001, which allows industries to voluntarily have their management procedures audited by an independent actor in order to obtain, along with its employees and stakeholders, a certificate of eco-compatibility¹².

Under the Amsterdam Treaty, in force since 1999, the co-decision procedure of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers has been extended to almost all environmental matters (unanimity is still valid for ecological taxation, spatial planning and energy supply) and in order to ensure “a high level of protection” the EU has also broadened its goals by setting out the following important objectives:

- conservation, protection and improvement of the environment;
- protection of human health;
- moderate and rational use of natural resources (cost-benefit analysis and eco-efficiency evaluations in production activities);
- promotion of measures aimed at solving regional or worldwide environmental problems at an international level.

Two processes have been important for the orientation of environmental policy: the Cardiff Process, which since 1998 has begun systematically integrating environmental policy

¹¹ In the 2007-2013 period, it is in the LIFE Plus phase, with an overall budget of 2.19 billion euros. Whereas for the 2014-2020 period, the European Commission has tabled a proposal to increase funding by 52% (for a total of 3.2 billion euros) in order to promote a more intense fight against climate change (the funds allocated for this action amount to about 800 million euros): web page dedicated to LIFE <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/>. On the recent proposal by the European Commission see: European Commission – Press Release, *Significant Boosts in EU Support for the Environment and Climate through the New LIFE Programme*, IP/11/1526, December 12th, 2011, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1526&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Proposal for the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) COM 2011/874 final, Brussels, December 12th, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/about/documents/COMM_PDF_COM_2011_0874_F_EN.pdf?reference=IP/11/1526&format=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

¹² Cf. Michael S. Wenk, *The European Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2005.

into the other Community policies¹³, and a process known as Environmental Policy Integration (EPI), aimed at pursuing sustainable development¹⁴. Moreover, in 2001 the Gothenburg European Council approved a European Strategy for Sustainable Development¹⁵. This initiative, which has incorporated the environmental, economic and social dimensions into the Lisbon Strategy, is made up of a number of programmes and actions that were defined during the European Council held in March 2000 in Lisbon, Portugal, aimed at making the EU “the economy based on the most competitive and dynamic knowledge in the world” and able to “achieve sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The European Strategy for Sustainable Development, reviewed and updated annually since 2001 by the Spring Council of Environment Ministers, has defined the following issues as critical:

- climate change and clean energy;
- sustainable transport;
- sustainable consumption and production;
- conservation and management of natural resources;

¹³ The Cardiff process has outlined a programme of deadlines and actions which has led to the adoption of strategies in nine sectors (transport, agriculture, energy, industry, internal market, development, fisheries, general affairs and economic and financial affairs). Regarding the importance of integrating environmental protection into economic policies, in particular for the competition policy cf. Suzanne Kingston, *Integrating Environmental Protection and EU Competition Law: Why Competition Isn't Special*, in “European Law Journal”, Vol. 16, No. 6, November 2010, pp. 780-805.

¹⁴ Cf. Andrew Jordan, Andrew Lenschow, *Greening the European Union: What Can Be Learned from the Leaders of EU Environmental Policy?*, in “European Environment”, Vol. 10, No. 3, May/June 2000, pp. 109-120; Andrew Lenschow (ed.), *Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe*, London, Earthscan, 2002; Id., *New Regulatory Approaches in ‘Greening’ EU Policies*, in “European Law Journal”, Vol. 8, issue 1, March 2002, pp. 19-37; William M. Lafferty, William M. Lafferty, Eivind Hovden, *Environmental Policy Integration: Towards an Analytical Framework*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2003, pp. 1-22, available at

http://www.prosus.org/prosusFTP/prosusrep/publications/prosusrep2002_07.pdf; William M. Lafferty, Jørgen Knudsen, *The Issue of ‘Balance’ and Trade-offs in Environmental Policy Integration: How Will We Know EPI When We See It?*, EPIGOV Paper No. 11, Ecologic – Institute for International and European Environmental Policy, Berlin, 2007,

http://ecologic.eu/projekte/epigov/documents/EPIGOV_paper_11_lafferty_knudsen.pdf; Martina Herodes, Camilla Adelle, Marc Pallemmaerts, *Environmental Policy Integration at EU level – A Literature Review*, EPIGOV Paper No. 5, Ecologic – Institute for International and European Environmental Policy: Berlin, 2007,

http://ecologic.eu/projekte/epigov/documents/EPIGOV_paper_5_herodes_adelle_pallemmaerts.pdf. For a report on the application of the EPI cf. EEA, *Environmental Policy Integration in Europe. State of Play and Evaluation Framework*, Technical Report No. 2/2005, Copenhagen, EEA, 2005, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technical_report_2005_2. For a recent evaluation of the EPI in relation to the Transport and Energy DG and to the Enterprise DG cf. Martin Koch, Alexandra Lindenthal, *Learning within the European Commission: The Case of Environmental Integration*, in “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 18, No. 7, October 2011, pp. 980-998.

¹⁵ European Commission, Communication from the Commission *A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development*, COM (2001)264, Brussels, May 15th, 2001, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0264en01.pdf.

- public health;
- social inclusion, demography and migration;
- world poverty.

In May 2005 the European Commission set forth the principles on which Community policies must be based to allow for sustainable development¹⁶:

- promotion and protection of Fundamental Rights;
- intra-and intergenerational equity;
- open and democratic society;
- involvement of citizens;
- involvement of businesses and social partners;
- policy coherence and governance (policy coherence at every institutional level);
- policy integration (integration of economic, social and environmental considerations in all policies);
- use of the best available knowledge;
- precautionary principle¹⁷;
- making polluters pay¹⁸.

¹⁶ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Draft Declaration of Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development*, COM 2005/218 Final, Brussels, May 25th, 2005, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0218en01.pdf.

¹⁷ In a specific communication, the European Commission stated the common criteria for the application of the precautionary principle: "[...] Where action is deemed necessary, measures based on the precautionary principle should be, *inter alia*:

- *proportional* to the chosen level of protection
- *non-discriminatory* in their application, ☐ *consistent* with similar measures already taken,
- *based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs* of action or lack of action (including, where appropriate and feasible, an economic cost/benefit analysis),
- *subject to review*, in the light of new scientific data, and
- *capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence* necessary for a more comprehensive risk assessment";

European Commission, *Communication of the Commission on the Precautionary Principle*, COM 2001/1, Brussels, February 2nd, 2000, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. For a criticism of the precautionary principle in the application established by the EU cf. Giandomenico. Majone, *What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 40, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 89-109. On the use of the precautionary principle within the Community cf. Nicolas de Sadeleer, *The Precautionary Principle as a Device for Greater Environmental Protection: Lessons from EC Courts*, in "Review of European Community & International Environmental Law", Vol. 18, Issue 1, April 2009, pp. 3-10.

¹⁸ This principle includes not only obligating polluters to compensate for damages but also denying them state aid in conformity with Community rules on state aid for environmental protection:

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/126106_en.htm. For an analysis of the principles of Community Environmental Law cf. Paolo Fois, *Il diritto ambientale nell'ordinamento dell'Unione europea*, in Giovanni Cordini, Paolo

In addition, every year since 2001 the European Commission has promoted the most important European meeting dedicated to the environment, Green Week, during which many civil society actors work together to elaborate proposals to implement EU environmental policy.

The Sixth Environment Action Programme (2002-2012) “Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice”¹⁹, approved by Decision No. 1600/2002/EC²⁰ of the EP and the Council of Ministers, has provided for new methods of intervention, such as partnerships between public and private actors involved in environmental protection (from the local authorities responsible for territorial management to industries and other economic and social realities). These actors would be involved in the development of environmental policy mainly through voluntary agreements, economic incentives for environmentally sustainable behaviour, green self-regulation and the sharing of positive results and best practices. The Programme has given priority to four issues that urgently need to be addressed (climate change, nature and biodiversity protection, health and quality of life, management of natural resources and waste) and has developed seven thematic strategies (air pollution²¹, marine environment²², sustainable use of natural resources²³, prevention and recycling of waste²⁴, sustainable use of pesticides²⁵, soil protection²⁶, urban environment²⁷)²⁸.

Fois, Sergio Marchisio, *Diritto ambientale. Profili internazionali europei e comparati*, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008, pp. 51-97. On Community Environmental Law cf. Jan H. Jans, Hans H.B. Vedder, *European Environmental Law. After Lisbon*, 4th edition, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2012. On the “polluter-pays” principle cf. Marco Lombardo, *Il principio “chi inquina paga” e la responsabilità ambientale da inquinamento diffuso nel diritto dell’Unione europea*, in “Il diritto dell’Unione europea”, No. 3, 2011, pp. 719-739. On the relevant judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities cf. Arne Bleeker, *Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice*, in “European Energy and Environmental Law Review”, Vol. 18, issue 6, 2009, pp. 289–306.

¹⁹ European Commission, Environment, The Sixth Environment Action Programme 2002-2012,

<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/>.

²⁰ Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, in “Official Journal L 242”, 10 September 2002, pp. 1-15;

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002D1600:EN:HTML>.

²¹ European Commission, Environment, Air, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/index_en.htm; Communication of 21 September 2005 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution COM(2005) 446, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/air_pollution/128159_en.htm, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0446en01.pdf.

²² European Commission, Environment, Marine and Coast, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/index_en.htm; Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/water_protection_management/128164_en.htm, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:164:0019:0040:EN:PDF>.

²³ European Commission, Environment, Sustainable Use of Natural Resources,

The prospect of environmental protection was “constitutionally” recognised in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, officially transposed by the member countries at the European Council of Nice (December 2000). In fact, in the Preamble of the Charter “promoting balanced and sustainable development” is clearly emphasised as one of the Community’s objectives. In addition, Article 37 (“Environmental Protection”) of the same states:

A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development²⁹.

The December 2000 Treaty of Nice, which came into force in February 2003, made only minor changes. One that should be highlighted is the provision of unanimity voting for those measures which could have a significant impact on the management of water resources and

<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/natres/index.htm>; Communication from the Commission of 21 December 2005 - Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources COM(2005) 670,

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/nature_and_biodiversity/l28167_en.htm,

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0670:FIN:EN:PDF>.

²⁴ European Commission, Environment, Waste, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/strategy.htm>; Commission Communication of 21 December 2005 "Taking sustainable use of resources forward: A Thematic Strategy on the prevention and recycling of waste" COM(2005) 666,

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/sustainable_development/l28168_en.htm,

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0666:FIN:EN:PDF>.

²⁵ European Commission, Environment, Plant Protection Products – Sustainable Use of Pesticides, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ppps/home.htm>; Communication from the Commission of 12 July 2006 entitled: "A thematic strategy on the sustainable use of pesticides" COM(2006) 372 final,

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l28178_en.htm,

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ppps/pdf/com_2006_0372.pdf.

²⁶ European Commission, Environment, Soil, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/index_en.htm; *Ibid.*, Report on the Implementation of the Soil Thematic Strategy and Ongoing Activities, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/three_en.htm; Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/environment/l28181_en.htm; Commission Communication of 22 September 2006 entitled "Thematic strategy for soil protection" COM(2006) 231 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0231:FIN:EN:PDF>; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Implementation of the Soil Thematic Strategy and Ongoing Activities COM(2012) 46,

[http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/pdf/COM\(2012\)46_EN.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/soil/pdf/COM(2012)46_EN.pdf).

²⁷ European Commission, Environment, Urban Environment, Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/urban/thematic_strategy.htm; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment SEC(2006) 16 / COM/2005/0718 final, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/urban/pdf/com_2005_0718_en.pdf.

²⁸ See the final assessment of the Programme carried out in 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/final.htm>; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Sixth Community Environment Action Programme - Final Assessment COM(2011) 531 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0531:FIN:EN:PDF>.

²⁹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), in "Official Journal of the European Communities", December 18th, 2000, C 364/17, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.

interfere with their availability (Art. 175). This provision was sought by Portugal, which is dependent on the water supply from rivers coming from Spain³⁰.

The Lisbon Treaty, the result of the difficult reform process launched at the Laeken Council in 2001 and which entered into force on December 1st, 2009, defines more clearly among its objectives the concept of sustainable development³¹ and makes explicit reference to safeguarding animal welfare in Community policies³². Furthermore, it explicitly provides for the external expansion of the EU's responsibilities also regarding environmental policy (Title XX, Arts. 191-193 TFEU) as well as the safety and welfare of European citizens and worldwide communities. Finally, it strengthens EU action in the fight against climate change and introduces energy policy as a new common policy (Title XXI, Art. 194 TFEU)³³.

The European Commission plays a key role in European environmental policy, since it has the general power to initiate legislation, especially through the designated European Commissioner and the Directorate General for the Environment³⁴. The topics it covers are: air, chemicals, industry, international issues, land use, nature and biodiversity, noise, soil, sustainable development, waste and water. Its main environmental tasks are: promoting,

³⁰ Article 175, par. 2: "By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and without prejudice to Article 95, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:

(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;

(b) measures affecting:

. town and country planning;

. quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the availability of those resources;

. land use, with the exception of waste management;

(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply".

³¹ Art. 3 par. 3 TEU (Treaty on European Union) "It [the EU] shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment". Furthermore (Art. 3 par. 5) "in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter".

³² Art. 13 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union): "In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage".

³³ Cf. David Benson, Andrew Jordan, *European Union Environmental Policy After the Lisbon Treaty: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 19, No. 3, May 2010, pp. 468-474.

³⁴ Official website of the Directorate General for the Environment of the European Commission:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm.

formulating and proposing policies aimed at achieving a high level of environmental protection and quality of life in the EU; monitoring that Environmental Law is being properly implemented in the Member States in close collaboration with the Court Justice of the European Communities; representing the EU in international organisations and conferences on the environment; allocating funds and disseminating information to the public. Other DGs also play a role in environmental policies in specific areas, entering also into competition or conflict with Environment DG (Energy and Transport DG, Agriculture DG, Research DG, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries DG³⁵, etc.). Finally, in February 2010 a special Climate Action DG³⁶ was established and Environment DG's competences in international negotiations were transferred to it in order to establish a global governance for the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change as well as to help achieve the ambitious goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 set by the EU (20% less greenhouse gases, 20% more renewable energy, 20% more energy efficient) under the Climate and Energy Package³⁷. In this respect it should be remembered that

³⁵ Cf. Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, *The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: the Case of the External Fisheries Policy*, in "Journal of European Integration", Vol. 30, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 401-417. On the application of the principles of Community Environmental Law in this sector cf. Till Markus, *Making Environmental Principles Work under the Common Fisheries Policy*, in "European Energy and Environmental Law Review", Vol. 19, issue 3, 2010, pp. 132-144.

³⁶ Official website of the Directorate General (DG) for Climate Action: http://ec.europa.eu/climateaction/index_en.htm.

³⁷ Council of the European Union, *Council Adopts Climate-energy Legislative Package*, 8434/09 (Press 77), Brussels, 6 April 2009,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107136.pdf; European Commission, Climate Action, Policies, Climate and Energy Package, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm. On this subject and EU climate policy in general refer to Chapter 3 *The EU Policy on Climate and Energy* in Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, *Twenty Years After the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development: the Durban Step and the Need for a Global Environmental Government on Climate Change*, Research Paper, Turin, Centre for Studies on Federalism, November 2011, pp. 50, http://www.csfederalismo.it/attachments/2313_RP_Grimaldi_Palea_Eng.pdf, pp. 17-23. For recent and further studies see Christian Egenhofer, S.J.A. Bakker, Jaap C. Jansen, J. Jussila Hammes, *Revisiting EU Policy Options for Tackling Climate Change: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of GHG Emissions Reduction Strategies*, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), November 2006, http://aei.pitt.edu/32597/1/36_Revisiting_EU_Policy_Options_for_Climate_Change.pdf;

Marjan Peeters, Kurt Deketelaere (eds.), *EU Climate Change Policy. The Challenge of New Regulatory Initiatives*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006; Paul G. Harris, *Europe and Global Climate Change. Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007; Miranda A. Schreurs, Yves Tiberghien, *Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation*, in "Global Environmental Politics", Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 19-46, http://www.bupedu.com/lms/admin/uploaded_article/eA.578.pdf; Christian Egenhofer (ed.), *Beyond Bali: Strategic Issues for the post-2012 Climate Change Regime*. CEPS Paperbacks, April 2008, http://aei.pitt.edu/32606/1/45_Beyond_Bali_post-2012_climate_change_regime.pdf; Carlo Corazza, *EcoEuropa. Le nuove politiche per l'energia e il clima*, Milano, Egea, 2009; Andrew Jordan, Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt, Tim Rayner, Frans Berkhout, *Climate Change Policy in the European Union. Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Sebastian Oberthür, Marc Pallemmaerts (eds.) with Claire Roche Kelly, *The New Climate Policies of the European Union*, Bruxelles, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press, 2010; Rüdiger Wurzel, James Connelly (eds.), *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*, London/New York, Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies, 2010; Caterina De Lucia, *Environmental Policies for Air*

the European Commission has set out guidelines to transform the EU into a low-carbon economy by 2050³⁸.

2. Internal and External Action: The EU's challenges, limits and opportunities as an environmental actor

The EU continues to be one of the most active international organisations in the environmental field. In fact, it is perceived as a leader because it is a normative power geared towards promoting multilateralism, sustainable development and the precautionary principle as well as its own economic and energy interests, aiming at independence and the development of renewable energy technologies as well as at mitigating the negative

Pollution and Climate Change in the New Europe, London/New York, Routledge, 2010; Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Fariborz Zelli (eds.), *Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012. Architecture, Agency and Adaptation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Javier de Cendra de Larragán, *Distributional Choices in EU Climate Change Law and Policy. Towards a Principled Approach?*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer International, 2011; Tanyeli Behi Sabuncu, *EU Climate Change Policy and European Energy Generation Industry*, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011; Leonardo Massai, *European Climate and Clean Energy Law and Policy*, London/New York, Routledge, 2011. For a comparison between the EU and the U.S. climate policy cf. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, *Climate Change Law and Policy. EU and US Approaches*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. For a more general look at the EU and the U.S. energy environmental policies cf. Miranda Alice Schreurs, Henrik Selin, Stacy D. VanDeever, *Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009. On the integration of EU climate and energy policies cf. Camilla Adelle, Marc Pallemmaerts, Joana Chiavari, *Climate Change and Energy Security in Europe Policy Integration and its Limits*, Report No. 4, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), June 2009, http://www.ieep.eu/assets/435/ccenergy_sec_report.pdf. For some case studies on the EU's contribution to combating climate change in development cooperation cf. Nicolien van der Grijp, Joyeeta Gupta (eds.), *Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the European Union*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. On the role of environmental NGOs in European climate policy-making cf. Fredrika Cruce, *How Did We End Up With This Deal? Examining the Role of Environmental NGOs in EU Climate Policymaking*, Bruges, College of Europe, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 19, June 2011, http://aei.pitt.edu/32320/1/wp19_Cruce.pdf. See also Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, EU Climate Policy, <http://eu2012.dk/en/EU-and-the-Presidency/About-EU/Politikomraader/ENVI/Klimapolitik>.

³⁸ See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050*, COM/2011/0112 final, Brussels, March 8th, 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0112:FIN:EN:HTML>; European Commission, "Energy Roadmap 2050", COM(2011) 885/2, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/doc/com_2011_8852_en.pdf; Nicolas Croquet, *Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050 - What Direction for EU's Climate Change Policy?*, "Climate Change Insights", January 25, 2012, <http://www.climatechangeinsights.com/2012/01/articles/international/commissions-energy-roadmap-2050-what-direction-for-eus-climate-change-policy/>. Cf. also Anthony Patt, Nadejda Komendantova, Antonella Battaglini, Johan Lilliestam, *Regional Integration to Support Full Renewable Power Deployment for Europe by 2050*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 20, No. 5, September 2011, pp. 727–742; Juan-Carlos Ciscar, Bert Saveyn, Antonio Soria, Laszlo Szabo, Denise Van Regemorter, Tom Van Ierland, *A Comparability Analysis of Global Burden Sharing GHG Reduction Scenarios*, European Commission, Joint Research Centre – Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012, <http://www.abhatoo.net.ma/index.php/fre/content/download/23120/427087/file/A%20Comparability%20Analysis%20of%20Global%20Burden%20Sharing%20GHG%20Reduction%20Scenarios.pdf>.

consequences of climate change in terms of security³⁹. In the light of this, the remaining problems, shortcomings and difficulties should be highlighted.

In order to lend more weight to the EU and allow it to better assert its authority and capacity it is imperative that it continue to progress, in particular to prevent disasters and environmental degradation, and systematically apply environmental principles to all its policies. In fact, there are still large sectors without adequate monitoring and environmental assessments. Moreover, while defending important positions and actions (from the Kyoto Protocol to the ratification of several international treaties, protocols and conventions on the environment), it has been difficult for the EU to lay out an urgent ecological “change of direction” that would reduce environmental problems and redefine economic and financial processes as well as provide an effective international environmental government. According to some authors the emergence of the EU as an international environmental actor does not primarily depend on the development of European environmental policy but on its presence and the historic events that have made the EU appear attractive to Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the EU has been active in supporting environmental initiatives in the Neighbourhood Policy and the Mediterranean area to cope with specific problems (desertification, safety operation of nuclear power plants, water pollution, etc.)⁴⁰. In fact, European environmental policy has also been applied to varying degrees not only to member countries but also to a geographic area, “Europe”, including the countries of the European Economic Area, the accession partners and bordering or neighbouring countries that are not expected to become member states but are involved in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU has endowed itself with supranational powers in the environmental field and as a whole

³⁹ Cf. Tom Delreux, *The EU as International Environmental Negotiator*, Farnham/Burlington, Ashgate, 2011; Christer Karlsson, Charles Parker, Mattias Hjerpe, Björn-Ola Linnér, *Looking for Leaders: Perceptions of Climate Change Leadership among Climate Change Negotiation Participants*, in “Global Environmental Politics”, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2011, pp. 89-107; Louise Van Schaik, Simon Schunz, *Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?*, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 50, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 169-186; Simon Schunz, *Explaining the Evolution of European Union Foreign Climate Policy: A Case of Bounded Adaptiveness*, *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, Vol. 16, Article 6, 2012, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm>. On the conception of the EU as a normative power cf. Ian Manners, *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?*, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 40, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 235-258.

⁴⁰ Cf. Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd edition, London, Routledge, 2006.

“is highly institutionalized with a dense set of formal regulations and a decision-making and adjudicatory far removed from those encountered in normal international environmental regimes”⁴¹.

Complexities and tensions make up a composite reality in which the EU projects the image of an environmental actor playing several different and overlapping roles, that of negotiator, a source of innovation, a market and a reference model⁴².

The “green” orientation of the EU’s activities has now become a myth only partly based on the real sustainability of European environmental policy, since it has adopted the high ecological standards of its most advanced countries as a point of reference, and it has been able to constantly promote itself through the Community dissemination and information as well as achieve objective confirmation and create a domestic and international reputation for itself through public opinion (in this case mainly thanks to its climate policy)⁴³. This identity is a source of legitimacy and an ambitious challenge. However, when its high-sounding objectives are not reflected in reality, there is a greater risk of not living up to expectations.

After the first half of the 1990s, the Commission and in particular Environment DG have pursued mediation with other institutions and economic lobbies as a way to define the overall management of major environmental issues. This choice was also motivated by the risk of innovations being rejected because they were considered too radical, such as the European tax on carbon dioxide and energy.

This tax was unsuccessfully proposed by the Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa Di Meana in 1992 and although it was supported by leading economists, it was perceived as being too difficult to implement with the existing decision-making system since, as a fiscal measure, it would have been subject to the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers⁴⁴.

41 John Vogler, *European Union Environmental Policy*, in Lorraine Elliott, Shaun Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., p. 20.

42 Cf. Anthony R. Zito, *The European Union as an Environmental Leader in a Global Environment*, in “Globalizations”, Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2005, pp. 363-375.

43 Cf. Andrea Lenschow, *The Myth of a Green Europe*, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 133-154. Commission of the European Communities, *Climate Change: Strong Public Support for EU Targets on Climate Change*, Press Release, IP/08/1314, Brussels, September 11th, 2008, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1314>.

44 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, A Community Strategy to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions and to Improve Energy Efficiency*, SEC (91) 1744 final, Brussels, October

However, the main weakness of the EU, also reflected in its environmental policy as well as in its closely intertwined climate and energy policies, is still connected to its hybrid institutional structure, in which basic powers and competences are still not communitarised and remain under the responsibility of national states. The fact that some areas (environmental taxation, spatial planning, land use, water resource management and energy policy options that influence Member States' choice of supply sources), which decisively influence the states' economic and political choices, are excluded from the Community method and majority vote and remain entirely under the responsibility of the individual states prevents the realisation of a true common environmental policy that is coordinated and flexible and that would make the EU's approach more comprehensive and coherent, more necessary than ever for the promotion of a new system of economic and social relations compatible with environmental protection and the redistribution of resources.

One fundamental, if not the greatest, challenge is the adaptation to and mitigation of climate change, which calls into question the system of global economic relations. The EU's willingness to lead the fight against climate change could be compromised by a lack of cohesion among the member countries and the current European economic and financial crisis. The goals achieved by EU environmental legislation risk being voided unless a global agreement is reached and institutions and instruments are established to ensure that the

14th, 1991, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4931/1/4931.pdf>; Id., Communication from the Commission, *A Community Strategy to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions and to Improve Energy Efficiency*, COM (92) 246 final, Brussels, June 1st, 1992, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4829/1/4829.pdf>; Id., *Proposal for a Council Directive to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Improving Energy Efficiency (SAVE Programme)*, COM (92) 182 final, Brussels, June 26th, 1992, <http://aei.pitt.edu/11939/1/11939.pdf>; Id., *Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy*, COM (92) 226 final, Brussels, June 30th, 1992, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4830/1/4830.pdf>; Id., Directorate General for Energy (DG XVII), *Consequences of the Proposed Carbon/Energy Tax*, SEC (92) 1996, 23 October 1992, Supplement to "Energy in Europe", February 1993, <http://aei.pitt.edu/8463/1/8463.pdf>; Id., *Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy*, COM (95) 172 final, Brussels, May 10th, 1995, <http://aei.pitt.edu/10052/1/10052.pdf>. On the issues related to the European carbon tax and European taxation cf. Alberto Majocchi, *Financing the EU Budget with A Surtax on National Income Taxes*, Discussion Papers, No. 1, CSF, October 2011, http://www.csfederalismo.it/images/stories/discussion_papers/01_a_majocchi.pdf; Alfonso Iozzo, *For a European Sustainable Development Plan*, Discussion Papers, No. 2, CSF October 2011, http://www.csfederalismo.it/images/stories/discussion_papers/02_a_iozzo.pdf; Alberto Majocchi, *Carbon-Energy Tax and Emission Permits in the EU*, Discussion Papers, No. 3, CSF October 2011, http://www.csfederalismo.it/images/stories/discussion_papers/03_a_majocchi.pdf; Micael Skou Andersen, Paul Ekins (eds.), *Carbon - Energy Taxation: Lessons from Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Paul Ekins, Stefan Speck (eds.), *Environmental Tax Reform (ETR). A Policy for Green Growth*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

Earth's average temperature does not exceed 2 °C, the emergency threshold that, if exceeded, would have extremely harsh and irreversible consequences for humanity, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)⁴⁵. By adhering to the Kyoto Protocol, the implementation instrument of the Convention on Climate Change adopted at the World Conference in Rio de Janeiro, signed in December 1997 and ratified by the EU and the Member States in May 2002⁴⁶, the EU has made a commitment to reducing emissions by 8% compared to 1990 emissions levels by 2008-2012. However, so far the results have not been satisfactory because, while some states are moving towards this goal, in others pollution has increased. Following the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, at the international level divisions are still prevalent between the North and South as well as among the major polluting countries on the policies that should be implemented globally at the imminent expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2012. A fundamental source of disagreement concerns to whom responsibility for global climate change should be attributed: emerging countries believe that the North, which has been polluting longer and is responsible for 80% of the total global emissions produced since the beginning of the industrial revolution to date, should bear the burden according to the principle of historical responsibility. By contrast, the industrialised countries of the North are requesting that the responsibility be shared, even if differentiated, considering the now rather significant emissions contribution of emerging countries, which has exceeded more than half of global emissions in recent years.

During the Copenhagen Conference, however, the EU was marginalised during the final phase leading to draft an agreed statement by the United States and the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) on the shouldering of non-binding commitments regarding long-term emissions reductions⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ An institution bringing together scientists from all over the world established within the United Nations in 1988 on the initiative of the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); official website: <http://www.ipcc.ch/>.

⁴⁶ Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder, Official Journal L 130 , 15 May 2002, pp. 1-3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002D0358:EN:HTML>.

⁴⁷ Cf. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, *Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance*, in "Global Environmental Politics", Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2010, pp. 18-24; Emma Broughton, *Copenhagen: le bilan et l'avenir*, in "Politique étrangère", No. 2, 2010, pp. 341-353; Thomas James Uldall Heidener, *As Time Goes By: EU Climate Change Actorness from Rio to*

Nevertheless, precisely regarding climate policy, the EU has been trying to set a good example for the international community for nearly a decade by launching the European Climate Change Programme after the presentation of the Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union, the Communication from the European Commission to the Council of Ministers and the EP on EU policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (generated mainly by the energy, industrial and transport sectors and, to a lesser but still significant extent, by heating and household consumption as well as the agricultural sector) in favour of a European Climate Change Programme and the application of Regulation 2037 of 2000 on substances that deplete the ozone layer. In *Winning the Battle Against Climate Change* (COM/2005/35 final)⁴⁸ the European Commission identified the following priorities: extending participation in the Kyoto Protocol to developed and developing countries, stimulating the development and diffusion of low-emission technologies, using flexible market-based instruments and applying adaptation policies. It also expressed the need to include air transport, maritime transport and the forestry sectors in the Community in addition to a global plan for greenhouse gas reduction.

Within it, the EU set up its own Emissions Trade Scheme (EU ETS), started in 2005 in accordance with Directive 2003/87⁴⁹, then revised, extended and improved in 2008⁵⁰.

Copenhagen, Bruges, College of Europe – United Nations University, Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers No. 3/2011, http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/BRIGG_papers/BRIGG_3_2011_Heidener.pdf; Stavros Afionis, *The European Union as Negotiator in International Climate Change Regime*, in “International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics”, Vol. 11, No. 4, November 2011, pp. 341-360.

⁴⁸ Commission of European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions *Winning the Battle Against Climate Change*, COM/2005/35 final, Brussels, 9 February 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0035:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁴⁹ Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 275, pp. 32-46, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0046:EN:PDF>. For an assessment of the functioning of the EU ETS in the first phase cf. Frank J. Convery, Luke Redmond, *Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme*, in “Review of Environmental Economics and Policy”, Vol. 1, issue 1, Winter 2007, pp. 88–111.

⁵⁰ See the guidelines of the European Commission to achieve a low carbon economy by 2050: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050*, COM/2011/0112 final, cit. On the problems and future developments of the EU ETS cf. Jon Birger Skjærseth, Jørgen Wettestad, *The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System*, in “Global Environmental Politics”, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 101-122; Id., *Fixing the EU Emissions Trading System? Understanding the Post-2012 Changes*, in “Global Environmental Politics”, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2010, pp. 101-123; Sebastian Okinczyc, *European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Phase III*, in “European Energy and Environmental Law Review”, Vol. 20, issue 4, 2011, pp. 164–173; Charles

Without going into detail about the rules and actions that make up the EU's climate policy, it is important to stress the need to make them consistent with the objectives of a sustainable energy policy set for 2050⁵¹.

The struggle to renew a binding agreement after the Kyoto Protocol, which has divided the international community, is still a priority of EU foreign and global policy⁵² and, therefore, the EU must be acknowledged as the regional organisation with the greatest supranational powers and as the one most geared towards eco-sustainable development. The EU convergence trend - though not complete - with groups and alliances made up of the countries that are the most vulnerable to climate change (the Alliance of Small Island States - AOSIS⁵³ and within it the Small Island Developing States - SIDS, the African Group - one of the five UN regional groups which includes 53 countries - the Least Developed Countries - LDCs and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America Group - ALBA Group - made up of Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, Antigua and Barbuda) and the major emerging economic

Poncelet, *The Emission Trading Scheme Directive: Analysis of Some Contentious Points*, in "European Energy and Environmental Law Review", Vol. 20, issue 6, 2011, pp. 245-254; Katherine Nield, Ricardo Pereira, *Fraud on the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Effects, Vulnerabilities and Regulatory Reform*, in "European Energy and Environmental Law Review", Vol. 20, issue 6, 2011, pp. 255-289.

⁵¹ On this point see the study assessing the lack of climate policy integration (CPI) in the European energy policy of Claire Dupont, Radostina Primova, *Combating Complexity: the Integration of EU Climate and Energy Policies*, in Jale Tosun, Israel Solorio (eds.) *Energy and Environment in Europe: Assessing a Complex Relationship*, "European Integration online Papers (EIoP)", Special Mini-Issue 1, Vol. 15, Article 8, 2011, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/viewFile/2011_008a/204. Concerning the relation between the European environmental and energy policies see also Jale Tosun, Israel Solorio, *Exploring the Energy-Environment Relationship in the EU: Perspectives and Challenges for Theorizing and Empirical Analysis*, in Id., *Energy and Environment in Europe: Assessing a Complex Relationship*, cit., http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/viewFile/2011_007a/203; Sophie Schmitt, Kai Schulze, *Choosing Environmental Policy Instruments: An Assessment of the 'Environmental Dimension' of EU Energy Policy*, in Tosun, Solorio (eds.) *Energy and Environment in Europe: Assessing a Complex Relationship*, cit., Article 9, http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/viewFile/2011_009a/205. For an assessment of the economic impact of the various economic instruments in environmental policy provided by the European Commission cf. J. Delbeke, G. Klaassen, T. van Ierland, P. Zapfel, *The Role of Environmental Economics in Recent Policy Making at the European Commission*, in "Review of Environmental Economics and Policy", Vol. 4, issue 1, Winter 2010, pp. 24-43.

⁵² Cf. John Vogler, *The European Contribution to Global Environmental Governance*, in "International Affairs", Vol. 81, issue 4, July 2005, pp. 835-850; Id., *Climate Change and EU Foreign Policy: the Negotiation of Burden Sharing*, in "International Politics", Vol. 46, No. 4, July 2009, pp. 469-490; John Vogler, Hannes R. Stephan, *The European Union in Global Environmental Governance: Leadership in the Making?*, in "International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics", Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 389-413; Sebastian Oberthür, *EU Leadership on Climate Change: Living up to the Challenges*, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Brussels, 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/llp/jm/more/forum07/oberthur.pdf>; Sebastian Oberthür, Claire Roche Kelly, *EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges*, in "International Spectator", Vol. 43, No. 3, 2008, pp. 35-50; Sebastian Oberthür, *The European Union's Performance in the International Climate Change Regime*, in "Journal of European Integration", Vol. 33, No. 6, November 2011, pp. 667-682.

⁵³ This organisation, founded in 1989 and currently including 43 low-lying and island states, has participated since the beginning in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee of the United Nations, which met that year to define an international convention on climate change. Official website: <http://aosis.info/>.

powers such as and especially Brazil, South Africa, China⁵⁴ and India (i.e. the BASIC Group established in 2009), which strives for their direct cooperation in the development of renewable energy and green technologies to reduce climate impact, is emerging as a new and final opportunity to lead the planet into a radical economic, energy and social transformation. However, it is facing the opposition of many industrialised countries and/or oil and gas exporters determined to exploit fossil fuels as much as possible and prevent the renewal of the Kyoto Protocol as well as a legally binding global agreement (the Umbrella Group, made up of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States; the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria and Angola; and the Arab League of Nations, 22 members and four observers)⁵⁵.

During the December 2011 COP17 in Durban, South Africa the agreement reached was limited to the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol for the 2013-2017 period, with the possibility of extending up to 2020, for only 35 of the 42 countries involved in the first phase (28 represented by the EU, including Croatia that will join the EU in July 2012) and to the global climate agreement that will not be reached until 2015 and will come into force starting from 2020. The COP17 is proof of the international community's inability and continued failure to offer real prospects for the protection of people and ecosystems, but has opened up a new window of opportunity, uncertain but unique. One step forward, though insufficient, has been made: for the first time, just in Durban, the EU managed to create a sort of alliance with China, India, the countries of the Alliance of Small Islands and the developing countries (in total 120 countries out of 194) on the development of renewable energies and the achievement of a

⁵⁴ Cf. Giulia C. Romano, *The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change: Bilateralism Begetting Multilateralism in Promoting a Climate Change Regime?*, Mercury (Multilateralism and EU in the Contemporary Global Order) E-paper No. 8, December 2010, http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E-paper_no_8_2011.pdf; Yan Bo, Giulia C. Romano, Zhimin Chen, *The EU's Engagement with China in Building a Multilateral Climate Change Regime: Uneasy Process Towards an Effective Approach* Mercury E-paper No. 12, September 2011, http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E_paper_no12_2011.pdf.

⁵⁵ For more information on the positions and the various alliances formed in the context of global climate governance cf. Lili Fuhr, Barbara Unmüßig, Hans JH Verolme, Farhana Jamin, *A Future for International Climate Politics – Durban and Beyond*, Berlin, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, November 2011, http://www.boell.eu/downloads/A_Future_for_International_Climate_Politics_-_Durban_and_Beyond.pdf.

reduction in emissions. Even though Canada, Japan and Russia in 2011 indicated that they did not intend to participate in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, it will still be renewed for a further period, while in 2015 a global legally binding pact (in the form of protocol, legal instrument or legal outcome) will be agreed upon. These commitments will only be realised far in the future and are stigmatised by those who are already experiencing the devastating consequences of the rise in average temperature (hurricanes, floods, island disappearance, desertification, environmental displacement) and the reaction time of global politics is long and drawn-out as well as inadequate in the event of emergencies that would require urgent responses, even in the short-term⁵⁶. However, in the meantime incisive action needs to be taken at all levels, from the local to the global level, to support and promote a global environment plan supported by credible strategies and instruments such as a global carbon tax and a tax on financial transactions⁵⁷.

For over a decade now we have been talking about creating a World Environment Organisation and about other proposals without achieving any results⁵⁸.

⁵⁶ For the outcomes of the COP17 see the Durban Platform, UNFCCC, *Draft Decision-CP17 - Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action*, Durban, December 10th, 2011, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf.

⁵⁷ For the development of these proposals at the international and European level refer to Chapter 6 *Proposal to Transform the Current Weak Governance into an Effective Global Environmental Government: Global Environment Plan, World Environment Organisation with Independent Powers and Global Carbon Tax* in Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, *Twenty Years After the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development: the Durban Step and the Need for a Global Environmental Government on Climate Change*, cit., pp. 38-49. On the current debate on a carbon tax cf. William D. Nordhaus, *To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming*, in "Review of Environmental Economics and Policy", Vol. 1, issue 1, Winter 2007, pp. 26-44; Daniel Gros, *A Border Tax to Protect the Global Environment?*, December 9th, 2009, <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4351>. For a review and an identification of the economic and social problems and consequences of taxes and market based instruments used to limit the pollutant emissions in various countries cf. Robert W. Hahn, *Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some Political Economy Considerations*, in "Review of Environmental Economics and Policy", Vol. 3, issue 2, Summer 2009, pp. 167-188.

⁵⁸ Cf. Chapter 6 *Proposal to Transform the Current Weak Governance into an Effective Global Environmental Government: Global Environment Plan, World Environment Organisation with Independent Powers and Global Carbon Tax* in Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, cit. See also Frank Biermann, *The Case for a World Environment Organization*, in "Environment", Vol. 20, 2000, pp. 22-31; Steve Charnovitz, *A World Environment Organization*, February 2002, <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/docs/IEG/Charnovitz.pdf>; Andreas Reckemmer (ed.), *UNEO – Towards an International Environment Organization. Approaches to a Sustainable Reform of Global Environmental Governance*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005; Frank Biermann, Steffen Bauer (eds.), *A World Environment Organisation: Solution or Threat for Effective International Environmental Governance?* Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005; Bharat H. Desai, *UNEP: A Global Environmental Authority?*, In "Environmental Policy and Law", Vol. 36, No. 3-4, 2006, pp. 137-157, [http://www.jnu.ac.in/Academics/Schools/SchoolOfInternationalStudies/Desai%20UNEP%20Article\[1\].EPL.pdf](http://www.jnu.ac.in/Academics/Schools/SchoolOfInternationalStudies/Desai%20UNEP%20Article[1].EPL.pdf); Lydia Swart, Estelle Perry (eds.), *Global Environmental Governance. Perspectives on the Current Debate*, New York, Centre for UN Reform Education, 2007; Marianneke J. Vijge, *Towards a World Environment Organisation. Identifying the Barriers to International Environmental Governance Reform*, Global Governance Working Paper No. 40 – September 2010, Amsterdam et al., The Global Governance Project, <http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP40.pdf>. For the proposal

The EU can continue to play a pioneering role by externally pursuing stronger diplomatic action and internally developing a transparent environmental policy. However, it must be reiterated that a federal institutional reform is essential in order for it to be able to have the powers at the common and European level to efficiently and effectively exercise its own capacities.

Focusing primarily on the internal action of European environmental policy, we should also highlight the difference between regulation and enforcement, intentions and commitments actually made, efforts and initiatives undertaken and the results obtained, which often do not meet expectations or even the minimum necessary requirements. It is also worth noting the contradictions in the overall environmental activity of the EU. If we restrict ourselves to a few general observations, a very black and white picture emerges. In several policy areas there have been partial improvements (e.g. the reduction in acid rain, in the air concentration of some pollutants such as lead and pesticides⁵⁹ and in some hazardous chemicals⁶⁰ or the improvement of water management, the subject of an EU Water Framework

Directive⁶¹, which in many ways must still be implemented). In others, the environmental situation has worsened caused, among other things, by an overall increase in waste production, increased degradation mostly of the natural heritage, and the loss of biodiversity (despite the Habitats Directive and the establishment of Natura 2000, a network of ecological sites)⁶².

of the establishment of the International Court for the Environment (ICE), on the model of the International Criminal Court (ICC) see <http://www.icef-court.org/>.

⁵⁹ Cf. Hendrik Wolff, Lisa Perry, *Trends in Clean Air Legislation in Europe: Particulate Matter and Low Emission Zones*, in "Review of Environmental Economics and Policy", Vol. 4, Issue 2, Summer 2010, pp. 293–308.

⁶⁰ In 2006 a new directive was approved resulting in the REACH system (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) which will become fully effective only in 2018, based on a centralised database run by a new European Chemicals Agency based in Helsinki. On this subject cf. Dieter Pesendorfer, *EU Environmental Policy Under Pressure: Chemicals Policy Change Between Antagonistic Goals*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 95–114; Reshad Forbes, The Long Arm of REACH: How to Navigate Through the Compliance Process, in "European Energy and Environmental Law Review", Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 34–50.

⁶¹ Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 23rd, 2000, Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:0072:EN:PDF>. On its implementation: European Commission, Environment, Water, Water Framework Directive, The EU Water Framework Directive - Integrated River Basin Management for Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html.

⁶² For a collection of studies reviewing European environmental policy and analysing some key sectors and important topics for debate (GMOs, chemicals, environmental assessment etc.) cf. Christoph Knill, Duncan Liefferink, *Environmental Politics in the European Union: Policy-Making, Implementation and Patterns of Multi-Level Governance*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007; Massimiliano Montini, Mariachiara Alberton (eds.), *La governance*

Furthermore, numerous infringement proceedings against Member States have been brought before the Court of Justice by the European Commission for failure to comply with EU environmental regulations. Therefore, one problem is clearly the lack of implementation of European environmental policy, which is partly due to Member States failure to transpose, implement and enforce EU directives or their failure to do these things adequately, and partly to difficulties in transposition due to various problems (lack of consistency among the Directives, lack of clarity etc.)⁶³.

On the other hand, environmental policy is the most cross-cutting and developing of the European policies. European environmental policy could actually be regarded as many different environmental policies which are interrelated within the EU and connected to all the other Community policies. It is hard enough to reconcile policies that respond to different action criteria with a shared application of the principle of sustainable development (however vague and ambiguous), or rather of an eco-sustainable approach. Moreover, there is a profound difference between the environmental policy within the EU and its external action, from trade to development aid, from agriculture to competition, where EU action tends to follow guidelines that favour business interests over environmental ones. The integration of the environmental dimension into all policies is not yet as effective as one might expect, and different choices end up being inconsistent with each other⁶⁴.

ambientale europea in transizione, Milano, Giuffr , 2008; Joanne Scott (ed.), *Environmental Protection. European Law and Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Andrea Lenschow, *Environmental Policy*, in Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, Alasdair R. Young (eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union*, 6th edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. For discussions about the internal tensions and international disagreements regarding EU policy on GMOs cf. G. Kristin Rosendal, *Governing GMOs in the EU: A Deviant Case of Environmental Policy-making?*, in "Global Environmental Politics", Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2005, pp. 82-104; Grace Skogstad, *Contested Accountability Claims and GMO Regulation in the European Union*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 49, No. 4, 2011, pp. 895-915. For a report on the impact of EU funding for research in the field of environmental protection cf. European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation - Directorate I – Environment, *Study on the Longer-Term Impact of European Union Funding of Research in the Field of Environment and Health – Final Report*, Bruxelles, December 2010.

⁶³ Cf. Barbara A. Beijen, *The Implementation of European Environmental Directives: Are Problems Caused by the Quality of the Directives?*, in "European Energy and Environmental Law Review", Vol. 20, issue 4, 2011, pp. 150-163. For more general discussions cf. Andrew Jordan, *Environmental Policy in the European Union. Actors, Institutions and Processes*, 2nd edition, London, Earthscan, 2005; Andrew Lenschow, *Environmental Policy: Contending Dynamics of Policy Change*, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace, M.A. Pollack (eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 5th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. On the Member States' failure to implement Community Law cf. Tanja A. B rzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke, Carina Sprungk, *Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply With European Law*, in "Comparative Political Studies", Vol. 43, No. 11, November 2010, pp. 1363-1390.

⁶⁴ A recent study presented by a European environmental ONG emphasises, for example, that between 2007 and 2010 the European Investment Bank, the main funding source for Community policies, substantially increased its own lending for the development of the fossil fuel-based energy sector (33 percent - EUR 16 billion) compared to the renewable

The influence on EU environmental policy of the economic and industrial lobbies and other interest groups⁶⁵, on the one hand, and organisations representing civil society specifically committed to protecting the environment in several respects, also called Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOS)⁶⁶, on the other, is particularly significant for the development of specific regulations and environmental policies⁶⁷.

energy sector (over EUR 13 billion). In the executive summary of this paper the following situation is reported: "Both lending to renewables and fossil fuels are on the rise. EIB support for renewables in 2010 reached EUR 5.8 billion, with EUR 5 billion for fossil fuels. The bank managed to increase its lending to renewables, but failed to stop increasing its lending to fossil fuels (compared to 2007 lending for fossil fuels had doubled by 2010). The EIB has developed criteria restricting its support for coal projects, but this has not prevented the bank from financing coal power plants, e.g. large installations in Slovenia and Germany. At the same time the most socially and environmentally beneficial type of energy investment - energy efficiency - has been largely neglected by the bank. The fact that a mere 5 percent of all energy investments have been spent on real energy efficiency is the largest shortcoming of the bank in the energy sector"; CEE Bankwatch Network, *Carbon Rising. European Investment Bank Energy Lending 2007-2010*, December 2011, <http://bankwatch.org/publications/carbon-rising-european-investment-bank-energy-lending-2007-2010>, <http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/EIB-carbon-rising.pdf>; for a summary cf. Manana Kochladze, *Greening the European Investment Bank*, "Project Syndicate", December 23rd, 2011, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greening-the-european-investment-bank>.

⁶⁵ Among the most influential economic lobbies at the Community level are: the Business Europe (<http://www.besnesseurope.eu/>); the COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations) and the COGECA (General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union) (<http://www.copa-cogeca.be/Main.aspx?page=HomePage&lang=en>); the CEEP (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services) (<http://www.ceep.eu/>); the ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists) (<http://www.ert.eu/>); the AMCHAM-EU (American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union) (<http://www.amchameu.eu/>); the CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) (<http://www.cefic.be/>); the ECPA (European Crop Protection Association) (<http://www.ecpa.be/>); the EUREAU (European Union of National Associations of Water Suppliers and Waste Water Services) (<http://www.eureau.org/>); the EUROPIA (European Petroleum Industries Association) (<http://www.europia.com/>); the ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers' Association) (<http://www.acea.be/>); the UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) (<http://www.ueapme.com/>); the EUROCHAMBRES (European Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry) (<http://www.eurochambres.eu/>). For a study on the role played by the business sector in the development of the global environmental policy cf. David L. Levy, Peter J. Newell (eds.), *The Business of Global Environmental Governance*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004.

⁶⁶ The main ENGOS are part of the Green 10 network consisting of ten networks and/or environmental non-governmental organisations which are connected at the European level (<http://www.green10.org/>):

- European Environmental Bureau (EEB): <http://www.eeb.org/>;
- Birdlife International Europe: <http://www.birdlife.org/regional/europe/index.html>;
- Climate Action Network Europe (CAN): <http://www.climnet.org/>;
- Greenpeace Europe: <http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/>;
- Friends of the Earth Europe: <http://www.foeeurope.org/>;
- International Friends of Nature: <http://www.nfi.at/>;
- European Federation for Transport and Environment: <http://www.transportenvironment.org/>;
- World Wide Fund for Nature Europe (WWF) European Policy Office: <http://www.wwf.eu/>;
- European Public Health Alliance – Environment Network (EEN): <http://www.env-health.org/>;
- CEE Bankwatch Network: <http://bankwatch.org/>.

For information on the ENGOS which have obtained UE funding: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ngos/index_en.htm (for a list of the 27 ENGOS considered eligible for funding in 2011: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ngos/pdf/ngos2011.pdf>).

⁶⁷ Cf. Jonas Dreger, *The Influence of Environmental NGOs on the Design of the Emissions Trading Scheme of the EU: An Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework*, Bruges, College of Europe, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 8, September 2008, <http://aei.pitt.edu/10875/1/wp8%20Dreger.pdf>. For some of the latest campaigns promoted by ENGOS for EU eco-compatible policies see that concerning the European Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Studies and Implementing Measures, covering energy-related products sold in Europe <http://env-ngo.eup-network.de/>. For an assessment of the environmental action of the European Commission headed by Barroso between 2004 and 2009

There is also evidence that the ENGOS have played a significant role in supporting the transposition of EU environmental legislation in the newly acceded countries and have been strengthened thanks to the support and consultant relationship with the EU institutions⁶⁸.

Therefore, despite its adoption of the principle of integrating the environment into all policies and the precautionary principle, the EU has so far proved it does not adequately understand environmental policies in their entirety. As evidence thereof, John McCormick, after analysing the policies implemented first by the EEC and then by the EU, on biodiversity, fisheries, agriculture, forestry and energy, illustrates how the management of natural resources has been considered quite distinctly from most of the elements of European environmental policy, such as air and water pollution and waste management. He also states that “while the EU has a variety of policies in particular areas that come under the general rubric of ‘the environment’, it is still some way from being able to claim to have an environmental policy”⁶⁹.

After ten years, this analysis is still valid. However, as aforementioned, a true EU environmental policy still does not exist primarily for one additional, fundamental reason: some environmental areas, which are important and highly strategic from a political-economic standpoint, are excluded from the co-decision procedure and majority voting. In fact, the principle of unanimity and the right of veto are still applied in certain vitally important decision-making areas, which remain entirely a national competence (environmental taxation, spatial planning, land use, energy policy). In addition, these areas have a great impact on the economic and social choices of the EU and the individual member states in relation to the

carried out by Green 10 cf. Green 10, *Off Target. European Commission 2004-2009. Environmental Progress Report and Lessons for the Next Commission*, June 2009, http://www.birdlife.org/eu/pdfs/Green_ten_assessment.pdf. On the influence of lobbies and ENGOS on EU climate policy cf. Anne Therese Gullberg, *Rational Lobbying and EU Climate Policy*, in “International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics”, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 161-178; Id., *Access to Climate Policy-Making in the European Union and Norway*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 20, No. 4, July 2011, pp. 464-484. For a comparison on the action of two major ENGOS in the area of global environmental governance cf. Vanessa Timmer, *Agility and Resilience. Adaptive Capacity in Friends of the Earth International and Greenpeace*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, cit., pp. 244-263.

⁶⁸ Cf. Elizabeth Bomberg, *Policy Learning in an Enlarged European Union: Environmental NGOs and New Policy Instruments*, in “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 14, No. 2, March 2007, pp. 248-268; Michael Briguglio, *Are ENGOS Empowered through EU Accession? The Case of Maltese ENGOS*, in “International Journal of Green Economics”, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2010, pp. 262-274.

⁶⁹ John McCormick, *Environmental Policy in the European Union*, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2001, p. 261.

various sources of energy supply and would require a flexible yet coordinated common policy. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the energy policy and ecological taxation: the inadequate, in the first case, and failed, in the second, “Europeanisation” of these sectors is likely to nullify or mitigate the positive effects of EU and national environmental policies.

At the Johannesburg World Summit on the Environment from August 26th to September 4th, 2002, ten years after the Rio de Janeiro Summit, which produced poor results at the international level⁷⁰, the European Commission set the guidelines of the EU's international environmental policy in a special Communication, *Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development* (COM 2002/82)⁷¹, in which it identified six priority objectives: trade for sustainable development, fighting poverty, natural resources, policy coherence, governance and financing sustainable development.

The enlargement of the EU to twenty-seven Central and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries starting from May 2004, ending with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and including prospects for future expansion, have made the development of environmental policy more problematic in that many new challenges have emerged. Because the development and conversion of the economy seem to have a higher priority, all fifteen countries involved in the most recent enlargement have only partially started to comply with EU environmental standards with the aid of EU neighbouring countries as well as specific and ad hoc programmes, such as PHARE (Poland-Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy), originally intended to provide economic assistance only to Poland and Hungary but later extended to other candidate countries, and which since 1990 has funded environmental projects for the safety operation of nuclear power plants, the TACIS Programme (Technical

⁷⁰ Cf. Simon Lightfoot, Jon Burchell, *The European Union and the World Summit on Sustainable Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?*, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2005, pp. 75-95; Id., *The Greening of the European Union? Examining the EU's Environmental Credentials*, London, Sheffield Academic Press, 2001.

⁷¹ Commission of European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions *Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development*, COM 2002/82 final, Brussels, 13 February 2002, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0082en01.pdf. For an analysis of the implementation of the concept of sustainable development in the external action of the EU cf. Camilla Adelle, Andrew Jordan, *The European Union and the 'External' Dimension of Sustainable Development. Ambitious Promises But Disappointing Outcomes?*, in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner, Anna Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, London/New York, Routledge, 2009, pp. 111-130.

Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) and the Agenda 2000 Programme, launched by the European Commission in 1997 to prepare for the enlargement. There is a risk that the application and promotion of adequate ecological protection will be more difficult, considering the high degree of environmental degradation inherited from the former socialist states, whose crumbling and polluting industrial and nuclear power plants as well as deposits of hazardous toxic waste increase the danger and possibility of environmental disaster, such as the February 2000 cyanide spill from a Romanian gold mine that reached the waters of the Tisza in Hungary and the Danube in Yugoslavia. Among the new environmental issues that will need to be addressed as a result of enlargement, the EU has inherited the task of redeveloping and reclaiming industrial areas and regions as well as consistently enlarging the large tracts of forest cover that now account for 40% of its territory⁷².

There are still wide gaps between leader and laggard countries. The former include countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark and then Austria, Sweden and Finland, whose national environmental policies are already restrictive and consolidated as well as influenced by public opinion and productive sectors that would appreciate a similar level of protection at the Community level. The latter include countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, which have weak environmental policies or are hardly prepared for the expensive investments that need to be made in the environmental field and are reluctant to apply more stringent Community rules. In the middle there are Great Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, which tend to support specific environmental measures rather than adopting

⁷² Cf. JoAnn Carmin, Stacy D. VanDeVeer (eds.), *EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*, London, Routledge, 2004. On the impact of enlargement on EU environmental policy cf. Jon Birger Skjærseth, Jørgen Wettestad, *Is EU Enlargement Bad for Environmental Policy? Confronting Gloomy Expectations with Evidence*, in "International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics", Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 263-280. On the risks related to conditionality and transposition of Community environmental regulations in the enlargement process for South East European (SEE) countries cf. Kerstin Tews, *From Law-Taking to Policy-Making. The Environmental Dimension of the EU Accession Process – Challenges, Risks and Chances for the SEE Countries*, in "Environmental Policy and Governance", Vol. 19, 2009, pp. 130-139. Finally, see the various contributions concerning the development of environmental organisations in Central and Eastern European countries in view of and after the last EU enlargement contained in "Environmental Politics", Vol 19, No. 5, September 2010. On the impact on European Parliamentary action cf. Charlotte Burns, Neil Carter, Nicholas Worsfold, *Enlargement and the Environment: The Changing Behaviour of the European Parliament*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 50, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 54-70.

general ecological approach⁷³. However, the leader-laggard dynamic only partly explains the evolution of European environmental policy. We must also remember, in fact, that individual actors have changed their position over the years and the countries considered leaders⁷⁴ have often been non-compliant in some sectors and, conversely, the laggards have had a more “virtuous” attitude in the implementation of some individual Community regulations⁷⁵. Ultimately, the positions of individual states change considerably according to the influence of internal and international policy. However, Community regulations and the activity of the Court of Justice have favoured a gradual approximation of laws. The positive impact of European environmental constraints on the countries initially lacking adequate tools and policies, such as the Southern European countries or those far from Central Europe (such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland), must not be underestimated. These countries generally have a more confident attitude and are more in favour of Community policies because they have benefited from economic transfers that have helped develop their policies as well as from the considerable exemptions granted them to avoid compromising their fragile economies in transformation, while mainly the Scandinavian countries are still more protective of their own autonomy and are sceptical. General consensus on European public policies in EU countries is still fairly high, and the same applies to environmental policies as well. McCormick suggests that this is due to the fact that the level of European governance of these policies is considered appropriate to address the environmental problems, which have no boundaries and require the joint political and economic efforts of different governments and administrations, and to the benefits of a cooperative strategy, in which the costs and benefits of policies are shared, otherwise they become overly burdensome and rather impractical for many partners. Moreover, the “leader-laggard” dynamic urges countries to achieve higher ecological goals. It is also important to remember the role that regional economic integration has played in promoting the development of environmental policies and the significant contribution of the

⁷³ Cf. Jon Burchell, Simon Lightfoot, *The Greening of the European Union? Examining the EU's Environmental Credentials*, cit., p. 30.

⁷⁴ Cf. Nuria Font, *La politica ambientale*, in Sergio Fabbrini, Francesc Morata (eds.), *L'Unione europea. Le politiche pubbliche*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, p. 182 (pp. 166-192).

⁷⁵ Cf. Tanja A. Börzel, *Why There Is No 'Southern Problem': On Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the EU*, in “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000, pp. 141-162; Id., *Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union. Why There is (Not) a Southern Problem*, London, Ashgate, 2003.

exchange of information and the continuous comparison of experiences and data which motivate countries and the EU to learn best practices and to shape their policies⁷⁶. Although free trade may negatively effect environmental standards, resulting in excessive costs for small businesses that are no longer protected by trade barriers and the risk of economic crises and job losses as well as a reduction in environmental restrictions or even the shifting of industrial production from areas with strong constraints to areas with fewer constraints, McCormick concludes that the regional approach offers more advantages than disadvantages compared to isolated national environmental policies that are not integrated, highlighting the essential role of intergovernmental and supranational cooperation⁷⁷.

Another useful perspective that can help explain the EU's desire to influence and orient global environmental governance according to its economic interests and in line with the regulations of its environmental policy is offered by Daniel Kelemen. In his analysis, the author uses the model of "regulatory politics", combining the effects of domestic politics (i.e. determined by EU national or Community internal political forces) and international regulatory competition and also applying it to the different attitudes of the EU and the U.S. in international environmental politics⁷⁸. In fact, while acknowledging the importance of the values and standards proposed by the EU as a civilian power in international politics, he believes the EU's drive to extend its internal environmental regulations to the international community is fundamental and illustrates three particular areas in which pressure could be exerted (GMOs, climate change, world trade). Ultimately, according to this perspective:

[...] the roots of the EU's commitment to global environmental leadership may be found at the intersection of domestic politics and international political economy. In the 1990s, the dramatic increase in power of environmental interests across Europe, and the dynamics of EU policy-making that encouraged harmonization at high levels of environmental protection, led the EU to adopt the strictest, most ambitious environmental legislation in the world. Given that strict

⁷⁶ McCormick, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-298.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

⁷⁸ Cf. Daniel R. Kelemen, David Vogler, *Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics*, in "Comparative Political Studies", Vol. 43, No. 4, April 2010, pp. 427-456, http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/dkelemen/research/Kelemen_Vogel_TradingPlaces.pdf.

standards were being put in place across Europe, it was in the interests of European industry and European governments to see similar standards spread to other jurisdictions⁷⁹.

The national governments of the Member States have often played a leading role in experimenting new environmental policies that have then spread to other countries and resulted in similar Community initiatives. In turn, the EU has encouraged the spread of new environmental policies and practices in less advanced countries, but it has also pursued goals that have put it in conflict with more “virtuous” countries. The role of national states (and of Germany for its “specific gravity”) is crucial for the adoption of Community policies by the Council of Ministers, and the gradual extension of the co-decision procedure has allowed the EU to develop environmental policies that are being consolidated on the initiative of the European Commission and with the increasing involvement of the European Parliament. This is also due to a quite shared political culture that is conducive to sustainable development, though it would require a parallel commitment to transforming the EU into a model of federalism and ensuring equal representation in all matters both to the national states and to the European Parliament to draft all aspects of environmental policy together.

Several studies point out the centralisation trend in European environmental policy, even greater than in the United States where each individual State still has its own approach. For example, California has played a leading role in ecological modernisation since the 1960s, but individual states are less capable of influencing federal policy than all the European states through the Council of Ministers⁸⁰. Kelemen has also highlighted the EU’s rigidity in its support of the implementation of Community policies, leaving little discretion to member countries and applying procedures and sanctions backed by the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the

⁷⁹ Daniel R. Kelemen, *Globalizing EU Environmental Policy*, in “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 17, No. 3, April 2010, p. 346 (pp. 335-349).

⁸⁰ For an interesting comparison cf. David Vogel, Michael Toffel, Diahanna Post, Nazli Z. Uludere Aragon, *Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States*, Working Paper 10/085, Harvard Business School, February 2010, <http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-085.pdf>. For a collection of essays on this topic cf. Norman J. Vig, Michael G. Faure (eds.), *Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union*, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2004.

European Communities⁸¹ since it cannot directly implement these policies and autonomously sanction polluters. This is because there is no supranational federal democracy and because national states still have the ability to block the institutional development of the EU and its environmental policies.

In short, the increased cooperation and mutual as well as interactive reinforcement of the Community, state, regional and local institutions can create the conditions for improving the efficiency of environmental policies and verify at what level (central or decentralised) they should be implemented with reference to a shared conception of sustainability, which still is not truly a priority value, considering the inter-state and transnational territorial and regional needs, the cross-border impact of different forms of pollution and the global impact of certain phenomena, something which would require a world government⁸².

Internationally, the EU is a unique example of supranational regional integration which has inspired experiences of integration and cooperation in other areas of the world.

An indigenous and specific development of environmental regionalism must clearly be promoted in order to tackle the environmental problems of the different regional and sub-regional areas. However, both the content of the policies and the EU's institutional architecture *in fieri* are capable of inspiring and supporting the various attempts to create multilevel environmental governance underway in other parts of the world⁸³, with transpositions and

⁸¹ Daniel R. Kelemen, *The Rules of Federalism. Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 52. The author makes a comparison between the EU and other federal systems arguing that the EU, especially in environmental policies, acts as a federal regulatory regime.

⁸² For an in-depth analysis of the theories of fiscal federalism and public finance that emphasises the complex decisions regarding the regulatory level of environmental policies within the EU, which should meet not only economic efficiency criteria but should also have an interdisciplinary approach combining economic, legal and political science related assessments to develop environmental federalism cf. Tim Jeppesen, *Environmental Regulation in a Federal System. Framing Environmental Policy in the European Union*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002.

⁸³ In recent years, the development of the regional level in order to improve environmental protection has been gaining greater scientific attention. The development of cooperation, governance and regional environmental integration depends on several factors (environmental degradation shared at the cross-border or regional level, growth of existing regional cooperation for other purposes, facilitation or limiting of interstate and state co-operation in individual regional areas by dominant or hegemonic States, e.g. the United States in North America, Brazil in Latin America, India in South Asia). Environmental regionalism processes are very different but have still developed and have managed to achieve, in some cases, even in the absence of institutions, at least the first three stages of "regionalisation" (information-sharing, consultation, cooperation), which may follow or have already followed the last two (harmonisation and integration) only in the case of the EU; cf. Deborah VanNijnatten, *The North American Case: Multi-level, Bottom-heavy and Policy-led*, in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., p. 150). Apart from the EU and the Europe region involved in the "Environment for Europe" process, on other continents or in other sub-continental areas there are very heterogeneous situations. In Asia, in addition to transnational governance authorities, like those established to facilitate cooperation in the area of the management of large rivers such as the Mekong and Tumen, there are three regions



where regional environmental governance has been developed, especially with the support of the UNEP (<http://www.unep.org/>), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, <http://www.unescap.org/>) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB, <http://www.adb.org/>): Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Burma), where major developments have occurred since the late 1970s in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, <http://www.aseansec.org/>) through programmes and without the creation of autonomous institutions in the spirit of the so-called "ASEAN way", including "non-interference norms that give priority to national sovereignty and a preference, in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, for step-by-step, quiet and consensus-based non-confrontational diplomacy"; Northeast Asia (China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation), where regional environmental cooperation has emerged only since the 1990s, especially through the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among China, Japan and South Korea (TEMM, <http://www.temm.org/>) - cf. Lorraine Elliott, *East Asia and Sub-regional diversity. Initiatives, Institutions and Identity* in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., pp. 56-75 (quotation p. 71) -; South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) where since the 1980s the South Asian Association for Environment Regional Cooperation (SAARC, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>), the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP, <http://www.sacep.org/>) and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD, <http://www.icimod.org/>) have started dealing with the environment through studies, analysis and statements, but with few concrete results and without institutions with autonomous powers, also due to poor funding and lack of political will - particularly in India, the dominant regional power (cf. Ashok Swain, *South Asia, its Environment and Regional Institutions*, in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., pp. 76-91). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest area of the planet, plagued by a number of different environmental problems, several regional initiatives by international actors and NGOs have emerged since the 1990s, but despite the Action Plan for the Environment Initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) of the African Union (AU) in June 2003 (<http://www.uneca.org/unregionalconsultations/documents/NEPAD%20Action%20Plan%20-%20environment.pdf>, <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Environment%20Action%20Plan.pdf>, <http://www.nepad.org/climatechangeandsustainabledevelopment/climatechange/about>), the support of the UNEP and the Global Environmental Facility (<http://www.thegef.org/>) and the involvement of many African sub-regional organisations (known as Regional Economic Communities) positive results are achieved only when a regional power is involved (South Africa) and when there is a strong external impetus. These initiatives are fragmented, segmented and sometimes have ulterior motives at a sub-regional level, mainly because of undemocratic states and the control exerted by military or tribal groups. For a review of their major achievements (including the African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development funded by the EU Development Fund) and their greatest problems cf. Daniel Compagnon, Fanny Florémont, Isabelle Lamaud, *Sub-Saharan Africa. Fragmented Environmental Governance Without Regional Integration*, in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., pp. 92-112. In the Middle East and North African (MENA) Region, the environment is one of the areas where cooperation among countries in conflict has been possible, especially regarding water management (particularly between Arabs and Israelis), even if this is also a sensitive and potentially explosive issue. The most important prospect that is most likely to emerge is actually the contribution of cooperation for environmental protection to peace-building and confidence-building to support the peace process in particular between Israelis and Palestinians; cf. Dora Kulauzov, Alexios Antypas, *The Middle East and North Africa. Sub-regional Environmental Cooperation as a Security Issue*, in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., pp. 113-129. In addition to sub-regional cooperation among countries in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (<http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/>), among the Mashreq countries and among the Maghreb countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation (Partnership) should also be mentioned, launched through the Barcelona Process in 1995 between the EU and twelve Mediterranean countries, then re-launched in Paris in 2008 under the Union for the Mediterranean (<http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/>). Within the financial instrument established by the EU under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm), the Mediterranean Action Programme (MEDA) in effect until 2006, there was a specific component, the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP), adopted in 1997 and focused on supporting environmental actions aimed mainly at water management and at the fight against desertification. Currently, the financing of the Euro-Mediterranean policy of the EU has been reabsorbed in its neighbourhood policy. In South America, where for several decades many regional integration projects have been initiated with limited powers and actors as well as overlapping initiatives, although there are significant shared ecosystems, the so-called "new feudal" regional integration has been difficult to achieve: the Amazon Treaty Cooperation Organisation (<http://www.otca.info/portal/index.php?p=index>), created in 1978, has worked poorly, except for some periods of revitalisation; in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur, <http://www.mercosur.int/>), the bodies with environmental competences (in particular the Technical Committee for the Environment, the Sub-Grupo No. 6) have been relegated to a secondary role; the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA, <http://www.iirsa.org/index.asp?CodIdioma=ENG>) has created strong contrasts and polarisation between civil society and NGOs, on the one hand, and governments and private entrepreneurs, on the other; during the third Summit of American Presidents in 2004 the establishment of the South American Community of Nations (UNASUR, <http://www.unasursg.org/>) was agreed upon and would be formed by the gradual convergence of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/>) (in 2008 the organisation organised the "Latin

selective adaptations induced by internal and external forces (sometimes promoted by the EU itself). This process is already partially underway and identifies the EU's "patchy, shallow, but not spurious"⁸⁴ influence on the structures and institutions of both the EU member states and external states as well as the other regional cooperation and integration processes throughout the world⁸⁵. This critical challenge depends precisely upon eco-sustainable human, social and economic development that is able to mitigate the changes in climate that are already taking place. Depending on the circumstances, individual environmental policies can be better addressed either through local cooperation or at the transnational, regional or interregional level. Individual policies can even be addressed at any level, as long as the subsidiarity principle is respected and a balance is found between costs and benefits and democracy and efficiency in the sharing of competences among the different levels of government and the concentration of powers at the level of government best suited

Climate" conference, http://www.comunidadandina.org/desarrollo/climalatino_e.htm), the Mercosur and Chile along with Guyana and Suriname and with the environment as one of the eight areas of cooperation; cf. Kathryn Hochstetler, *Under Construction. Debating the Region in South America*, Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., pp. 130-146; on Mercosur cf. Kathryn Hochstetler, *Fading Green? Environmental Politics in the Mercosur Free Trade Agreement*, in "Latin American Politics and Society", Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 1-32; on Amazonia cf. Beatriz Garcia, *The Amazon from an International Law Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. For the developments in regional integration in Latin America, cf. also Carlos Alfredo de Silva, Javier Alejandro Orso, *The Complicated Process of Building the South American Community of Nations Against the Problematical Globalization*, in "Acque & Terre", No. 4-5, 2011, pp. 88-105. In Central America some organisations pursue environmental cooperation, such as the Central American Integration System (SICA, http://www.sica.int/index_en.aspx) - composed of Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic - with the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD, <http://larc.iisd.org/category/actors/intergovernmental-organization/ccad/>), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, <http://www.caricom.org/>) with the Caribbean Renewable Energy Development Programme (CREDP, <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/projects/credp.jsp?menu=projects>), the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (<http://caribbeanclimate.bz/>) and the Association of Caribbean States (<http://www.acs-aec.org/>) which deals with trade, transport, sustainable tourism and natural disasters. In the North American area characterised by the presence of three large federal states (federations), multi-level environmental governance has been achieved with different actors and organisations both in environmental agenda-setting and in environmental policy-making: "Whereas there is a tradition of environmental bilateralism and diplomacy on the Canada-US and US-Mexico borders, two additional sites of governance have emerged: first, at the sub-national level where U.S. states, Canadian provinces and Mexican states are working together within cross-border regions to address shared environmental problems; second, at the trilateral level new mechanisms created alongside the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, <http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx>) also provide a broader framework for cooperation"; Deborah VanNijnatten, *The North American Case: Multi-level, Bottom-heavy and Policy-led*, in Elliott, Breslin (eds.), *Comparative Environmental Regionalism*, cit., p. 147 (pp. 147-162).

⁸⁴ Cf. Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, *When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2012, p. 193 (pp. 192-207).

⁸⁵ Cf. Tobias Lenz, *Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 155-173; Anja Jetschke, Philomena Murray, *Diffusing Regional Integration: the EU and Southeast Asia*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 174-191. On the diffusion of the European Court of Justice model, which has been extended to 11 international courts cf. Karen J. Alter, *The Global Spread of European Style International Courts*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2012, pp. 135-154.

to deal with the environmental issues under consideration⁸⁶. Knowledge sharing, complementary modes of knowledge and expertise (enhancing local knowledge of indigenous communities and avoiding the construction of a reductionist scientific perspective), transparency of institutions and practices and democratic procedures must all be ensured in environmental decision-making processes. Climate change and the economic, social and energy transformations necessary to address it, however, require a global government and supra-national, regional institutions to build it in order to ensure the transition into a new era. In the current dilatory and unsatisfactory, undemocratic and untransparent governance, in which obstacles and the defense of national interests prevail, the alternative would result in the aggravation of living conditions of communities and ecosystems - already underway - and would cause the irreparable damage indicated by IPCC scientists. The efforts of international organisations in the field of global environmental governance are inconsistent, and they often have objectives that are far from environmental protection. They are made up of very different actors: intergovernmental organisations⁸⁷, associations, networks of experts, nongovernmental organisations, multinational companies, banks and private financial institutions⁸⁸, specialised agencies composed of governments or hybrid organisations with multilevel participation (e.g. World Commission on Dams⁸⁹, Minerals, Mining and Sustainable Development Initiative (MMSD⁹⁰), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI⁹¹), Global Compact⁹²,

⁸⁶ Cf. Oran Young, *The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2002.

⁸⁷ In particular, but not exclusively, the UN organisations, agencies and programmes with direct or indirect environmental competence: besides the UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html>) and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboutcsd.shtml).

⁸⁸ Cf. Christopher Wright, *Setting Standards for Responsible Banking. Examining the Role of the International Finance Corporation in the emergence of the Equator Principles*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, cit., pp. 51-70.

⁸⁹ Established as a result of the campaigns against large dams in different parts of the world through an initiative promoted at the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and World Bank workshop, it has an independent commission, which included all stakeholders in 1998 and was operating until the presentation of its final report in 2000. For further information see <http://www.unep.org/dams/WCD/>.

⁹⁰ Since 2011, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM, <http://www.icmm.com/>) has emerged from it.

⁹¹ A permanent, cross-sectoral and multi-level initiative aimed at developing and promoting guidelines at the global level to provide reports and information on the environmental, social and economic activities of public, private, profit and non-profit organisations. Further details available at <https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx>.

⁹² A network promoted by the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan for the development and voluntary compliance of corporations and private actors with sustainable practices and rules to protect human rights and workers and to fight corruption (website: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>).

World Water Council⁹³, Global Water Partnership⁹⁴ etc.). Their work is fragmented and multifaceted with varying levels of authority, procedures and international regimes. Environmental competences have often been added to those established by international organisations operating in the economic⁹⁵, commercial⁹⁶, security, social and development cooperation sectors. This overlapping and chaotic combination of actors, roles, mechanisms and bureaucracies⁹⁷ have a negative effect on the environment.

It has been found, for example, that in most cases the projects financed by financial institutions and international agencies have produced an overall increase in carbon dioxide emissions or have failed to significantly decrease them, thus scarcely influencing environmental governance⁹⁸. Currently, the action taken by the G-20 Summit has also had a negative impact.

⁹³ An organisation proposed by industries, professionals, international specialised agencies and intergovernmental organizations (website: <http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/>).

⁹⁴ Promoted by the World Bank, the UNDP and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to support regional action and the implementation of projects for sustainable water management (partnership). For further information see <http://www.gwp.org/>.

⁹⁵ See, for example, the case of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/>), which through its Environmental Performance Reviews of the examined states contributes to the assessment of environmental policies and to policy diffusion (http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3746,en_21571361_37949547_37973326_1_1_1_1,00.html); cf. Markku Lehtonen, *OECD Peer Reviews and Policy Convergence. Diffusing Policies or Discourses?*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, cit., pp. 71-90; Kenneth G. Ruffing, *The Role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Environmental Policy Making*, in "Review of Environmental Economics and Policy", Vol. 4, issue 2, Summer 2010, pp. 199-220.

⁹⁶ Cf. Trish Kelly, *The Impact of the WTO. The Environment, Public Health and Sovereignty*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007; Sikina Jinnah, *Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization Secretariat Influence on Trade-Environment Politics*, in "Global Environmental Politics", Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2010, pp. 54-79.

⁹⁷ Cf. Frank Biermann, Steffen Bauer, *Managers of Global Governance. Assessing and Explaining the Influence of International Bureaucracies*, Global Governance Working Paper Series No. 18, Amsterdam, Berlin, Oldenburg, Postdam, Global Governance Project, 2005; Steffen Bauer, *Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats in Global environmental Politics*, in "Global Environmental Politics", Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 23-49; Steffen Bauer, Per-Olof Bush, Bernd Siebenhüner, *Treaty Secretariats in Global Environmental Governance*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 174-191; Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner (eds.), *Managers of Global Change. The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2009.

⁹⁸ Cf. Axel Dreher, Magdalena Ramada y Galán Sarasola, *The Impact of International Organizations on the Environment. An Empirical Analysis*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, cit., pp. 19-50. This analysis also focuses on the International Monetary Fund (IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>), which since 1991 has integrated environment protection into its programmes when deemed significant for the macro-economic stability of a country

(<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/enviro.htm>; cf. IMF Factsheet, *Climate Change and the IMF*, 4 April 2012, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/enviro.pdf>),

the World Bank (<http://www.worldbank.org/>)

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:20118248~menuPK:7333378~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244381,00.html>) the World Trade Organisation (WTO, <http://www.wto.org/>, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, <http://www.iadb.org/en/inter-american-development-bank,2837.html>), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB, <http://www.afdb.org/en/>), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERDB, <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/homepage.shtml>) and the United Nations Development and Environmental Programmes' Global Environment Facility (GEF) proposed in 1990, created the following year by the World Bank and managed by the

This international forum, so decisive for international economic development and composed of the seven most industrialised countries (G-7) and emerging economies, aims at maintaining access to natural resources and raw materials in the interests of the countries participating in it through agreements and financial mechanisms. Attention and hopes are also concentrated on the various cooperation relations and public-private partnerships that have been established, mostly top-down, to achieve environmental objectives and are logistically and financially supported by international organisations⁹⁹, while private traders have launched different regulatory initiatives¹⁰⁰. All these initiatives, depending on the circumstances, may contribute to environmental improvements, but it is difficult to assess their impact without any coordination and evaluation, which should be conducted by independent bodies established by a global environmental organisation.

The EU is working on a global emissions reduction plan and is counting on the convergence of several countries that, until recently, have been very divergent on this matter. However, 2020 is too far in the future for the entry into force of a legally binding constraint. This process must be sped up before it is too late, supportive institutions must be created, the United Nations must be strengthened and a World Environment Organisation must be established to develop a global reduction plan and equitable and redistributive solutions as well as to instill greater confidence by avoiding the adoption of neoliberal and economic orientations aimed exclusively at preserving the balance of power.

World Bank itself along with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UNEP. On the important coordination action of the UNEP cf. Steinar Andresen, Kristin Rosendal, *The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in the Coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 133-150. For a discussion on the role of the World Bank - composed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) - in global environmental governance cf. Park, *op. cit.* Cf. also Zoe Young, *A New Green Order? The World Bank and the Politics of the Global Environment Facility*, London, Pluto Press, 2002.

⁹⁹ Cf. Liliana B. Andonova, *International Organizations as Entrepreneurs of Environmental Partnerships*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 195-222.

¹⁰⁰ Regarding the Forest Stewardship Council (<http://www.fsc.org/>), an organisation which has defined and voluntarily applied environmental standards, and the International Forum on Forests (<http://www.un.org/esa/forests/index.html>) cf. G. Kristin Rosendal, *Overlapping International Regimes. The Case of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) Between Climate Change and Biodiversity*, in "International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics", Vol.1, 2001, pp. 447-468, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/10.1/10.1.Rosendal2001Overlapping.pdf

On the case of the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES, <http://www.ceres.org/>) cf. Philipp Pattberg, *Private Governance Organizations in Global Environmental Politics*, in Biermann, Siebenhüner, Schreyögg (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 223-243.

Only an inclusive, global and eco-sustainable organisation capable of ensuring democracy and transparency could create a new world order. Meanwhile, the EU along with the other willing countries and the international organisations could create a Global Climate Community along the lines of the first European Community, the European Community for Coal and Steel, the first example of the transfer of limited though essential national powers to a common organisation in pursuit of the common good. Preserving the common good, which depends on shared resources and the health of the environment as well as providing a new direction for world politics, is an obligation we cannot back away from.

To this end, all countries need to take on common but differentiated responsibilities based on their own capabilities through the adoption of a shared plan, which is legally binding and implemented by a common organisation endowed with the necessary supranational power and adequate financial resources accumulated through common ecological taxation and a tax on financial transactions¹⁰¹.

¹⁰¹ For an in-depth discussion of possible measures and achievements aimed at establishing a global environmental government cf. Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, *Twenty Years After the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development: the Durban Step and the Need for a Global Environmental Government on Climate Change*, cit., pp. 38-49.

**A FEDERAL EUROPE FOR PROMOTING A NEW MODEL OF GROWTH:
MOVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND A BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE¹**

Alberto Majocchi

Those of us who want a unified Europe, the European integrationists, must leave behind the half-measures and pragmatic false compromises and learn again what really matters to us. The United States of Europe. Nothing more and nothing less. The current crisis has shown us that half-measures cannot withstand harsh realities, nor can false compromises. It has also shown that European visionaries were the true realists. And that only the path towards the United States of Europe can provide a real alternative to failure”

Joschka Fischer, *The United States of Europe*, Lecture to the Heinrich Heine University in Dusseldorf, 1 June 2010.

1. During the last two years a deep crisis has ravaged the world economy. The main industrialised countries have been heavily hit; less the new emerging economies. The governments have tried to face the crisis with the traditional instruments of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. A full recession has been avoided, but rich countries are not completely out of the crisis. This dramatic experience has shown that there is an urgent need for change. In the past century, the main objective of economic policy has been to promote Gdp increases, that were identified with a rising welfare. But this is no longer the case in the new world economy. In many countries Gdp increases, but the quality of life is not improving at the same rate.

¹This text is also available at
http://www.federaleurope.org/fileadmin/files_uef/Congress_2011/Political_Commissions/A_federal_Europe_for_promoting_a_new_model_of_Growth_by_Alberto_Majocchi.pdf.

The pressure on natural resources is unsustainable. Looking for more and more energy sources, natural disasters follow, as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico shows. Globalisation and the ensuing increased worldwide competition apparently oblige many countries to dismantle the welfare system and to trim down environmental protection. Thus the time seems ripe for moving urgently from uncontrolled growth towards sustainable development and a better quality of life.

While the crisis of the world economy has been originated in the financial sector, it has been rapidly spreading into the real economy. It has arisen out of a fundamental disequilibrium within the American economy, where demand has for many years outstripped the value of output, with an ensuing permanent deficit in the trade balance, twinned to a budgetary deficit in continuous expansion and to a growing indebtedness of the private sector. From 1976 to 2007 the richest 1% of the American households seized 58% of the total increase in real income. As a consequence of this growing inequality in income distribution, in the US the banking system has been largely involved in supporting the demand either of houses (and other durable goods) or consumption goods, disregarding the over-use of natural and material resources, and thus favouring the emergence of the twin deficits and the worsening of the global environment.

2. The uninterrupted growth of the world economy has been supported during the last two decades by a spectacular increase in productivity, ensuing to a worldwide expansion of a huge wave of technological development, following the implementation of the ICT revolution originated in the US. But the model of growth prevailing in the United States is now obsolete since it is largely based on a resource-exhausting consumption demand and the American economy remains the most energy-intensive in the industrialised world. Furthermore, the increase in consumption for the American households is largely satisfied through cheap imports coming from industrialising countries. It is true that this US demand supports exports from these areas, but in this way real resources move from the less rich countries of the world towards the richest one.

The balancing role played by the US in supporting the growth of the world economy in the period after the 2nd World War - with a surplus in the trade balance funding the deficit in the capital account - is now totally absent.

After the adoption of the Marshall Plan, European states were obliged to import consumption goods from the US since domestic production was totally disrupted as a consequence of the war and these imports were paid through the inflow of American funds. But in this way it was supported at the same time either the conversion of the US economy from military production to the production of civil goods or the recovery of the European economy. Now the twin deficits in the US are financed through capital imports from the rest of the world.

Unfortunately, all over the world economy the American model of growth has been largely followed. This model - that is still generally prevailing - has characterised the second half of the previous century, but should now be radically changed. For most countries the main factor determining the growth rate was a technological development of imitative kind. It was sufficient to import the best technologies from the most advanced countries to raise productivity and to increase the standard of living. But many countries have now reached the technological frontier and are unable to restart growth through import of technologies from abroad. If a new phase of growth has to be kicked off, a renewed capacity of innovation must be promoted and the production of new kinds of goods and different production processes should be envisaged.

3. A better quality of life is the main objective of the new model of growth, but the achievement of this goal requires as a first step a deep change in the pattern of consumption. In rich countries goods should be purchased in greater quantity that satisfy real human needs and improve welfare. Many of these goods are immaterial – for instance, personal services, cultural goods, natural resources, environmental quality. Furthermore, in the post-industrial world, following the ICT revolution and the ensuing increase in labour productivity, working time could diminish, thus creating space for more leisure. Consequently, demand for enjoying cultural and natural goods could increase. At the same time, a larger quantity of material goods should be put at disposal for satisfying basic human needs in the poor countries of the world. This is the first step for starting an endogenously-determined process of growth in these countries as well.

Production processes too should be modified in depth. Environmental protection should be considered side-by-side with profit-maximisation and competitiveness in evaluating the effectiveness of the methods of production adopted by firms. In this evaluation energy-saving and trimming down the use of natural resources should be considered important parameters. More efficient capital goods could increase productivity, thus providing room for higher wages and better conditions of life for the workers.

4. In rich countries production processes are largely energy-intensive. This is particularly true for the United States that consumes a quarter of the world oil production even though it has only one-twentieth of the global population. As President Obama has recently remarked, the time for clean energy is now and the use of so much energy for unit of Gdp should be decreased.

As it is well known, climate changes are linked, to a great extent, to the burning of fossil fuels. To fight global warming the use of fossil fuels should be largely cut down. A carbon-energy tax could be effective in promoting either energy-saving through the higher prices of energy brought about by the energy share of the tax, or fuel-switching, since the carbon share of the tax favours the use of fuels with less carbon content. Hence the tax could promote a curbing of CO₂ emissions and a moving of the productive structure along the path towards a low-carbon economy. Part of the revenue flowing from the energy-carbon tax could be used to promote innovation in the field of renewable energy or in exploiting new energy sources, while competitiveness of the countries implementing the tax could be protected by introducing border tax adjustment, that is burdening at the border foreign goods imported with the same tax levied on domestic production.

5. At the world level the pattern of growth followed in the past is now unsustainable since the global environment is unable to support the enormously increased pressure on natural resources. The foreseen expansion of world population from 6 to 9 billion will intensify global competition for natural resources and put a further pressure on environment. The world was ecologically in equilibrium when only one billion people was rich and energy-consuming. Now, luckily, the ratio between rich and poor is reversed and a new equilibrium could be reached only if the consumption of natural resources and the exploitation of energy sources are decreased in the rich countries since, from the point of view of equity, it is more and more unacceptable that more than one billion of the bottom poor be excluded from a reasonable standard of living.

Furthermore, it is true that while the availability of consumption goods has been continuously increasing, even in the affluent societies many essential needs are not adequately satisfied. Hence, policy measures to support across-the board consumption demand are not an effective way out from the current crisis. More selective policy measures are needed and a process targeted to the promotion of a sustainable development – from an economic, social and environmental point of view – must be started as soon as possible.

6. A policy promoting the recovery of the economic activity worldwide is the unavoidable first step to be adopted to favour the kick off of a process for achieving sustainable growth. In the affluent societies this policy should not be targeted to a further increase in consumption demand, but to the strengthening of a new and more balanced economic and social model, environment-friendly. Investments are essential to achieve this goal, as well as a redistribution policy aimed to cutting down existing inequalities in income distribution, with the ensuing negative economic and social effects. But consumption should be supported in the bottom poor countries through a keynesian policy at the world level targeted to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals coming out from the Millennium Declaration adopted in September 2000 by the United Nations, committing Member States to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets with the deadline of 2015.

The transition to a sustainable development pattern requires the implementation of a plan including expenditure projects in different areas:

- research and development expenditures and promotion of higher education, to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic production
- public and private investments in advanced technologies and support to champions in the new leading industries
- financing projects to improve the quality of life for the citizens (water and air quality, sustainable mobility, renewable energy, urban renewal, efficient personal services, especially for weak people - babies, old people, disabled)
- investments to promote conservation and to enlarge utilisation of cultural goods and natural resources
- investments for completing worldwide the existing network in the fields of transport, energy and telecommunications.

7. In the traditional economy growth depends on unceasing demand increases and enhanced production efficiency through market incentives. Prices reflect the balance between demand and supply and provide the right incentives for an efficient allocation of production factors. But in the new economy external costs of production and consumption activities due to pollution and to the use of natural resources should be internalised into prices to avoid market failures and to maximise welfare. This outcome could be achieved through the use both of economic instruments (environmental taxes, emission trading system) and of command-and-control measures. But costs of environmental policy are translated into higher prices either with taxes or with command and control measures and these higher prices curb demand increases of goods and services. Hence, the question follows: is economic growth hampered by environmental policy?

In the literature about environmental policy an important role is played by the Porter hypothesis that the constraints deriving from environmental policy oblige firms to promote technological innovation and, consequently, prop up economic growth. Porter suggests that innovation concerns product and production processes, but also new management practices with an ensuing decrease in production costs. As a matter of fact countries with rigid environmental constraints show higher rates of productivity increases: Germany, the most performing export country worldwide, is one of the most advanced in environmental protection as well.

Hence, it seems justified to draw the conclusion that in the long run there is no trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection.

8. In the old model of growth Gdp changes are widely used to evaluate the effectiveness of an economic policy: but Gdp by itself is not an efficient indicator of welfare. Environmental damages are not computed in Gdp, while expenditures caused by environmental degradation increase Gdp. If an efficient policy of prevention of diseases is implemented, health expenditures decrease and welfare apparently worsens. This example shows that a new set of indicators is needed to measure welfare. The overall aim of this set is to favour policy measures able to improve the quality of life both for current and future generations through the creation of sustainable communities able to manage and use resources efficiently and to tap the ecological and social innovation potential of the economy, ensuring prosperity, environmental protection and social cohesion. The conclusions of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission promoted by the French President Sarkozy represent a useful first step in the right direction².

9. Conditions of life in urban areas represent an essential feature of the quality of life. Everywhere in the world progress is generally taking place within the cities and people concentrate in these areas, in the developing countries as well. But congestion and pollution are endemic in urban areas with external costs that bring about a worsening in the quality of life. Furthermore, given the increasing ratio between urban population and means of transport, urban mobility is not guaranteed to everybody. Urban life is particularly poor for the weak layers of the population, especially babies and old people.

Then, a first problem that must be urgently addressed is ensuring mobility to all the urban population, while simultaneously promoting a progressive reduction in the use of private vehicles. An unavoidable pre-requisite to achieve both these goals is to carry out a policy providing a coherent planning of urban development that takes care - as a relevant priority - of environmental needs. As a second step, the growth of an efficient network of different kinds of public transport should be ensured and funded.

² Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*, http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.

But the implementation of this plan requires a lot of money and a long period of time. It follows that, if the final goal has to be achieved, during the transition period the use of private vehicle should contribute to the funding of the mobility plan through a system of road pricing, like that already implemented in London, Singapore and, with different characteristics and objectives, in Milan; a system that is able to reduce progressively the use of private vehicles and to provide at the same time the money to fund the investments needed to develop the public transport network or alternatives modes of transport.

10. One of the worst effect of urbanisation is the difficulty to guarantee a sufficient food production to feed the population in the poor countries as well as in the rich ones. In developing countries a large part of the population is fed through self-consumption, that becomes impossible when people are urbanised. A green revolution aiming to productivity improvements in the agricultural sector is quite important. But agricultural policy measures per se are not sufficient. The rate of population growth should be checked and this demographic policy should be backed by measures targeted to supporting a process of decentralisation of economic activities, so that the agglomeration effect pushing people to move to the most congested urban areas could be balanced.

11. Some conclusions could be drawn from this analysis. The transition to an environment-friendly world is in march. But it has to be recognised that the process of changing the current economic model at the world level requires a multilateral effort. No single country by itself could reach this outcome acting alone. But, if it is able to reach a political unity through a federal link, Europe has the possibility to play an important role in this process, showing that it is possible to overcome the national dimensions that are totally inadequate in the modern world to achieve a sustainable development.

A federal Europe could adopt a new set of indicators of welfare, as it has been suggested by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission, to advance along the path already pointed out in Article 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon on European Union stating that “the Union’s aim is to promote (...) the well-being of its peoples”. The investment program needed to kick-off a new phase of growth could be funded with the emission of Union bonds.

In this way, while member states should be obliged to comply with the Maastricht constraints, guaranteeing financial stability, a growth policy could be implemented by the federal government, adopting the golden rule of public finance setting that debt is only allowed when funding investment – and not consumption - expenditures. Hence, with these virtuous behaviours the existing trade-off between stability and growth could be dismissed.

At the federal level, the transition to a low-carbon economy could be funded by a carbon-energy tax, while at the urban level road pricing could guarantee the transition to a sustainable mobility model. If Europe succeeds, this could be a strong incentive for other countries to follow the same path. But the success of the European policy requires a radical change in the existing institutional structure. Only a federal Europe could play this role implementing an effective economic policy backed by an external policy promoting a positive European role in the transition to a multilateral world.

12. This positive evolution of the economic perspectives of the world economy has been supported by technological growth and globalisation has given the possibility to new countries to be included in the industrialised world. But a global effort is required to include in the process the bottom poor countries as well. The African continent represents the black hole in this process of balanced growth. As a matter of fact, not only equity, but also efficiency requires that income distribution should be improved *between and within* the different countries. This is a difficult, but decisive task, and in this area too Europe - with its past experience in the promotion of income growth in the new countries joining the Union - could show that a positive outcome is possible. Combining the promotion of environmental protection and a better quality of life with a fair distribution of income within the European continent and all over the world, a federal Europe could show that a policy aiming to raise welfare for human beings everywhere in the world is possible.

Now it is up to the European people to promote the building up of an effective federal Constitution, overcoming the dramatic limits of the existing European Union, confirmed with overwhelming evidence by the economic slowdown of the last two years that has shown how the current European crisis is only superficially a financial crisis.

As Krugman rightly remarked “to make the euro work, Europe needs to move much further toward political union, so that European nations start to function more like American states”³. Fischer also has recently reminded us that the recent European meltdown “in essence is a political crisis caused by the political weakness of the EU and the euro area”. And he added that “if the EU is unable to act as one, then the euro area can and must act as its vanguard, firstly within the Treaty and, if that brings no results, or they prove too slow, *outside the Treaty*, but in its spirit and in the interests of the Union”.

It is up to the governments to take this decision, but it is the role – and the duty – of the federalist movement to promote an initiative mobilising the public opinion and pushing European governments urgently to act.

³ Paul Krugman, *The Making of a Euromess*, “The New York Times”, February 14, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15krugman.html>.

PART FOUR

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE VIEW OF EUROPEAN GREENS AND REGIONALIST PARTIES



NOTES ON ENVIRONMENTALISM AND FEDERALISM

Franco Livorsi

In the past fifteen years I have often discussed the topic of environmentalism: in *Stato e libertà* (1992), in an essay on the political and religious trends of ecology published in “Belfagor” (1995), and especially in *Il mito della nuova terra. Cultura, idee e problemi dell’ambientalismo* (2000)¹.

The first reason for the recurrent treatment of this topic is rooted in the strong interest I have always had, since the days of my youth, in the naturalistic, pantheistic and vitalistic traditions of philosophy and psychology. Born in the Renaissance and developed during the Romantic period, these currents have indeed converged in social and political environmentalism, whose basis was laid after 1945 and developed starting from 1979, first in Germany, then worldwide.

The second reason for my interest in environmentalism is rooted in the strong belief that the end is approaching for “western” civilization – also defined as capitalistic, bourgeois, privatistic, market-based, Modern, as well as for the civilization of “endless growth”. Marx expressed similar concerns, even though the communist movement, which kept referring to Marx’s ideas for a long time, did not manage to give new life to western civilization, and turned out to be itself a symptom of the political malaise it wished to modify. One concept from the Marxian and Marxist analysis of capitalism that remains valid is the idea of capitalism being like a machine with an excellent motor and accelerator, but with no brakes.

¹ Franco Livorsi, *Note sull’ambientalismo*, in Id., *Stato e libertà. Questioni di storia del pensiero politico*, Torino, Stampatori Tirrenia, 1992, pp. 297-301; Id., *Tendenze politiche e religiose dell’ambientalismo*, in “Belfagor”, 5, 1995, pp. 517-36; Id., *Il mito della nuova terra. Cultura, idee e problemi dell’ambientalismo*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2000.

This was outlined in the first book of Marx's *Kapital* (1867)² through the formula of MGM (Money – Goods – Money): the first “M” must increase and turn into the latter “M”, that is, produce a profit at all costs. Yet, this process implies a perpetual increase of M, that is, an everlasting economic expansion which would become a disastrous source of overproduction, but would not help eliminate under consumption. At any rate, this is not the proper juncture for a detailed discussion on the question whether the MGM process might be the result of the economic system, producing self-destructive global effects in the long run, or rather, as I have upheld for a long time, of the “advanced western” collective way of thinking, now reinforced by the secularization of values. The MGM process was also strongly upheld by the supporters of national capitalism claiming to be socialists or communists “in power”: indeed, they were extremists, seeking endless economic growth at all costs, even at a high human price.

At the basis of the social phenomenon mentioned above there is, I believe, some sort of strong existential choice which, having defeated the rest, has become a shared and apparently “normal” way of thinking. Even a 1960s apologist of neo-capitalism such as historian and cultural journalist Giorgio Bocca, though unwillingly, had to accept this fact, a position from which he nevertheless retracted in 1998:

Globalization – wrote Bocca – is inevitably followed by underworld shadows. Its idea of profit maximization is turned into the common thoughts and actions of those who make money illegally, following such principles as ‘everything has its price’ and ‘everyone mind their own business’. Dirty and hot money must be brought beyond the point after which it is impossible to retrace its origin.³

Just as ethical is the analysis of the former Marxist and later anarchist, Murray Bookchin. In *The Ecology of Freedom*, Bookchin explains how the fetish of goods, which is typical of capitalism, is not so much the result of a distorted mechanism of values, as of society's

² Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, I. *Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*. (Erster Band), Hamburg, O. Meissner, 1867, See also the second edition (1873).

³ Giorgio Bocca, *Miracolo all'italiana*, Milano, Edizioni “Avanti!”, 1962; Id., *I giovani leoni del neocapitalismo*, Bari: Laterza, 1963 (where Bocca upholds neo-capitalistic reforms), to be compared with Id., *Voglio scendere*, Milano, Mondadori, 1998, as well as with Id., *Il dio denaro: ricchezza per pochi, povertà per molti*, Milano, Mondadori, 2002. See also: Aldo Grasso, *Malandrini globalizzati*, “L'Espresso”, October 1, 1998; Marco Neirotti, *Bocca, l'apocalisse è dietro l'angolo*, “La Stampa”, September, 18, 1998.

fetishistic mentality⁴. It is also due to out-of-control overpopulation – the world inhabitants have increased from 1 billion 200 hundred million people in the nineteenth century to over 5 billions nowadays – worsened both by the position of the Catholic Church regarding contraceptives and by the lack of attention, as well as the contrasting commercial interests, of western and developing countries. But it is especially the consumption of meat which causes negative effects on global climate, due to deforestation. In fact, according to scientific data from 1993, almost “60 billion square kilometers of tropical forest (twice the size of Belgium)” are destroyed by deforestation every year. This process has been monitored by the Joint Research Center at Ispra – the Italian European Committee research center – whose research data are available on the web⁵.

Giovanni Sartori, a political scientist, was converted to the ecologists' cause several years ago. The main reasons for his new attitude were the high number of inhabitants on our planet – together with its obvious, verified side effects, some of which are indeed affecting the environment – and the greenhouse effect caused by exhaust gas making holes in the thin ozone layer that protects the Earth from ultraviolet rays, causing global warming, as well as drought and strong floods. Sartori is not afraid of being considered a catastrophist when he states that the Earth had not been this hot for 500 million years and that, according to cosmologist and astrophysicist Martin Rees, it is very unlikely that the human species will

⁴ Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, Palo Alto, Cheshire Books, 1982 (Italian translation: *L'ecologia della libertà. Emergenza e dissoluzione della gerarchia*, Milano, Eleuthera, 1984, p. 119).

⁵ This piece of information was taken from Giovanni Caprara, *La Terra è sempre meno verde*, in “Corriere della Sera”, Novembre, 30 2003, p. 31,

http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2003/novembre/30/Terra_sempre_meno_verde_co_0_031130071.shtml. An updated map of the Earth's forests can be found at <http://news.discovery.com/earth/new-forest-height-map-120221.html>. See also: Giovanni Caprara, Guido Visconti, *Ecco la Terra inquinata dalla Cina alla Pianura Padana. La mappa dell'inquinamento globale Fotografati i veleni d'Europa e d'Italia La dimensione planetaria del fenomeno è potenzialmente più grave dell'effetto serra* “Corriere della Sera”, October 14, 2004. Yet, there are also such skeptical environmentalists as Norwegian statistical scientist, ex-ecologist Bjorn Lomborg, renowned for his original work *The Skeptical Environmentalist* (*The Skeptical Environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a recent critical position on this topics see William D. Nordhaus, *Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong*, “The New York Review of Books”, March 22, 2012, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/why-global-warming-skeptics-are-wrong/?pagination=false>. The Italian newspaper “Corriere della Sera” has compared Lomborg to ecologist and scientist Carl Pope, director of the Sierra Club, in the following much-discussed article: Carl Pope, Bjorn Lomborg, *Ma il mondo è messo male o sta meglio?*, “Corriere della Sera”, July, 4, 2005, p. 12, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2005/luglio/04/mondo_messo_male_sta_meglio_co_9_050704088.shtml, http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Documento/2005/07_Luglio/04/documento.html (original article Carl Pope, Bjorn Lomborg, *Debate: The State of Nature*, “Foreign Policy”, July 1, 2005, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/07/01/debate_the_state_of_nature?page=0,0).

survive the closing of the twenty-first century. Sartori also mentions the opinion of the National Academy of Science:

Every idea suggesting that the global warming of the past twenty years is due to natural causes, particularly to increasing irradiation from the Sun..., is simply indefensible.

After this statement, Sartori concludes by saying that ours is not so much the *homo sapiens sapiens* as the *stupidus stupidus* species. Sartori's opinion reminds of Morin and Kern's opinion in their work *Terra-Patria* (1993): man is not *sapiens sapiens*, but *sapiens demens*⁶.

This rather sketchy survey regarding the "strategic" impossibility of the current way of life can be completed with a statement delivered by philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer in 1990:

At present, the worst threat for the world is a different one: that of an ecologic catastrophe. This we do not know how to face.

Later on, Gadamer gives a suggestion that seems very appropriate also from a federalist point of view:

There is a strong need of some kind of international cooperation which were not interested in national and industrial egoism, but which oil crises are keeping at a distance. Here in Germany most young people are Greens and rightly worry about the preservation of the environment and the control of industrial development. Yet, at this moment in history, to stop this development would mean to condemn to death 2 billions of people, whose existence is connected with the development of industrial economy. (...) This problem is already impossible to solve under certain points of view. (...) The truth is that, for the first time in human history, we do not now how to save our species. (...) But, since I am not so sure that there is only one kind of modernity, it might as well be possible that, owing to increasing difficulties in our technocratic society, we will have to face a religious outbreak much stronger than the present one⁷.

Seventeen years later, Gadamer's forecast turns up to have been correct, especially about two points.

⁶ Giovanni Sartori, *Homo stupidus fermati in tempo. Inerti di fronte al clima sempre più torrido*, "Corriere della Sera", August, 17, 2003, p. 1, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2003/agosto/17/HOMO_STUPIDUS_FERMATI_TEMPO_co_0_030817004.shtml. See also Edgar Morin, Anne B. Kern, *Terra-Patria*, Milano, Cortina, 1994; and Livorsi, *Il mito della nuova terra*, cit., pp. 261-71, for an analysis of Morin and Kern's work.

⁷ Franco Marcoaldi, *Vedo nero* (Interview to Gadamer), "La Repubblica", September 6, 1990, p. 32, <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/09/06/vedo-nero.html>.

The first concerns the difficulty in facing such disasters through agreements merely depending on governmental will, such as those trying to limit “emissions of exhaust gas worsening the greenhouse effect in order to prevent terrible consequences on global climate”. There is by now a general agreement on “the scientific evidence of the relationship between global warming and the continuous production of exhaust greenhouse-effect gas into the atmosphere”, as noted also by 2000 scientists “coordinated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC) in 1998. In 1992, 160 countries agreed by words of mouth to head towards this direction at the world summit held in Rio de Janeiro. Similar commitments were undertaken at the 1997 interstate summit in New York, and a pressing fulfillment of these decisions was invoked at the World Economic Forum held in January 2007 at Davos. But little can be done without an agreement involving such greatly polluting countries as the USA – trying to protect its industrial power – the recently industrialized countries of China and India – wishing not to slacken their growth in such a favorable moment – and a developing country like Brazil⁸. Above all, commitments providing for no legal sanctions are useless, which once again highlights the necessity of both international and continental federalism.

The second point corroborating the limits of an interstate agreement policy is related to the wish for changes of the worldwide popular masses, who can actually influence the policy within their country, and even on an international level. The decisional power of elites is, in fact, often overestimated. It seems impossible to limit industrial development, if people themselves do not realize the importance of an ecological point of view. It must also be remarked that this change is not likely to happen shortly, but might be induced by the aftermath of a catastrophe.

These observations may, I believe, shed some light on the fundamental steps leading from Marxism to environmentalism. These steps are primarily: the end of historical and collectivistic materialism, the still-unsolved changes in the rules of civilization, the necessity of modifying people’s mentality.

⁸ For further discussion on these topics see an interesting article by Franco Spoltore, *Inquinamento: non ci salvano i governi*, in “Federalismo nel Mondo”, 3, 1998, pp. 10-11. A very good explanation, providing updated information, was issued on the scientific supplement of the Italian newspaper “La Stampa” by Paolo Mastrolilli, *Kyoto. Via al protocollo nell’anno del grande caldo*, February, 15 2005.

Social environmentalism is a possible answer: the idea of life on a human and natural scale, as opposed to the capitalistic and western myths of industrial development, wealth and limitless power. Despite several secondary aspects, social environmentalism is nevertheless generally oriented towards the acknowledgement of Nature as a single whole whose inner interdependence must not be violated, be it seen either from a pantheistic point of view, according to Deep Ecology⁹, or simply as an immense, living world based on the delicate interdependence of all the creatures that are part of it. However, it is essential to remark that all different forms of environmentalism agree on the fact that a change in the collective mentality of an “intranatural”, not of an *antifysis* kind will be the focal point of the environmentalist revolution.

This could also lay the basis for a strong alliance between environmentalism and federalism, united together against the negative effects of modern countries’ mutual war, and sharing a common appreciation of peace as an absolute value. Indeed, Gandhi has been a thinker and a revolutionary as dear to the Green party as Marx has been to communists and left-wing socialists. Gandhi’s thought has been completely acknowledged as a fundamental base of their party line by such Green representatives as Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, by exponents of Deep Ecology, as well as by such leading personalities of the peace movement as Galtung, Petra Kelly – one of the founders of the *Grünen* – and finally many supporters of the Italian Green party, once belonging to the Radical party¹⁰.

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi – or Mahatma (Big Soul) – theorized and put into practice the idea of non-violence: self-sacrifice as opposed to the sacrifice of others, the conversion of enemies into friends through the example of a spiritual and honest life – seen as a way of becoming part of the communion of all the creatures within the universal Being – as well as freedom from imperialism. Gandhi strongly criticized western industrial development or, as he defined it, “the Kali-Yuga era”, that is, the cycle of Kali, goddess of destruction.

⁹ Bill Devall, George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered*. Salt Lake City, UT, Peregrine Smith, 1985.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*. See also: Arne Naess, *Okology, samfunn og livsstill*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1976; Id., *Gandhi and the Atom Age*, Totowa, New Jersey, Bedminster Press, 1965 [1st ed, Oslo, 1960]; Id., *Gandhi and the Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyagraha. Theoretical Background*, Oslo/Bergen/Tromsø, Universitetsforlaget, 1974; Johan Galtung, *Gandhi oggi*, introduction by Giuliano Pontara, Torino, Gruppo Abele, 1987.

Mahatma also theorized interstate federalism, as opposed to the egoism of nations: in fact, “non-violence” might become, in his opinion, “the basic structure of a worldwide federation”. After the invention and first use of the atomic bomb in 1945, Gandhi was even more convinced that a worldwide federation would be essential for the preservation of the human species. The way towards federalism outlined by Gandhi, though somewhat utopian, was nevertheless extremely interesting: federalism should start from autonomous, self-governmental rural communities, and then proceed to some bigger communities which would connect the rural realities to the province, the region and the nation. And so on, following a circular structure, to the highest circle of a worldwide federal union¹¹.

Neo-Gandhian pacifist Johan Galtung theorized an advanced form of “European” confederation, joining together the former European countries as well as Russia and Turkey¹². This idea was so far from being utopian as to have become true, though without Russia. In the “wide” Europe formed by 25 nations – soon by 30 – there has so far prevailed not so much the federal concept of the “nation made up of nations”, upheld by European and contemporary federalists, but the less binding concept of confederation, which, I believe, may lead to a problematic governmental coordination of the European Union.

Interestingly enough, the position of the earliest ecologists was not dissimilar. For instance, Denis de Rougemont, who theorized “integral federalism”, belonged to “Esprit”, a group of Mounier’s followers, and criticized the complementary function of nations to the capitalistic model, suggesting as an alternative a union of European regions. Together with some of the most important pacifists and ecologists, de Rougemont founded the Action

¹¹ For more information about this see Giorgio Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, pp. 60-65 (with references to Gandhi’s works from 1924 and 1942, as well as to the works mentioned in this footnote). See also Pontara’s anthology: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Teoria e pratica della nonviolenza*, Torino, Einaudi, 1973, the basic Italian reference book to Mahatma’s thought. See also Gandhi, *The Voice of Truth*, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Trust, 1968; Diane M. Jones, *The Greening of Gandhi. Gandhian Thought and the Environment and World History*, in John Donald Hughes, *The Face of the Earth: Environment and World History*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2000, pp. 165-179. This topic has also been discussed in several of my books: *Il mito della nuova terra*, pp. 287-288, 334-337, *Coscienza e politica nella storia. Le motivazioni dell’azione collettiva nel pensiero politico contemporaneo. Dal 1800 al 2000*, Torino: Giappichelli, 2000, pp. 389-396.

¹² Cf. J. Galtung, *After the Cold War What? A Pan-european Confederation!*, in the appendix to AA.VV., *Searching for Peace. The Road to Transcend*, London: Pluto Press, 2000. See also Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cit., pp. 68-69.

Ecologique Européenne, and published a book entitled *L'avenir est notre affaire* (1977)¹³. Indeed, there was already being outlined a strong meeting point between ecologists and federalists: this concerned not only peace as the essential value of European federalism – as upheld by Spinelli and his followers¹⁴ – but also a criticism on nation states, seen as outdated political structures to be integrated through a continental and global union through an effort leading to “e pluribus unum”.

The same ideas were shared by Petra Kelly, the principal founder of the *Grünen* movement in Germany, in 1979. Despite the prevailing of the *realos* within the German Green party, Kelly followed these ideas until October, 19 1992, when she was found dead – probably because of a murder-suicide enacted by her husband, Gert Bastian, a former general of the German army. Kelly's death seems oddly similar to that of another figure, that of Alex Langer, the principal founder of the Italian Green Federation, who was found hanging from a tree in 1995. Indeed, in *Politik und Ökologie* (1991), Petra Kelly wrote:

If we acknowledge the connection among poverty, inequality and the destruction of the environment, we must then also create new alliances among ecologist groups, pacifists and defenders of human rights.

Yet, already in 1990, Kelly had observed in *Moral und Menschenwürde*:

I consider my work as done for the people and with the people. [...] there is no other way to do politics but by paying attention to one's heart and feeling a deep solidarity towards our fellowmen¹⁵.

¹³ Cf. Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cit., pp. 73-76.

¹⁴ Cf. Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, foreword by Eugenio Colomni; introduced by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, with an essay by Lucio Levi, Milano, Mondadori, 2006.

¹⁵ Kelly's observations can be found in Laura Stanganini, *Petra Kelly, storia di una speranza*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, No. 2, 2002, p. 79; *Lezioni di Petra*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, No. 9, October 2002, pp. 62-63. Interestingly enough, like Alexander Langer, later on in life Kelly felt disappointed by the “realistic” evolution of the Green party, which urged her to write in her *Lettera aperta ai tedeschi*: “The *Grünen* have become too German, they cannot be considered international anymore. They have become a sterile party that is attracted to power. [...] At first, they wished to transform power starting from the lowest levels, but meanwhile have become the victims of high-level power. [...] In my opinion, the most reliable allies are popular initiatives and social movements.” [*Ibidem*]. Of course, one does not have to agree with Kelly's pessimistic attitude, after the changes that took place in the following years. Information on Kelly's life and thought can be found in Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cit., pp. 139-141.

These ideas are indeed typical of Neo-Gandhian thought, leading directly to that of the Grünen. After all, the Grünen started out as a political movement in Germany, in 1979, after the ideology of pacifist groups: they owe much not only to the 1968 generation who had fought against the Vietnam war, but also to the German movements of the 1970s, greatly worried about the development and use of small “tactical” bombs, invented to kill millions of people without damaging any surrounding structures. Living in a nation shared by the capitalist and by the communist world, the Germans of the 1970s feared that, in case of an atomic war, Germany would surely become the main battlefield. Besides, Germany had been the birthplace of the Romantic themes of the sacredness and inner vitality of Nature, as illustrated by Goethe, von Humboldt, Novalis and Schelling. In the 1930s, there had even developed a kind of turbid Nazi environmentalism, which nowadays is often either overestimated or underestimated within the Green party genealogy¹⁶.

Among the earliest Grünen, beside such left-wing members as Petra Kelly, there were also such right-wing exponents as Herbert Gruhl. Gruhl opposed the American way of life not so much because of an antimperialistic attitude, as for its being unnatural and artificial, and a collective kind of life which was alien to the German life-style – seen in turn as a Romantic alternative to Marxism and American capitalism. Gruhl sometimes mentioned the need of a “green prince” or “prince of ecology”, able to impose a natural life-style with the help of state power or of a strong and “democratic” state¹⁷.

¹⁶ Stefano Vastano, *Eco-razzismo alla tedesca*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, June 1996, p. 30. In his work, Vastano discusses Oliver Geden’s *Rechte Ökologie (Rechte Ökologie. Umweltschutz zwischen Emanzipation und Faschismus*, Berlin, Elefanten Press, 1996) regarding the earliest fascist – in his opinion – roots of political ecology. Vastano also quotes from Herbert Gruhl’s *Un pianeta saccheggiato*: “If we are willing to save the life of future generations, we are now as helpless as ever before. Nothing but a strong nation can decide our future.”; cf. Herbert Gruhl, *Ein Planet wird geplündert: die Schreckensbilanz unserer Politik*, Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer 1975. On Herbert Gruhl see Alain De Benoist, *Herbert Gruhl e i Verdi tedeschi*, in “Diorama letterario”, No. 186, May-June 1995, pp. 25-26.

¹⁷ An essential work on this topic is Elia Bosco (ed.), *Ecologia e politica. La questione ambientale nella Repubblica Federale di Germania (1970-1990)*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1992. It is very critical towards the fundamentalist, non-libertarian “physiocentric” wing – as opposed to the libertarian physiocentric wing of Carl Amery – especially because of its fascist-like characteristics, sometimes attributed to Rudolf Bahro himself. Yet, because of its essential criticism on the American way of life, Bosco considers the Green party a very important movement which has helped incorporate into the progressive wing several ideas that might have been influenced by right-wing thought. For more information on right-wing environmentalism, see Alain De Benoist, *Alle radici della sfida ecologica*, in “Diorama letterario”, No. 186, May-June 1995, pp. 13-24. On the political and social evolution after the reunification of Germany see Elia Bosco, *La nuova Germania. Società, istituzioni, cultura politica dopo la riunificazione*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2000; Elia Bosco, Josef Schmid, *La Germania rosso-verde. Stabilità e crisi di un sistema politico (1998-2005)*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2010.

Other young Green fundamentalists were influenced by mystic and libertarian thought. But right-wing and ultra left-wing fundamentalists were soon defeated, and the Green party came to acknowledge its similarities to the Red party. Yet, these similarities were never theorized even by such representatives as Norwegian philosopher Naess, Austro-American Fritjof Capra, as well as Antoine Waetcher, leader of the “Friends of the Earth” movement and of the French Green party, still following the original *Grünen* slogan: “We are not right-wing nor left-wing: we are beyond.” In fact, in 1993 Waetcher observed:

Ecology was born neither out of capitalism nor out of socialism. It was born instead out of our wish to live in harmony with our fellowmen and all other living creatures. We always said to be ready to support the government, no matter who its members are. Now, the basis for discrimination is our partners’ wish to agree upon the common program we have signed together with *Génération Ecologie*¹⁸.

However, the Green party has been able to agree in a substantive way only with left-wing governments.

The Green party ideology, which originally was inclined towards pacifism and confederacy, partly upheld and partly did not uphold federalism. In fact, the Green party generally opposed the federal “nation made up of nations”, not in the name of the preservation of nationalism within the European Union, but for fear of a new super-state. According to their analyses, similarly to the United States, such a state would end up supporting imperialism, thus going against the self-government of small communities upheld by ecologists, as well as the essential value of peace. Besides, the Green party has always been opposed the American way of life, perhaps owing to the strong influence of 1968 movements¹⁹.

¹⁸ Cf. Silvia Zamboni, *Il sogno di Antoine*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, No. 3, 1993, pp. 44-47.

¹⁹ See, for instance, the opinion of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the French Green Party and, later on, the leader of a European Green group made up of 33 parties: *Ecologia del potere. Forum. Faccia a faccia con Daniel Cohn-Bendit*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, June 1999. Cohn-Bendit said: “Are we so sure that the American way is stronger than ours? We must never forget that the economic success of the United States is based on a society made up of many poor people and few rich people. American society is rooted in fear: it keeps 2 million people in prison, as compared to 50.000 in France and Italy, and prevents millions of citizens from having any kind of social protection.”

Later on, the Green party switched to a non-pacifist stance coupled with a “European federalist” position.

This was due not only to the relationship between the Green and the Red party, related to the victory of the *realos* in Germany and France, but it was a way to get over their extremist views. Indeed, the Italian Green party has often been marginalized owing to its inability to abandon extremist positions, in order to reconcile ecology with reality. Interestingly enough, Lenin’s renowned opinion on extremism, expressed in his *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (1920)²⁰, was intended not only to stigmatize as non-communist any current of radical sectarianism, but also to highlight that extremism was a disease typical of growing Communism, which was to be overcome, but might as well infect even the best “comrades”. Therefore, while the Greens, too, can happen to be infected by this disease – typical, as it were, of a time of evolution – it must be cured, being an obstacle to the party’s cause. The four main features of the Greens’ extremism have been, I believe, the following: 1) a kind of absolute and naïve pacifism; 2) a kind of semi-anarchic spontaneity; 3) the inability to discern the treatment of serious, but not so relevant, environmental problems from the treatment of important environmental problems, which are discussed rather abstractly; 4) rejection of any kind of alliance as well as indifference towards the nature of political allies.

Yet, some aspects of those four features still need to be preserved, in order to avoid making the opposite mistake: such as, switching from “naïve pacifism” to a similarly negative kind of international *real-politik*; from libertarian spontaneity to some kind of Green, neo-Leninist centralist party; from too high an interest to total indifference regarding local problems; from rejecting political alliances to becoming “men for all seasons” in the name of institutional gratuities. The ability of serious politicians lies also in avoiding extremism (that is, sectarianism and opportunism)²¹.

²⁰ See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Opere scelte*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1970.

²¹ For more information about this topic, see Livorsi, *Il mito della nuova terra*, cit., pp. 359-439, one of the first works to discuss the case of Italian Greens from a historical point of view. See also the bitter analysis and testimony by Carlo Ripa di Meana, *Sorci Verdi. L’ambientalismo, la politica, le lotte di potere. Quattro anni da portavoce dei Verdi*, ed. Stefania Marra, Milano, Kaos, 1997.

This is why consistent and pragmatic politicians should pay attention to such popular movements as those which protest against the summits of the more developed countries, as it happened at Seattle (USA) in December 1999 and later in other towns around the world.

The Green party has been inclined, and is still often inclined, to extremism. Yet, the Greens have generally grown up. At the time of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, when Muslims were massacred by the Serbs, the Italian Alexander Langer and the Franco-German Cohn-Bendit both opted for democratic interventionism. Cohn-Bendit's decision was very important for the Bosnian war. Indeed, a follower of libertarian ideas, Cohn-Bendit was the actual leader of the French left-wing protest movement in 1968. After being expelled from France, he obtained the German citizenship, and, as a member of the *Grünen*, was appointed environment committee chairman at Frankfurt. Having returned to France, he became the most important leader of the *Verts*, and was elected for the European Parliament as the leader of a group constituted by over thirty Green parties and movements. After that, Cohn-Bendit opted for a democratic interventionist position against the massacres in Yugoslavia²². His decision was barely followed, owing above all to the opposition of the most important *Grünen* leader, the German Joschka Fischer, then minister of the region of Hesse. Fischer considered Cohn-Bendit's choice not apt for the German people. In fact, in order to contrast the Serbians, both the air force and ground army would have been needed, and this would have eventually led to a guerrilla warfare that still sounded threatening to those Germans who had fought in the Second World War²³. This discussion between Cohn-Bendit and Fischer was nevertheless the sign of a political evolution of the European (and German) Greens.

After all, the Green party has highlighted the positive effects brought about by the European Union upon the environment. Enrico Fontana observed in 1999:

Without waiting for the ratification of the Amsterdam Treatise, the decisions of the European Parliament have already improved environmental policy, by modifying the important law on the reclamation and reduction of packages, and approving the introduction of the so-called "hierarchical priority"

²² Silvia Zamboni, *Il pacifismo è nudo? Intervista a Daniel Cohn-Bendit*, in "Nuova Ecologia", No. 6, 1993, pp. 37-41.

²³ Joschka Fischer contradicted Cohn-Bendit in an interview: cf. Silvia Zamboni, *Nella trappola delle emozioni*, in "Nuova Ecologia", No. 6, 1993, p. 39.

(prevention, re-use or re-cycling, and, only then, burning or dumping), as well as the principle of “the more you pollute, the more you pay”. Italian environmental laws derive, after all, from decrees issued by the European Union. Similarly, the programs and funds for sustainable development all have arrived from the European Union. Thus, environmentalism has long since switched to a European level²⁴.

It is now interesting to analyze the different ways in which the question of nuclear energy has been discussed. Being aware that radioactive waste needs thousands of years to decay, the Greens have always opposed the use of nuclear energy, though in different ways. In Germany, laws were voted allowing the construction of nuclear plants, in order to fill the nation's increasing need of energy. There were built several nuclear plants, which helped meet 25% of the energetic requirements. But in 1998 the *Grünen* entered the Parliament within the red-green coalition constituted by Gerhard Schroeder, and Joschka Fisher became the minister of foreign affairs. Fischer managed to change the law on nuclear energy: no new nuclear plants were to be built, all existing nuclear plants were to be gradually destroyed and totally stopped within 12 years, and there should be found a place nearby apt for controlled nuclear waste dumping²⁵. By then an important party, the French Greens tried to uphold similar ideas, but did not manage to get into Parliament owing to Chirac's victory over Jospin in 2002. Yet, other European Green parties have had different opinions. For instance, in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine, the Italian Green party, together with the socialists, sponsored a referendum aiming at closing down the few existing Italian nuclear plants²⁶, as it were, some of the most advanced power stations in the world.

However, the creation of the European Union favored better reconciliation between the Greens' convictions and responsibilities. In fact, the European Union was born out of the ideal of lasting peace within a continent where some of the cruelest wars ever had taken place. Pacifism is indeed a very important feature in the thought of both Gandhi and the Greens, and the most important document of European federalism – the *Manifesto of Ventotene* – was

²⁴ Enrico Fontana, *Cittadini d'Europa*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, April 1999, pp. 31-35.

²⁵ On nuclear energy and other such topics as genetic modification of plants and animals, see Grazia Francescato, Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, *Il principio di precauzione*, Milano, Jaca Book, 2002.

²⁶ For an informative but still scientifically valid discussion of this problem, see Piero Angela, Lorenzo Pinna, *La sfida del secolo. Energia. 200 domande sul futuro dei nostri figli*, Milano, Mondadori, 2006: especially pp. 81-95, 107-117 (about nuclear energy), 119-136 (about renewable energy).

written in August 1941 by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, who had been exiled by the Fascist government during the Second World War. Furthermore, Germany and France had recognized that only through the European Union would they be able to acquire international status, in a world ruled by the USA and URSS. From the 1950s, Germany and France supported the reaching of agreements with the Italy of De Gasperi and some of his followers, as well as with Belgium and Luxembourg. At first, the European Union helped manage essential raw materials, such as coal and steel (CECA, 1950-51); later on, though in vain, it tried to promote a united military defense (CED, 1952), which was sabotaged by France, still afraid of Germany's rearmament; then, it aimed at favoring a free circulation of goods within an Economic European Community made up of just six countries (MEC, 1957-59), although customs impediments were eliminated only in 1968. In 1969, the European Union stated its purpose of favoring the circulation of European inhabitants within the Union, and created such institutions as a European Parliament, universally elected by European citizens (1979). Finally, the European Union has been and is still willing to become a federal "nation made up of nations", in order to counterbalance the economic power of the USA, China and India.

The European Union – constituted by 12 nations in 1993, 15 in 1995, 27 more recently, and soon up to 30 – has turned out to be a strong stimulus towards innovation²⁷. This is also due to the weakness of European Parliament as opposed to the national sovereignty of the single European countries, which nevertheless allows the European Union to set up debates in areas that are often overlooked by national governments. The most important example of this was the 1995 decision in favor of a single European currency – the Euro – which was put into practice in 1999 by the 11 most mature nations, that is, ready for a federal process. Thus, a common, public financial policy on a continental level was finally attained. Yet, foreign and military policies – an essential basis for any modern or federal nation – were not unified. In fact, such nations as France and Germany have not yet decided to give up on any effective power

²⁷ For an interesting, though very optimistic, analysis by an American economist as well as one of the most important ecologist thinkers, see: Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, New York, Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2004 (Italian translation *Il sogno europeo. Come l'Europa ha creato una nuova visione del futuro che sta lentamente eclissando il Sogno Americano*, Milano, Mondadori, 2004). Thanks to its advanced welfare and strong tendency to pacifism, united Europe could destroy the wish for life-style supremacy and world hegemony of the United States.

regarding military and foreign affairs, despite the crisis brought about by globalization, which does not allow the simple engaging of a single nation in economic, social and military action, owing also to the worldwide supremacy of the United States.

However, Europe has become a very important ground even for such reforming parties as the Greens, after the first parliamentary election in 1979, the making of decisions over specific areas of action, and the creation of a European currency which has helped harmonize the economy of the single nations against sudden inflation or deflation. Indeed, the Green party had 27 representatives within the European Parliament already in 1994, which increased to 38 in 1999, while the socialists had lowered from 214 to 180, out of 626 total Parliamentarians in the year 2000²⁸. The Green party interest in the European Union emerged not only from the 1984 decision to coordinate all European Green parties, but also from the creation of the European Green Parties Federation at Helsinki, in 1993, which later developed into FEPV at the Berlin Congress in 2002, and finally became an actual European Green Party, in Rome on February, 19-21 2004²⁹. Therefore, the Greens have come to accept both the Maastricht Treaty (1993) – which had transformed the EEC into a European Union to be based on the Euro currency – and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which had increased the power of Parliament, always subject, though, to the single nations' will and right of veto, and to the governmental institution of the European Committee.

The Green party has also realized the strong need of federalism within the European Union (as a “nation made up of nations”), because of the continuously increasing number of new members. For instance, in 1998 Cohn-Bendit's French Green party complained about the status of Europe, which, “like the American Southern states in the nineteenth century, thinks of itself as continuously and potentially secessionist”. They later observed that

...institutional federalism remains a decisive issue. A federal state, founded on European citizenship, would increase Europe's reliability. In the aftermath of the Sarajevo war, and before any other catastrophes take place in Kosovo, we'd better stop meditating and finally give Europe a decisive political boost. Europe needs to be redesigned through the creation of a European constituent

²⁸ Cf. Enrico Fontana, *Speranze d'Europa*, in “Nuova Ecologia”, September 1999, pp. 43-45.

²⁹ See especially Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cit., pp. 184-185 and 185 ff (providing a list of websites).

assembly, guided by the power of a great democratic Parliament elected by all European citizens. (...) We must carry on the project of a European constitution, that is, the founding principle of a European federation based on ecology and solidarity. The Constitution is a democratic solution for revising the treaties, as opposed to an intergovernmental method³⁰.

Cohn-Bendit's words also illustrate how France was not completely willing to accept the Rome Treaty as a Constitution: in fact, this treaty was later rejected through a referendum by the French and the Dutch in June 2005, which severely questioned the actual union of Europe. Interestingly enough, though, the Constitution was accepted by the European Green party on February 17, 2005. This more favorable attitude of the Green party towards Europe and federalism was strongly supported by Joschka Fischer and Cohn-Bendit.

On May, 12th 2000, Fischer delivered a very important speech entitled "Quo vadis Europe?" at Humboldt University in Berlin: there he proposed that Europe should turn from a confederation into a federation. According to Fischer, the European Union should have a Constitution, become a federation, have an effective Parliament headed by an authoritative president elected by the European people, as has always happened within the USA³¹. Later on, as the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fischer spoke again in favor of this idea to the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament at Strasbourg, whose president was at the time Giorgio Napolitano. According to Fischer, the European Union was becoming a big institution, made of 25 nations, soon to become 30: only by turning from a confederation into a federation could Europe avoid returning to the status of a mere customs union. Beside a president elected by the people, Fischer hoped for the introduction of a bicameral system: the former Chamber must be elected by European citizens, while the latter Chamber must be made up of representatives of the nations' parliaments, in order to put together both national and European interests. The single European nations did not all agree upon this: for instance, Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato stated his preference for "a political perspective based on the sovereignty of the single nations".

³⁰ Cohn-Bendit e i deputati francesi: una Costituzione federale 'per una rivoluzione democratica europea', in "L'Unità Europea", No.297, 1998, p. 11. See also Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, cit., pp. 150-152.

³¹ Fischer's speech was originally published in *Le Monde* on May, 15 2000. See Joschka Fischer, *Dalla confederazione alla federazione. Riflessioni sulla finalità dell'integrazione europea*, in "Europa Europe", No. 4-5, 2000, pp. 147-158, (English text available at http://www.maclester.edu/courses/intl372/docs/joschka_fischer_en.pdf).

Instead, Cohn-Bendit publicly supported Fischer's idea through an article in the Italian newspaper "Corriere della Sera"³².

This process was stopped by the failure of the referendum confirming the European Constitution in France and Holland, and by the victory of the Christian Democrats, led by Angela Merkel, in Germany. Yet, as the president "in office" of the European Committee, Germany has favored a European policy: in fact, a very important agreement on the reduction of exhaust emissions and the use of renewable energy (solar panels and biofuel) was signed at Brussels, on March, 8 2007.

The PMs of 27 nations agreed to increase of 20% the use of renewable energy within the Union by 2020, with exceptions for such economically weaker countries as Poland and Slovakia. Because of its great quantity of nuclear plants, Chirac's France asked for the inclusion of nuclear energy within the kinds of non-polluting, non-greenhouse effect energy. This idea was nevertheless rejected by Italy, Germany and Austria, which considered nuclear energy too dangerous.

This and other incredibly complex aims would not have been achieved without the existence of the European Union, as well as without the Green party commitment within and in favor of Europe. At the moment, the future of the Green party remains undefined: it is impossible to state when it will be able to develop on a European and national level, whether it will tend to shift towards "red" or "pink" or be eventually incorporated within a bigger, environmentalist reformatory group, or if it will ever find any stranger political allies. Yet, even now, it is evident that the idea of a global confederacy has had its roots also within the Green party, and European federalism has become for the Greens a very important feature that has grown up and will be growing within their party.

³² Daniel Cohn-Bendit, *Lettera al premier Amato*. 'Coraggio, un salto in avanti', "Corriere della Sera", July, 7 2000, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2000/luglio/07/quale_unione_parliamo_co_0_0007072691.shtml.

**FROM REJECTION TO SUPPORT FOR A SUPRANATIONAL EUROPE:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREENS' POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION UP TO THE EARLY
1990S**

Giorgio Grimaldi

I think that today, for Greens in all European countries there is no serious alternative to the commitment to transform the European Community, but always with a view to a federalist integration of the European continent¹.

1. Introduction

During the 1980s the Green movements and parties were organised on a national basis and in many different ways, almost everywhere aggregating and federating, not without some difficulties, local civic lists and committees, or even small political parties. They emerged in Western Europe – a part of the development of those movements that sprung up in the 1970s² in most continents – as an interesting and original political force that linked a growing concern for the ecology and the spread of environmental protection as a political priority with specific campaigns such as that against nuclear energy. In particular, the Green movements and parties not only attempted to propose new policies and thoroughgoing social change based on decentralisation, they also advocated a more democratic and transparent relationship between

¹ Alexander Langer, *Pan-european Federalism*, in "Green Leaves", Bulletin of the Greens in the European Parliament, No. 2, May 1991, p. 3.

² The first Green parties emerged in 1972 in Australia. The United Tasmania Group was formed on a regional basis in this year, marking the origins of the Australian Greens which became a political force during the late 1990s making their political breakthrough in August 2010, allowing them to become the third political party in the country and crucial for governance. The Green obtained more than 10% of the votes, electing 9 senators and for the first time 1 member of the House of Representatives. In New Zealand, meanwhile, the Values Party, now-defunct, gained 5.2% of the votes in the 1975 national elections.

institutions and citizens, promoted non-violence and rejected militarism, supported the expansion of rights and the development of an economy based on renewable energy sources.

In 1979, with the participation of some countries in the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the ecologists found within the European sphere a springboard from which to launch transnational cooperation and to strengthen their presence.

If local authorities had initially represented the platform from which the Greens were able to obtain a more significant political presence than that achieved nationally, after their accession to the European Parliament (EP) in 1984, the European Community (EC) and then the European Union (EU), these arenas became an important stage for political actors to advocate environmental protection, peace and the promotion of new and more balanced North-South international relationships. This opportunity has allowed the Greens not only to lay the foundations in some countries for their ascent to a national level, but also to start them along the problematic path of political development. In fact, after an initial period characterised mainly by maximalist and antagonistic positions, they have, since the early 1990s, gradually approached a more constructive, pragmatic and reformist stance on Europe and the European integration process³.

³As for the EU's impact on the changing of European Green parties, see Elizabeth Bomberg, *The Europeanisation of Green Parties: Exploring the EU's Impact*, in "West European Politics", Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2002, pp. 29-50; Eric H. Hines, *The European Parliament and the Europeanization of Green Parties*, in "Cultural Dynamics", Vol. 15, No. 3, 2003, pp. 307-325; Elizabeth Bomberg, Neil Carter, *Greens in Brussels: Shapers or Shaped?*, in "European Journal of Political Research", Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 99-125. For a recent analysis on Europeanisation of parties in some countries of the continent, see Thomas Poguntke, Nicholas Aylott, Elisabeth Carter, Robert Ladrech, Kurt Richard Luther (eds.), *The Europeanization of National Political Parties. Power and Organizational Adaptation*, London / New York: Routledge, 2007; Nicolò Conti, *Domestic Parties and European Integration. The Problem of Party Attitudes to the EU, and the Europeanisation of Parties*, in "European Political Science", Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 192-207. Below I suggested a study that analyses the positions of national parties towards European integration from 1984 to 1996, highlighting the prominent influence of ideological belonging to a political family in terms of attitude towards Europe. The Greens parties, in this context, appear to be moderately opposed to economic integration as a result of damage to the environment by economic growth and have an ambivalent attitude towards political integration: positively considered in terms of capability of supranational institutions to strengthen environmental policies, but opposed for the lack of democratic participation, cf. Gary Marks, Carole J. Wilson, Ray Leonard, *National Political Parties and European Integration*, in "American Journal of Political Science", Vol. 46, No. 3, July 2002, pp. 585-594 (especially Table 1 - *Cleavage Location and Position on European Integration*, p. 587), <http://www.unc.edu/~qwmarks/assets/doc/Marks.Wilson.Ray.political%20parties%20and%20european%20integration.pdf>. A low incidence of national positions compared with a rather strong influence of political ideology on parties' and governments' positions for or against European integration in reference to negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam are remarked in Mark Aspinwall, *Preferring Europe. Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration*, in "European Union Politics", Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 81-111. For an analysis of the role of European integration in the general election campaigns in six Western European countries in the 1970s see Hanspeter Kriesi, *The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns*, in "European Union Politics", Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, pp. 83-108. Regarding the examination of the new political spectrum that ranges from the position Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to

The diversity of individual national parties and their specific and distinct origin⁴ made it difficult to build a common and shared “green” vision of Europe. For many years the differences as well as the prevailing lack of focus on European integration within the ecological organisations, especially at a local level, only made the convergence of ecologists possible based on a vague appeal to a Europe of regions and peoples, a Europe built from the bottom up, demilitarised, outside NATO and in opposition to institutional and bureaucratic apparatus of the European Communities. The majority of parties and the elected Green representatives shared, with different nuances, a hostile attitude towards projects of European construction considered an expression of the logic of power and the centralisation.

Establishing themselves as the third national party of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1983 as well as the first political force to overcome the barrier of 5% needed to enter the Bundestag in the second postwar period (5.6% of the votes), after forming the *Sonstige Politische Vereinigung DIE GRÜNEN* list for the European elections in 1979 which obtained 3.25% of the votes and their official founding in 1980⁵, and consisting of various groups and movements, the *Grünen* maintained for a long time a position that was strongly critical of European integration. However, at the same time, they embraced a complex and contentious internal debate that was extended more generally to fundamental choices regarding their political role and the key points of their programme to be implemented. Although the *Grünen* – by far the most significant party in terms of experience within the movement and one of the most important Green political parties in the world – were marked by several other cultural and political differences, from their early years, they saw the emergence of two main general tendencies: one reformist, made up by the so-called *realos*, who aimed at changing norms and

traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) which is considered most effective in order to determine the greater or lesser inclination towards European integration see Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Carole J. Wilson, *Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?*, in “Comparative Political Studies”, Vol. 35, No. 8, October 2002, pp. 965-989, <http://www.unc.edu/~gwm/ark/assets/doc/hoghe,%20marks,%20wilson%20-%20does%20leftright%20structure%20party%20positions%20on%20European%20integration.pdf>.

On the specific features of the political groups in the EP and their differences in relation to political positions, identified on the right-left structure and the one on the EU's powers and objectives, see Gail McElroy, Kenneth Benoit, *Party Groups and Policy Positions in the European Parliament*, in “Party Politics”, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007, pp. 5-28.

⁴ Cf. Miranda Schreurs, Elim Papadakis, *The A to Z of the Green Movement*, Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, The Scarecrow Press, 2009.

⁵ In March of that year the German Greens elected for the first time since their birth, with 5.3% of the votes obtained, six representatives to the regional parliament of Baden-Württemberg. Before their foundation, a Green alternative group in Bremen had obtained in October 1979 5.1% and the election of four members to the Landtag.

implementing environmental and social policies consistent with the preservation of natural resources; while the other, radical, represented by “fundamentalists” (*fundis*), who promoted a change of values from a biocentric perspective and opposed any compromise of these values or supported radical leftist⁶ policies. This distinction, typical of the German Green movement which had gathered for the first time so many diverse groups (alternative left, ecologist groups, civic lists, peace movements, etc.), did not emerge in the same way in the various Green parties of other countries, each with its own specific and different history, but still heavily affected the development of a European cooperation among these actors⁷.

Far more important in promoting a Europeist or federalist attitude on the one hand, or Eurosceptic and antagonist on the other, were, however, three determinant factors that will be analysed in the course of this paper:

- the national political cultures from which these new political actors emerged;

⁶ Among the first studies on ecologists and the German Greens see George Pridham, *Ecologists in Politics: The West German Case*, in “Parliamentary Affairs”, Vol. 31, Issue 4, 1978, pp. 436-444; Rudolf Brun (ed.), *Der grüne Protest. Herausforderung durch die Umweltparteien*, Frankfurt, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1978; Detlef Murphy, Joachim Raschke, Frauke Rubart, Ferdinand Müller (eds.), *Protest. Grüne, Bunte und Steuerrebell. Ursachen und Perspektiven*, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1979; Joachim Raschke, Frauke Rubart, *Die Grünen und das Parlamentarische Regierungssystem* in “Gegenwartskunde”, No. 32, 1983, pp. 143-157; Horst Mewes, *The West Germany Green Party*, “New German Critique”, Vol. 28, Winter 1983, pp. 51-85; Anna Otto-Hallensleben, *Von der Grünen Liste zur Grünen Partei. Die Entwicklung der Grünen Liste Umweltschutz von ihrer Entstehung 1977 bis zur Gründung der Partei Die Grünen*, Göttingen, Muster-Schmidt Verlag, 1984; Albrecht Rothacher, *The Green Party in German Politics*, in “West European Politics”, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1984, pp. 109-116; Eva Kolinsky, *The Greens in Germany. Prospects of a Small Party*, in “Parliamentary Affairs”, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1984, pp. 434-447; Bernd Guggenberger, Udo Kempf (eds.), *Bürgerinitiativen und Repräsentatives System*, 2nd ed., Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984; Fritjof Capra, Charlene Spretnak, *Green Politics: The Global Promise*, London, Hutchinson, 1984; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *Social Movements and the Greens. New Internal Politics in Germany*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 13, 1985, pp. 53-67; Id., *The West-German Greens. A Women's Party*, in “Parliamentary Affairs”, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1988, pp. 129-149; Id., *The Greens in West Germany. Organisation and Policy-Making*, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1989; Wilhelm P. Bürklin, *The German Greens. The Post-Industrial Non-Established and the Party System*, in “International Political Science Review”, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1985, pp. 463-481; Ibid., *The Split Between the Established and Non-Established Left in Germany*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, 13, 1985, pp. 283-293; William Chandler, Alan Siaroff, *Postindustrial Politics in Germany and the Origins of the Greens*, in “Comparative Politics”, Vol. 18, No. 3, April 1986, pp. 303-325; Thomas Poguntke, *Grün-alternative Parteien: Eine neue Farbe in westlichen Parteiensystemen*, in “Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen”, 18, No. 3, 1987, pp. 368-382; Gregg O. Kvistad, *Between State and Society: Green political ideology in the mid-1980s*, in “West European Politics”, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1987, pp. 211-228; Werner Hulsberg, *The German Greens*, London, Verso Press, 1988; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *The German Greens in the 1980s. Short-Term Cyclical Protest or Indicator of Transformation?*, in “Political Studies”, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1989, pp. 114-122; Gene E. Frankland, *Federal Republic of Germany: Die Grünen* in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*, Boulder, San Francisco and London, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 61-80. As for a critical review of scientific literature on Greens until the early 1990s cf. Thomas Poguntke, *Between Ideology and Empirical Research. The Literature on the Germany Green Party*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 21, 1992, pp. 337-356.

⁷ Cf. Brian Doherty, *The Fundi-Realo Controversy. An Analysis of Four European Green Parties*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 95-120.

- the Greens' entry to the European Parliament and their gradual, active, critical and proactive integration into the Community's institutional life;
- the change in the international political situation with the end of the Cold War after 1989.

The reflection of the Greens on European institutions has grown at three levels, interacting with each other, with European dynamics as well as with those of the individual ecologist parties:

- in the national debate inside the Green parties;
- in the Parliamentary Groups in the European Parliament;
- in the Coordination and then in the Federation of European Green Parties, which evolved in 2004 in the European Green Party.

When looking at the evolution of the complex relationship between this political family and Europe, it is necessary to consider these different contexts in which the interaction with the European integration process and the contribution of individual politicians in addressing choices and collective positions played an important role. However, far from being the ideal aspirations of ecologists, Europe, as a fragile and incomplete reality, gradually became a battleground where hopes emerged for the establishment of policies for peace, environment, human rights and the enlargement of democratic spaces.

Despite some unfavorable factors that go some way to explaining why they did not succeed as a mass party (such as a lack of a well-defined social actor of support and of a great reference institution, the hegemony of industrial logic antithetical to Greens and the segmentation of environmental issue), the Greens are a transnational political actor represented and organised at a European level and in the process of coordination at a world level too⁸.

⁸On European Green parties, cf. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative List*, cited above; Dick Richardson, Chris Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge. The Development of Green Parties in Europe*, London, Routledge, 1995; Jérôme Vialatte, *Les parties verts en Europe occidentale*, Paris, Economica, 1996; Michael O'Neill, *Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe: New Politics, Old Predicaments*, Aldershot, Hampshire, U.K., Ashgate, 1997; Pascal Delwit, Jean-Michel de Waele (edited by), *Les partis verts en Europe*, Brussels, Editions Complexe, 1999; Jon Burchell, *The Evolution of Green Politics. Development & Change within European Green Parties*, London, Earthscan, 2002; Christopher Rootes, *It's Not Easy Being Green. Green Parties: From Protest to Power*, in "Harvard International Review", year XXIV, No. 4, 2003; Heinrich Böll Stiftung (hrsg.), *Die Grünen in Europa. Ein Handbuch*, Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2004; E. Gene Frankland, Paul Lucardie, Benoît Rihoux (eds.) *Green Parties in Transition. The End of the Grass-roots Democracy?*,

2. From the elections of the European Parliament by universal suffrage to the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit (1979-1984): a difficult start for the Green European cooperation

In addition to the first EP elections by universal suffrage, the year 1979 saw also the first electoral experience of a variety of ecologist formations in Europe and the driving force by a number of groups that would emerge as Green parties within the next few years. The Green coalitions had gained no elected candidates, although they obtained some good election results, and, after the vote, formed along with alternative and radical parties the European Coordination of Green and Radical Parties (ECGRP) aimed at cooperation among these political actors⁹. The Coordination adopted as a shared basic paper the declaration of the international ecological organisation Action Ecologique Européenne (ECOROPA), founded in Paris on December 11th and 12th, 1976 during a meeting of scientists and ecologists from around the continent in order to adopt and formulate joint initiatives. After the elections, the ecologist and radical groups published the “Platform of Ecopolitical Action for a Peaceful Change in Europe”¹⁰, which existed before the formation of the ECGRP. Because of the divisions between the radical and ecologist parties, the Green parties of the Coordination, which in the meantime had gathered Swedish (Miljöpartiet)¹¹, Irish (Ecology Party from Eire) and Austrian Greens

Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008; Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, Brussels, Heinrich Böll Stiftung EU Regional Office, 2008, http://www.boell.eu/downloads/GREEN_IDENTITY_UK_web.pdf. On the concept of Green ideology is available a large literature containing different analyses. According to Talshir – different approaches to Green ideology (ecological project, New Left, New Politics) would fail to provide a conceptual framework. Greens are eclectic and would represent various subideologies able to coexist in a “modular ideology”; cf. Gayil Talshir, *The Political Ideology of Green Parties: From The Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Among recent studies cf. Andrew Dobson, *Green Political Thought*, 4th edition, London, Routledge, 2007; Joe Smith, *What Do Greens Believe?*, London, Granta, 2006; Andrew Dobson, Robyn Eckersley (eds.), *Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; Andrew Dobson, Sheryllyn MacGregor, Douglas Torgerson (edited and introduced by Michael Saward), *Trajectories of Green Political Theory*, in “Contemporary Political Theory”, Vol. 8, Issue 3, August 2009, pp. 317-350.

⁹ *Die Grünen* (GDR), *Agalev and Ecolo* (Belgium), *Mouvement d'Ecologie Politique* (France), *Ecology Party* (Great Britain), *Politieke Partij Radikalen* (the Netherlands) and *Partito Radicale* (Italy) joined this body – the only one among the aforementioned political actors to have achieved a political representation to the EP, taking part in the establishment of a technical group of twelve MPs which also included the Belgian regionalists, the Danish anti-Europe movement and the Scottish nationalists; cf. Sara Parkin, *Green Parties. An International Guide*, London, Heretic Books, 1989, p. 258.

¹⁰ The corresponding acronym in English was PEACE (“Platform of Ecopolitical Action for a Peaceful Change of Europe”); cf. Thomas Dietz, *Transnational Greens: Time for a Change?* In “Green Matters”, No. 1, 1999, p. 35. Id., *Similar but Different? The European Greens Compared to Other Transnational Party Federations in Europe*, “Party Politics”, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 2000 (pp. 199-210), p. 200.

¹¹ Born in 1981, *Miljöpartiet de Gröna* established in its country and in 1988 succeeded to be the first new party in seventy years to get their own national parliamentary representation; cf. Martin Bennulf, *The Miljöpartiet de Gröna*, in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and*

(Alternative Liste Österreich) and the newborn French Green Party (Les Verts - Confédération Ecologiste), gave birth to a new Coordination, the “European Greens” and adopted the “Joint Declaration of Intent” presented at a press conference in Brussels on January 23rd, 1984 as a commitment paper for a joint programme to be presented at the European elections of that year¹². It only had the task of ensuring five main objectives:

- the exchange of information, proposals and programmes;
- mutual support for national campaigns;
- the preparation of joint actions and joint statements on topics of European importance;
- the organisation of seminars and the development of European and international policies;
- the drawing up of a common manifesto of intent.

The Declaration opened by proclaiming the Green movement a hope for the future, with the aim of restoring power to citizens, making clear that a better life depended on a return to a balanced relationship between humankind and the rest of nature, the radical rethinking of the relationship between rich and poor, and the defence of peace. The Greens decided to work together at an international level, by extending cooperation to the Eastern European countries and other continents and presented themselves as an opportunity to stop the shared policies of the traditional political forces that aimed at continuing economic and industrial growth underestimating the basis of life itself and causing an increase in pollution and wars. From these premises, therefore, a criticism of Europe developed. According to the Greens, Europe should not be ruled by central authorities, but should enhance the diversity of cultures, peoples and regions therein through a federal institutional structure which would take into account these differences and could therefore ensure a true sovereignty based on regions and the dignity and responsibilities of citizens. The latter would be guaranteed through the participation in decision-making, the decentralisation of institutions, a constant dialogue with leaders at the various levels, free debate, the access to official documents, referenda to test

Alternative Lists, cited above, pp. 139-154; Martin Bennulf, Sören Holmberg, *The Green Breakthrough in Sweden*, in “Scandinavian Political Studies”, Vol. 13, 1990, pp. 165-184; Martin Bennulf, *Sweden: The Rise and Fall of Miljöpartiet de Gröna*, in Dick Richardson, Chris Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge. The Development of Green Parties in Europe*, cited above, pp. 128-145.

¹² Cf. Paolo Bergamaschi, *In Europa non siamo soli*, in “Verdi”, No. 0 (waiting for authorisation), s. d. (1989), p. 8.

the will of people and finally extending vote to immigrants. The Greens criticised the armament expenditures which had to be greatly reduced in order to eliminate the huge gap between the North and South of the continent, and proposed a review of agricultural policy, at that time subsidised and based on industrial methods which degraded the lives of animals and plants, replacing them with productive methods of self-sufficiency to save the planet's ecological and nutritional adaptation. Alternatively, they proposed the use of non-violent civil defence, called for a blockade of arms trade and an independent European defence strategy aimed at making a first step towards multilateral disarmament.

The opposition to the use of nuclear energy – characterised by an expensive, outdated, inhumane and extremely dangerous technology – which was one of the main reasons leading to the ecologist and pacifist mobilisation in Europe was also addressed to any development having a resultant damaging effect on the environment. The Greens then took issue with the excessive use of non renewable energies, indicating as energy-saving alternatives, the use of locally produced renewable resources. However, the criticism of the European Greens embraced the whole capitalist economy which was responsible for inequalities between regions and social groups, the concentration of the means of production, the artificial creation of needs and of higher unemployment. It was now time to reject both liberal Western capitalism and the state capitalism of the East to establish a third way compatible with the creation of an ecological society, in which the economy would have to be regenerated from the bottom up, through a system of self-sufficient communities capable of giving priority to respect for ecosystems, sustainable development, small production units, social usefulness and the response between products and the real needs of individuals. To this process it must be added the participation of workers in the organisation and the production management, as well as that of residents at the production units, the reduction of working hours and the redistribution of income and resources.

The Declaration was concluded by underlining the birth of the Coordination of the European Greens as a reference point to create a genuine Green International¹³.

¹³ Cf. *Joint Declaration of the European Green Parties*, Brussels, January 23rd, 1984, in Parkin, *Green Parties*, cited above, *Appendix I*, pp. 327-329.

The debut of the Coordination of the European Greens in January 1984 was immediately hit by a severe conflict between the German Greens, who supported the entry to the coordination of an alternative cartel of small Dutch parties of the *Groen Progressief Akkoord* (GPA)¹⁴, and other “pure”¹⁵ Green parties (and in particular *Ecolo* and *Ecology Party*), which were reluctant to accept the entry of a group of leftist parties and accepted the entry of a small Dutch Green Party, *De Groenen*¹⁶. As a result of this contrast, the German Greens decided to leave the Coordination.

During the first congress of the European Greens in Liege (March 31st – April 1st, 1984) a technical agreement was also reached aiming at a reimbursement of election expenses for the European elections of 1984 and signed in Paris on April 28th, 1984 along with a less exhaustive statement compared with the Brussels Declaration signed by nine parties for a “new Europe, neutral and decentralised with autonomous regions, each keeping their own cultural autonomy” and based on seven points:

- 1) opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe, total disarmament and dissolution of military and power blocs;
- 2) promotion of environmental policies respecting ecological balance and fight against every type of pollution and degradation of nature and countryside;
- 3) affirmation of women’s equality in all areas of social life;
- 4) measures against unemployment and the reduction of the welfare state, in the interests of workers and consumers, both at the economic and social and occupational level;

¹⁴ This organisation consisted in four Dutch parties: the CPN (the *Dutch Communist Party*), the Dutch Green Party, the PPR (*Radical Political Party*), and the PSP (*Pacifist Socialist Party*).

¹⁵ Ferdinand Müller-Rommel distinguished two general types of Green parties, different both in programmes and political strategy: pure reformist Green parties that allowed free economic initiative, brought into politics purely environmental issues and were mainly more favorable to alliances with social democratic parties than with the radical forces of the New Left (Green parties of Belgium, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland and France); radical and alternative Green parties that aimed instead at the changing of political and social institutions, fought for an alternative democracy and rejected cooperation with the Social Democrats, preferring alliances with the New Left (*Groen Links* Dutch Green Party and the Green parties of Germany, Luxembourg and Austria); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *The Greens in Western Europe. Similar But Different*, in “International Political Science Review”, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1985, (pp. 483-499), p. 491.

¹⁶ Regarding the distinct and permanent political vision of *De Groenen* and the GPA’s heir, *Groen Links*, formed as an electoral alliance in 1989 and then established in 1990 becoming the largest Dutch Green party, cf. Paul Lucardie, Gerrit Voerman, Wijbrandt van Schuur, *Different Shades of Green: A Comparison Between Members of Groen Links and De Groenen*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 40-62.

- 5) development of policies towards the Third World based on equitable relations, reorganisation of economic relations between Europe and developing countries with greater cooperation between solidarity movements and local indigenous movements;
- 6) free expression of the fundamental rights of people to build an ecological and emancipated society;
- 7) the start of environmentally friendly forms of agriculture and preservation of jobs in rural production units of medium and small size¹⁷.

3. GRAEL's experience (1984-1989) within the Rainbow Group of the European Parliament

In the European elections of June 17th, 1984 Green formations gained a positive result, especially in some regions of Central and Northern Europe. The Green movements obtained 8% of the votes in the FRG and Belgium and from 4 to 6% of the votes in the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg, while in Great Britain and Ireland they gained a much lower percentage of the votes¹⁸.

The EP elections for the first time allowed the European Greens to have appointed MEPs, representatives of continental Europe and from three countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium). The Grünen, in fact, gained seven seats, the GPA two, while Agalev and Ecolo one each. This imbalance which favoured leftist and alternative components marginalised the Belgian Greens and led ecologist formations to an agreement only with the two Italian MEPs elected in two lists of the Italian radical left (the Proletarian Democracy Party and the Proletarian Unity Party) for the creation of a component of the emerging Rainbow Group in the EP¹⁹ called Green Alternative European Link (GRAEL)²⁰.

¹⁷ Cf. *The 'Paris Declaration'*, in Parkin, *Green Parties*, cited above, *Appendix II*, pp. 329-330. Cf. Michele Delore, Bruno Boissière, *L'Europe des Verts: déjà une réalité*, in "Combat Nature" – Spécial "Les Verts", No. 62, June 1984, pp. 30-34.

¹⁸ Cf. Wolfgang Rüdig, *The Greens in Europe: Ecological Parties and the European Elections of 1984*, in "Parliamentary Affairs", Vol. 38, No. 4, 1985, pp. 56-72.

¹⁹ The Rainbow Group, a group of elected members from very different formations, represented the continuation and the "green" updating of the Technical and Defence Coordination Group of independent groups and members (TCG) born in 1979, and from which it inherited its status. The TCG was made up of the Danish People's Movement (four elected members), individuals elected from the Belgian regionalist party *Volksunie*, the Italian political parties DP, PdUP and PR as well as of an Irish movement. Within it, three subgroups were established for the sake of political affinity: the GRAEL (the largest one, with eleven members, after the accession in 1986 of the Belgian and Flemish parties, *Agalev* and *Ecolo*), the Eurosceptical party *Folkebevægelsen mod EF* (Danish People's Movement – four members), the European

The GRAEL maintained its complete independence from the European Greens and prevented, especially under pressure from the German Greens and alternative groups, the creation of a “Green International”. From an ideological point of view, three Green components at a European level were distinguished in a spectrum ranging from Green to Red (socialists-communists): the European Greens, Die Grünen and the GPA.

Within the GRAEL there were experiments in new ways of organising and managing political work. The GRAEL tried to be at the service of a vast archipelago of movements and initiatives with a strong focus on the protection of human and minority rights and the problems of the Third World. It provided financial resources and information, rejected hierarchy, promoted the equation of duties and emoluments between MEPs and staff, created working groups and established the organisation of a monthly joint meeting, the “plenum”. The latter was open to the public for political discussion and comprised those elected, the only ones to have the right to vote, as well as the *Nackrückern* or “successors”, ready to replace the MEPs in office according to the rotation²¹ in the second half of the legislature²².

Free Alliance (EFA), a clustering of regionalist movements with four elected members (two of the Flemish party *Volksunie*, one of the Sardinian Action Party).

²⁰ According to a group representative of the Netherlands “in the eyes of the parliamentary establishment, this rather seemed like the intrusion of a motley crew: a set with ties to the German *Grünen* (‘street terrorists’ in the words of the European conservatives), a couple of radical Italian leftists, plus a few dubious Dutch individuals: a provo, an extreme-left priest, a communist, and, on top of it all, a pacifist!”; Bram Van der Lek, *Intrusion of a Motley Crew: the First Green Group in the European Parliament*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, p. 90 (90-94). As for the activity of the GRAEL cf. The Rainbow Group in the EP, *Rainbow Politics. Green Alternative Politics in the European Parliament*, The Rainbow Group, Green-Alternative European Link (GRAEL), EP, Brussels, June 1988; Karl H. Buck, *Europe: The “Greens” and the “Rainbow Group” in the European Parliament* in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative List*, cited above, pp. 176-194. See also the GRAEL Fund and Luisa Cavalli, *L'azione del GRAEL nel Parlamento europeo, con particolare riguardo alla politica dei diritti dell'uomo*, Graduation Thesis in Political Science, University of Padua, 1990 available at the Historical Archives of the European Communities, Villa Il Poggiolo, Florence.

²¹ The mid-term rotation was one of the most significant elements of that view of basic democracy that the Greens and the alternative movements, especially in Germany, wanted to promote as a political practice; cf. Klaus Dicke, Tobias Stoll, *Freies Mandat, mandatsverzicht des Abgeordneten und das Rotationsprinzip der Grünen*, in “Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen”, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1985, pp. 451-465; Helmut Fogt, *Basisdemokratie oder Herrschaft der Aktivisten? Zum Politikverständnis der Grünen*, in “Politische Vierteljahresschrift”, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1984, pp. 97-114; Thomas Poguntke, *The Organization of a Participatory Party - The German Greens*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 15, 1987, pp. 609-633; Id., *New Politics and Party Systems. The Emergence of a New Type of Party?*, in “West European Politics”, 10, 1, 1987, pp. 76-88; Id., *Unconventional Participation in Party Politics: the Experience of the German Greens*, in “Political Studies”, Vol. 40, 1992, pp. 239-254.

²² The permanent working groups were as follows: Agriculture (4 components), Environment (3), Human Rights (10), Women (5), Energy (8), Immigrants (8), Genetic Engineering (6), Peace and Disarmament (8), Economic-social Issues (9), Third World (11); cf. Cavalli, *op.cit.* p. 174. For some testimonies regarding some of these groups (women, immigrants, human rights and agriculture) and the cooperation on those issues continued eventually by the Greens in the EP cf. Ali Yurttagül, *Migration, Asylum, Civil Rights and Minorities*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 97-98; Annette Görlich, Margret Krannich and Annemiek Onstenk, *Breaking New*

The GRAEL, however, was a failure in terms of cooperation between the Green and alternative group lists due to the high number of conflicts and the individualism of individual MEPs. While pre-election disagreements contributed to this situation, the lack of a clear common political plan was even more damaging, despite the efforts of individuals, employees and advisors²³.

From a political perspective, contradictory opinions and ideas within the GRAEL emerged, especially with regard to the European integration process. There was a vague common view on how to build a different Europe: neutral, anti-consumerist and against the exploitation of nature as well as being seriously concerned with the issue of exhaustible resources and the formation of a “culture of limit” and an ethos of conservation too. On the contrary, the EEC, the CECA and the Euratom were viewed as a means of implementing capitalist policy and, although to a different extent among reformists and fundamentalists, were rejected in their present form. Inspired by the principles of decentralisation of decision-making and individual responsibility towards society, the common election platform contained in the Statute of GRAEL, which specified the Declaration of Paris, added little to the latter. In fact, it politically supported a European peace plan based on friendship between peoples and ethnic groups, with no division between the Western bloc and the communist bloc. Furthermore, it promoted the adoption of strict EU legislation on environmental control systems, the decentralisation of production, fiscal principles against tax evasion and in favour of disadvantaged social groups, encouraged the creation of eco-taxes, a radical change of CAP by eliminating incentives for overproduction and the use of chemical fertilisers, implementing new standards of hygiene and animal welfare in farms. Ultimately, the political components of the GRAEL did not merge and the group was not effective, because of its inconsistent strategies for action²⁴.

Ground – The Women’s Bureau, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cit., pp. 99-100; Hannes Lorenzen, *Green Agricultural Policy – The Perennial Battle*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 103-110.

²³ Among them we should mention the journalist John Lambert, a promoter since the late 1960s of the *Agenor* think-tank, which aimed to develop cooperation on European issues of alternative left groups, as well as an excellent expert in Community institutions and policies.

²⁴ By using an index of cohesion, initially developed by Fulvio Attinà and calculated on the basis of the roll-call votes in the EP sessions with a maximum degree equal to 100, if the MPs of a group voted all in the same way, taking into

The attempt to experiment with new political forms failed, although the GRAEL as a group was more active and visible on the front of peace, women's and workers' rights than on the ecology and used its resources to bring out at the European and international level movements' claims and critical initiatives in favour of a global alternative²⁵. One obstacle was undoubtedly the supremacy and dogmatic attitude of the majority of German Greens who maintained, along with Dutch representatives, a strongly hostile position towards the European Community.

The Statute of the GRAEL included the drafting of a detailed political programme; however, it never saw the light. An ad hoc group identified five positions to be developed for an alternative Europe, discussed at Koltenberg in September 1985:

- a criticism of NATO and the armaments policy;
- the rejection of the CAP and the deepening of environmental and health damages caused by agricultural industry and the impact on the Third World and rural societies;
- the defence and extension of liberties and rights by proposing a "European area of liberty and asylum" as well as measures for the protection of minorities and the fight against racism;

account one hundred and ten votes held in the second term of the EP, the Rainbow Group (in which the GRAEL's core was the most important part) would have a rather low degree of cohesion (67.8), higher only than that recorded in the Socialist Group (62.2); cf. Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, *Il Parlamento europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, tab. 9, p. 112 (re-adaptation from Fulvio Attinà, *The Voting Behaviour of European Parliament Members and the Problem of Europarties*, in "European Journal of Political Research", XVII, 1990, pp. 577-579).

²⁵ According to a then German MEP who joined the GRAEL "the first parliamentary Green group in the EP was able to play an important role in the events that saw the internationalism of the 60s and 70s develop into the movement critical of globalisation in the 1990s"; Frieder Otto Wolf, *Magic Moments From the Past*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, p. 96 (95-96). According to a parliamentary assistant of the GRAEL there was a *trait d'union* connecting the action of the group to the current pro-global justice movements and networks referred to as the World Social Forum; moreover, she also provided examples and modes of action experienced at that time: "At a time when the EP was the weakest of the European institutions, we made full use of all the opportunities that the Parliament offered in the form of parliamentary reports, speeches, emergency resolutions, inter-parliamentary conferences, delegation trips, hearings and not least telephone campaigns[...] extra-parliamentary activities were reasonably significant if not even more important. Creating a network of various movements (environment, peace, human rights, women, solidarity with the third world, and anti- nuclear) was right at the top of the agenda. We did indeed have something to offer: ourselves as well as our parliamentary party facilities. Networking throughout Europe required multilingual communication, translation skills, information exchange, analysis and experience in building cooperation structures, some of which are still in existence. Nearly all the issues and projects that we initiated are still prominent on today's European agenda: an alternative meeting to the 1986 *World Economic Summit* in Bonn; the occupation in Geneva of the building housing the UN High Commission for Refugees; the use of parliamentary immunity to draw attention to the state of refugees in El Salvador; the trip to Guatemala in 1986 post its "democratic opening"; the disastrous consequences of development aid during 'Operation Flood' in India when European milk exports destroyed the Indian market; debt forgiveness in the developing world and criticism of the structural changes demanded by international finance institutions, which the then European Community also wished to adopt. Our approach was and still is right", Barbarita Schreiber, *Dogged Workers for Sustainable Solutions*, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, p. 101 (101-102).

- the conversion of economy in an ecological sense and the use of renewable energies, environmental employment and reduction of working hours;
- democratic control over scientific research and in particular a strict regulation of genetic technology and techniques of information and communication.

However, these guidelines were not endorsed by the whole group. In September 1986 a meeting was held in Terschelling to verify the Kortenberg programme; the meeting was inconclusive and assigned a working group the task of drafting a text on Community institutions also to illustrate the group's position on Europe.

The GRAEL's common approach to Europe was an "unresolved" issue and was negatively affected by the separation into three main tendencies within the *Grünen* (integrationist, antagonist and pragmatic). At Terschelling, the German MEP and coordinator of the working group on Europe, Von Nostitz, proposed that the GRAEL would not participate in the voting of the EP, except in exceptional cases, to boycott its working agendas, emphasise new forms of parliamentary struggle and advocate a major weight of the EP in relation to the other Community institutions. However, the majority of participants opposed the proposal so as not to leave the field open to other parties. The working group on Europe presented its conclusions in February 1987 illustrating its reformist position to democratise the EC, shared by the Belgian Greens, the Danish radical Verbeek, the Demo-Proletarian Tridente and the German Green Schwalba-Hoth, according to whom the most important goal was to achieve an increase in the powers and role of the EP²⁶.

However, this constructive tension sat in contrast to the "anti-system" position of another part of the *Grünen*, led by the MEP Piermont and the Dutch socialist-pacifist Van Der Lek, who opposed any strengthening of the Community bodies and of the EP as well, considered undemocratic and unrepresentative of the citizens of Europe as well as capitalist institutions and functional to the U.S. hegemony.

According to this strongly ideological interpretation, European integration, as a result of the membership of most EC's member countries to NATO, would put at great risk hypotheses

²⁶ Franz Schwalba-Hoth, *Thesenpapier zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, internal memorandum of the GRAEL, Brussels, 1987.

of disarmament as well increase tensions under the Warsaw Pact. The political and military union of Europe would imply only a strengthening of NATO and a worsening of the international climate. An immediate objective of this component was to boycott intergovernmental cooperation at the European level in favour of an increased dialogue with the East and transnational cooperation between alternative-Green and radical groups. The remaining German MEPs such as Graefe zu Baringdorf, an expert in agricultural policy, did not take into consideration the problem of integration and did not take a definite position on the issue. He intended to direct his energy to action within the EP in order to contribute to an ecological reform of its policies, ending up accepting and legitimising, while criticising, the Community institutions.

The GRAEL, therefore, could not develop the vague and undefined project of a Europe of Regions²⁷ without a unified position on European integration. In the end a diffuse Euroscepticism prevailed within it, which had also a timely confirmation in the vote against the establishment of the Delors Commission in January 1985. The GRAEL was divided between the “pro” and the “against” the vote for the accession of Spain and Portugal²⁸, on the increase in the EP’s powers and the Single European Act.

The German Green Frieder Otto Wolf had proposed since 1986 a strategy based on five different types of orientation towards as many categories of international organisations:

- clear opposition to Euratom and a reconstruction on a different basis of the EEC and CECA, with the latter to be re-converted along with European Industry;
- inclusion of other non-EC organisations;
- elimination of organisations based on Atlantism (NATO, WEU and others);

²⁷ On ecoregionalist and ecofederalist views, a member of the German Greens and a Catalan ecologist presented a study proposal: Alfred Horn, Santiago Villanova, *Für eine Konföderation der Öko-Regionen Europas. Politische Strategie der Grün/Alternativen für Europa*, contribution to discussion, GRAEL, 1985.

²⁸ In particular, the German Greens opposed the entry of Spain and Portugal in the European Community, as they considered the latter a capitalist organisation and a potential future military power. Compared with their proposals for disarmament and at the same time dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, the choice of Spain entering into NATO in 1986, as a result of the outcome of a referendum to decide on this issue was seen as aggravating the division between blocks at a global level and was severely attacked. For an analysis of the positions of the European Greens and the Green parties in relation to the enlargement of the European Communities and the EU see Giorgio Grimaldi, *I Verdi e gli allargamenti delle Comunità europee e dell'Unione europea (1973-2004)*, in Ariane Landuyt, Daniele Pasquinucci (edited by), *Gli allargamenti della CEE/UE 1961-2004*, Vol. II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 1099-1126.

- support of the development of a contact and cooperation network for the construction of institutions and global organisations like the UN and GATT;
- creation of an alternative network of associations and groups ranging from fair-trade economy to sectoral initiatives²⁹.

On July 9th, 1986 after the death of the Italian MEP and federalist Altiero Spinelli, the previous May, some parliamentarians launched, exactly ten years after the founding of the Crocodile Club³⁰, an appeal for the establishment of a federalist intergroup for the European Union with the aim of promoting similar groups at a national level and resuming the fight for a federal Europe³¹. Only a few Italian and Belgian members of the GRAEL took part in it, specifically emphasising the existence of a deep difference of views with their German and Dutch colleagues³².

Within the GRAEL, however, there was a minority that was interested in exchanging ideas and opening a dialogue with federalist movements. The themes of nationalism and sustainable development had been the focus of a broad, common reflection of federalists and ecologists since the 1970s in Germany and France and, later, in Italy, and this was evidenced by the international conference “The Ecology and the European Union”, organised in Italy, in Pavia, by the Centre for Studies, Information and Documentation on Federalism, Regionalism

²⁹ Cf. Frieder Otto Wolf, *Für eine strategisch angelegte grün-alternative Politik auf europäischer Ebene*, in “Grüner Basis Dienst”, *Der Koloss Europa. DIE GRÜNEN und das Europäische Parlament. Analysen und Halbzeitberichte der Europagruppe*, No.10, October 1986, pp. 47-48.

³⁰ Altiero Spinelli founded on July 9th, in the homonymous restaurant in Strasbourg, a cross-parliamentary group of federalist action; for a brief history and evaluation of the Crocodile Club cf. Pier Virgilio Dastoli, *L'azione del Club del Coccodrillo*, in Ariane Landuyt, Daniela Preda (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, Vol. I, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 559-567.

³¹ In the following years, the Federalist Intergroup of the EP, along with those formed in the individual member states, tried to promote in various countries a consultative referendum on the constituent mandate to the EP for the next legislature. In Belgium, the Green parties played a prominent role, thanks also to the impetus of the President of the Federalist Intergroup to the Belgian Parliament, Ludo Dierickx, Green Senator who brought this body on January 9th 1989 to propose a bill establishing a consultative referendum on the attribution of constitutional powers to the EP, which was immediately welcomed by *Ecolo*, *Agalev* and the Flemish liberal Party; cf. P. Herroelen, *Si estende in Europa la lotta per il mandato. Anche il Belgio potrà forse avere il suo referendum*, in “L'Unità Europea”, year XVI, No. 179, p. 4. Dierickx, speaking at the Fourteenth Congress of the European Federalist Movement in Rome (March 3rd- 5th, 1989), besides reporting on the procedure of the law enabling the referendum in Belgium that failed to be approved, retraced, also in light of his long militancy in the UEF, the last battle for the constitutional mandate, indicated as a step in continuity with the post-war federalist commitment and especially with the battle for the Congress of the European People; cf. *Un Congresso storico*, in “L'Unità Europea”, monthly magazine of the European Federalist Movement (Italian Section of the UEF), year XV n. s., No. 180-181, February-March 1989, p. 8. Dierickx's bill passed in the Belgian Senate on May 24th, 1989 with a less large majority than expected, due to rethink of Flemish Socialists and Christian Democrats; cf. *Prima vittoria federalista al Senato belga*, in “L'Unità Europea”, year XV, No. 183, May 1989, p. 7.

³² Besides Roelants du Vivier by now out of the GRAEL, Staes and the Italian Tridente were the only representatives of the GRAEL.

and European Unity (CESFER) and by the European Foundation Luciano Bolis from January 9th to 10th, 1988. It brought together some Italian MEPs and several environmental and federalist economists as well as three federalist representatives: the Green Italian MEP Sergio Andreis, the German MEP Franz Schwalba-Hoth and Belgian Green Senator Ludo Dierickx. The conference was the beginning of a mutual understanding between ecologists and federalists, through the elimination of some mutual prejudices, particularly existing in Germany. The strong hostility of the *Grünen* to Spinelli's Treaty was interpreted by federalists as a total rejection of Europe, while conversely, the federalists themselves were perceived by the Greens as supporters of a political and military European superpower, capable of competing with other superpowers. Schwalba-Hoth, a representative of the then-Europeist minority component of the German Greens, stressed that the ecologist movement, in its vocation, was international and anti-nationalist and spoke in favour of the EP's transformation in a House of Representatives of the People and of the Council of Ministers in a Chamber of States. Moreover, he stated that a common strategy unified ecologists and federalists: both, in fact, were opposed to centralisation of power and agreed on the goal "to organise institutions at all levels in order to make the right decisions at the lowest level possible". Dierickx, however, admitted the need for ecologists to develop a debate on democratic institutions, necessary and effective for decision-making at a continental level in order to cope with ecological emergencies. Although there were substantial differences between federalists and ecologists, a debate was inaugurated highlighting as common goals the democratisation of the European Community and the search for international institutional solutions as a contrast to nationalism. After all, the tensions inside the GRAEL reflected those triggered by the confluence of so many heterogeneous political components in this troubled new political project of the *Grünen* in the FRG.

4. The *Grünen* and European integration in the 1980s: the stage of radicalism from its birth to German unity and the contribution of Petra Kelly

Dependent on their very strong left alternative and grass-roots identity – enough to be called a “non-party party” – the *Grünen*, by far the most important Green party, in the early years did not deal with European integration³³. Faced with the need to take a stance regarding the development of the European Communities, they vigorously opposed any prospect of institutional strengthening. In particular, they feared the evolution of the Community into a military and economic power and contested, for example, the draft Treaty drawn up by Altiero Spinelli and voted by the EP in February 1984. The first official position against the European Community (EC) adopted by the party was formulated at the Congress of Karlsruhe (March 3rd-4th, 1984), where the proposal for a Europe of regions was indicated as an alternative, seen as a vague sort of federation or radical-democratic confederation³⁴. The European Communities were bluntly defined as a set “of bureaucracies, bombs and butter mountains”³⁵. The weakness and the inability of the European Parliament to develop an opposing action were sharply reported: “The majority of the (...) European Parliament has so far (...) advocated a militarisation of the EC (...). In the efforts that the traditional parties are making for a broadening of the competencies of the European Parliament, the Greens do not see any possibility of ‘democratising’ the EC, but only the attempt to transform it even further into a superpower of Western Europe”³⁶.

However, Petra Kelly (1947-1992), one of the founders of the party and politically engaged in the civil rights and peace movements in the United States in the late 1960s, presented a unique figure.

³³ In its programme appeared in 1978, the first small ecologist conservative party promoted by Herbert Gruhl the GAZ (*Grüne Aktion Zukunft*) did not speak against NATO, wanting to maintain good relations with the United States, while criticising the economic and non-ecological nature of the European Community; cf. Eva R. Karnofsky, *I partiti tedeschi e la campagna elettorale per il Parlamento europeo*, in Gianni Bonvicini, Saverio Solari (eds.), *I partiti e le elezioni del Parlamento europeo. Interessi nazionali ed europei a confronto*, Roma-Bologna, Istituto Affari Internazionali - Il Mulino, 1979, p. 99 (83-100). In the *Grünen*'s programme for federal elections in 1980, the European Community was not even mentioned, nor in that of 1983, despite calls for action at all levels (“Think globally, act locally” was, in fact, the most popular motto among ecologists).

³⁴ Cf. Holm A. Leonhardt, *Zur Europapolitik der Grünen*, in “Zeitschrift für Politik”, No. 2, 1984, p. 193 (pp. 192-204); Die *Grünen*, *Global denken - vor Ort handeln: Erklärung der Grünen zur Europawahl 1984*, Bonn, 1984.; *ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁵ Die *Grünen*, *Global denken - vor Ort handeln: Erklärung der Grünen zur Europawahl 1984*, cited above, p. 38.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

After her return to Germany in 1970 and her initial membership to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which she soon left after some disagreements and because of her ecologist, anti-nuclear and non-violent position, in the early eighties she became a symbol of political ecology in Europe. Trained in European issues with a degree in Political Science from the European Institute of the University of Amsterdam, she also graduated in 1971 in Political Science at the European Institute at the University of Amsterdam with a thesis on European integration. From 1972 to 1983, Kelly worked as an officer in Brussels at the Economic and Social Council of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Commission dealing with work, social and environmental issues, women's rights, health and consumer protection. During the same period she was intensely active in pacifist and ecological associations, including the Federal German Youth, working in the mid-1970s at the international magazine "Forum Europe", particularly engaged in the struggle for peace, disarmament and protection of environment, where she was the European Community correspondent. Involved in the *Bürgerinitiativen* and in the development of the German Green movement she was for the first time elected to the Bundestag in 1983 and again between 1987 and 1990, participating as a member of the Subcommittee for Europe. She expressed at this level a Europeist and federalist attitude, but was radically opposed to a military and economic Europe that exploited the Third World and – in line with the majority of Greens – to a German reunification that would give birth to a centralised state, proposing as an alternative a reorganisation of Germany into regional states³⁷.

Kelly advocated a civil and political struggle "from the bottom up" and a non-violent transformation of society firmly anchored in the groups, movements and associations of civil society, both to avoid the gap between institutions and parties on the one hand, and citizens on the other, and to ensure even through civil disobedience freedom and affirmation of shared

³⁷ Cf. Petra Kelly, *A Green View of a German Reunification and Europe's future*, speech held at the Alumni Dinner, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C., November 19th, 1990, in Id., *Nonviolence Speaks to Power*, (collection of five speeches and four essays, August 1987- July 1991), edited by Glenn D. Paige e Sarah Gilliatt, Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii Honolulu, Hawaii, 1992, pp. 87-112. The whole book is available on the website <http://www.nonkilling.org/pdf/b4.pdf>. As for the Green thought by the author cf. Id., *Fighting for Hope*. London, Chatto and Windus, Hogarth Press, 1984; Id., *Thinking Green! Essays on Environmentalism, Feminism, and Nonviolence* by Petra K. Kelly, Berkeley (California), Parallax Press, 1994.

ethical values when confronted with dogmatic positions. Considering the planet and its protection a field of action, the German Green pursued a profound political renovation that led to the rejection of a European Community mainly built on economic and potentially military interests and objectives³⁸.

The German Greens were deeply opposed to European integration until the mid-1990s. Some choices highlighted this hostile attitude. In particular, in December 1986, the Green Party was the only political force in the Bundestag to vote against the ratification law on the Single European Act, denouncing the limitation of the norms protecting the environment in member countries and a loss of the democratic power of national parliaments in favour of the EC Council of Ministers. The possible development of a European military cooperation and of a united Europe as a capitalist superpower with nuclear weapons, long kept the *Grünen* strongly opposed to the commencement of a European constituent process. On January 19th, 1989, in fact, the German Greens voted against a resolution tabled in the Bundestag with the aim of urging the federal Government to take, within the EU institutions, all necessary steps to put the European Parliament in a position to develop, on behalf of the European Council and the Governments of the Member States as well as in cooperation with other bodies of the Community, a project of European Union, later to be submitted for its ratification to the Community Member States, and approved by all the other represented political forces³⁹.

³⁸ Petra Kelly gradually retired from politics and public life along with her partner Gerd Bastian, a former general who became a pacifist and Green member. In 1992 they were both found dead in their home probably due to a murder-suicide initiated by Bastian. Due to her position promoting Greens as a “anti-party party” committed to a non-violent transformation of society became increasingly isolated. Emblematic were her own words: “I refused to play the tactics game of being either a dogmatic leftist “Fundi” or a pro-Social Democrat conservative Green “Realo”, or even a mediating “Centralo” – because I felt that all of these boundaries must be transcended if we are to create a non-violent, feminist, ecologically alternative society”; Petra Karin Kelly, *Beyond the Greens*, “Ms”, November/December 1991, p. 70, cited above in Ruth A. Bevan, *The Dilemma of Power in Petra Kelly’s Antipolitics*, Institut für Höhere Studien (HIS), Reihe Politikwissenschaft, No. 22, March 1995, p. 38. See also Id. *Petra Kelly: the Other Green*, in “New Political Science”, Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2001, pp. 181-202. See also Sara Parkin, *The Life and Death of Petra Kelly*, Rivers Oram Press/Pandora, 1995.

³⁹ Cf. *Il Bundestag approva una mozione a favore del mandato costituente*, in “L’Unità Europea”, year XVI, No. 179, January 1989, p. 4. As for an analysis of the relationship between German Greens and the European Community, between 1979 and 1989 cf. Elisabeth Bomberg, *The German Greens and the European Community: Dilemmas of a Movement-Party*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 160-185 e in David Judge (ed.), *A Green Dimension for the European Community, political issues and processes*, London, 1993, pp. 160-185.

This radicalism came from the clear position in foreign policy of an alternative view of “ecological peace” (*Ökopax*)⁴⁰ which led the German Greens to oppose a speedy German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). They, in fact, were supporters of civic dissident organisations in the GDR and requested a transformation, opposing a simple annexation by the FRG⁴¹. For this reason, in July 1990 in the Bundestag they voted against the Treaty of Unification. In 1990 several civic organisations in the GDR promoted an electoral alliance in the first multiparty national elections in that country, called *Bündnis 90*, which subsequently, after the unification, in 1993 merged with the German Greens. Only thanks to eight elected members of this alliance the Green and civic representatives prevented a complete electoral defeat. In fact, at the national elections of 1990 the Greens failed to enter the Bundestag remaining below the established quorum. Their opposition to the reunification had severely penalised them, considering the new national and European climate, calling for a strong change. The forward-looking but ill-timed attempt of the Greens to focus the attention of voters on global environmental problems – in a bid to move the focus from nationalism to climate change just two years before the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro which for the first time raised this issue on a global scale – was a striking turning point for the German Greens, calling on them to resurrect and acquire a more pragmatic profile.

⁴⁰ Burns and van der Will emphasised the Green view as follows: “On the one hand, they draw attention to the environmental damage caused by militarism and to what they see as the umbilical cord linking the civil and military use of nuclear power (the plutonium for atom bombs being produced, of course, by nuclear power plants). On the other hand – and more fundamentally – their analysis of the martial postures adopted by the East and West is rooted in their basic ecological critique of modern industrial society. Viewed in that light precious little difference can be discerned between the economic systems of Western capitalism and Soviet communism. Equally beholden to the – for the Greens – spurious dictates of economic growth both are locked into a battle for ever scarcer resources, markets and political sphere of influence that ‘has brought humanity to the brink of self-destruction’ (quote by Die Grünen, *Friedensmanifest*, Bonn, n. d., (1980), p. 2); Rob Burns, Wilfried van der Will, *Protest and Democracy in West Germany. Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda*, Houndmills, Basingstoke and London, 1988, pp. 234-235.

⁴¹ “[...] like much of the German Left, members of the German Green Party saw the territorial division of Germany as a morally acceptable consequence of the Nazi period. The rationale was that the existence of the socialist regime in the German Democratic Republic prevents the recrudescence of German expansionism and nationalism. Their East German policy was quite similar to *Ostpolitik* (Eastern Policy), advanced by the SPD during the Brandt administrations of 1969 to 1973”; Tad Shull, *Redefining Red and Green. Ideology and Strategy in European Political Ecology*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 78.

5. Eurosceptics and Europeists in action: some examples on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall

From May 28th to 29th, 1988 the first meeting took place between representatives of the Green movements in Nordic countries – namely Finland, Denmark, Iceland (Women's List) and Sweden – discussing the creation of a Nordic Green Alternative, a common organisation to develop and promote a specific political and economic role for Northern European countries which were non-EC members as a part of a future Europe of Regions. The meeting was characterised by opposition to European integration on the basis of the existing Economic Community both of Johann Galtung and the Danish Greens. The former, a Norwegian political scientist and peace researcher, invited Green parties and movements to oppose a new European superpower; the latter illustrated the negative effects in the environmental and social sector of accession to the EC. The signed paper was clearly anti-Europeist:

Yes! To the world and a Green Nordic Region, No! To the Superpower Dream and Growth of Materialism in the EEC. Instead of EEC-membership or EEC-harmonisation we want cultural and ecological cooperation with all countries and the whole of Europe. We want to warn that EEC-harmonisation makes independent Nordic rules for environmental protection impossible, a fact that Denmark has already discovered in, for example, the case of returnable bottles and cancer warning labels on products. The EEC-model is a deadly threat to democratic ideals, traditional popular interests and qualitative values⁴².

The first Joint Declaration of the European Greens, signed in Brussels, was made only on the occasion of the 1989 European elections and seemed more concerned with criticising the EC rather than proposing an alternative. Several drafts were presented by the European Greens from the end of 1988 to the Spring of 1989.

To comprehend the variety of existing positions and the inability to find convergence on feasible proposals and projects, it is interesting to compare the three main papers prepared as draft programmes of the European Greens in view of the 1989 EP elections:

⁴² Cf. *Nordic Greens say No to Common Market*, in "The European Greens", newsletter of the European Greens, August 1988, p. 2.

2. the third draft of December 9th, 1988 proposed by two German Greens (anti-Europeist and fundamentalist paper);
3. the summary draft of the co-secretary of the European Greens, the Swedish Per Gahrton, prepared on February 20th, 1989 (Euro sceptic position);
4. the final joint Declaration signed by the Greens in Brussels in March 1989 (point of mediation between the two previous papers and Europeist positions).

The three texts, written in quite dissimilar styles, reveal a long-endured internal debate that was far from being resolved.

The first paper with its hard and peremptory tone was a long indictment of the disasters that Western civilisation had caused all over the world and in Europe and totally rejected the existing European institutions. The title of the introduction of this text, “Europe – Dream and Nightmare” and the quote of Franz Fanon⁴³ suggested the strong emotional and ideological power of the whole paper. It provided an apocalyptic historical reconstruction, where the main responsibility fell on the European continent which had provoked through the centuries the Crusades, the conquest and destruction of other cultures, slavery, colonialism and imperialism, as well as the two world wars of the twentieth century, generated by the German desire for global dominance. The blame was put on the European expansion legitimised by the Greek-Roman civilisation, the Holy Roman Empire, the modern nation-state and the positivist belief in the power of technical progress. The natural conditions of life and community organisations had been destroyed by the growth of capitalism and patriarchy, which had become dominant on a global scale. In this view, the policies of the European community remained a threat to the Third World, just behind the world hegemony of the United States, the Soviet bloc as well as the economic power of Japan⁴⁴.

⁴³ “Now we know how humanity has had to suffer for every victory of the European spirit” (Frantz Fanon).

⁴⁴ Jürgen Maier, Anne Schulz, *Joint Paper of the European Green parties in European elections of 1989*. Draft No. 3, December 9th, 1988, typescript (pp. 9), p.1. The paper is articulated in the following sections after the introduction: 1) “The Single Market 1992 - Big Business against ecology and regional autonomy”; 2) “Environment”; 3) “Agriculture”; 4) “Disarmament and Demilitarisation instead of Euro-militarism”; 5) “The EC and the Third World”; 6) “Democracy and Human Rights - the losers of the European super-state”; 7) “Women”; 8) “Europe of Regions instead of a European super-state”; 9) “The dream of a common European home”.

Marked by millenarian criticism, fundamentalism and Marxism-Leninism and clearly contrary to European integration, this draft went further showing the common people as victims of the Western system suffering from the threat of “military confrontation on the continent” and unemployment resulting from economic expansion. It also held up new technologies as false solutions, tools generating social and ecological problems and new forms of oppression for women in particular. It specifically indicted the European Movement, accusing it of blindness for having confused the old dream of unification of Europe as a ‘continent of peace’ with plans for forging an alliance against the Soviet Union, i.e. a Western European regional alliance under the rule of the U.S. military. The old European powers still hoped for a (Western) European superpower in the context of this alliance⁴⁵. According to this radical stance, the Single Market was a project that threatened the economic and cultural autonomy of regions. Furthermore, the state of the environment also deteriorated due to economic interests to which the EC was enslaved. The longed-for Europe of regions represented, *de facto*, the denial of the EC and the dreaded Europe as a ‘superstate’ with centralised powers, which was in sharp contrast to the principles of democratisation and decentralisation. It was therefore necessary to limit to a minimum the powers of the European Communities and the European Parliament⁴⁶. The document also spoke in favour of the right of veto for each state. Although in a piece of perverse logic, the document’s marked anti-Europeanism seemed to be restricted to a “defensive” nationalism that held out few other prospects, willing to demonise any organisational and institutional construct that grew out of the “system”, it was proposed as an emergency exit for the dream of a different world based on democratic and non-violent self-determination: a free Europe united in the context of international organisations with no supranational powers such as the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council of Scandinavian countries and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

According to this view, breaking down all boundaries for a cooperation beyond the blocks, but without truly integrated institutions, should be the goal of Green and alternative parties. Their presence in the EP was seen as an opportunity to give voice to grass-roots movements, using available resources to enhance its capacity for action⁴⁷.

On the contrary, the paper written by the Swedish Per Gahrton⁴⁸ was more structured, sober and less rhetorical; although he was strongly unbalanced towards anti-Community position, he used a more thoughtful tone and offered in support of the criticism of the European Community, authoritative opinions and comments taken from international magazines and other sources. The preamble was markedly ecologist and clearly influenced by the liberal tendency of the author, unwilling to endorse statements and subjects of the Marxist and alternative left. The key slogan, “European Cooperation - Yes! Western European State - No!” summarised the intent of creating new decentralised pan-European relations following the example of cross-border agreements of international conferences. The Common Market was seen as a disastrous hypothesis and the EP as a forum to express opposition, forge alliances among Green movements, obtain information and open a debate, despite the lack of power of the Assembly. The opposition of Gahrton to the EEC was clear but based on less ideological arguments, though still very close to Anglo-Saxon Euroscepticism.

The Joint Declaration of March 1989 represented a mediation between the above-mentioned fundamentalist and “pure” views and the reformist attitude of the Belgian, French and Italian Greens. Its content did not change much from that of Gahrton’s paper, but was more discursive and propositional.

⁴⁷ Maier, international secretary of the German Greens between 1987 and 1990, has also written a brief history of the Green Party of 1990, in which he illustrates a perspective of a common European home in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division into blocks: “European Collective Security is a proposal to define the “common house of Europe” more concretely and could be an alternative to simply adding more and more nations to the EC. This framework could provide a basis for a more intense exchange and cooperation in economy, ecology, technology, and culture. It could be an alternative to the ideas of drawing Eastern European nations closer and closer into the orbit of the EC and ultimately establish French-West German political and economic hegemony over Europe. Building the Common House of Europe must at the same time involve new arrangements concerning world trade structures to reduce the capacity of the “economic superpowers” to establish permanent dependence of the Third World (and possibly in the future Eastern Europe) in the notorious European tradition of Empires. Ultimately, the Common House of Europe has to be built from the grassroots. Green movements play an important role in this endeavour”; Jürgen Maier, *The Green Parties in Western Europe. A Brief History, Their Successes and Their Problems*, May 13th, 1990, <http://www.globalgreens.org/literature/maier/westerneurope>.

⁴⁸ *European Greens: programme. Draft for: Common Statement of the European Greens for the 1989 Elections to the European Parliament*, typescript (draft Gahrton-résumé, pp. 15), p. 2.

The preamble stressed the proposal for a new concept of Europe, a Europe of autonomous regions without borders, with a decentralised structure and a social organisation based on eco-sustainable local production. It was necessary to build a common European home without military alliances, incompatible with the division into blocks, the creation of a Western European super-state, and the gap still existing between the northern and southern hemispheres. The criticism towards the single European market whose project was to expand the consumption and harm the environment, was linked to the alternative proposal of a pan-European cooperation based on existing organisations such as the CSCE and the Council of Europe, extended to the entire continent understood as a biosphere. Moreover, it needed to look positively at the climate of *perestroika*. The role of neutral countries was considered essential in orienting a new Europe of Regions towards disarmament and co-existence. Finally, despite their participation in the EP election, the Greens considered the Community institutions anti-democratic and would fight to democratise them, first by asking for full access for all citizens to information on decision-making processes of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Their guiding principle would still remain tied to a Green political vision according to which there would exist no authority at a higher level than is necessary⁴⁹.

6. The first Green Group in the EP (1989-1994) and the new international challenges: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Yugoslavian crisis, the Maastricht Treaty.

In 1989 – a year marked by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe mainly due to a non-violent revolution⁵⁰ – and in the subsequent years, the federalist and radical renewal of the EEC started to open a breach in the European Greens, in particular thanks to the input of the French, Belgian and Italian representatives. In those years the first independent Green Group in the European Parliament, less “Nordic” and more “Mediterranean”, was established, thanks to

⁴⁹ *Dichiarazione di Intenti Comuni dei Verdi europei*, (Declaration of Common Intent of European Greens) Brussels, March 1989, in Verde Europa Lista Verde, *Idee verdi per l'Europa*, edited by Piero Villa, cited above, pp. 84-85 (partial reproduction of the Declaration itself, pp. 84-88).

⁵⁰ On the role played by the Green parties and movements in Central and Eastern Europe in the transition from communism to democracy cf. Matthew R. Auer *Environmentalism and Estonia's Independence Movement*, in “Nationalities Papers”, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1998, pp. 659-76; Erich G. Frankland, *Green Revolutions? The Role of Green Parties in Eastern Europe's Transition, 1989-1994*, in “East European Quarterly”, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1995, pp. 315-345.

the entry of several French representatives. Moreover, a self-convening of the Green Parliament of Europe took place in Strasbourg from July 3rd to 5th, 1990, gathering a hundred representatives of European Green parties from twenty-five countries, including Central and Eastern Europe, to establish a dialogue and agree on common choices in the face of the economic, social, political and ecological crises of the continent⁵¹. In the European elections of 1989 the Green movements in Europe were at the peak of their European and international success. They managed to affirm themselves almost everywhere⁵² and elect thirty MEPs from all EC countries, except Greece. The most striking national results were 14.9% of the votes for the British Greens⁵³ – but they did not gain seats because of the majority proportional system of representation adopted in the country⁵⁴ – and 10.6% for the French Greens, which instead obtained the election of nine MEPs⁵⁵. The Green vote marked a new trend rather than just a mere protest against the European Community on the whole⁵⁶. The success of French and Italian Greens altered the balance of power within the EP, with the formation of the first Green group no longer characterised by overwhelming Green power and representing a symptom of a crisis for the German Greens that grew acute in 1990 in the general elections when the West German Greens left the Bundestag.

⁵¹ Regarding this initiative with symbolic and friendly value which also led to the approval of a joint resolution on peace and disarmament and a dozen other common resolutions produced on various topics see Alexander Langer, *Ein Grünes Europa-Parlament, Entwurf für eine Schlussresolution eines Grünen Europaparlaments (wurde dann aber nicht behandelt)*, Strasbourg, July 1990, in *Vie di pace/Frieden Schliessen*, cited above, pp. 390-399; Id., *Si è riunito il Parlamento Verde d'Europa*, in "Azione nonviolenta", year XXVII, August-September 1990, pp. 12-13.

⁵² Mark N. Franklin, Wolfgang Rüdiger, *On the Durability of Green Politics. Evidence from the 1989 European Election Study*, in "Comparative Political Studies", Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995, p. 411 (409-439).

⁵³ Cf. C. J. Pattie, A. T. Russell, R. J. Johnston, *Going Green in Britain? Votes for the Green Party and attitudes to green issues in the late 1980s*, in "Journal of Rural Studies", Vol. 7, No. 3, 1991, pp. 285-297.

⁵⁴ The result was astounding compared with 0.6% of the votes achieved in 1984 and the Greens complained about the unfairness of the electoral system. It has been estimated that by adopting a proportional system the British Greens, who at that time were the third national party with about 2,300,000 votes collected, could elect 11 MEPs; cf. Michael Burgess, Adrian Lee, *The United Kingdom*, in Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The 1989 Election to the European Parliament*, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 203.

⁵⁵ Cf. John Curtice, *The 1989 European election: Protest or Green Tide?*, in "Electoral Studies", Vol. 8, No. 3, December 1989, pp. 217-230; Cees Van der Eijk, Mark N. Franklin, *European Community Politics and Electoral Representation: Evidence from the 1989 European Elections Study*, in "European Journal of Political Research", Vol. 19, No. 1, 1991, pp. 105-127. In Luxembourg, due to the division in three parties of election system, the ecologists could not take advantage of 11.3% of the votes obtained.

⁵⁶ Cf. Daniele Pasquonucci, Luca Verzichelli, *Elezioni europee e classe politica sopranazionale 1979-2004*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004, pp. 132-133.

The Green Group in the EP (GGEP), founded on July 25th, 1989 was made up of eight MEPs from France, eight from Germany, seven from Italy (three elected in the Green Europe list, two in the Green Rainbow list and one each in the DP and the anti-prohibitionist League), three from Belgium (two of Ecolo and one of Agalev), two from the Netherlands (Regenboog/Groenlinks) as well as of one from Portugal (Os Verdes) and one from Spain (Izquierda de los pueblos, a regionalist left list). According to the Statute approved, the two co-spokespersons of the GGEP had necessarily to be a man and a woman – as well as the two vice – in order to guarantee gender equality. To hold such positions the Italian Alexander Langer and the Portuguese Maria Santos were appointed. On the whole, with the debut of the Green MPs in the Mediterranean area, the balance was overturned in favour of the latter and at the expense of the Nordic and Eurosceptic component, although the group maintained within it “pure” and alternative ecologist parties, as well as elected representatives of other small left-wing formations. This new influence was confirmed by the rejection of the French, Belgian and Italian Greens to join the Rainbow Group along with the regionalists as well as with the Danish anti-Europeist movement.

The GGEP proved to be more solid and compact than the GRAEL, which was also a subgroup, despite the fact that internal differences continued to be significant⁵⁷. Some institutional positions in the EP were first held by Green MEPs: the German Telkämper became vice-Chairman of the Assembly until 1991, and the French ecologist leader Waechter was appointed Chairman of the Committee of the Planning and Regional Policy. In the second term the Belgian Paul Lannoye and the Italian Adelaide Aglietta became spokespersons of the Group, while the French Marie Anne Isler Béguin held the position of vice-Chairman in the EP, the Dutch Nel Van Dijk became Chairman of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the German Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf and the Italian Gianfranco Amendola were elected vice-Chairmen respectively of the Committee on Agriculture, Fishery, Rural

⁵⁷ Analysing the first year of the Green Group in the EP and the dilemmas to be solved “EP News” outlines: “[...] German Greens, [...], are ambivalent in their attitudes towards European Community. Traditionally opposed to what they see as a “rich man’s club” based on a CAP [Common Agricultural Policy] that has contributed towards the destruction of the environment, benefited large-scale producers and encouraged the intensification of farming with all its adverse affects, this faction has tended to support a wider international grouping of states”. *Greens Pressing to Keep on the Go. Focus on the ‘Anniversary’ Party...*, “EP News”, July 9th – 13th, 1990, p. 2 (2-3).

Development and Environmental Protection and of that related to Public Health and Consumer Protection. The GGEP was closely connected with the Coordination of the European Greens, hosting its secretary in its Brussels seat. A key element of the Group's activity proved to be issues related to peace and disarmament, which became a specific field of action for the Greens in the EP, thanks also to the important role played within the EP's Intergroup on "Peace and Disarmament" by Solange Fernex, among others, who chaired it, and Alexander Langer⁵⁸.

However, the real novelty, which constituted a break with the GRAEL's tradition, was to put as a priority, among others, the EC's institutional reform in the direction of a democratic federalism in the political agenda, thanks to the Italian and French Greens. The GGEP also tried not to assume a biased political stance in the EP. Rather than aiming at collaborating with the left, they developed a cooperative attitude open to a convergence on issues under discussion in order to play a successful leading and transversal role in different circumstances, for example on controversial and sensitive topics such as genetic engineering and the trafficking of arms. The GGEP, however, was something very different compared with the main EP's parliamentary groups, continuing to grow, albeit to a more limited extent than the GRAEL, some practices based on direct democracy (rotation of French and Dutch Greens) and with a focus on the relationship with movements, associations and civil society⁵⁹.

Among the components of GGEP the Italian Adelaide Aglietta, Alexander Langer, Virginio Bettini, the French Claire Joanny (President of the Federalist Intergroup in the EP) Bruno Boissière and the Belgian Paul Lannoye were known for their commitment to build a federal Europe, based on regional autonomy and a European Parliament endowed with full power and the competence to appoint members of the European Commission.

They also debated with organised European federalism and led most ecologist MEPs to adopt more Europeist positions, despite the inclusion of elected Eurosceptics from

⁵⁸Cf. Les Verts au Parlement européen, *Vers une nouvelle politique de sécurité. Non Prolifération. Essais Nucléaires. Industries d'Armements. Commerce des Armes. Objection de Conscience. Ex Yougoslavie*, Groupe de travail "paix et désarmement", Brussels, February 1994.

⁵⁹Cf. Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, *The Greens at the European Level*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 1, No. 1, 1992, pp. 132-137. For an analysis of the activity of groups of the EP cf. Tapio Raunio, *The European Perspective. Transnational Party Groups in the 1989-1994 European Parliament*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997.

Scandinavian countries and the British Isles⁶⁰. A political reformist federalist project, albeit aimed at gradually implementing radical changes, replaced a generic Green pan-Europeanism, critical of the EU and aimed at promoting incisive reforms for a political Europe capable of coping with global problems as well as abandoning the narrow and asphyxiated intergovernmental practices, eliminating the democratic deficit and the assumption of effective power by the EP.

Concerning the enlargement of power of regions, the Greens proposed an initiative of the EP that was supposed to elaborate a draft constitution for the EU and submit it to national parliaments or peoples who would thus have been called to confirm or reject the draft. The regional dimension, essential for ecologists, was highlighted by Anthoine Waechter in particular, who was persuaded that Europe was certainly a more appropriate platform than nation-states to address the most pressing international issues such as environmental degradation, inequality between the northern and southern hemispheres as well as the structural unemployment in industrialised countries. Waechter rejected the Council's proposals regarding the establishment of a consultative organ of the regions not directly representative of individual regions, while calling for the formation of an autonomous regional committee as a premise for a future Chamber of regions which would complement a European Parliament with full power. According to Waechter, integrating the regions in Treaties should imply finding means and funds to enhance the regional policy and compensate, through the increase of structural funds for the most disadvantaged regions, the effects of common monetary policy that would limit the macroeconomic power of individual states.

The call for democracy and federalism, however, was disregarded by the Maastricht Treaty with the risk of reducing the EU to a free trade area, according to the intentions of Great Britain, the Greens decided to vote against the Maastricht Treaty⁶¹, criticising the lack of initiative of the Italian government. On March 12th, 1992 in Strasbourg, the GGEP made clear its position on the Maastricht Treaty and invited all groups to make their own criticisms in a

⁶⁰ For a programme of institutional reforms of the EU cf. *L'Unione europea secondo i Verdi. Un'architettura istituzionale democratica per l'Europa*, leaflet-brochure edited by the Green Group in the European Parliament, in "Notizie Verdi", year III, No. 35, October 18th, 1993.

⁶¹ Cf. Adelaide Aglietta, "No" to Ratification of Democratic Vacuum, in "Crocodile", November 1991, p. 11

constructive way to send a clear political message to European governments, deciding not to vote for, but neither pointlessly against, without having formulated a credible alternative⁶². In particular, the Greens raised three fundamental issues related to the democratic deficit of the Treaty:

1. the need for a unified institutional structure on all matters of Community competence;
2. the effective and democratic functioning of the EP;
3. the assignment of a mandate to the EP with the task of drawing up a draft constitution to be submitted to national parliaments before 1996⁶³.

On April 7th, 1992 the report prepared by the British Labour member David Martin did not follow the recommendations of the Greens who rejected it and asked not to ratify the Treaty to the parliaments of the Member States without verifying a serious commitment of the Lisbon European Council to convene a new IGC in 1993. Moreover, they made clear that the Greens were not against Europe but in favour of a federal and democratic Europe capable of welcoming other countries wishing to join the EU, and that they saw this goal jeopardised, because of Maastricht.

Ultimately, Maastricht was for the Greens a setback for the process of democratic integration that would lead to institutional paralysis with the increase of the Member States.

On February 10th, 1993 the GGEP, after the majority voted against the Delors Commission because of the low profile of the initiatives announced for the future, turned to the Council to urge “a deep reform of the institutional functioning” before the European elections of 1994. The Greens demanded that this reform should be implemented before the accession of new members and on the basis of a draft constitution drawn up by the EP and submitted to national

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶³ Parliamentarians from the GRAEL proved to be extremely hostile to the European Union in the making. At the sitting of the Parliament of November 20th 1991 Telkämper took a bold step comparing the future consequences of Maastricht with those of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. He stressed the emergence of “a new European order to complete the hegemonic power of Western Europe, adding foreign policy and defense and then a complete state of a market without forgetting, however, to complete democracy in the Member States”. Verbeek decried the total absence of participation of citizens in the process of reform of the EC and the identity of the EC itself that perfectly coincided with an economic power advocating unlimited growth and in competition with Japan and the United States at the expense of the rest of the world reduced to a state of poverty. In the opinion of the Dutch MEP, the community construction was incorrigible and the claim to reform represented an example of arrogance on the part of the Brussels institutions. Finally, Van Dijk completed this critical Green “from the left”, emphasising the democratic, social and union deficit of the EC. For a summary of the collective position of the GGEP on Maastricht cf. also L. QUAGLIA, *Maastricht. Il benessere innanzitutto*, in “Notizie Verdi”, year II, No. 15, May 4th, 1992, p. 12.

parliaments. For the GGEP, it was also essential that, by 1996, the IGC was convened to take decisions on enlargement⁶⁴.

In May 1993 the EP approved Langer's report, made on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which emphasised the urgent acceleration of a pan-European process of democratic, political, economic and institutional integration led by the CSCE, the UN's regional organisation, acting as a guarantor of the regional security system to counter the many threats to security in the East-West relations (the lack of control of armed forces and weapons systems after the collapse of the USSR, border disputes and ethnic and national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the great economic and social gap between Eastern and Western Europe, enormous environmental damage and risks inherited by the industrial system and the nuclear race, as a way to solve the energy problems)⁶⁵.

Before the end of the term and after four years of work, the draft constitution was introduced in the EP, tabled by the popular Fernand Herman on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs. It was inspired by a cooperative and decentralised federal model, subsidiarity and double democratic legitimacy based both on citizens and states. Aglietta and the "federalist" Greens did welcome with enthusiasm this project consisting of a preamble and forty-seven articles that would re-found the EU in a federal sense, but denounced the reluctance of the EP to proceed, mainly because of the hostility of the Socialist Group and also because of the attention to the next elections for the renewal of the EP.

The emerging strong internal disagreements within the individual parliamentary political groups resulted in a referring back of the text to the Institutional Committee and a presentation by Herman of a new document, approved by a majority (154 yes, 84 no and 46 abstentions) on February 10th, 1994, deferring it to the next term for further discussion and putting the draft constitution only as an annex to the resolution⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Il PE vota la fiducia alla Commissione*, in "L'Unità Europea", (from "Agence Europe", February 10th, 1993), year XX n. s., No. 228, February 1993, p. 12.

⁶⁵ Cf. *La crisi dell'Europa dell'Est. Il problema affrontato nei suoi risvolti politici, di sicurezza ed ecologici*, in "Europa Oggi", No. 5, May, 1993, p. 3.

⁶⁶ For a thorough description of the institutional Group of the GGEP and Herman's report (*Risoluzione sulla Costituzione dell'Unione europea con allegato Progetto di Costituzione Europea* – doc. A3 -0064/94) cf. I Verdi al Parlamento europeo, Federazione dei Verdi, *Europa verde. Materiali di informazione e di lavoro su l'ambiente al Parlamento*

The GGEP, which had supported the project throughout its entire process, did not attend the final vote on the report because of these irregularities.

The GGEP, unlike GRAEL, established without any reservations a Working Group on institutions that monitored, applying constructive criticism, the EEC reforms and the passage to the EU. Aglietta and Boissière fought a mostly federalist battle and therefore challenged the Maastricht Treaty, the former participating as a representative of the GGEP to the EP delegation in the inter-institutional Conference on the negotiation and implementation of the EU Treaty, while the latter participating as a co-Chairman of the reconstituted Federalist Intergroup of the EP⁶⁷.

7. Alexander Langer and Adelaide Aglietta, Green leaders in the fight for a federal Europe

Among the Greens, the Italian MEPs Alexander Langer and Adelaide Aglietta were pioneers of the need to build a European federation to ensure peace, ecological change of the economy and society, respect for human rights and co-existence among peoples. They devoted a large part of their political activity and energy to the construction of this project, representing two important figures among ecologists and federalist MEPs.

Adelaide Aglietta (1940-2000), from Turin, who had a secular background, began her political experience in 1974 in the Italian Radical Party (PR), characterised thanks to its leader Marco Pannella by a strong commitment to European federalism. Leader of the battles for the recognition of divorce and abortion in Italy, in 1976 she became national secretary of the PR, the first woman to head a political party in that country. In 1978 she courageously agreed to participate as a member of the jury in a trial held in Turin involving the extreme left terrorist organisation Red Brigades, writing a diary as testimony of that experience. In the late 1980s she gave birth to the *Verdi Arcobaleno* (Rainbow Greens) and was elected MEP for two terms from 1989 to 1999 in the lists of this political party, ending her political activity just before her death

Europeo. Panorama generale, approfondimenti e prospettive: uno strumento per meglio gestire le iniziative ambientaliste, Rome, Green Office in the EP, May 1994, pp. 23-54.

⁶⁷ Green MEPs Aglietta, Boissière, Bandres Molet, Cramon Daiber and Onesta, along with the Group's co-worker Monica Frassoni participated in the group on institutions of the EP. Only French Green MEPs took part in the Federalist Intergroup of the EP: Boissière, Fremion, Joanny (also as a President for a certain period) and Onesta.

due to a cancer against which she struggled for several years. In the EP, Aglietta was directly involved in EU institutional reforms, fighting in favour of the European constitution as well as civil and political rights (and particularly against the death penalty and human rights violations in the world), and her federalist action was influenced by Altiero Spinelli's⁶⁸ European federalism. Aglietta warned against the risk that the sinking of a draft constitution would provoke and urged to continue in the direction of the Ventotene Manifesto by appealing directly to the fathers of European federalism Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, according to whom "Europe does not fall from the sky", especially when national self-interests and racism re-emerged with arrogance to prevent a Europe of the peoples⁶⁹.

Alexander Langer, from South Tyrol, an expert in German culture and ethno-linguistic matters, approached European federalism by different routes. Following his engagement in Catholic associations, *Lotta Continua* and different ecological and pacifist movements in his youth, he became deeply engaged in sociological, philosophical and cultural thought on nationalism and the value of diversity and coexistence, autonomy and cooperation to build peace and a sustainable future. In addition to play a leading role in the birth of the Green movement in Italy and being a tireless organiser of several ecological, humanitarian and non-violent initiatives and campaigns, especially for balancing the relations between the North and South of the planet and overcoming "ethnic" barriers between peoples and individuals, especially in the last years of his life he dedicated much of his efforts to the concrete development of projects to democratise the EU's structures and to initiate a federal political Europe. "To realise European hope"⁷⁰ was the objective that Langer – candidate for the Italian Greens in the 1989 European Elections and then MEP until 1995 and first co-chairman of the Greens in the EP – strived to pursue through his passionate and intensive activity. He began firstly by starting from direct experiences and evident local needs, orientating towards the creation of a supra-national and federal systems to guarantee peace, justice, co-existence and

⁶⁸ Cf. Adelaide Aglietta, *Il disegno federalista*, in "Metafora Verde", year I, No. 1, July-August, 1990, p. 46 (pp. 45-46).

⁶⁹ Cf. Adelaide Aglietta, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo. Bilancio di una legislatura al Parlamento Europeo (1989-1994) di Adelaide Aglietta*, supplement of "Notizie Verdi", January 31st, 1994, p. 30.

⁷⁰ Alexander Langer, *Con i Verdi per realizzare la speranza europea*, a programme manifesto of the electoral campaign in view of the elections of European Parliament, June 1994, p. 1. This folding manifesto reproduces multicoloured geopolitical maps of Europe and the UE.

ecosystem protection. Langer considered Europe to be a fertile ground to be improved and tilled in order to build a better future after the fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, reaffirming the importance of the UN, the OSCE and the supranational democratic regional federations, of which Europe had to set an example. The sudden removal of the blocks of the Cold War and the consequent recovery of the independence of many countries at once showed the need to counter the dangerous resurgence of nationalism, xenophobia and the discrimination that were developing in large parts of Europe, following the past and present political, economic and social upheavals. According to Langer, Europe should become a fully democratic international political actor capable of integration and openness, a guarantor of security and peace beyond its borders, a defender of civil and human rights in the world. The dramatic inability and unwillingness of the EU to develop an effective democratic framework was rather clear in the 1990s and throughout that decade, faced with the wars between states and ethnic groups in the former Federation of Yugoslavia that frustrated the efforts of those such as Langer, who tried to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and stressed unsuccessfully the assumption of responsibilities and effective interventions by the EU.

“Act locally and think globally”, the motto of ecological culture, found in Langer a careful advocate in order to overcome the nation states and to return to a politics closely connected with territory, to a “Europe of regions”⁷¹ and its integration into a European and world community⁷². He held that it is exactly this connection with territory and an ecological and non-violent vision that lead to an institutional order and a more appropriate conception of federalism to ensure diversity and cooperation among peoples in comparison with the nation-state. Langer offered a federalism characterised by a contextual shift in power and competences downwards (reinforcement of autonomy and local self-government) and

⁷¹ Langer, *Europa delle regioni o delle etnie?*, “Il Manifesto - La talpa”, December 5th, 1991 and in “Arcobaleno”, No. 46, December 11th 1991; Id., *Für ein Europa der Regionen*, in “Pogrom”, No. 174, December 1993- January 1994 entitled *Ein Europa der Regionen in Aufsätze...*, cited above, pp. 286-296.

⁷² Cf. Id., *Nazionalismo e federalismo nell'Europa attuale*, in Gustavo Zagrebelsky (ed.), *Il federalismo e la democrazia europea*, Roma, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1994, pp. 89-98; Id., *Politische Defizite der EG bedrohen Europa*, Kommentar über die Ergebnisse des Europäischen Rats in Maastricht, “Deutschlandfunk”, Straßburg, 12 Dezember 1991, in Id., *Vie di pace...*, cited above, p. 347.

upwards (construction of supra-national authorities and systems)⁷³. Europe should have changed just to meet precisely that “need of Europe” widespread among the population, “but always with a view to a federalist European integration of the continent”⁷⁴ following some specific guidelines: the primacy of the political union rather than the economic one, the opening of enlargement to the East and interregional cooperation with the Mediterranean region⁷⁵; establishment of a “pan-European community” with “different local markets”; solid social guarantees, with a strict social legislation; decentralisation; democracy; disarmament; linguistic and cultural pluralism; alliance with the South of the world and consumer and productive self-restraint, “a condition so that the planet can have a future”⁷⁶.

Langer considered “many of the so-called nation states [...], most [...] in reality pluri-national, [...] both too big and too small. [...] too big to allow real participatory democracy, to respect the requirements and the powers of local communities or satisfy citizens who do not want to delegate their voice to parties, lobbies or unions. [...] too small to be able to deal effectively with some of the great contemporary problems such as the environment or peace and disarmament”. The cosmopolitan and federal alternative stemmed from the consideration that “[...] the demand for decentralization of local power, on the one hand, and of supranational association on the other, are basically two sides of the same coin. European federalism, the cultural current that has furnished so many of the ideas that have nourished people’s aspiration to a united Europe, today must include both these aspects if it is to be convincing: it must redistribute the powers of the existing contemporary European nation states both downwards and upwards, towards regions and local communities, and towards

⁷³ Cf. Langer, *Diversità, autodeterminazione e cooperazione dei popoli: vie di pace*, (speech held at the Meeting “Localismi, nazionalità ed etnie”, Istituto Maritain, Preganzio Treviso, December 6th 1991), in Id., *La scelta della convivenza*, pp. 81-82 (pp. 71-85). Langer also intervened on the issue of federalism as an infra-national perspective to be advanced in Italy, issue that was disregarded and little deepened by the Italian Greens; cf. Id., *Il gioco dei cento cantoni. Il federalismo è divenuto un nodo essenziale del dibattito politico e culturale italiano. Una visione verde del localismo*, in “Frontiere”, No. 3, 1994, p. 5.

⁷⁴ Langer, *Pan-european Federalism*, cited above, p. 3.

⁷⁵ Cf. Langer, *Insieme con l'Est e il Sud*, in “Europaregioni”, year XIII, No. 23, June 12th, 1992, p. 222; Id., *Fratellanza euromediterranea*, in “Verdeuropa”, No. 2, May 1995, p. 3 and in particular Id., *Ethnicity and Co-existence in the East Mediterranean*, speech at the joint international conference “Palestine, the Arab World and the Emerging International System: Values, Culture and Politics”, July 5th-9th, 1993, Birzeit-Jerusalem-Nablus in *Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation – June 2001*, Bolzano, Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation, 2001, pp. 18-26.

⁷⁶ Cf. Langer, *Pan-european Federalism*, cited above, p. 3.

supranational federal bodies on the other”⁷⁷. However, it was also necessary to create “European regions” as “territorial communities well-defined through the importance of their common vital interests and a solid democracy of self-government,” cross-border cooperation to stop all the ethnocentrisms generating conflicts and disruptions⁷⁸. According to this ecologist from South Tyrol, federalism, therefore, was an effective response to counter the effects of the rise of nation states and guarantee democracy, participation and recognition of ethnic minorities, especially in areas subject in the previous years to the communist control in the Balkans and in Caucasus and offer prospects for peace in conflicts as devastating as those of the Middle East⁷⁹.

Langer outlined the framework of a Europe “united and more convinced, more real and larger, but also more complex and democratic” with a general rebalancing of power⁸⁰ and the creation of a common pluralistic European citizenship enhanced by the coexistence of local and regional realities, main actors of a political polycentric Europe⁸¹ in which the inhabitants were “fully ‘European’ and fully ‘natives’ in their local realities”⁸². The EP should have been transformed into a bicameral legislative assembly with a branch representing national and regional realities, and this would help to bridge the EU’s democratic deficit. From this perspective, the Maastricht Treaty showed all the limitations and the reluctance of governments to build a Europe of citizens, since it continued its policy of small steps, while it would be necessary to assign the European Parliament – following the outcomes of the Italian

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Cf. Langer, *E’ sufficiente il Comitato delle Regioni?*, in “Europaregioni”, year XV, No. 1, January 7th, 1994, p. 2.

⁷⁹ “Can Federalism provide elements for better solutions, in view of a post-Nation-State development? Perhaps the return of the Nation States – even as a reaction to denied rights and longstanding oppression – may be historically unavoidable in the short term, at least until it leads into a total catastrophe. But in the long term one should look further, and there are two developments which seem to deserve closer attention: a) the tendency towards supra-national integration, at least on a regional level (e.g. like European Community, and many other bodies with similar purposes: Organization for African Unity, MERCOSUR in Southern America, etc.); b) the tendency towards decentralization of the state, i.e. towards regionalisation at an administrative and legislative level so that power can be decentralized in favour of more local units, based on sharing the same territory, not necessarily the same ethnic belonging. True federalism means transferring power and competencies, decision-making and participation from the national level both to the supra-national and to the infra-national (local, regional) level.”; Langer, *Ethnicity and Co-existence in the East Mediterranean*, speech at the joint international conference “Palestine, the Arab World and the Emerging International System: Values, Culture and Politics, July 5th-9th, 1993, Birzeit-Jerusalem-Nablus in *Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation – June 2001*, Bolzano, Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation, 2001.

⁸⁰ Cf. Langer, *Regioni ed integrazione europea*, cited above, in Id., *Vie di pace...*, cited above, p. 334.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 335.

consultative referendum of 1989 that had revealed a strong consensus in Italy for European unity – the role of a Constituent assembly to draw up a federal constitutional project for a united Europe that would be subject to referenda in all member countries⁸³. In a report on the enlargement process Langer went further and pointed out that “for the path towards the unity of the world” and a “pluri-national community united in a single common law” and “to overcome the numerous and serious sources of conflict tension”, resulting from the multitude of sovereign states aiming at defending their own interests and the right to non-interference in the face of the crisis of supranational intergovernmental systems such as the UN and the OSCE, a pragmatic and useful answer could come from “the growth of integration processes from the various regions of the world which are more similar because of some homogeneity”⁸⁴.

Faced with the hostility to European integration by the Scandinavian, Austrian, Irish, Swiss⁸⁵ Greens and a part of the German ones, who considered it a defeat, an organisation enslaved to the market, Langer tried to impose his vision of an EU as “a rebalance and moderation tool”, in which peoples and cultures could find a “common denominator”, as well as a project in which to invest after the fall of the postwar division of the continent, striving, on the one hand, to counter “the Europeanism of those who simply want the new super-state, the new superpower”⁸⁶, but without disregarding, on the other, that over many years the EU

⁸³ Langer, *L'Unione Europea bussa alle porte. Davvero a Maastricht si può dire solo sì?*, in “Azione Nonviolenta”, No. 12, December 1992, p. 6 (pp. 4-7).

⁸⁴ Langer, *L'Unione Europea del dopo Maastricht*, in “Verdeuropa”, No. 2, May 1995, p. 4; (report on “The Enlargement of the European Union” for the Meeting of European Green in preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, EP, March 31st – April 1st, 1995).

⁸⁵ Regarding the Swiss Greens, resulting from the confluence of lists and parties (the first was even founded at Neuchâtel in 1971, while the first Green deputy in a parliament in Europe was Daniel Brélaz elected to the Swiss parliament in October 1979) cf. Andreas Ladner, *Switzerland: The ‘Green’ and ‘Alternative Parties’* in F. Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*, cited above, pp. 155-175; Simon Hug, *The Emergence of Swiss Ecological Party: A Dynamic Model*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 18, No. 6, 1990, pp. 645-670; Matthias Finger, Simon Hug, *Green Politics in Switzerland*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992, pp. 289-306; Clive H. Church, *The Development of the Swiss Green Party*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 252-282; Id., *Switzerland: Greens in a Confederal Polity*, in D. Richardson, C. Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge. The Development of Green Parties in Europe*, cited above, pp. 146-167. In July 2007, the Green Liberal Party of Switzerland resulted from the convergence of individual cantonal parties, a center-right ecologist party distinct from the Swiss Greens which gained 1.4 % of the votes in the legislative elections and some representatives. On similar liberal ecologist positions there are also the Green Liberal Democrats, a component of the English Liberal Party.

⁸⁶ Cf. Langer (edited by), *I Verdi in Europa*, (interview-colloquium between Alexander Langer e Claudia Roth co-Presidents of the Green Group in the European Parliament, June 20th, 1995) in *La via verde. Programma d'azione e progetto dei verdi italiani*, Florence, Passigli, 1995 (supplement to “Notizie Verdi”, year V, No. 13, 1995), pp. 118-119. As already mentioned, the majority of Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Finnish Greens converged on Europeist positions; cf. also

process also had some qualities healing historical hostilities, ensuring pluralism and leading to the integration of important economic sectors.

His reflection on the danger of resurgent nationalism against which opposing a federal Europe is extremely lucid and profound, as part of a global and ecological vision, in keeping with a historical process that is called to deal with deep changes, through new tools and spirit, to escape wars and implement a conversion or change of direction in order not to destroy the planet's resources. "Less and better" (less environmental impact, waste, pollution, traffic, cement, armaments, etc.) to refrain from reckless development, the sanctification of consumption and goods, and to encourage sobriety ("*lentius, profundius, suavius*")⁸⁷ was for Langer important individual and collective behaviors to be practiced to improve the quality of life and avoid destructive competition, rediscover the value of small things and "waste" and restore a harmonious relationship with creation.

A few months before committing suicide, Langer, as President of the Green Group in the EP to which he was appointed after his re-election as MEP in 1994⁸⁸, developed a draft plan to outline the group's position in view of the opening of the IGC, which was to reform the Maastricht Treaty. Langer, in a lucid and skilful way, suggested the essential reforms to make the EU progress towards a federal supranational democracy that would be ready to enlarge and integrate the East and, ultimately, the South of Europe. The path was forged: conferring full power and co-decision for institutional reforms to the European Parliament to be submitted to Member States for their ratification, eliminating the power of veto, allowing the entry into the EU through flexible integration and providing the opportunity to establish different relationships with any countries that would not accept an increased integration (referring to Art. 82 of 1984 Spinelli's Treaty). To create a Green Europe then it was necessary to carry out an ecological and social conversion setting sustainability and social justice as the main criteria for

Alex Langer e la speranza federalista. Un ricordo di Langer, in "MFE-zine", July 2000 (on-line monthly magazine of the European Federalist Movement).

⁸⁷ Langer proposed the overthrow of the Olympic motto ("*citius, altius, fortius*") and often returned to this question specifying the meaning of these statements and advocating a return to a "simplicity" of life; cf. Id., *La conversione ecologica potrà affermarsi solo se apparirà socialmente desiderabile*, in Id., *Il viaggiatore leggero. Scritti 1961-1995*, edited by Edi Rabini, Palermo, Sellerio, 1996, p. 146 (the volume is a large collection of the writings of the ecologist from South Tyrol).

⁸⁸ For an account of his activity in the European Parliament between 1992 and 1994 see Langer, *Rapporto dall'Europa 2*, edited by Daniela Detomas, Edi Rabini, Stefano Squarcina, Uwe Staffler, Gruppo Verde al PE, Bolzano, May 1994.

all Community policies; to renew the European social model ensuring transparency and democracy at work and opportunities for consumers to participate in economic decisions; to establish democratic control of monetary union; to apply a European ecological economic policy; to develop a common foreign and security policy determined by majority vote at a European level and aimed at the defence of international law and conflict prevention through disarmament and progressive demilitarisation; to ensure adequate protection of citizens' and residents' rights and make institutions more effective⁸⁹. Langer's suicide, besides depriving the ecologist parties and movements of one of its most valuable and creative witnesses, created a great void, but left a European and global political inheritance to be collected and implemented for those who want to build a federal and united Europe⁹⁰.

⁸⁹ Cf. Alexander Langer, *Draft Proposal for the Political Position of the Green Group in the EP at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996*, (April 1995), in Id., *The Importance of Mediators, Bridge Builders, Wall Vaulters and Frontier Crossers*, Bolzano/Forlì, Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation/Una Città, 2005, pp. 203-227.

⁹⁰ For further writings about co-existence and federalism see Langer, *Moltiplicare i confini o superarli?*, in "Il Dibattito Federalista", year VI, No. 3, July-September 1990, pp. 56-57; Id., *Diversità, autodeterminazione e cooperazione dei popoli: vie di pace*, in Id., *La scelta della convivenza*, Roma, Ed. e/o, 1995, pp. 84-85. About Langer's European federalism I dare to refer to Giorgio Grimaldi, *Alexander Langer: speranze e proposte per un'Europa federale*, in "I Temi", year VII, No. 26, December 2001, pp. 9-40;

http://www.mfe2.it/cagliari/documenti/Alexander_Langer_Grimaldi.htm. On the importance of building bridges between peoples and as for his commitment for interethnic coexistence see Giorgio Grimaldi, *Alexander Langer, "costruttore di ponti" tra i popoli*, in Corrado Malandrino (edited by), *Un popolo per l'Europa unita. Fra dibattito storico e nuove prospettive teoriche e politiche*, Florence, Olschki, 2004, pp. 193-212. The largest source of news and texts is at present the CD-Rom *Alexander Langer - Vita, Opere, Pensieri*, cited above. See also the web-site of the Alexander Langer Stiftung Foundation at: <http://www.alexanderlanger.org>.

THE GREENS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM MAASTRICHT TO LISBON: FROM NATIONAL DIVERSITY TO UNITY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC AND FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE

Giorgio Grimaldi

As long as the EU's life-threatening political crisis continues, its financial crisis will continue to destabilise it. At the heart of resolving the crisis lies the certainty that the euro - and with it the EU as a whole - will not survive without greater European political unification. If Europeans want to keep the euro, we must forge ahead with political union now; otherwise, like it or not, the euro and European integration will be undone. Europe would then lose nearly everything it has gained over a half-century from transcending nationalism. In the light of the emerging new world order, this would be a tragedy for Europeans¹.

1. From the Maastricht Treaty to the federal proposal by Joschka Fischer: the Europeist evolution of the German Greens

The last strong opposition to the progresses in European integration supported by the Grünen, which lost the first pan-German elections of 1990, was against the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty after its ratification in Germany. Four Green MEPs filed a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court on the grounds that the Treaty, violating federal and democratic principles, should have been considered unconstitutional. This initiative was more successful than expected since the Karlsruhe Court allowed the Greens to voice their reasons in two days of hearings, thus increasingly publicising them. The Court expressed itself in favour of the compatibility between the Treaty and the *Grundgesetz* (German Basic Law) while stressing the need for greater democratisation of European institutions and the protection of the

¹ Joschka Fischer, *Does Europe Have a Death Wish?*, in "Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences", Series: The Rebel Realist, June 27th, 2011, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fischer63/English>.

participation right of the Government, the federal Parliament and Länder governments in the evolution of the European integration process.

After a slow but inexorable restructuring of the party, which took place between 1991 and 1993² as a result of the internal defeat of the fundamentalist and anti-Europeist wing, who ended up leaving the party, the German Greens, urged by the group chairman in the Bundestag and former Minister of the Environment of Hesse Joschka Fischer, merged with the former German Democratic Republic civil rights' movements under the name *Bündnis '90/Die Grünen*³. The new party line, more reformist and liberal, took more Europeist stances - although since 1990 the Green Group in the Bundestag had been publishing a foreign and economic policy programme calling for a policy of openness towards the entry of all Eastern European states in the EU, including former Soviet Union states, in order to create an enlarged, federalist and unified Europe⁴ - abandoning the slogan "Yes to Europe, No to the EU" at the party congress in Aachen and achieving their first breakthrough with their manifesto for the European elections

² Cf. Ralf Fücks (ed.), *Sind die Grünen noch zu retten?*, Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1991; Gene E. Frankland, Donald Schoonmaker, *Between Protest and Power: the Green Party in Germany*, Boulder (Connecticut), Westview Press, 1992; Thomas Poguntke, *Party Activists versus Voters: Are the German Greens Losing Touch with the Electorate?*, in Wolfgang Rüdiger, *Green Politics One*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1990, pp. 29-46; Id., *Goodbye to Movement Politics? Organisational Adaptation of the German Green Party*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 2, No. 1, 1993, pp. 379-404; Id. *Alternative Politics: the German Green Party*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1993; Geoffrey K. Roberts, *The Green Party in Germany 1990-91*, in "Environmental Politics", 1, 1992, pp. 128-132; Id., *Developments in the German Green Party: 1992-95*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1995, pp. 247-252; Joachim Raschke, *Krise der Grünen. Bilanz und Neubeginn*, Marburg, Schüren Presse Verlag, 1991; Id., *Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden, was sie sind*, Köln, Bund Verlag, 1993; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa. Entwicklungsprozesse und Erfolgsbedingungen*, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993; Thomas Scharf, *The German Greens. Challenging the Consensus*, Oxford, Berg, 1994; Gene E. Frankland, *The Rise, Fall and Recovery of Die Grünen*, in D. Richardson, C. Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge. The Development of Green Parties in Europe*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 23-44; Margit Mayer, John Ely, Michael Schatzschneider, *The German Greens. Paradox Between Movement and Party*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1998. To compare the transformations of the German Greens with those of the Swedish Greens cf. Detlef Jahn, *The Rise and Decline of New Politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany. Resource Dependence and New Social Cleavages*, in "European Journal of Political Research", Vol. 24, 1993, pp. 177-194.

³ Cf. Thomas Poguntke, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, *Still the Same with a New Name? Bündnis 90/Die Grünen after the Fusion*, in "German Politics", Vol. 3, Issue 1, April 1994, pp. 91-113; Tissy Bruns, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Oppositions- oder Regierungspartei?*, in "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", 1, 1994, pp. 27-31; Detlef Jahn, *Unifying the Greens in a United Germany*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 312-318. Concerning the difficulties in obtaining representation and consensus in the former German Democratic Republic, despite the participation of many civil movements of 1989 in the development of the Greens in that area cf. Thomas Poguntke, *Alliance '90/The Greens in East Germany. From Vanguard to Insignificance*, in "Party Politics", Vol. 4, Issue 1, January 1998, pp. 33-55.

⁴ Cf. Die Grünen im Bundestag, *Auf dem Weg zu einer ökologisch-solidarischen Weltwirtschaft. Konzept für eine grüne Außenwirtschaftspolitik*, Bonn, 1990, p. 35.

of 1994, to the point of taking a clear position in favour of the European Federation in the subsequent consultations of 1999. Some of its members, such as the former '68 student leader

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (elected to the EP since 1994 in Germany and re-elected MEP as leader of the French Greens in 1999⁵ and again in 2004 in Germany and then finally in 2009 as the frontrunner of the French ecologist list *Europe Écologie* obtaining an extraordinary 16.2% of the votes) and the same Fischer (Foreign Minister of Germany between 1998 and 2005 and during that time the undisputed leader of the German Greens, who began in government in September 1998 forming a coalition with the Social Democrats later reconfirmed in September 2002⁶) have become among the staunchest supporters of the Constitution of the United States of Europe, i.e. a political European Union with sovereign powers and federal in nature. However, only at the beginning of the 21st century did the German Greens fully support the project of a Federal Europe and, in the words of one of its current prominent members, it can be said that from the European elections of 2004 “*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* were the party of Europe in Germany”⁷. The German Green Party took a clear position in favour of the EU's

⁵ Presenting his ideas on the future of Europe before the European elections of 1999, Cohn-Bendit spoke in favour of the establishment of a European federal state and, ultimately, of the birth of a European people. According to the leader of the French Greens, who also theorised about a “third left”, an essential step towards federal European unity had to be ecological cohesion (redirecting the European economies towards sustainable development), social cohesion (aimed at reducing the working hours across the EU and harmonising wages, workers' rights and social protection systems), democratic cohesion (through the tangible improvement in the living conditions of citizens through public and private projects and initiatives funded by the EU in partnership with associations and local authorities), political cohesion (through crucial institutional reforms such as the elimination of the rule of unanimity and the EU single representation in international organisations), Constitutional cohesion (through the merging and revision of the existing European Treaties and the development of a Charter of Fundamental Rights) and, finally, multi-cultural cohesion (through cultural exchanges and various modes of interrelation and knowledge especially among young people); cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Henri Guaino, *La France est-elle soluble dans l'Europe? Le débat enfin!*, Paris, Albin Michel - Fondation Marc-Bloch, 1999, pp. 127-131.

⁶ Regarding the reformist turning point of the German Greens and the experience of national government in alliance with the Social Democrats cf. Charles Lees, *The Red-Green Coalition in Germany: Politics, Personalities, and Power*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001; Joachim Raschke, *Die Zukunft der Grünen*, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 2001; Wolfgang Rüdig, *Germany*, in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Thomas Poguntke (eds.), *Green Parties in National Governments*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 78-111 (published also as special issues of the journal “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2002); Ingolfur Blüdhorn, *New Green Pragmatism in Germany-Green Politics: Beyond the Social Democratic Embrace?* in “Government and Opposition”, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004, pp. 564-586; Werner Reuttner, *Germany on the Road to “normalcy”: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government (1998-2002)*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Christoph Egle, *Bündnis '90/Die Grünen: processi d'apprendimento ed evoluzione programmatica negli anni della coalizione rosso-verde*, in Elia Bosco, Josef Schmid, *La Germania rosso-verde. Stabilità e crisi di un sistema politico (1998-2005)*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2010, pp. 111-144.

⁷ Reinhard Bütikofer, *As Greens We Need Europe and Europe Needs Us*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, Brussels, Heinrich Böll Stiftung EU Regional Office, 2008,

federal reform in 1998 during the debate on the introduction of the single European currency, viewed by the German Greens as an opportunity to take significant steps towards pan-European integration and make necessary democratic, ecological and social changes.

The proposal put forward by Joschka Fischer on May 12th, 2000 at Humboldt University in Berlin⁸ regarding a core group of federal states which the United States of Europe could be built around through an evolutionary process capable of protecting different identities has definitely become the most important contribution to the debate on the future of Europe, which developed before and after the signing of the Treaty of Nice (December 2000) and was mainly fuelled following this initiative. Fischer read his famous speech “Quo Vadis Europe?” aimed at the reconciliation of two needs: the creation of a European unity, no longer merely economic but political and with real executive and legislative powers, and the enlargement of the Union to the Eastern European countries, EU accession candidates wishing to join the Community to consolidate in some cases uncertain economic and democratic development as well as avoid explosive conflicts. The objective of the European federation stressed by Fischer explicitly intended to follow in the footsteps of that Community process started fifty years ago through the Schuman Declaration, which provided for the functional and gradual integration of vital sectors of the economy to involve Germany in a European perspective of peace, according to Jean Monnet’s view, which, however, has now exhausted all its own potential due to the establishment of a single currency (the euro). Fischer proposed the completion of the political unity of the continent through the creation of a federal state-organisation founded on a constitutional pact rather than on treaties, with a European Parliament and an executive body freely elected by citizens. He also believed that those countries available to move in this direction should form a “centre of gravity”, the original nucleus of the future federation, open to any other possible member countries resulting from enlargement. According to the German Foreign Ministry, the European project was doomed to failure unless it succeeded in

http://www.boell.eu/downloads/GREEN_IDENTITY_UK_web.pdf. p. 122 (122-124). Concerning the very detailed German Greens’ manifesto see Dan Hough, *The European Parliament Election in Germany, June 13 2004*, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 3, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), 2004, p. 5, at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-3-germany-2004.pdf>.

⁸ Joschka Fischer, *From Confederacy to Federation. Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration* speech at Humboldt University in Berlin, May 12th, 2000, http://www.macalester.edu/courses/intl372/docs/joschka_fischer_en.pdf.

implementing strong reforms and, first and foremost, abandoning consensus decision-making in the field of security, justice and home affairs and replacing it with qualified majority voting, as well as eliminating the right of veto, which would have created a stalemate in more than two dozen countries. By supporting the revision of the Commission's composition and the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers as well, Fischer identified a new overall and important goal to achieve: peace, improved well-being and co-habitation among the Eastern Europe countries and their integration with Western Europe, preparing a sort of Marshall Plan for the Balkans in order to avoid the risk of wars and nationalistic tendencies caused by economic and social problems. However, Fischer's federalist project proved to be cautious, putting the nation-states at the heart of the federative pact, thus attracting some criticism among the more federalist Greens⁹, while being strongly rejected by figures less in favour of supranational integration, such as the Irish Green John Gormley¹⁰.

2. From Euroscepticism to federalism: a brief overview of the various positions of the other major Green parties

Partially or entirely different reasons other than those of the German Greens (maintenance of East and West neutrality or distrust of the EU process, development of regional cooperation and more stringent environmental policies) have led other Green parties to oppose European integration. In particular, the Swedish, English and Irish Greens have

⁹ While highly appreciating his initiative, MEPs Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Monica Frassoni and the President of the Italian Greens Grazia Francescato (later to become President of the European Greens) intervened by criticising some aspects of Fischer's proposal, especially the provision for a Parliament made up in part of members appointed by individual states; cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Grazia Francescato, Monica Frassoni, *La UE ha spento l'Europa*, in "La Repubblica", June 6th, 2000, p. 17.

¹⁰ In 2001 Gormley affirmed that for a new democratic European Union for the people "the idea of a Union for the enlarged Europe and the Federation for the avant-garde as proposed by Jacques Delors and supported by Joschka Fischer must be abandoned if the essential integrity of the union is to be maintained. Indeed, the 2004 Treaty should not be a constitution for a federal super-state, but rather an International Treaty, which fully respects the sovereignty of member states"; see John Gormley, *Keynote speeches. Address to the Institute of European Affairs*, October 15th, 2001. Gormley also declared that he was sure that some people did vote against the Treaty of Nice in 2001 for selfish reasons, because they were not in favour of enlargement; quoted in the "Irish Times", October 16th, 2001; see Neil Collins, Terry Cradden (eds.), *Political Issues in Ireland Today*, third Edition, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 26.

spoken against developing forms of statehood in the EC and then in the EU¹¹, in line with the prevailing attitude within the other political forces in their specific national context.

In France, local ecologist parties¹² were already calling for a Europe of Regions and were against the nation-state by the end of the 1970s, including *Europe Écologie*, led by Solange Fernex in the 1979 elections, whereas the two European ecologist parties running for the 1984 European elections, *Les Verts-Europe Écologie* and *Entente Radical et Écologiste*, led by Brice Lalonde, both adopted an environmental and federalist stance. *Les Verts-Europe Écologie* set forth a federalist project influenced by French personalist philosophy (Proudhon), by integral federalism and regionalist environmental thought (Denis de Rougemont), while the latter, contrary to radical libertarian green party constitution explicitly supported the creation of the United States of Europe promoted by Altiero Spinelli. The term “federation” was directly used in the proposals by *Les Verts-Europe Écologie*, but the term “confederation” also often recurred. This indicated a certain terminological confusion since these terms were interchangeably used, although references to the union, the constitutional pact, the separation of powers and the principle of subsidiarity suggested that, despite their vagueness, their project for Europe could already have been defined in 1984, albeit superficially, as basically federalist and “ecologically” Europeist on a regional basis. In the European elections of 1999,

¹¹ The Ecology Party, formed in 1973 under the name “People”, as the first Green Party (renamed the Green Party of England and Wales) supported the secession of Great Britain from the European Economic Community in the 1975 referendum and spoke in favour of a strong decentralisation of powers, a large regional confederation and the affirmation of national identity and autonomy, supporting as a positive model the peaceful separation of Norway from Sweden at the beginning of the century; Sandy Irvine, Alec Ponton, *Il manifesto verde. Tutti i modi per salvare la Terra*, Padova, Muzzio, 1990 (original title: *A Green Manifesto*, London, Macdonald Optima, 1988), p. 210. Regarding a study on the early development of the Ecology Party cf. Wolfgang Rüdig, Philip Lowe, *The Withered ‘Greening’ of British Politics: A Study of the Ecology Party*, in “Political Studies”, Vol. 34, 1986, pp. 262-84. Concerning the development of environmentalism and the Green Party in the 1990s cf. Pippa Norris, *Are We All Green Now? Public Opinion on the Environment in Britain*, in “Government and Opposition”, Vol. 32, No. 3, Summer 1997, pp. 320-339; Jon Burchell, *Here Come the Greens (Again): The Green Party in Britain During the 1990s*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 145-150. Regarding the British Greens’ recent emergence out of the political marginality at the national level as well, after going through turbulent decades and hard times marked by a few political statements (except for the broad consensus achieved in the European elections of 1989 and their representation in the European Parliament obtained since 1999 through the amendment of the British electoral system for the European elections), cf. Neil Carter, *The Green Party: Emerging from the Political Wilderness?* in “British Politics”, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 223-240; Sarah Birch, *Real Progress: Prospects for Green Party Support in Britain*, in “Parliamentary Affairs”, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2009, pp. 53-71.

¹² In France, ecologist movements evolved thanks both to the presence of various associations for the protection of the environment and to the emergence of a strong movement against nuclear plants. In 1973 the *Écologie et Survie* list obtained 3.7% of the votes in the elections to the National Assembly and in 1974 René Dumont, a famous agronomist and expert in the Third World, was the first candidate for the Presidency of the Republic supported by ecologist associations and movements who obtained 1.2% of the votes.

Les Verts (the most important ecologist formation re-aggregating almost all the already existing fragmented components and led by Cohn-Bendit, symbol of the 1968 French student protests and a cultivated intellectual and politician returned to France shortly before the European elections) was among the few French political parties openly in favour of a federated Europe. Based on this political option, *Les Verts* opposed the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, questioning the EU mild reforms it introduced. In an article published in *Le Monde* on November 26th, 1998, the French Green MPs and the same Cohn-Bendit criticised the Treaty claiming it was totally inadequate and unable to achieve the objectives set out, namely enhancing the effectiveness of common policies in the field of foreign and security policy as well as judicial and police cooperation, strengthening the prerogatives of the European Court of Justice, adapting the institutional system to enable EU enlargement, thus bringing the EU closer to citizens. The French Greens officially declared that such a Treaty was useless and dangerous, presenting their concrete proposal for a European federation¹³. The new Europe would emerge by adopting the principle of subsidiarity, objectively dividing up competences and defining precisely those exclusive of the federal government. Currency, foreign policy, defence policy and border control would certainly fall within federal competences, while the remaining should be more appropriately positioned at the national, regional and local level. Moreover, the French Greens were very careful not to risk confusing the concept of subsidiarity with that of the decentralisation, even large-scale, of functions¹⁴.

Even the Belgian Greens, from the beginning, have been gravitating towards a national and supranational federalist approach¹⁵. Both the Flemish ecologist party *Agalev*¹⁶, which

¹³ Cohn Bendit e i deputati francesi: una Costituzione federale "per una rivoluzione democratica europea", in "L'Unità Europea", year XXV, No. 297, November 1998, p. 11.

¹⁴ Cf. also *Les Verts, Réinventer l'Europe...Et si le vert était la couleur du XXI siècle?*, programme of *Les Verts* in the 1999 European elections, preamble by Jean-Luc Bennaïm, J.C. Blau and Francine Bavay, Paris, supplement to "Vert Contact", No. 530, 1999.

¹⁵ Cf. Herbert Kitschelt, Staf Hellemans, *Beyond the European Left. Ideology and Political Action in the Belgian Ecology Parties*, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1990. Concerning the analysis of the affirmation of the Green parties in Germany and Belgium, viewed as the continuation of the emergence of "left-libertarian parties" in Europe cf. Herbert Kitschelt, *Organization and Strategy of Belgian and West Germany Ecology Parties. A New Dynamic of Party Politics in Western Europe?*, in "Comparative Politics", Vol. 20, No. 2, January 1988, pp. 127-154; Id., *The Rise of Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems*, in "World Politics", Vol. 40, No. 2, January 1988, pp. 194-234; Id., *The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989. According to Herbert Kitschelt, left-libertarian parties are a new type of party "combining a commitment to individual autonomy and public participation with a programme of social justice and economic

emerged from the development of the *Ander Gaan Leven* movement (literally “to start living differently”) founded in the early 1970s in Antwerp by Jesuit educator Luc Versteyleen to experiment with new Community and anti-consumerist lifestyles and promote democratic participation and environmental protection, from which it separated in 1982 to become a political party whose active member was Ludo Dierickx (1929-2009) leader of the European Federalist Movement and Altiero Spinelli’s collaborator and *Ecolo* (*Ecologistes Coalisés pour l’Organisation de Luttes Originales* – Confederated Ecologists for the Organisation of Original Struggles), the Green Party of Wallonia founded in 1980 as a result of the confluence of forces inspired by integral federalism such as *Democrazie Nouvelle*, a splinter of *Rassemblement Wallonie*, founded by Paul Lannoye, future MEP and President of the EP Green Group from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2001, who included this view in the statements of his 1973 manifesto¹⁷, maintained that the federal process inside the country, subsequently implemented in 1993, should evolve in a truly democratic fashion in order to merge with a future European federation¹⁸.

The political choice of a federation was clear and unambiguous to *Agalev* (*Groen!* since November 2003) and *Ecolo*, and was strengthened over the years. Since the 1980s *Agalev* has supported a deeper and more geographically extensive political integration of the continent, combined with a clear change in the institutional architecture of the Community system, considered essential for the establishment of a European federal state. This change entailed the Commission taking over the functions of the European government, the dissolution of the

redistribution which emerged in Western Europe in response to a growth-oriented, bureaucratic and antidemocratic political structure”; Mark N. Franklin, Wolfgang Rüdig, *On the Durability of Green Politics. Evidence from the 1989 European Election Study*, in “Comparative Political Studies”, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995, p. 414 (409-439).

¹⁶ Cf. Johan Malcorps, *Groen! – A Tale of Falling Down and Getting Up Again*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 39-51.

¹⁷ Cf. Benoît Lechat, *Ecolo, An Evergreen Story at the Heart of the Europe*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 28-38; Id., *La Marche Verte. Introduction à une histoire des idées écologistes en Wallonie et à Bruxelles (1968-2008)*, Namur, Etopia, 2008, http://www.etopia.be/IMG/pdf/Etude_2008_Lechat_identite_verte.pdf.

¹⁸ “Federalizing the country should be a process of political decentralization, and should not be the creation of two new centralized sub-states. The ideology of nationalism is rejected by both AGALEV and ECOLO; it is considered to be totally absurd in a country that must be prepared to become a part of a European federation. The Greens want the concept of nation-state to be dissociated from the concept of *Volk*, with its connotations of linguistic, racial or ethnic homogeneity”, Kris Deschouwer, *Belgium: The “Ecologists” and “AGALEV”*, in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*, Boulder, San Francisco & London, Westview Press, 1989, p. 49.

Council of Ministers and the Parliament, elected by proportional representation in a single European constituency ensuring the highest level of representation possible to the different political forces, acquiring full legislative, constitutional and control powers. Furthermore, *Agalev* proposed a European federation of regions acting in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and open to further accessions decided through popular referenda organised in those countries aspiring to be part of it. The Europe proposed by the Flemish ecologists was a federated space capable of enhancing autonomy at any territorial level, allowing voters to exercise democratic control, and attracting as well as encompassing all the peoples and states from the Atlantic to the Urals. Regarding the operative Community system, to which it was deeply opposed, *Agalev* highlighted the need to rebalance the economic and monetary union with the political, social and ecological union, without transferring powers in the areas of security and defence to a pan-European structure, i.e. also representative of non-members of the European Communities, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). *Ecolo* and *Agalev* promoted a regionalist-based Europe and the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly of European Regions to which the European executive was supposed to refer. This required a review of the European Community's competences to be extended by a European federation Treaty approved by an interregional Assembly, which was to include four major reforms (the subordination of the power of the Council of Ministers to the EP, the possibility of holding a popular initiative referendum in Europe, lowering the voting age to sixteen and eligibility to eighteen, the incompatibility of the MEP's term with other elected offices at a national level).

Among the other proposed objectives were: democracy in enterprises with self-management and small, eco-friendly sized production activities; the use of clean technologies; regional managerial autonomy of the economy; European monetary unification; limiting the influence of multinational corporations; opening Europe to all candidate countries on the continent to the EU¹⁹. In 2001, in response to an open letter on globalisation by the Belgian

¹⁹ Cf. Benoît Rihoux, *Belgium: Greens in a Divided Society*, in Dick Richardson, Christopher Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge: the Development of Green Parties in Europe*, cited above, p. 106 (pp. 91-108); Pascal Delwit, Jean-Michel De Waele, *Ecolo: les verts en politique*, Bruxelles-Paris, De Boeck, 1996; Marc Hooge, Benoît Rihoux, *The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999*, in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000.

Prime Minister, the leaders of *Ecolo* and *Agalev* further specified their concept of Europe: Europe was to be a more democratic institution, able to work towards an equitable distribution of natural resources, a policy of market regulation in accordance with social justice, sustainable development and based on conflict prevention, in order to achieve a more inclusive form of globalisation through debt reduction for the countries in the southern hemisphere and the strengthening of international cooperation initiatives aimed at them²⁰. The active Europeist and federalist role of the MEPs elected in *Ecolo* (François Roelants du Vivier, Paul Lannoye, Brigitte Ernst de la Graete, Pierre Jonckheer and Monica Frassoni from Italy) as well as the important initiatives carried out by the Green Energy Ministers (Olivier Deleuze and Magda Aelvoet, activists in *Agalev*) for the Kyoto Protocol should also be mentioned.

The Italian Federation of the Greens, founded in 1986 in Finale Ligure as a federation of local ecological and civic lists which emerged throughout the nation and a few years earlier had organised themselves into a coalition called “Arcipelago Verde” (Green Archipelago), began addressing the political dimension of Europe in view of the EP elections of 1989 and promoted an important conference, the International Convention “Verdeuropa”, held in Florence from October 29th to November 1st, 1988 with the aim of developing a comprehensive approach to the problems of the continent with a view to overcoming the division into two world blocks. A working group named “Il Paradosso Europa” (The Europe Paradox) was activated within the convention and coordinated by Vittorio Castellazzi (1932-2011) as a member of *Lega per l’Ambiente* (League for the Environment) and the Italian European Federalist Movement (Movimento Federalista Europeo, MFE), which expressed a federalist and European spirit in its conclusions²¹. The federal Assembly of the Italian Greens in Maiori, held the following December, decided to expand the scope and supranational collaboration of the European Greens through the creation of bioregional committees, starting with the “Mediterranean bioregion”²². In 1989, both the Federation of the Greens with its lists “Verdi Sole che Ride”

²⁰ Cf. *Reaction to the Open Letter: Agalev/Ecolo - Belgium* (signed by the secretaries of *Ecolo*, Jacques Bauduin, Philippe Defeyt and Brigitte Ernst and the secretary of *Agalev*, Jos Geysels), in *Open Letter on Globalisation. The European Debate of Laeken, 14-15 December 2001*, Prime Minister’s Office, Tielt, Lannoo Printers, 2001, pp. 121-123.

²¹ Cf. Vittorio Castellazzi, *Il problema della democratizzazione della Comunità Europea*, Verdeuropa – Working Group “Il paradosso Europa”, typescript, November 1988.

²² See *I Verdi e l’Europa*, general motion of the federal Assembly held in Maiori (Salerno), December 16th-17th-18th, 1988.

(Greens – the Sun that Smiles) and the “Verdi Arcobaleno” (Rainbow Greens) with their own independent lists resulting from the confluence into the ecology field of environmentalists, radicals, anti-prohibitionists, libertarians and non-Orthodox Marxists (mostly from the Proletarian Democracy Party), spoke out in favour of the European federation through the programmes presented for the elections planned for the renewal of the EP. The “Verdi Sole che Ride” called for the democratic strengthening of European institutions and local self-government requesting that the power of nation-states be reduced through European democratic institutions (starting from the EP) or through the reorganisation of the powers and competences of local and regional communities, by defining specific basic units (local urban districts, river basins, mountain communities) capable of designing and implementing regulatory territorial and government measures for eco-compatible containment and the selection of industrial and economic developments, as well as in general of the use of the territory. Federalism was described as the appropriate institutional system to reconcile the demands of local autonomy with those of coordinating collective interests, enabling the harmonious coordination of the various local authorities, ensuring the protection and support of local cultural identity in the face of pressures to conform to the dominant culture and xenophobic attitudes²³. Starting from their criticism of the regional policies of the European Community and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), their request to improve regional transportation infrastructures and their promotion of energy saving, decentralised production to forge a new relationship between citizens and institutions, ecologists wanted a new Europe based on two principles: a Community Parliament with real sovereignty and powers as well as immediate deliberative capacity, albeit limited for the moment, along with the prospect of federalism, which would give voice to local self-governments adequately reformed, adapted to and interconnected with a European dimension, necessary to address environmental problems and pave the way for ecological balance²⁴. Moreover, they highlighted the lack of democratic control over the decision-making structures of the EEC, which had become “a place in which

²³ See Verde Europa Lista Verde (Green Europe-Green List), *Idee verdi per l'Europa*, edited by Piero Villa, Federation of Green Lists, May 15th, 1989 (printed in recycled paper in Genoa), pp. 81-82.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

the various economic lobbies exert their pressures” rather than an institution truly open to the public, creating the “Europe paradox”, defined as the inability to perceive the undemocratic nature of the EEC “despite the widespread awareness that the fundamental problems of the future will be played out at a continental and global level”²⁵. The result of this analysis was the clear support for a European federal constitution, balancing the powers of the other organs of the European Community with those of the EP and in a reference to Spinelli’s project approved by the EP in 1984 which then ended in deadlock, while very limited institutional reforms prevailed in the Single Act entered into force in 1987²⁶.

The *Verdi Arcobaleno per l’Europa* differed little from the *Verdi il Sole che Ride*²⁷ in their proposals. In addition to paying greater attention to social and education issues, they explicitly supported the referendum on the allocation of constituent powers to the new EP in order to start a constituent process (a referendum which gained very wide consensus and, inter alia, had a number of candidates from the *Verdi Arcobaleno* lists among the signatories of the proposal), promote a European federal constitution to serve the people rather than the powerful or the businesspeople as well as the creation of a European environmental policy integrated with all other Community policies²⁸.

Despite the outstanding common result in the European elections of 1989 (3.8% and three seats for the *Verdi il Sole che Ride* and 2.4% and two seats for the *Verdi Arcobaleno*), the Italian Greens, who joined together only in 1990, were unable to develop a clear policy line regarding the European integration process. Infra-national as well as European federalism failed to become a priority of the chaotic Federation of the Greens, even though there were the conditions for federal action, confirmed in several official documents as evidenced by a passage of a document referring to “regional federalism”, as opposed to confederal federalism, as a tool for wider participation and responsibility, considered an expression of the defence of local self-interests typical of the Leagues (in particular the Northern League, which

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁷ The programmatic differences were, in fact, small and the presentation of a unitary list was almost been completed just before the election but was not due to personalistic conflicts.

²⁸ *Verdi Arcobaleno per l’Europa, Aria, acqua, terra: scegli l’alternativa. Verdi Arcobaleno liberi e verdi*, supplement to “Il Fiorino”, Rome, June 1st, 1989, p. 3.

was to become one of the most important Italian political parties, adopting an appeal to federalism as a political basis, also interpreted as the secession of the productive and industrial North from the rest of the country), which was approved during the meeting sanctioning the unification of the *Verdi il Sole che Ride* with the *Verdi Arcobaleno* held in Castrocaro in December 1990²⁹. The Italian Greens (*Federazione dei Verdi*)³⁰ were actually unable to grasp the importance of the institutional issues, with the exception of the accounts of individual federalist members. This inability, however, reflects only one of many points of weakness that since the 1990s has led the Greens to political and electoral decline, despite their participation in centre-left coalition governments from 1996 until their exiting Parliament following the 2008 elections³¹, the failed election of MEPs in 2009 and the beginning of a difficult path of rebirth “from the bottom-up” with the ecologist Constituent, which initiated the merging of the Federation of the Greens into a broader ecological entity, *Ecologisti e civici* (Ecologists and Civic Networks) patterned after the creation of *Europe Écologie* in France³² and launched in November 2011³³.

3. The second Green Group in the EP (1994-1999)

In the European elections of 1994 the Greens established themselves as a stable political entity of the European political landscape³⁴, they lost some seats (the new GGEP fell from twenty-eight to twenty-two members) showing an expansion of its consent only in certain regions of Northern Europe previously excluded from representation in the EP, such as Ireland and Luxembourg. However, there was no change either in the substantial insignificance of the

²⁹ *Verdinsieme: cambia la politica*, cit. in Mao Valpiana, Michele Boato, Castrocaro. *Verdinsieme*, in “Azione nonviolenta”, year XXVIII, No. 1-2, January-February 1991, p. 26.

³⁰ See the official website: <http://www.verdi.it/>.

³¹ For a short and sharp analysis on the events of the Italian Greens see Sergio Andreis, *Have We Created a Monster? The Rise and Fall of the Italian Greens*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 22-27.

³² For an analysis see by an historical Italian Green leader see Marco Boato, *Sei i Verdi diventano ecologisti. La lezione di Cohn-Bendit*, in “Mondoperaio”, No. 4, April 2011, pp. 55-63, <http://www.mondoperaio.it/Portals/Rainbow/images/default/Pdf/2011/4-2011.pdf>.

³³ See the official website: <http://www.ecologistiecivici.it/>.

³⁴ Neil Carter, *The Greens in the 1994 European Parliamentary Elections*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1994, p. 495 (495-502).

Greens in the South and the Mediterranean area³⁵ or in the crisis in Britain, where the Green Party failed to return to 1989 levels after the defeat of the reformists, who were in favour of electoral alliances. Ecology was no longer a major factor of political mobilisation, even though since the 1990s there had been a strong anti-nuclear campaign directed against the nuclear tests conducted by France in the Pacific Ocean and opposed by Greenpeace as well as a broad deployment of ecological movements and parties worldwide. Meanwhile, in the European context the Greens were starting to transform themselves from “alternative parties” into “reformist parties”, though without managing to become mass parties, also because of their more or less convinced and superficial acceptance of many issues they brought to the fore in the programmes of other parties.

The second GGEP was formed in July 1994 and is made up of as many as twelve representatives from Germany, three from Italy, two from Belgium, two from Ireland, one from the Netherlands, one from Luxembourg and only one member from another formation, the Italian Leoluca Orlando, Mayor of Palermo, founder and representative of “La Rete” (The Net), the civic and rights movement, particularly active on issues of legality and justice, while a Danish MEP from the Socialist People’s Party left it after only a few months to enter the United Left Group. In January 1995 the GGEP welcomed three new members, one respectively from Austria, Sweden and Finland, and in September the same year three new Swedish MEPs, after the first direct elections to the EP held in these countries.

Therefore, an unbalanced representation in favour of Northern Europe in the GGEP was expanded and Euroscepticism increased³⁶, though it was limited shortly thereafter when the Austrian³⁷ and Finnish Greens adopted more Europeist positions.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 498-499.

³⁶ In 1995, in the first elections to the EP, the Swedish Greens obtained 17.2% of the votes and four seats thanks to their strong opposition to the EU; cf. Jon Burchell, *No to the European Union: Miliöpartiet's Success in the 1995 European Parliament Elections in Sweden*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1996, pp. 332-338. Concerning Euroscepticism in Europe cf. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, 2 Vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

³⁷ Cf. Volkmar Lauber, *The Austrian Greens*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1995, pp. 313-19. The Austrian Greens (*Die Grünen-Die Grüne Alternative*, founded in 1993 as the result of the merger of two former Green parties, one moderate and reformist and the other radical and alternative, both formed in 1982), after the failure of their campaign against EU membership in the national referenda, did not work on withdrawing Austria from the EU but on influencing the union from inside. In the 2004 European Parliament election, the Austrian Greens, in a campaign co-ordinated with the other Green parties in the EU, were the most ‘European’ or ‘Europhile’ party, demanding “a transformation of the EU

The second GGEP was even more reformist and pragmatic than the former one, with some exceptions. One of the main reasons for disagreement was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), maintaining also different views on European integration. However, while the German Greens were now mostly in favour of federal development, the majority of the newcomers, especially the Swedes led by Eurosceptical founder Per Gahrton and the Irish opposed the EU's institutional development. This led to an "agreement to disagree" on institutional issues, instead of trying to reconcile opposing views³⁸.

In light of the proposal made by the CDU-CSU of Germany, which proposed the establishment of a "hard core" of federal countries and a multi-speed Europe, the Greens denounced the conditions of this model of unity created around the strongest member states, creating a separation between more and less powerful states. The Greens warned the EP not to support agreements among individual groups of countries on important subjects, like it did for the Schengen Treaty, out of the control of any democratic body.

Concerning EU enlargement, Langer urged members not to implement a policy of waiting rigidly imposed on Eastern European countries for their integration³⁹, but to promote a process of accession in accordance with the needs and cultural and civic heritage of those countries, aimed at building a common democratic house capable of offering EU association to those areas where different ethnic groups co-exist. To this end, Langer proposed that all EU parliamentary groups worked on a joint text of convergence regarding the results of the Essen Summit. This appeal fell on deaf ears with the result that the EP, divided and weak, could not

from a project of governments ruling like feudal lords to one of the European citizens, an extension of co-decision rights for the European Parliament, and an expansion of the common social and environmental policy" Franz Fallend, *The European Parliament Election in Austria June 13 2004*, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 13, EPERN, 2004, p. 3 at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-13-austria-2004.pdf>. Furthermore "Austria's traditional neutrality policy was to be upheld within an autonomous EU common foreign and security policy, focusing on conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution"; *Ibid.* See also Id., *Austria*, in "European Journal of Political Research", Vol. 44, Issue 7-8, December 2005, pp. 940-956.

³⁸ Cf. Elizabeth Bomberg, *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union*, London, New York, 1998, pp. 119-120. As for the Green parties' views on the European Union until the early 1990s, see also Wolfgang Rüdig, *Green Parties and the European Union*, in John Gaffney (ed.), *Political Parties and the European Union*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 254-272.

³⁹ Langer returned to criticise the Stability Pact signed with the Central and Eastern European countries, considering it an obstacle aimed at prolonging time rather than a strategy or a path to membership and stressed that the GGEP would have preferred that the newcomers had been treated in similar way as the Prodigal Son in the Bible parable; cf. *Central and Eastern Europe*, in "Green Facts", Plenary Session, April 1995.

politically express itself. The GGEP's criticism of the German Presidency and the Essen Summit focused on the absence of a political strategy and a view of European integration which took into account the Central and Eastern European countries and the lack of any control over some parallel structures in the EU and Europol⁴⁰.

On December 8th, 1995 the conference "European Union, global challenges and UN reform" was held in Brussels, promoted by the Union of European Federalists (UEF), the World Federalist Movement (WFM) and the GGEP, and the possibility for the EU to offer itself as a potential model for UN reform was discussed. In addition to discussing the EP Resolution of February 8th, 1994 urging the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly and the entry of the EU in the UN Security Council, this initiative was an opportunity for ecologists and federalists to exchange ideas⁴¹.

The Greens, however, continued to remain divided on institutional prospects: in the GGEP meeting held in Brussels from March 31st to April 2nd, 1995 and in that of the Federation of European Greens on October 14th-15th, 1995, they did not reach an agreement on the reform of the Maastricht Treaty, nor on the role of the IGC. However, after the Council of Madrid, the GGEP stated that moving to the third stage of economic and monetary union planned for January 1st, 1999 was premature, since crucial obstacles to achieving single currency were still unresolved, and highlighted a number of important gaps in the discussion and proposals of the Council in environmental, social, economic and immigration fields as well as on trade relations with other European countries⁴². In March 1996, before the opening of the IGC on the reform of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Greens again brought up the need for an EU enlargement to the East and South and supported the need to give priority to this political objective so as not to favour the birth of a core group of strong countries, the only ones able to meet the strict criteria to enter the monetary union, and a large number of satellite states. This was the concern of Gianni Tamino, who intended the common currency as "the obvious tool of

⁴⁰ Cf. *Essen Council & German Presidency*, in "Green Facts", Plenary Session, December 12th-16th, 1994.

⁴¹ Cf. Lucio Levi, *The European Union and the Reform of the United Nations Part I*, in Lucio Levi, Charlotte Waterlow, *The European Union & U.N. Reform*, London, One World Trust, 1996, p. 1. As for the EP Resolution cited above (No. A3/0331/93, February 28th, 1994, "the Union's role within the UN and the problems of reforming the UN"), see an extract in *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁴² Cf. *Spanish Presidency and Madrid Council*, in "Green Facts", Plenary Session, January 15th-19th, 1996.

a single political reality uniting multiple states inside itself, not as an end in itself”⁴³. The demands of the Greens were aimed at introducing the effective protection of European citizens and residents through the new concept of extended citizenship, sustainable development, a peace-oriented security policy, disarmament, preventive actions to allow for inter-ethnic co-existence and reform of the Parliament to be elected by proportional representation common in all member countries and transformed along with the Council in one of the two chambers of a real legislative authority. All this should have been part of a constituent democratic and participatory process. The GGEP tabled to the EP about fifty amendments to the report containing recommendations for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty (the EP’s role in the ratification of the Treaty, the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the strengthening of social and environmental policies, the introduction of referenda, positive support actions to women’s participation in public life, the extension of Community rights to EU residents, the abolition of the Schengen Agreement, the promotion of a policy of full employment, the modification of the Euratom Treaty, the redefinition of the status of animals in the Treaties, the taxation of capital movements and the introduction of Community minimum environmental tax in the EU), but few were accepted. Among them, however, the GGEP managed to obtain the approval of a provision guaranteeing access to EU documents, the opening of the Council’s legislative meetings to increase citizens’ access to information and knowledge of the Community law-making process⁴⁴, an explicit declaration establishing that a “real political Union” was the objective of the reforms and, finally, a statement demanding the power to ratify the Treaty be granted to the EP⁴⁵. Eventually, however, the GGEP, with the exception of a few abstentions, voted against the report supported by the People’s and Socialist groups, denouncing a lack of democracy in the IGC, following the failed involvement of the EP. The preparation of the broadest EU enlargement and the adoption of a single European currency were two important tests for the GGEP.

⁴³ Cf. Lucilla Quaglia, *Appuntamento a Torino. Le richieste dei Verdi per il semestre italiano*, in “Notizie Verdi”, year VI, No. 2, February 10, 1996, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Cf. *Intergovernmental Conference*, in “Green Facts”, Plenary Session, March 11th-15th, 1996.

⁴⁵ Cf. Adelaide Aglietta, *Il PE e la CIG. Molto fumo e poco arrosto*, in *Dossier CIG*, in “Verdeuropa”, No. 4, March 1996, p. I.

The co-chairman of the GGEP, Magda Aelvoet, appointed “minister of state” in her country for her active contribution to the federal process, presented the Green priorities in the area of fundamental institutional reforms in view of EU enlargement: the adoption of qualified majority rule in the Council of Ministers and the extension of the co-decision procedure in the EP on all matters. These elements were combined with the typical orientation of the group, aiming to create a social, ecological, political and at last democratic Union, able to correct and counteract the economic and monetary Union through the “constitutional method”, i.e. a European draft constitution to be submitted to referendum in each member country. Not all the Greens agreed upon the latter proposition, particularly the Swedish Greens, as had already been repeatedly emphasised, who clearly opposed the strengthening of the EU; however, the majority of the GGEP fell in line with these proposals as well as with the opening of the enlargement discussion to all candidates, with the exception of excluding those countries that failed to respect human rights (Slovakia and Turkey) from the real negotiations⁴⁶. In November 1997 the EP was called upon to decide on the Treaty of Amsterdam; despite the criticisms, doubts and the GGEP’s no-vote, a resolution presented by the People’s and Socialist Groups won a large majority⁴⁷.

Along with the Socialist Group, which gave its support only at the very last moment, the People’s and Green Groups voted for the admission of all candidate countries, including Turkey⁴⁸, to the European Conference, a body designed for discussion and debate.

The Luxembourg Council, however, divided the candidate states into two groups: the first group (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) was composed of countries that had already made significant progress in economic and social convergence towards the established criteria and thus were admitted to the negotiations, while the second

⁴⁶ Cf. Lucilla Quaglia (ed.), *Più democrazia. Magda Aelvoet parla dell’allargamento dell’Unione europea*, in “Notizie Verdi”, year VII, No. 15, September 20th, 1997, p. 7.

⁴⁷ The EP adopted the Amsterdam Treaty with 348 votes in favour, 101 against and 34 abstentions; cf. *Sì del Parlamento al Trattato di Amsterdam anche se mancano le riforme istituzionali*, in “Europa Oggi”, No. 11, November 1997, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Cf. Paolo Bergamaschi, *Nessuna discriminazione. Allargamento: il Parlamento Europeo insiste per aprire i negoziati con tutti*, “Notizie Verdi”, year VII, No. 22-23, December 20th, 1997, p. 6; Id., *Allargamento: il Parlamento Europeo insiste per aprire i negoziati con tutti*, in “Verdeuropa”, No. 9, January 1998, p. 7.

group (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) was further behind and required more prolonged talks and bilateral negotiations.

On May 2nd, 1998, the EP met in extraordinary session to deliver its final opinion on the economic and monetary Union as well as the introduction of the single currency in eleven out of fifteen member countries. The GGEP voted by a majority in favour of the euro, calling for the creation of a parallel social democratic Union in order to meet citizens' needs. However, within the group, there was one no-vote by Carlo Ripa Di Meana, former European Commissioner for the Environment, involved in the failed promotion of a European carbon tax and then spokesman for the Italian Greens from 1993 to 1996, who shortly after left the Group to join the European United Left/Nordic Green Left Group. The year 1999 also opened with the German Presidency, a country that by then had been governed by a Red-Green coalition for several months, and for the first time a Green minister presented the Council's programme. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, who opened his speech by identifying the adoption of the single currency as "an act of sovereignty and thus eminently political in nature" but a risk unless the EU decided to move forward to complete the integration process and transform itself "from a Western European Union into a Union of Europe as a whole" able "to operate at the global level".

One of the first key objectives of the EU would be a revision of its structural policy in favour of weaker countries through more decentralised, simple and eco-friendly support, as well as the reform of the CAP, basing it more on competitiveness, environmental sustainability, the needs of Eastern European countries and implementing it through cost reduction. All these would be combined with an effective employment policy, the rapid enlargement of the EU in accordance with a strategic view based on realism and pragmatism, as well as the strengthening of EU capacity for action in foreign policy. According to Fischer, to ensure the overall ability to act of the enlarged EU it was also necessary to abandon decision-making by consensus and adopt the principle of majority voting in as many cases as possible. European integration had made war within the EU impossible and its process needed to be continued in order to cope with the challenges of globalisation and ensure stability and peace, as well as

crisis prevention in the neighbouring regions of the EU. Fischer believed that the EU would need to be strengthened in four key policy areas: institutional reforms by going beyond the Treaty of Amsterdam, extending EP co-decision powers to all legislative decisions which the Council took by a majority vote and drawing up a Charter of Fundamental Rights with the participation of national parliaments and social groups; common foreign and security policy based on the values of peace and respect for human rights to facilitate effective crisis management; European identity in the field of security and defence; expansion of the Justice and Home Affairs policy to create a space of freedom, security and rule of law⁴⁹. Concerning the institutional reforms, for the first time the Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers clearly spoke in favour of a European Charter of Fundamental Rights and a European constitution. This fact caught the attention of Aglietta, who for years had tenaciously promoted the need for a federal Europe, a Europe of citizens, with a real institutional balance and citizenship, as well as stature as an international actor⁵⁰. The German Presidency ended with the Cologne Summit after going through the crisis of the Commission and especially the Kosovo war.

This tragic event gave crucial impetus to the revival of the CFSP and the start of a European defence policy as well as to the formulation of a stability pact for the Balkans, of which Fischer was one of the main architects. The Kosovo war had caused an even more decisive division in the ecologist movement between radical pacifists and pro-military intervention as a last resort in the face of rampant violence, particularly against the civilian population⁵¹.

A turning point that actually convinced part of the Greens to request military intervention to stop Bosnian genocide had already occurred in 1995 through Langer's appeal at the Cannes Summit, after the Srebrenica massacre in August of that same year.

On December 14th, 2000 the EP voted by a large majority in favour of a resolution tabled by the EPP, PES, ELDR and the Greens/EFA. By criticising the European Council of Nice for giving

⁴⁹ Cf. *Debates of the EP* (1. Programme of activities of the German Presidency and the situation in Kosovo), No. 4-531, pp. 35-36, January 12th, 1999.

⁵⁰ Cf. Adelaide Aglietta, *Cittadinanza. Un progetto oltre le nazioni*, in "Erba", No. 6, February 26th -March 4th, 1999, p. 8.

⁵¹ The conflict was especially harsh in Germany, where the same Fischer, during the party congress in Bielefeld in May 1999, was fiercely contested by some militants because of his stance in favour of armed intervention in Kosovo and as a result his ear was injured by the launch of red paint.

priority to immediate national interests rather than those of the EU and demanding that the EU Constitutional Affairs Committee adopted a decision before the start of the ratification process, it required the convening of a Convention, similar to the one established for the preparation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be attended by representatives of various EU bodies as well as the candidate countries to EU membership, aimed at developing a reform plan of the EU that would lead to a constitution.

The institutional issue now played a key role within the Greens/EFA and became a priority to promote more suitable policies and solutions to economic, social, and ecological problems as well as to demands for democracy, autonomy and security.

In 1999, finally, for the first time a German Green member, the economist Michael Schreyer, joined the European Commission led by Romano Prodi (1999-2004) as Commissioner responsible for the budget, financial control and the fight against fraud. In 2008 Lutz Mez launched a proposal to create the European Community for Renewable Energy (EREN) in order to enhance the development of the renewable energy sector and intra-European cooperation as well as make the EU capable of dealing with the energy conversion necessary to mitigate the consequences of climate change and ensure energy security⁵².

4. From Coordination to the European Federation of Green Parties

For a long time supranational cooperation among the Greens was weak, then the first breakthrough occurred in Masala, near Helsinki, Finland, in June 1993 with the birth of the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) featuring a pan-European identity as a result of the accession of several Green parties from non-EU countries of Eastern Europe⁵³.

⁵² Michele Schreyer, Lutz Mez, *ERENE European Community for Renewable Energy. A Feasibility Study*, Berlin Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008, <http://www.boell.de/downloads/ERENE-engl-i.pdf>.

⁵³ For an analysis of the peculiarities of the EFGP cf. Thomas Dietz, *Die grenzüberschreitende Interaktion grüner Parteien in Europa*, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997; Id., *Der "Club" der Internationalen - Die Grünen ante portas*, in "Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen", No. 2, 1999, pp. 433-447; Id., *Similar but Different? The European Greens Compared to the Other Transnational Party Federations in Europe*, in "Party Politics", Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp. 199-210; Id., *Les Verts européens comptent-ils?*, in Pascal Delwit, Erol Külahci, Cédric Van de Walle (eds.), *Les fédérations européennes de parties. Organisation et influence*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2001, pp. 199-212; Cédric Van de Walle, *La fédération européenne des partis verts: une organisation plutôt européenne qu'écologiste?*, in Delwit, Külahci, Van de Walle, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-153; Thomas Dietz, *European Federation of Green Parties*, in Karl Magnus Johansson, Peter Zervakis (eds.), *European Political Parties Between Cooperation and Integration*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002, pp. 125-159; Id., *Do the European Greens Matter? The Problems of Influencing the Decision-making in the European Union*,

This made it different from the European party federations of other political families which had been established since the 1970s. However, its federal structure, which included more than twenty Green parties, was still quite fragile and had clear and profound internal differences, some even irreconcilable, regarding the European integration process (especially with respect to the implications of a Security and Defence Policy), as a result of deep-rooted local and national tendencies and the lack of a more thorough common debate on Europe and EU policies. The impossibility of defining common strategies for European institutional reforms is confirmed by the lack of precise references on these issues in the common electoral manifestos presented during the five European elections from 1984 to 2009 despite the progressive deepening of the political content expressed in these manifestos⁵⁴.

The European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) declared its main aim to be: the democratic change of Europe, open to all countries on the continent, and its intention to adopt an open, active, constructive and critical stance towards the ongoing European integration process aimed at contributing to the process of world cooperation⁵⁵.

The EFGP was mainly characterised by two original features compared to other transnational party organisations in Europe: openness and pan-European vocation in addition to the support of non-EU country parties and a seat established in Vienna rather than in Brussels, where the Party of European Socialists, the European People's Party and the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party had their seat. All of this oriented them more towards the East and put them in a pivotal position between the East and West as well as

in Pascal Delwit, Erol Külahci, Cédric Van de Walle (eds.), *The Europarties. Organization and Influence*, Brussels, Centre d'étude de la vie politique of the Free University of Brussels (ULB), 2004, pp. 263-285, http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers_livres/theeuropartiesorganisation/fichiers/en_bookefpp.pdf; Cédric Van de Walle, *The European Federation of Green Parties: Rather a European than an Ecologist Organisation?*, in Delwit, Külahci, Van de Walle (eds.), *The Europarties. Organisation and Influence*, cited above, pp. 185-202.

⁵⁴ For an analysis of common election manifestos of the Greens in the European elections of 1999, cf. Cédric Van de Walle, *The European Federation of Green Parties Common Manifesto. Disclosing Distinctive Views of European Integration*, "Le Cahiers du Cevipol" No. 4, 2000, http://dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/dossiers_fichiers/cahier00-4.pdf. For an analysis of election manifestos submitted by the various political families in the first twenty years of direct elections to the EP cf. Matthew Gabel, Simon Hix, *Defining the EU Political Space. An Empirical Study of the European Elections Manifestos, 1979-1999*, in "Comparative Political Studies", Vol. 35, No. 8, 2002, pp. 934-964. As for national parties' manifestos for the European elections cf. Paul Pennings, *An Empirical Analysis of the Europeanization of National Party Manifestos, 1960-2003*, in "European Union Politics", Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006, pp. 257-270; Nicolò Conti, Anna Rita Manca, *L'Europa nel discorso politico degli stati membri: un'analisi degli euromanifesti*, in "Rivista italiana di Scienza Politica", Vol. 38, No. 2, August 2008, pp. 217-248.

⁵⁵ Cf. European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP), *Statutes*, adopted on June 20th, 1993 in Helsinki, art. 2, pp. 1-2. See also EFGP, *Guiding Principles of EFGP*.

between the North and South of the continent. The EFGP was also the only European federation of parties that presented a transnational political manifesto to the EP elections in 1994. The document consisted of more than forty pages explicitly aimed at changing Community economic policy through the introduction of green taxes, yet it neglected to include a definition of the Europe of Regions and was the result of a compromise among a dozen EU ecologist parties that still had very divergent ideas⁵⁶. Differing views on institutional issues and developments in the European integration process between “federalists” and “confederalists”, who only intended to establish transnational co-operation among EU countries and European regions on individual policies, made impossible the birth of subgroups exclusively composed of EU parties that would probably benefit from direct interaction with the EFGP.

In December 1994, for the first time the EFGP, as was the custom for the other European political federations, submitted to the EU European Council meeting in Essen a statement calling for EU reform in the interest of democracy, peace, environment and a reduction in unemployment. The Council of the European Federation of Greens was held from February 9th to 11th, 1996 in Turin in view of the start, in the same city, of the new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) opened on March 29th, 1996 and charged with the revision of the EU Treaties. In the meeting some previous as well as new differences emerged, but nevertheless a document expressing a two-third majority on the following five key points was approved: 1) EU democratisation, reform and enlargement; 2) social and ecological reform; 3) common foreign and security policy for peace; 4) civil rights for all residents and common policy on justice and home affairs; 5) greater efficiency, transparency and democracy of institutions⁵⁷.

The first Congress of the EFGP was convened in Vienna from June 21st to 23rd, 1996 to enable the Green parties of the old continent to define strategies and actions in the European

⁵⁶ Cf. Bomberg, *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union*, cited above, p. 78. “Europe is an uncomfortable halfway house, neither international nor local and for that reason uninteresting (...) for many Greens the notion of ‘Europe’ immediately conjures up the EU. It appears that for some green members their refutation of the EU carries over to a more general refutation of (or a least ambivalence towards) European policy (and their policy towards the EU in particular) has suffered from a history of neglect on both the national and European levels”; Simon Hix, Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union*, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. 26.

⁵⁷ Cf. European Federation of Green Parties, *The Political Position of the European Federation of Green Parties at the European Union Intergovernmental Conferences of 1996*, adopted in the fourth Council of Turin, February 11th, 1996, Brussels March 7th, 1996.

integration process. More than three hundred participants from twenty-nine different countries attended, but only two hundred were delegates divided proportionately among the member parties and having decision-making power. The introductory document extolled the role of the European Greens as being part of “a social and cultural movement that will contribute to the radical reform of society on four key issues: ecological development, security policy, new citizenship and North-South relations”⁵⁸. In the meeting the EFGP was asked to develop a powerful tax reform initiative based on the criteria of eco-compatibility and solidarity by adopting a resolution to gradually increase the tax on energy and raw materials consumption while decreasing the employment tax and its correlated costs⁵⁹. Furthermore, the Congress strongly objected to the results of the IGC presented in Florence and gave the green light to prepare the electoral manifesto for the 1999 European elections.

From February 26th to 28th, 1999 the second European Congress of the EFGP took place in Paris where, along with over a thousand delegates, they ratified the common Manifesto of the Greens for the European elections, the first version of which was prepared (and later amended) during the Council of London on November 7th, 1998⁶⁰.

This Manifesto turned out to be the lowest common denominator reached among converging views on a broad range of policies (social, ecological and civil rights) and institutional reforms (legislative role of the Parliament and the Commission’s control, replacement of the Schengen Agreement and Europol with other more democratic solutions, introduction of environmental taxes, reduction in working hours etc..) but again did not

⁵⁸ Cf. Paolo Bergamaschi, *Verdi europei. Rifondare l’Europa. Questo l’obiettivo del primo Congresso dell’eurofederazione verde*, in “Notizie Verdi”, year VI, No. 10, June 15th, 1996, p. 7.

⁵⁹ Cf. Id., *Oltre l’Europa. A Vienna il primo congresso dei Verdi europei*, in “Notizie Verdi”, year VI, No. 12, July 13th, 1996, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Concerning how to prepare a common Manifesto for the European elections of 1999, cf. Van de Walle *The European Federation of Green Parties Common Manifesto: Disclosing Distinctive Views of European Integration*, cited above, pp. 12-13. However, at the end of the process with the approval of the manifesto, the Danish, Norwegian, English and Welsh Greens still had reservation regarding the expansion of majority voting in EU decision-making. According to Van de Walle national political manifestos are classified based on three categories: the first includes very accurate programmes that address almost all the policies and adopt a precise position on federal, confederal or Eurosceptic European integration (programmes of the Green Parties of Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Sweden, England, Wales and of the Dutch Green Party *Groen Links*); the second includes less detailed manifestos with a limited number of concrete proposals and an undefined approach to European integration (party programmes of the Greens of Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, Italy and Scotland); and the third and last category includes brief and ambiguous programmes towards Europe and a few comprehensive proposals (programmes of the Green Parties of Denmark, Portugal and Spain). The Dutch Green Party *De Groenen* and the Green Parties of Denmark and Greece did not participate in the European elections of 1999 due to internal disagreements or limited resources, *ibid.*, p. 12.

mention the project of the “Europe of Regions” or the single currency or the European Monetary Union or the Union or the ECB, nor did it address sensitive and controversial issues such as migration policies and the CFSP, the harmonisation of tax systems, enlargement to include the Mediterranean countries and more detailed proposals against unemployment. At the conference, the debate focused on the revival of the fight against GMOs, agricultural reform and non-violent crisis management in Kosovo without excluding possible military intervention⁶¹. However, the EFGP took a stand against the NATO attack on March 26th, 1999, two days prior to the Joint Declaration of the Italian, French and German Green Ministers of the Environment.

5. From the EP election of 1999 to the birth of the European Green Party and the approval of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

After July 1999 and the European elections⁶², the Greens/European Free Alliance was formed in the EP, as a result of the agreement between the Greens and the regionalist parties with a progressive and Europeist orientation all joined together under the European Free Alliance/Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe (EFA-DPPE)⁶³. This bond, which so far has established renewed co-operation even after the subsequent elections, has found an area of common ground in the prospect of a federal Europe of peoples and regions, which many people consider instrumental in the pursuit of autonomy or independence⁶⁴. Moreover, it has

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Cf. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *Les écologistes: de l'anonymat au succès électoral*, in Gérald Grunberg, Pascal Perrineau, Colette Ysmal (eds.), *Le vote des quinze. Les élections européennes du 13 juin 1999*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2000, pp. 163-180, http://www.leuphana.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PERSONALPAGES/Fakultaet_1/Mueller-Rommel_Ferdinand/files/les_ecologistes.pdf. Regarding the general electoral outcomes cf. Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001.

⁶³ For information about this organisation, see the official website <http://www.e-f-a.org/home.php> and also refer to the essay by Marco Stolfo contained in this volume.

⁶⁴ “The parties of the EFA/DPPE are, in principle, favourable to European integration, as long as it reduces the weight of the states and a regional interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity is made. This means that the Europeism of these parties is fundamentally tactical and instrumental, with an evident dose of ambiguity as their criticisms of the Europe of the States are compatible with their confederal project of another, supposedly homogenous Europe of many more states, one that would coincide with the real nations”; Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera De Prat, *Political Parties and European Integration*, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009 (originally published in Spanish: *Partidos políticos e integración Europea*, Barcelona, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2008), p. 71. For an analysis of Green thought and nationalism that

coincided with the establishment of greater internal cohesion among the Greens in the EP, although it has caused some defections and tensions on issues of foreign policy and especially on the war in Kosovo, also addressed by centre-left governments along with Green members.

Just over a year after the signing of the Treaty of Nice, on April 9th, 2001, a seminar entitled “Nice and the Future of the European Union” was held in Varese, organised by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, an institution linked to the German Greens, and the Centre for Federalism Mario Albertini. A working group composed of scientists and ecologists was established to draw up a document on Europe by the European Greens, which was presented later at the Conference on the Future of Europe promoted by the Greens/European Free Alliance, held on September 24th and 25th, 2001, in Strasbourg.

The text is presented in the form of a political manifesto, defining the objectives of Europe as both the historic task of ensuring peace on the continent and the new one of protecting political authority by restoring balance between political and private actors to protect citizens’ interests⁶⁵.

In January 2002, the Italian European Federalist Movement (MFE) and the Italian Federation of the Greens formed a joint working group on Europe for a mobilisation campaign to urge the European Convention, which the European Council in Laeken in December 2001 had charged with formulating proposals and projects on the future of Europe, to draw up a draft federal constitution. The Greens-MFE memorandum of understanding is based on the request for two fundamental reforms to achieve a European Federation: the transformation of the Commission into a true European government accountable to the EP and the abolition of the right of veto in all decisions where it is still provided for, including the ratification procedure of the European Constitution, with the extension of majority voting on all issues of European importance and the introduction of the EP co-decision in all these matters. Furthermore, the

also takes into account the civic nationalist parties with progressive orientation cf. Paul Hamilton, *The Greening of Nationalism: Nationalising Nature in Europe*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 27-48.

⁶⁵ Cf. Varese paper. *Una visione verde per un’Europa unita. Dopo il fallimento di Nizza, nuovo slancio per l’Unione*, in *Volontà di futuro. Da Canberra a Perugia*, in “Mappe”, supplement to “Il sole che ride”, fortnightly magazine of the Italian Greens, No. 2, January 2002, pp. 66-74, <http://www.verdi.it/download/mappe03.pdf>.

Greens and the MFE also agreed on joint action regarding two other objectives: the integration of the UN democratic reform into the EU's foreign policy priorities so that all states and peoples may participate equally in global governance, and especially the intention to launch a global plan for sustainable development, from the Kyoto Protocol to controlling climate change and the establishment of a "European peace-keeping force" as part of the European civilian service, composed of young Europeans eager to contribute to the alleviation of human tragedy through methods of cooperation and solidarity⁶⁶, a synthesis of the proposed European Civil Peace Corps presented since 1995 by Alexander Langer and of the initiative promoted by the MFE for the creation of a compulsory European civilian service⁶⁷.

The European Convention (which took place between February 2002 and July 2003 and ended in the adoption of a draft European Constitution) was the real test of the predominantly federalist commitment of the European Greens and was attended by two Green representatives as Green members (MEP Johannes Voggenhuber, former member of the Herzog Commission to draw up the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000⁶⁸ and the Minister Joschka Fischer, appointed to represent the German government since September 2002) and five more Greens nominated by national parliaments as alternate members⁶⁹. The European Constitution, officially defined the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed on October 29th, 2004 in Rome and then subject to ratification by EU member states, unified, simplified and modified the provisions of previous treaties and represented an unprecedented opportunity to make the new EU progress towards further integration. Within the European Convention, the Greens, albeit with few members working with different political and social entities as well as voluntary associations, managed to include some proposals to

⁶⁶ Cf. *Una iniziativa comune Verdi-MFE per una costituzione federale europea*, Rome, January, 23rd, 2002, in "L'Unità europea", monthly journal of the MFE, year XXIX, No. 335-336, January-February 2002, p. 5.

⁶⁷ Cf. Giorgio Grimaldi, *Il progetto del corpo civile europeo di pace*, in "Quaderni Satyagraha", year II, No. 3, June 2003, pp. 169-194; Id., *Il corpo civile di pace europeo e il Parlamento europeo per una nuova politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell'Unione europea*, in "DIREonline", No. 4, March 2004.

⁶⁸ For a draft Charter of Fundamental Rights prepared by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the former German Green MEP Edith Müller and by the jurist Wolfgang Ullmann, presented at a colloquium organised by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Brussels on December 3rd, 1999 on the European Constitution, the Charter of Rights and Citizenship of the European Union cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Edith Müller, Wolfgang Ullmann, *Draft Clarification of Fundamental Rights in the European Union*, in Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, *Europäische Verfassung, Grundrechte und Unionsbürgerschaft. Festschrift für Wolfgang Ullmann*, Brussels, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 1999, pp. 127 ff.

⁶⁹ The Austrian Eva Lichtenberger, the Belgian Marie Nagy, the Irish John Gormley and the Luxembourger Renée Wagener.

strengthen environmental policies, prevent the integration of the Euratom Treaty into the new draft Constitution (in view of a revision by 2007, upon their proposal) and include conflict prevention in the European security policy as well as the partial recognition of the peace corps as a lesser form of humanitarian aid corps. However, in addition to the results of their efforts, two documents were crucial for the emergence of the Greens and Regionalists as the most federalist political force⁷⁰, regardless of some rather critical and radical opinions expressed in some situations by a few temporary representatives and the difference in views between Fischer, who often works in collaboration with French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and other ecologists regarding proposals on European foreign policy and the role to be assigned to states within the new institutions.

The first document is the guidelines for the European Constitution included in the paper “The Unity of Europe” presented by Voggenhuber in December 2002. While stressing that Europe’s structures should not be permanently defined, therefore, preventing it from adopting a federal system, he outlined the features of a supranational Republican democracy with a bicameral Parliament (the EP and Legislative Council or Chamber of the States) endowed with full powers of control over the executive body (the Commission), and provided for the abolition of the veto right in any European policy. Voggenhuber thus outlined a constitutional model very similar to a federal project aimed at establishing a political union⁷¹. The second document is an explicitly federalist draft European Constitution developed by three young members of the German Greens in September 2002⁷² and divided into three parts (the Charter of Fundamental Rights; definitions of peace, promotion of prosperity, sustainability and democracy as founding principles of the EU as well as of objectives, procedures, competences and budgetary rules; institutional architecture) contained in only twenty-four articles. It introduced a new EU consultative body, a Council for Sustainable Development, which should

⁷⁰ Cf. Jacques Ziller, *La nuova Costituzione europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003, p. 102.

⁷¹ Cf. Johannes Voggenhuber, *The Unity of Europe, Outline for a European Constitution*, December 2002, p. 12; CONV 499/03 Contrib. 202 of January 21st, 2003, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00499.en03.pdf>.

⁷² The proponents were Anna Lührmann (former member of the European Youth Convention in July 2002 and since September 2002, the youngest MP ever elected to the Bundestag and in the world, also re-elected in September 2005), Omid Nouripour (Iranian-German Green member and a member of the National Council of *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) and Jan Seifert, who was appointed President of the German Young European Federalists (*Junge Europäische Föderalisten*) the following October, in Lübeck: cf. Giovanni Biava, *La JEF tedesca promuove il referendum federalista in Germania*, in “L’Unità europea”, year XXIX, No. 344, October 2002, p. 20.

replace the Economic and Social Council tasked with ensuring the environmental sustainability of all EU policies⁷³. In view of the European elections of June 2004, at the conclusion of a process opened during the third Congress of the EFGP held in Berlin from May 17th to 19th, 2002, the European Greens established themselves as the first European political party (European Green Party), based on the Statute of European Political Parties, during the fourth Congress of the EFGP held from February 19th to 21st, 2004 in Rome, as a union of thirty-four parties from all over the European continent, with a common programme aimed at “federating” the many and still disparate ecological forces⁷⁴, particularly favouring the small formations of Eastern Europe.

⁷³ Cf. *Ersten Grüner Verfassungsentwurf o First Green Draft for a European Constitution*, on the website: <http://blog.jan-seifert.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/GreenEuConstitution.pdf> or on the website of the European Convention (<http://european-convention.eu.int>) among the contributions of the political groups. For more information cf. Agence Europe, *UE/Convenzione/Verdi: Progetto di costituzione dei Giovani verdi tedeschi*, Bulletin Quotidien Europe No. 8298, Monday/Tuesday, September 16th -17th, 2002. For a more extensive description cf. Giorgio Grimaldi, *Il progetto di costituzione europea dei Verdi*, in “L’Unità europea”, year XXIX, No. 345-346, November/December 2002, pp. 18 and 27. For a more detailed analysis of the activities carried out by the Greens at the European Convention cf. Id., *I Verdi e la Convenzione europea*, in Ariane Landuyt, Daniele Pasquinnucci (ed.), *L’Unione europea tra Costituzione e governance*, Bari, Cacucci, 2004, pp. 299-334.

⁷⁴ See *Verdeuropa. Pandora’s Box*, “Mappe”, supplement to “Il sole che ride”, fortnightly magazine of the Italian Greens, No. 8, February 2004, (bilingual text Italian/English), <http://www.verdi.it/images/stories/libri/mappe08.pdf>. In 2012 the European Green Party (EFG) is composed by as many as 38 member parties (*Partia e Gjelber/Green Party* – Albania, *Partit Verds d’Andorra/Greens of Andorra* – Andorra, *Die Grünen/The Greens* – Austria, *Ecolo* – Belgium, *Groen!!/Green!* – Belgium, *Bulgarian Green Party* – Bulgaria, *Cyprus Green Party* – Cyprus, *Strana Zelenych/Green Party* – Czech Republic, *Eestimaa Rohelised/Estonian Greens* – Estonia, *Vihreät De Gröna/Green League* – Finland, *Green Party of England and Wales* – United Kingdom, *Europe Écologie/Les Verts/Europe Ecology/The Greens* – France, *Sakartvelo’s mtsvaneta partial/Georgia Greens* – Georgia, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen/Alliance ‘90/The Greens* – Germany, *Ecologist-Prasinoi/Ecologists Greens* – Greece, *Zöld Demokraták Szövetsége/Green Democrats* – Hungary, *Green Party/Comhaontas Glas* – Ireland, *Federazione dei Verdi/Federation of Greens* – Italy, *Latvijas Zala Partija/Latvian Green Party* – Latvia, *Dēi Grēng/The Greens* – Luxembourg, *Alternattiva Demokratika/Democratic Alternative* – Malta, *Partidul Ecologist din Moldova “Aliante Verde” (PEM AVE)/ Ecologist Party of Moldova Green Alliance* – Moldova, *De Groenen/The Greens* – Netherlands, *GroenLinks/GreenLeft* – Netherlands, *Green Party in Northern Ireland* – Northern Ireland, *Miljøpartiet De Grønne/Environmental Party The Greens* – Norway, *Zieloni 2004/Greens 2004* – Poland, *Partido Ecologista Os Verdes/Ecological Party The Greens* – Portugal, *Verzii-Partidul Verde/Green Party* – Romania, *Russian Zelenaya Alternativa (Grova)/Green Alternative* – Russia, *Scottish Green Party* – Scotland, *Strana Zelenych/Green Party* – Slovakia, *Stranka mladih Slovenije* – *Zeleni Europe (SMS-Zeleni)/Youth Party of Slovenia/Greens* – Slovenia, *Los Verdes/The Greens* – Spain, *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV)/Initiative for Catalonia Greens* – Spain, *Miljøpartiet de Gröna/Environmental Party The Greens* – Sweden, *Grüne/Les Verts/La Verda/Verdi/Greens* – Switzerland, *Partija Zelenykh Ukrainy (PZU)/ Green Party of Ukraine* – Ukraine) and by another 10 parties as observer members (*Azərbaycan Yaşıllar Partisi/Green Party of Azerbaijan* – Azerbaijan, *Bielaruskaja Partyja “Zialonye”/Belarusian Greens* – Belarus, *Zelenite* – Bulgaria, *Zelena Lista/Green List of Croatia* – Croatia, *Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)/Socialist People’s Party* – Denmark, *Lehet Más a Politika/LMP* – Hungary, *Green Russia* – Russia, *Zeleni/Greens* – Serbia, *Yeşiller Partisi/Green Party of Turkey* – Turkey) and the European Network of Green Seniors (ENGs). Among its members and observers, the European Green Party has its own representatives in all EU countries in addition to Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Albania and Serbia. The following parties have submitted their applications for membership: *Social-Ecological Party Green Party of Armenia* – Armenia; *Demokratska Obnova na Makedonija* – *Dom/Democratic Renewal of Macedonia*; *The Green Party of Serbia* – Serbia. A newborn Spanish green party created to unify all the people, movements and parties with green ideology, EQUO, was largely supported by the EFG and by other Spanish green political actors in the Spanish general elections of November 2011; see the website <http://www.equova.org/>. The only European countries without parties affiliated with the European Greens are still Iceland, Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina



Among the latter in particular the revived Czech Green Party *Strana Zelenych* has emerged with many ups and downs⁷⁵ along with the Polish *Zieloni 2004*, created just before the European elections and characterised by a marked Europeist attitude, also shared by other Green parties in Central Eastern Europe⁷⁶.

This transformation, defined “historic” by Cohn-Bendit, for the first time placed a European political movement with a single manifesto⁷⁷ in a campaign conducted at the same time and in the same way in all EU countries, a sign of positive discontinuity in the still slow process of building independent and defined European parties needed to democratically build a Europe of Peoples⁷⁸.

and Montenegro. The Independent Youth Organisation of the European Green Party is the Federation of Young European Greens (FYEG) - <http://www.fyeg.org/>-, created in 1988 and headquartered in Brussels (2 spokespersons - a woman and a man who are as such additional members of the Committee of European Greens). The bodies of the European Green Party are the Committee (the executive body composed of 9 members including 2 spokespersons - a woman and a man who since October 2009 have been the Italian Monica Frassoni and the Belgian Philippe Lamberts -, 1 Secretary General, 1 Treasurer, 5 members), the Council (the General Assembly with at least one representative of each party, 2 from the FYEG), the Congress (extended General Assembly of 400 members with at least 4 representatives from each party, and 2 for the FYEG, which, after its initial founding in Rome in 2004, met in Geneva in October 2006, in Brussels in March 2009 and in Paris in November 2011), the Conciliation Committee and the Financial Monitoring Group. The delegations of the member parties must ensure the presence of at least 40% of the delegates (in the Congress and the Committee) for each gender. As a rule, in all bodies (Congress, Council, Committee and others) decision-making is by qualified majority vote (two-thirds) and a three-fourths majority is required to amend the statutes. Parties only can become members or as an exception particularly deserving individuals or MEPs from the Greens/EFA (by a unanimous vote of the Council ratified by the Committee). Within the European Green Party there are 4 networks: Green East-West Dialogue, Baltic Sea Greens, Green Islands Network of the British Isles and the North Sea), Green Mediterranean Network and several Working Groups (Common Foreign and Security Policy, Gender, Global Greens, Individual Support, Lesbian/Gay/Transgender People, Local Councillors, Social Policy, Statutes). There is also a political foundation of the European Green Party, the Green European Foundation (GEF); for further details see the website <http://gef.eu/home/>.

⁷⁵ Cf. Stephen Deets, Karel Kouba, *The Czech Greens Revived*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 17, Issue 5, November 2008, pp. 815-821; Petr Jehlička, Tomáš Kostecký, Daniel Kunštát, *Czech Green Politics After Two Decades: the May 2010 General Election*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 20, Issue 3, May 2011, pp. 418-425.

⁷⁶ Cf. Bartek Lech, *Ready for a Bumpy Ride*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 112-113 (111-116).

⁷⁷ EGP, *Common Manifesto for the European Elections 2004*. “A Better Europe Depends on You!”, 2004.

⁷⁸ Cf. Agence Europe, *I Verdi hanno lanciato la campagna per le europee. Battesimo simbolico del partito europeo a Roma. Divergenze tra i padrini Cohn-Bendit e Fischer*, “Bulletin Quotidien Europe”, No. 8651, Tuesday, February 24th, 2004, pp. 7-8. It is worth noting that Cohn-Bendit and Monica Frassoni spoke in favour of a budget increase to cope with EU enlargement, while Fischer, a leading figure in the German government who asked for a reduction in Community expenditures along with other countries, at the opening of the conference urged all Greens to support the European Constitution for Europe to enable Europe to strengthen its international role and contribute to political control over economic globalisation. Some discordant voices led to the re-emergence of distinct positions among the European Greens: on the one hand, Fischer’s *realpolitik* emerged in favour of the independent initiatives of individual countries to go ahead and agree on a common strategy, on the other hand, there was Cohn-Bendit’s concern about leaders who were likely to obstruct the path of the European Constitution. In addition, Cohn-Bendit blamed the German Foreign Minister for not proposing the creation of a High-Commissioner for sustainable development and for being too optimistic in assessing China’s improvements in human rights. Therefore, the European Greens spoke against the EU lifting the arms embargo on China and asked Europe to put pressure on Russia over the Chechen issue; cf. *ibid*. For more information see the website of the European Greens <http://www.europeangreens.org> and the one dedicated to the joint campaign for the EP elections in 2004, <http://www.eurogreens.org>.

After the EP elections of 2004⁷⁹, the Greens/EFA Group was re-founded by obtaining more or less forty elected members, including two independent MEPs elected in the Swedish anti-fraud and Dutch anti-corruption Europe Transparent⁸⁰.

Monica Frassoni and Daniel Cohn-Bendit were re-elected Spokespersons for the Group from 2001 to 2009. They led the Greens/EFA in their federal commitment in support of the European Constitution, while stressing many people's dissatisfaction with the final text adopted by the IGC and signed by the Member States, and later on with the Treaty of Lisbon as well, after their failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe following the "no" votes in the French and Dutch referenda in May and June 2005. On November 16th, 2004, the Greens/EFA Group approved a motion tabled by Voggenhuber entitled "Yes to a European Constitution"⁸¹. This motion established the task of ecologists which was not to prevent the adoption of the Constitution, which would have created a very serious crisis and would probably have marked the end of institutional reforms since negotiations between twenty-five countries would have had to be re-opened, but rather to approve it and then request that it be amended, thus the position they adopted was clearly different from that of the European Left, which voted against the Treaty. The Greens complained about the absence of a single European referendum on the popular ratification of the European Constitution and committed

⁷⁹ Cf. Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Hermann Schmitt, *The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?*, in "West European Politics" Vol. 28, No. 3, May 2005, pp. 650-679; Id. (ed.), *European Parliament Elections After Eastern Enlargement*, London, Routledge, 2010.

⁸⁰ Cf. Neil Carter, *Mixed Fortunes: The Greens in the 2004 European Parliament Election* in "Environmental Politics", Vol. 14, No. 1, February 2005, pp. 103-111. Among the elected members, for the first time there was a representative of the Spanish Green Party *Los Verdes*, who was elected thanks to an agreement with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). In Spain there is also the *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* (ICV), a Catalanian Red-Green party resulting from the merging of left and separatist parties in the region with an eco-socialist and pacifist orientation, formally constituted in 1990. It is currently in the Catalan government and since 2004 has had an elected MEP. The ICV is the only case of a Green Party organised on a regional basis and, unlike most Green Parties, although advocating a supranational Europe and further enlargements, has adopted a firm stance against the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. With respect to the intertwining of ecology, Community federalism, self-determination and Leninism inside the ICV and more generally to the comparison of the electoral manifestos of the Green Parties presented by the six largest EU countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland) in the European elections of 2004 with elected members (*Bündnis '90/Die Grünen*, *Les Verts*, Greens, Green Federation, ICV) and for an analysis of the manifestos of 42 national European parties from every political family in the same countries cf. C. Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat, *Political Parties and European Integration*, cited above, Ch. 4, *The Parties of the EGP*, pp. 167-185 and p. 249. For a historical overview of the relationship between ecologist movements and parties and nationalities cf. Giorgio Grimaldi, *Movimenti ecologisti e partiti verdi in Spagna tra difesa del territorio e affermazione dell'autonomia e delle nazionalità*, in Alfonso Botti (ed.), *Le patrie degli spagnoli. Spagna democratica e questioni nazionali (1975-2005)*, Milan, Bruno Mondadori, 2007, pp. 224-254.

⁸¹ Regarding the stance adopted by the Greens/EFA Group on the European Constitution cf. Johannes Voggenhuber, *Yes to European Constitution. The Path Towards the Future of Europe Does not Lead Back to Nice*, Strasbourg, November 15th, 2004, pp. 5, <http://www.zieloni2004.pl/art-503.htm>.

themselves, once it was approved, to asking the EP to convene a new Convention and propose the ratification of a “first amendment” to extend the co-decision method and qualified majority voting to all Community matters, abolish the use of the IGC for constitutional amendments, reform the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Defence Policy (ESDP) making war unlawful and allowing European military initiatives only upon the assent of the EP vote, create an area of security, justice and social solidarity, while also establishing the objective of full employment and the use of European laws to define common social standards and a minimum corporation tax⁸².

On January 12th, 2005, the European Parliament approved the draft European Constitution by a large majority (500 yes, 137 no and 40 abstained). 80% of the Greens /EFA Group voted in favour and only seven MEPs (British, Spanish, Swedish and one Belgian) voted against it. In the vote, the Greens/EFA Group turned out to be the third most united parliamentary group after the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Party of European Socialists (PES). Two amendments to the Corbett-Mendez de Vigo report on the European Constitution tabled by the Greens were also approved by the EP: the first emphasised their willingness to use the right of initiative (European Citizens’ Initiative) provided for the new Constitutional Treaty once it entered into force⁸³; and the second, presented along with the PES and the European People’s Party - Christian Democrats (EPP-ED) recognised the role of civil society representation in the ratification debate and encouraged the launch of initiatives to promote the active involvement of European citizens in the debate on institutional reforms.

On February 17th, 2005, during an extraordinary Council Meeting in Brussels, the European Greens adopted a resolution in favour of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for

⁸² Cf. *I Verdi: ratifica della Costituzione e Convenzione costituyente*, in “L’Unità europea”, year XXXI, No. 370, December 2004, p. 16. Regarding the assessment of the European Constitution cf. Nicola Vallinoto (ed.), *Europa: che fare? Intervista a Monica Frassonì, co-Presidente del Gruppo dei Verdi/ALE al Parlamento europeo*, January 28th, 2005, available on the website http://italy.peacelink.org/europace/articles/art_9355.html and now also on “Il Dibattito Federalista”, year XXI, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 33-35.

⁸³ The instrument of the European Citizens’ Initiative will be used as of April 2012 following the approval of EU Regulation No. 211/2011 of the EP and the Council.

Europe by a large majority (51 votes in favour and 7 against), with only four parties out of thirty-two casting a negative vote (the Swedish, Danish⁸⁴, Norwegian⁸⁵ and Greek Green Parties)⁸⁶.

This was a victory for federalist ecologists, who were probably more numerous among the members elected than among the voters, some of which (about 50%, according to the polls) voted against the European Constitution in referenda in France and Holland (May 29th and 1st June, 2005), precisely the countries where the Constitutional Treaty was rejected⁸⁷, thus marking its abandonment. However, the majority of its content was maintained in the Lisbon Treaty with the exception of symbols, the revision of legislative instruments and the designation of certain key positions (the Minister of Foreign Affairs was renamed the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 and eventually ratified; however, its ratification was not so smooth after the negative referendum of June 2008 in Ireland and the resistance of other countries (Poland, the Czech Republic). It entered into force on December 1st, 2009.

⁸⁴ The small Danish party *De Grønne* founded in 1983, currently having no political significance, was expelled from the European Greens in 2008 because of its collaboration with *The People's Movement Against the EU*, Denmark's traditional Eurosceptic formation, with other similar parties in addition to *The June List*.

⁸⁵ *Miljøpartiet De Grønne* is a very marginal party founded in 1988 with only elected local authorities. The great differences among the Green Parties of the Nordic region should also be taken into account, both in terms of ideological consistency and political platform as well as in relation to European integration. While the Finnish Greens began to support integration in the late 1990s, in particular demonstrating their support of EU enlargement to the East as well as a tax reform to introduce a European tax on energy and raw materials in order to reduce labour and income taxes, the Swedish Greens are still Eurosceptic. The Danish Socialist People's Party *Socialistisk Folkeparti*, joining the European Greens as observers and originally strongly Eurosceptic is in the middle. Finally, the Icelandic Red-Green Movement *Vinstrihreyfingin - grænt framboð*, founded in 1999 and in the government since 2009 in a centre-left coalition with 21.7% of the votes and 14 seats, has emerged. This party is not part of the European Greens and is against NATO and EU membership, but curiously it is in the government of a country that has just applied for EU membership following a severe economic crisis. For a discussion of the differences among the Nordic Greens in an analysis of the different political families in those countries cf. Gunnar Grendstad, *Reconsidering Nordic Party Space*, in "Scandinavian Political Studies", Vol. 26, No. 3, 2003, pp. 193-217.

⁸⁶ European Greens, *Adopted Resolution of the European Green Party on the EU Constitutional Treaty*, European Green Party Extraordinary Council Meeting, Brussels, February 17th, 2005, http://www.heide-ruehle.de/heide/artikel/298/doc/reso_verfassung_european_greens.pdf, <http://www.politics.ie/forum/green-party/303-expected-88-european-greens-say-yes-new-eu-treaty.html>.

⁸⁷ Regarding the national parties' stances in the referenda on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe cf. Ben Crum, *Party Stances in the Referendums on the EU Constitution. Causes and Consequences of Competition and Collusion*, in "European Union Politics", Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, pp. 61-82.

6. Towards the European elections of 2009 and beyond: prospects of an ecological federalism

The European Greens have confirmed their strongly Europeist view even in recent years. At the Second Congress of the European Green Party, held in October 2006 in Geneva, they approved the joint declaration “A Green Future for Europe”, containing their official common position on European integration. In it, the EU was considered an international project for peace and human rights, a model for the sustainable future of the planet designed to defend the European social model, consumer rights and health as well as promote a green economy and a new globalisation based on democracy, respect for diversity, equality, rule of law and the strengthening of the EP’s supranational power, in particular by ensuring its legislative initiative power and the allocation of a percentage of seats directly to the European parties⁸⁸.

In November 2006, the French Green MEP Gérard Onesta, Vice President of the EP and member of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs as well as a staunch European federalist, put forward Plan A+ , aimed at a detailed analysis of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, simplifying it and overcoming delays in the ratification process. Onesta proposed changing the structure of the Treaty by dividing it into a constitutional section (Charter of Rights, principles and institutions), subject to European trans-national referendum to be held simultaneously throughout the EU, and another section containing all other provisions related to policies and protocols. Preserving the essence of the Treaty, Plan A+ introduced limited but important changes in the Treaty’s ratification and revision procedures, i.e. the EP’s approval and at least four-fifths of national parliaments for the entry into force of the Treaty and any possible amendments to it⁸⁹. In the 2009 EP election the Green/EFA Group was reconstituted⁹⁰

⁸⁸ For the English text of the resolution see

http://europeangreens.eu/fileadmin/logos/pdf/policy_documents/Future_for_Europe.English.pdf.

⁸⁹ For the English and French version of Plan A+, divided into three sections (Action Plan, New Constitution, New Treaty), see Gérard Onesta, *Le Plan A+, Relance du processus constitutionnel européen*, automne 2006, <http://www.onesta.net/planA+.html>; Id., *Plan A+: Revival of the European Constitutional Process*, Autumn 2006, <http://www.onesta.net/planA+anglais.html>.

⁹⁰ Its official website is <http://www.greens-efa.org/>.

and increased its members from 42 to 55, re-emerging as the fourth largest party group in the EP⁹¹.

Also joining the Group were the Swedish Pirate Party whose successful single-issue agenda was dominated by related issues of digital file sharing and online privacy, obtaining 7.1 % of the votes and one mandate, and an Estonian independent candidate Indrek Tarand, a contingent national individual triumph generated by “popular dissatisfaction” and the “change from open to closed electoral lists in EP elections”⁹². However, the real surprise was the new pro-integrationist political force the French *Europe Écologie*, a coalition of Greens, regionalists, environmentalists and representatives of NGOs led by Cohn-Bendit, that obtained 16.3% of the votes and 13 elected Greens plus one Corsican regionalist, including the anti-globalisation activist and former opponent of the Lisbon Treaty José Bové, and won the same number of seats in the EP as the French Socialist Party⁹³. In addition to the German and Finnish Greens, the Danish Socialist People’s Party (SPP) also performed well (15.9% and two seats), electing Margrete Auken, a well-known politician originally against Denmark joining the European Community in 1972 (like the party, until recently) and converted over to a pragmatic and pro-EU view “because it [the EU] can do more for the environment than states can by themselves”⁹⁴. Finally, the Greek Greens obtained their first MEP and the Luxembourg Green Party received 16.8%, while the Dutch Green Left won two seats in a polarised environment where “the parties that prospered most were those with the most clear-cut positions on Europe, whether it was the Euroscepticism of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party or the pro-integrationist platforms of D66

⁹¹ See Neil Carter, *The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 19, No. 2, March 2010, pp. 295-302.

⁹² Allan Sikk, *The European Parliament Election in Estonia, June 7, 2009*, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 41, EPERN, 2009, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-41-estonia-2009.pdf>.

⁹³ “Europe Ecology proposed a ‘Brussels for Employment’ (*Bruxelles de l’emploi*) summit to address both the economic crisis and environmental concerns by transforming the EU into a low-carbon economy and thereby creating 10 million jobs over five years. The movement also called for a European Renewable Energy Community and for the replacement of the Stability and Growth Pact with a pact for environmental cooperation”; Sally Marthaler, *The European Parliament Election in France, June 7th, 2009*, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 31, EPERN, 2009, p. 5, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-31-france-2009.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Ann-Christina L. Knudsen., *The European Parliament Election in Denmark, June 7th, 2009*, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 42, EPERN, 2009, p. 11, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-42-denmark-2009.pdf>. Earlier on, the choice of Danish MEP and member of the SPP John Iversen to leave the Eurosceptical EP Group the Unitary European Left and join the Green Group was due to different views on the June 2nd, 1991 Danish referendum rejecting the Maastricht Treaty.

and Green Left”⁹⁵. In Austria, the Greens changed their top candidate and Johannes Voggenhuber, prominent MEP since 1995, was not re-nominated. This decision was prompted by the party’s disappointing results whereas the new party led by Ulrike Lunacek “attempted to develop a clearer profile, intensify contacts with (EU- and Lisbon Treaty - critical) NGOs, such as Attac, and present new faces”. The public internal strife emerged with negative electoral outcome. Moreover, the Austrian Greens were the only voice in favour of continuing negotiations in order to support the reform process in Turkey and make future Turkish EU accession possible⁹⁶.

To sum up, in concluding his analysis of the Green European vote in 2009 Carter notes that:

- the internal quarrels and factionalism, like in Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy have damaged the Green parties;
- the collapse of left-wing parties has helped the Greens increase consensus, in the same way their choice of being ‘neither right nor left’ as well as the leftist identity of the majority of their voters has had a positive influence;
- their willingness to campaign for a distinctively European programme was important “but it is hard to separate this from the specific support for the Greens among voters concerned about the environment who see the EU as the natural forum in which to address transboundary issues”;
- “given the predominantly national basis of the election electoral campaigns, with little attention given to EU issues, it is doubtful that many voters could really identify the Greens as being obviously concerned about EU issues”;
- finally, the Greens “remain ill-balanced”, having made little progress in Central-Eastern and South Mediterranean Europe⁹⁷.

⁹⁵ Stijn van Kessel, Ben Crum, *The European Parliament Elections in the Netherlands*, June 7th, 2009, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 28, EPERN, 2009, p. 10, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-28-netherlands-2009.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Franz Fallend, *The European Parliament elections Austria*, 7 June 2009, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 43, EPERN, 2009, p. 7 at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-no-43-austria-2009.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Cf. Carter, *The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election*, cited above, p. 301.

The European Green Party programme, “Green New Deal for Europe”⁹⁸, mainly intended to outline the so-called green economy and the promotion of sustainable economy and mixed measures, incentives and binding targets in order to combat climate change, including the creation of 5 million new ‘green collar’ jobs over the 5-year lifetime of the EP as well as public investments in green technologies and technology services. Its strong environmental, pragmatist and European disposition may be able to explain this outcome, even if European issues were rather marginalised during the national elections and, in some cases, the Greens and Socialists attracted votes from disappointed socialist and left-wing voters.

A distinctive Green European profile was affirmed in the 2009 European election but “it is hard to separate this from the specific support for the Greens among voters concerned about the environment who see the EU as the natural forum in which to address transboundary issues”, while “given the predominantly national basis of the election campaigns, with little attention given to EU issues, it is doubtful that many voters could really identify the Greens as being obviously concerned about EU issues”⁹⁹.

Now the Greens are emerging as an international and worldwide political force organised in networks and regional federations¹⁰⁰.

Up to now, the Green parties have been experiencing a long-standing identity crisis and, despite some progress and a significant amount of experience in institutional participation in various countries, do not enjoy sufficient support and organisation to take the lead in profoundly reforming political processes. The Greens still have great potential but after originating as challengers to the political establishment, they have often accepted

⁹⁸ <http://europeangreens.eu/greennewdeal/>; <http://greennewdeal.eu/>.

⁹⁹ Carter, *The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election*, cit., p. 301.

¹⁰⁰ In 2001, in Canberra, Australia, the first Global Greens Conference was held and attended by representatives of seventy-two Green parties from all over the world (including the continental federations or regional networks founded since the 1990s: African Greens Networks, Federation of Green Parties of the Americas, Asia-Pacific Green Network, European Federation of Green Parties) to draft a common Charter. For speeches on this event, see the text of the document and the founding act of the Global Greens Coordination cf. *ibid.*, pp. 14-24 and 32-64. The origins of the international cooperation of the Greens date back to the First Planetary Meeting of the Greens held during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil hosted by the Brazilian Greens (*Partido Verde*). During this meeting, the decision was made to establish a Global Green Steering Committee that first met in Mexico City in 1993 and formed the Global Green Network, active until a more effective cooperation was re-launched under the Oaxaca Declaration of 1999. The second Global Greens conference was held in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 2008 as well as the third one in Dakar, Senegal, in 2012. For more information, see also the official website of the Global Greens Coordination: <http://www.globalgreens.org>.

compromises, trying to demonstrate “governmentability” as small coalition parties at the national level as well as reduce and alienate the protest vote. Since the mid-1990s, their experiences in national European governments in centre-left alliances (Finland¹⁰¹, Italy¹⁰², Belgium¹⁰³, France¹⁰⁴ and Germany¹⁰⁵) as well as within a broader coalition¹⁰⁶ in Georgia, have produced contradictory results and often further weakened the electoral support of ecologists¹⁰⁷.

In recent times, however, the Greens took part in centre-right government coalitions from 2007 to 2009¹⁰⁸ in the Czech Republic and from 2007 up to now in Latvia¹⁰⁹, Finland¹¹⁰ and

¹⁰¹ The Finnish Greens (*Vihreät De Gröna* - Green League) were the first Green Party to participate in a national government in 1995, remaining there until 2002, when they left after protesting against the executive's decision to start building a new nuclear plant cf. Annamari Konttinen, *From Grassroots to the Cabinet: The Green League of Finland*, in “Environmental Politics”, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2000, pp. 129-134; Kim O. K. Zilliacus, “New Politics” in Finland. *The Greens and the Left Wing in the 1990s*, in “West European Politics”, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2001, pp. 27-54.

¹⁰² In Italy, from 1996 to 2001 the Federation of the Greens took part in centre-left governments within the alliance of the *Ulivo* coalition (The Olive Tree - first represented by the Minister of the Environment Edo Ronchi until 2000 and then by Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, as Minister of Agriculture and Gianni Mattioli as Minister of Community Policies between 2000 and 2001) and from 2006 to 2008 again in a centre-left coalition, *L'Unione* (The Union - with Pecoraro Scanio as Minister of the Environment). Following the repeated loss of electoral votes since 2008 and fragile alliances with minority left-wing parties it has no more national parliamentary representatives, has suffered divisions and is in the process of being reconstituted.

¹⁰³ The Belgian Green parties participated in the federal government from 1999 to 2003 in a “purple” coalition (socialist, liberal and green parties) led by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt.

¹⁰⁴ The French Greens entered the national government in alliance with the Socialists and other left-wing forces from 1997 to 2002. Dominique Voynet was Minister of the Environment.

¹⁰⁵ The German Greens were in government with the Social Democrats, as aforementioned, from 1998 to 2005.

¹⁰⁶ The Georgian Greens joined the coalition of the Union of Citizens of Eduard Shevardnadze, which governed from 1995 to 2003, being part of it from 1995 to 1999, as aforementioned.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Thomas Poguntke (eds.), *Green Parties in National Governments*, London, Frank Cass, 2002; Wolfgang Rüdiger, *Between Ecotopia Disillusionment: Green Parties in European Government*, in “Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development”, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 2002, pp. 20-33; Benoît Rihoux, *Governmental Participation and the Organisational Adaptation of Green Parties*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 69-98; Benoît Rihoux, Wolfgang Rüdiger, *Analysing Greens in Power: Setting the Agenda*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-33; Patrick Dumont, Hanna Bäck, *Why So Few, and Why So Late? Green Parties and the Question of Governmental Participation*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 35-67; Wolfgang Rüdiger, *Is Government Good for Greens? Comparing the Electoral Effects of Government Participation in Western and East Central Europe*, in “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 127-54. Regarding the prospects of the Greens in the aftermath of the 1999 European elections cf. Roberto Biorcio, *I Verdi in Europa: una nuova era?*, in “Il Mulino” year XLVIII, No. 385, September-October 1999, pp. 929-937.

¹⁰⁸ Regarding the Czech Greens cf. Šádí Shanaáh, *The Czech Green Party: Brief Success or Lasting Presence?*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 72-79.

¹⁰⁹ Indulis Emsis was the first Green leader to become Head of Government in Europe in February 2004 leading a transitional government that lasted for a few months. The Latvian Greens have been in the government on several occasions in the country (from 1993 to 1998 and from 2002 to present) and since 2002 have formed part of the electoral coalition Union of Greens and Farmers (*Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība*).

¹¹⁰ Since 2007, the Finnish Greens have returned to the government, no longer with the Social Democrats but in a coalition with three centre-right and centre parties: Centre Party, National Coalition Party and Swedish People's Party. See Pekka Haavisto, *The Greens in Finland. From Grassroots to Government*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 60-65. After the April 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections, in June

Ireland¹¹¹ and in regional governments where the Greens play an interesting and autonomous role with new possibilities of development. The German Greens, in particular, their position strengthened in the last 2009 elections despite being an opposition party, face many viable options allowing them to collaborate in different contexts with other major political forces on programme negotiations¹¹².

However, there is still too great a gap between the need for the ecological renewal of society and consensus that the Greens and ecological movements manage to obtain on the political scene, even because ecology is now an integral part, though often superficial, of the political agenda of almost all the political families; however, it is not a priority for political parties and voters, except in the case of emergencies and exceptions.

The recent nuclear disaster near Fukushima, Japan, which occurred in March 2011 after a terrible earth and seaquake that generated a tsunami hit its shores, producing strong radioactive pollution has revived a strong worldwide anti-nuclear movement.

In the wake of this catastrophe, in Germany, the Grünen have impressively strengthened their position not only because of this tragedy, but also thanks to their lasting and progressive efforts as a pragmatic political force particularly committed to the development of economic, energy and social policies. For the first time, this has led to regional elections in Baden-Württemberg, where they were a resounding success establishing

2011 Green League entered the new national government in coalition with other five parties (National Coalition Party, Social Democratic Party, Swedish People's Party, Left Alliance, Christian Democrats).

¹¹¹ Regarding the Irish experience cf. Tommy Simpson, *From Pressure Group to Government Partner. The Irish Way*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 52-59.

¹¹² "They can join: a 'traffic light' coalition with the Social Democrats or Liberals; a 'Jamaican flag' coalition with the Christian Democrats and Liberals; a coalition with the Christian Democrats, as in Hamburg; or a left-leaning alliance with Social Democrats and left-wing socialists as aspired to in Hesse. The political spectrum has taken on a new form and the Greens are now able to form varied political alliances, though this has brought with it the challenge of having to hone a sharper political profile", Ralf Fücks, *Foreword. The Greens, A Force for Europe*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, p. 4. See also Ingolfur Blühdorn, *Reinventing Green Politics: On the Strategic Repositioning of the German Green Party*, in "German Politics", Vol. 18, Issue 1, March 2009, pp. 36-54, <http://people.bath.ac.uk/mlsib/public%20access/Bluehdorn%20-%20Reinventing%20Green%20Politics.pdf>;

Melanie Haas, *The German Greens: Past, Present and Future*, in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.), *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*, cited above, pp. 8-21. Recently, the German Greens (Alliance '90/The Greens - Bündnis '90/Die Grünen) have participated in alliances with the Christian Democrats and Liberals – in Hamburg with the Christian Democratic Union/CDU from 2008 to 2010 and in Saarland since 2009 with the CDU and the Free Democratic Party/FDP in a coalition called "Jamaica" (green, black and yellow), while continuing their collaboration with the Social Democrats in other regions (in Bremen, the Greens have been in the government with the SPD since 2007).

themselves as the second most important party, surpassing the SPD and for the first time taking part in a governing coalition as their senior partners¹¹³.

Even though it is difficult to predict the future, some changes seem to indicate the opening up of new possibilities for the Greens, linked both to social and ecological problems, the left's identity crisis and social democracy throughout Europe and the world¹¹⁴ as well as to the developments and challenges posed by European integration, still unable to help the EU face the economic crisis, the climate emergency and the most important worldwide problems as a unified global actor. Although they are still a minor political force, the European Greens are the fourth political family in terms of the number of seats with its own strong representation within the EP assembled in a group made up of the regionalists of the European Free Alliance, one of the most efficient and organised¹¹⁵.

After a long and complex path, the European Greens can certainly be considered one of the political forces more positively oriented towards the federal development of the EU, and probably the most determined and radical in proposing the democratisation of Community institutions, even after the difficulties encountered within the major groups and those with a long Europeist tradition (people's, socialist, liberal-democratic groups) in maintaining internal cohesion on these issues. There are also those who believe that, at present, the European Greens are the only truly federated party, capable of establishing common action at a continental level, despite some exceptions such as the internal division of the French Greens on the 2005 referendum regarding the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe¹¹⁶. According to a recent study based on a comparative analysis of Green voting in twelve Western European

¹¹³ The Alliance '90/The Greens Party more than doubled their votes. On May 12th, 2011, after 58 years of CDU dominance, Winfried Kretschmann was elected as the first ever Green Minister-President of a German State.

¹¹⁴ For a study establishing a strong correlation between the parliamentary presence of Green parties and less air pollution and, in parallel, a generally favourable approach to environmental protection by social democratic and left parties when they are opposition parties and in the government (even with a Green minority), when they end up favouring traditional economic policies of economic expansion and full employment, cf. Eric Neumayer, *Are Left-Wing Party Strength and Corporatism Good for the Environment? Evidence from Panel Analysis of Air Pollution in OECD Countries*, in "Ecological Economics", Vol. 45, 2003, pp. 203-220;
[http://www2.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Article%20in%20Ecological%20Economics%20\(Left-wing%20and%20pollution\).pdf](http://www2.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Article%20in%20Ecological%20Economics%20(Left-wing%20and%20pollution).pdf).

¹¹⁵ Cf. C. Rodríguez-Aguilera De Prat, *Political Parties and European Integration*, cited above, p. 70.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Daniel-Louis Seiler, *L'Europe des partis : paradoxes, contradictions et antinomies*, Working Papers No. 251, Barcelona, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2006, pp. 27-28 (pp. 57),
http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/worpap/2006/hdl_2072_3596/ICPS251.pdf.

Countries, today the Green parties are a stable political actor guaranteed on a social basis (environmental, libertarian, and pro-immigration attitudes) and “green voters are particularly pro-European in half of the countries, but even in the half where they are not *pro*-Europe, they are not notably *anti*-Europe, not even in Sweden and Ireland where the Green parties themselves (until recently) belonged to the Euroskeptic camp”¹¹⁷ but their “attitudes towards European integration do not strongly distinguish themselves from other voter groups so that the cultural aspect of globalisation process remains the issue that primarily defines the Greens’ position”¹¹⁸.

Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the electoral programmes for the 2004 European elections of five parties of the European Green Party, chosen from among the six largest EU countries with MEPs elected to the EP and compared to the common programme of the European Party.

The results have confirmed this political family’s clear-cut propensity to: a supranational Europe (except for the British Greens who propose a “third way” of cooperation based on the OSCE model with respect to federal development and intergovernmental practices) open to enlargement with no pre-established limits (in favour of Turkey’s entry into the EU); the development of inclusive European citizenship that may be acquired by immigrants residing in Community territory for more than a set period of time as well as a multicultural Europe (not including a reference to Christian roots in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty); an increase in the EU’s powers and its democratisation; balance economic liberalisation with the promotion of regulatory and redistributive social policies; and the elimination of the power of veto as well as the EP and European Commission’s acquisition of full competence with regard to foreign, security and defence policy. It has also been brought to the fore that less attention is paid overall to issues concerning justice and domestic affairs (only the English and the Italian

¹¹⁷ Martin Dolezal, “Exploring the Stabilization of a Political Force: the Social and Attitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization”, in *Western European Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 3, May 2010, pp. 544-545.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 548.

Greens have gone deeper on this subject by asking for the communautarisation of the third pillar)¹¹⁹.

The Greens highlight the obsolescence of the nation-state and their political ecology converges with European federalism. According to the Greens and their motto “think globally, act locally!” a new global order could be improved through the responsible efforts of all local and regional communities. If the EU is neither local nor global, but rather a hybrid supranational and intergovernmental, multi-level regional organisation, and initially the Greens neglected this dimension in its development¹²⁰, the Europeanisation and the nation-states’ limited ability to face global issues such as climate change and economic and ecological conversion have vigorously pushed them to take pro-integrationist action in a wide range of policies.

The European Greens strongly support EU environmental policy, pro-immigration laws, asylum policy, the strengthening of the EP and have a cohesive and favourable position towards future EU enlargements¹²¹, but Green European Parliamentary manifestos avoid direct mention of contested issues such as federalism or single currency.

The Greens have showed a great capacity to implement European transnational cooperation and cohesive and professional action in the EP¹²². However, this work and its

¹¹⁹ Cf. C. Rodriguez-Aguilera De Prat, *Political Parties and European Integration*, cited above, pp. 243-255. The author gives some explanations regarding the method applied: “This study has opted for locating the parties in function of the documents that they presented for the 2004 elections on five *issues* to calibrate their greater or lesser support for European integration: 1°) supranationalism (positive) or intergovernmentalism (negative), 2°) a citizenry as an expression of an eventual European *demos* (positive) or as a mere formality (negative), 3°) increase in Community powers (positive) or freezing/diminishment of the same (negative), 4°) progressive communitarisation of the second pillar (positive) or maintenance of intergovernmentalism (negative), 5°) communitarisation of the third pillar (positive) or maintenance of intergovernmentalism (negative)”; *Ibid.*, p. 253. While the Greens in Germany and France are in third place in the general overview of European parties, considered on the basis of the sharing of three positive issues (while not taking a position on the communautarisation of the second pillar - requested, however, by the British Greens and the ICV - and the third pillar), in this case-study the author fails to point out what can also be deduced from Table 5, i.e. that the parties considered members of the European Green Party are the only ones who do not share any negative attitudes towards European integration; cf. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹²⁰ “Europe is an uncomfortable halfway house, neither international nor local and for that reason uninteresting (...) for many Greens the notion of ‘Europe’ immediately conjures up the EU. It appears that for some green members their refutation of the EU carries over to a more general refutation of (or at least ambivalence towards) European policy and their policy towards the EU in particular has suffered from a history of neglect on both the national and European levels”; Simon Hix, Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union*, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. 26.

¹²¹ See Giorgio Grimaldi, *I Verdi e gli allargamenti delle Comunità europee e dell’Unione europea (1973-2004)*, in Ariane Landuyt, Daniele Pasquinucci (eds.), *Gli allargamenti della CEE/UE 1961-2004*, Vol. II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 1099-1126.

¹²² Regarding these considerations and a comparative outlook in relation to and in disagreement with Left parties as supporters of the nation-state see Richard Dunphy, *Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration*,

outcomes do not always seem to stimulate major consensus in favour of European integration at a national and local level.

Green criticism of the present EU (and also of current economic globalisation) is deeply embedded in its achieved full involvement aimed to create a sustainable, democratic and peaceful Europe, contrasting the threats represented by nationalism, populism and the new insurgence of xenophobia and violent extreme-right movements. In 2010 some Green politicians such as Fischer¹²³, Daniel Cohn-Bendit¹²⁴ and the current Belgian EP Vice President, Isabelle Durant, were among the promoters of the Spinelli Group, the federalist initiative for a federal Europe aimed at rallying citizens, NGOs, academics, intellectuals and politicians to act in order to increase the support of this project and attempt to pursue it¹²⁵.

Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 157-163. Concerning a comparative study of federalism and political ecology in theory and political action see Giorgio Grimaldi *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005. On the common 1999 European Green electoral manifesto see Van de Walle, C., *The European Federation of Green Parties Common Manifesto. Disclosing Distinctive Views of European Integration*, cit.

¹²³ For a biography of this Green leader, for many years leader of the *Realos* faction of the German Greens cf. Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic. An Alternative History of Postwar Germany*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.

¹²⁴ Among his latest writings on Europe see Daniel Cohn-Bendit, *Que faire? Petit Traité d'imagination à l'usage des Européens*, Paris, Hachette Littératures, 2009.

¹²⁵ The Spinelli Group manifesto concludes with the following eloquent statement: "Nationalism is an ideology of the past. Our goal is a federal and post-national Europe, a Europe of the citizens. This was the dream the founding fathers worked so hard to achieve. This was the project of Altiero Spinelli. This is the Europe we will go for. Because this is the Europe of the future"; see Spinelli Group Manifesto, <http://www.spinelligroup.eu/manifesto/>.

TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND EUROPE: SHARED ISSUES OF THE “ENVIRONMENTALISTS” AND THE “REGIONALISTS”

Marco Stolfo

1. Introduction

The starting point of the present article is a statement by Maurits Coppieters, a prominent representative of the Flemish democratic party *Volksunie*, who in the late 1970s happened to define regionalists, federalists and ecologists as “the emerging political family of the Europe of the future”¹. Indeed, our purpose is to shed light on these “family ties”, that in general bind environmentalists and ecologists on the one hand, and those who, with a somewhat generic term, can be called “regionalists”, on the other.

This survey takes as privileged references Western Europe and the period between the early 1960s and the present day, and is carried out taking into consideration in particular the positions of “regionalist” groups, movements and parties. Our attention will be focused on three “key questions”- the territory, rights and the European dimension- on which the bond between “environmentalists” and “regionalists” is manifested in agreements of both a theoretical and a practical nature.

2. “Environmentalists” and “Regionalists”. A clarification and a definition

Those of “Environmentalists” and “Regionalists” are two wide-ranging and generic notions. People are well aware of that, so much so that both are used here “between quotes”.

¹ Paul H. Clayes, Edith De Graeve-Lismont, Nicole Loeb-Mayer, *Belgium*, in Karlheinz Reif (ed.), *Ten European Elections Campaigns and Results of the 1979/81 First Direct Elections to the European Parliament*, Aldershot, Gower, 1985, p. 49. To the activity of Coppieters, Belgian politician and member of the Belgian Chamber (1965-71), the Belgian Senate (1971-1979) and the European Parliament (1979-81), the Maurits Coppieters Center (<http://www.cmc-foundation.eu/>) is dedicated; inaugurated in 2007 and promoted by the European Free Alliance (EFA), it became its political European foundation of choice in 2008.

As to the first label, it is quite clear that “environmentalists” means simultaneously something more and something less than ecologists. The environmentalist dimension is wider than the ecological, which is horizontally contained in it, but vertically differs from it, because ecologism (in comparison with “mere” environmentalism) has stronger qualifications as an autonomous, peculiar, complex political thought endowed with a comprehensive vision of reality and with instruments and policies for its transformation in the direction of sustainability. In sum, one can state that environmentalism denounces or governs, whereas ecologism gives an interpretation and based on its own vision of the world proposes a change². Despite that, in this work we have chosen to use the term “environmentalists”, less appropriate but more widely used, even when referring to ecologist movements and parties.

Even the notion of “regionalist” and “regionalism” is wide-ranging indeed, given that the meanings of “region” are various and numerous³. In our case, “regionalists” is used for political groups, movements and parties that define themselves as an expression of sub-State territorial communities of limited dimensions -for which one could speak of regionalists in a strict sense- that often have a definite historical profile - “historical regions”-; in some cases they are made stronger by cultural and linguistic elements, so that they can be called *ethnic regions*, to use an expression by Denis De Rougemont⁴, or *nationalities, historical nationalities* (to use expressions one can find in the Spanish constitutional-right language)⁵, *nations without State*⁶ or *ethnic groups*⁷, that have demographic and geographic dimensions smaller than the

² See Andrew Dobson, *Green Political Thought*, London, Routledge, 2000 (4th edition, 2007).

³ To prove how relative the term “region” is, suffice it to think that Europe can be considered as a whole a region of the world, but also a tiny portion of an Italian commune can be named a country region. On this matter, see Mario Caciagli, *Regioni d'Europa. Devoluzioni, regionalismi, integrazione europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003, pp. 15-16.

⁴ De Rougemont distinguishes between three types of regions: the ethnic, the trans-border, those defined as “civic participation spaces”, see Denis De Rougemont, *L'avenir est notre affaire*, Paris, Stock, 1977 and François Saint-Ouen, *Denis de Rougemont et l'Europe de Régions*, Genève, Fondation Denis De Rougemont pour l'Europe, 1999.

⁵ See *Costitucion del Reino de España*, Art. 2, in *Mercator Legislation*, <http://www.ciemen.cat/mercator>.

⁶ Cf. AA. VV., *Il fattore nazione*, *Dossier di Le Monde Diplomatique*, n. 9, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, November 1981; Walker Connor, *Etnonazionalismo. Quando e perché emergono le nazioni*, Bari, Dedalo, 1994; Charles Robert Forster (ed.), *Nations without State. Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1980; Alberto Melucci, Mario Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etno-nazionali in Occidente*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1992; Sergio Salvi, *Le nazioni proibite. Guida a dieci colonie “interne” dell'Europa occidentale*, Firenze, Valecchi, 1973.

⁷ See Guy Héraud, *L'Europe des ethnies*, Paris, Presse d'Europe, 1963; James G. Kellas, *Nationalist Politics in Europe. The Constitutional and Electoral Dimensions*, Palgrave, New York, 2004; François Fontan, *Ethnisme. Vers un nationalisme humaniste*, Bagnols sur Cèze, Librairie Occitane, 1975
http://ethnisme.ben-vautier.com/agir/fontan_livre/fontan.html; Milton. J. Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflicts in Western World*, Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1977; Daniele Petrosino, *Stati Nazioni Etnie*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2002.

national States they are located in. Quite often they are regions that within the same States are in a marginal and peripheral geographic location, and such a marginal status is also reflected in their social and economic aspect.

3. “Regionalists” on the march. Features of the “ethnic revival”

The “regionalists” we want to consider are political groups, movements and parties that often have more ancient roots (early 1900s or even the 18th century)⁸, but emerge in the second half of the 1900s and in particular in the 1960s, and are the protagonists of the so-called “ethnic revival” or ethno-nationalism⁹.

It is a social, cultural and political phenomenon whose features make it resemble only partly to traditional nationalism, that of the 19th century. For the rest – and this results from both how these movements perceive themselves, and the interpretation that many scholars have given to it¹⁰ – it has peculiar aspects that make it differ from that to a significant degree.

Among the elements allowing us to separate the claims and the movements of an ethno-nationalist character from traditional nationalism, there is first of all the articulation of

⁸ They are a set of parties and movements quite different from each other for history and inspiration. In this context one can include both the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV: <http://www.eaj-pnv.eu/eusk/>), leaning towards the center, with a past of fierce opposition to the Francoist regime and before that supporting the Republic, but which was founded in 1895 with a conservative, traditionalist and confessional profile; and historical parties like the *Plaid Cymru* (Welsh National Party: <http://www.plaidcymru.org>) and the *Partaidh Naiseanta na h-Alba*-Scottish National Party (<http://www.snp.org.uk>) established respectively in 1925 and in 1934, which place themselves in the political scenario in a center-left position similar to that of Scandinavian social-democracies and electorally emerged in the second half of the 1960s, or the *Partito sardo d'azione* (Sardinian Action Party), born in 1921 on center-left, federalist and autonomist positions (but now leaning in a centre-right coalition), *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC: <http://www.esquerra.cat/>), historical and dynamic Catalan progressive force, and the political groups born after WWII, often on the left, like the Breton Democratic Union (UDB, *Unvaniezh Demokratel Breizh*: <http://www.udb-bzh.net/?lang=fr>), established in 1964, or more-recently-founded organizations like the *Partit Occitan*, born in 1987 by the merging of several left-wing Occitanian movements (Occitanian Party – *Partit Occitan* – PÔc: <http://www.partitoccitan.org>). On this matter, see also Michael Watson (ed.), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism*, London, Routledge, 1990. Are not to be considered part of this context – at least in the writer's opinion – political parties like the Bavarian CSU or the Italian Northern League, while there should be included all the left and extreme left nationalist parties and movements. Among the ‘regionalist’ claims considered here, there are forms of popular mobilization lacking a real political organization, but perhaps anticipating the birth of ‘regionalist’ movements and parties.

⁹ See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1981; Joshua A. Fishman, *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*, Berlin, Mouton Publishers, 1985; Riccardo Petrella, *La Renaissance des cultures regionales en Europe*, Paris, Entente, 1978 and also Melucci, Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etnico-nazionali in Occidente*, cit.; Salvi, *Le nazioni proibite. Guida a dieci colonie “interne” dell’Europa occidentale*, cit.; Joshua A. Fishman, Ofelia Garcia (eds.), *Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity. Disciplinary and Regional Perspectives*, Volume 1, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

¹⁰ See Erik Allardt, *I mutamenti nella natura dei movimenti etnici: dalla tradizione all’organizzazione*, in “Il Mulino”, XXVIII, 1979, pp. 323-348; Alberto Melucci, *L’invenzione del presente. Movimenti, identità, bisogni individuali*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1982; Melucci, Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etnico-nazionali in Occidente*, cit.

their political objectives “on a range of alternatives that include various forms of autonomy and decentralization, which do not necessarily imply the setting up of a new ‘independent’ State”¹¹.

The self-determination of *nationalities*, of the so-called *nations without State*, consists more in general in the overcoming of their condition of linguistic and cultural (but also political and economic) inferiority, therefore it contemplates a wider spectrum of objectives and outcomes: the juridical and real recognition of the official status of their own language and the ensuing establishment of policies of *language planning*, the protection and extension of civil and political rights of those belonging to the specific ‘linguistic’, ‘ethnic’, ‘national’ or more generally ‘regional’ or ‘territorial’ community, the creation of autonomous provinces or regions corresponding to each community's ‘own’ or ‘historical’ territory, sometimes in the framework of a federal-type reform of the State they are part of and in the perspective of the creation of a federal Europe ‘of the peoples’, of the ‘ethnic communities’, of the ‘regions’¹².

Another peculiar feature of many of such movements and parties is the connection between culture, the economy and politics: the language's minority status, for example, in these cases proves to be an interpretative tool of the whole condition of the community and the territory. So, the cultural claim tends to lose its ‘regressive’ connotation, tied to a mere recovering, if not exalting, of a mythical past which they pretend to go back to, and takes on a ‘progressive’ profile: the culture they call for is an evolving culture (renewed or to be renewed), whose claims blend together with wider-reaching claims that aspire to a

¹¹ Melucci, Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etnico-nazionali in Occidente*, cit., pp. 18-19.

¹² Mentions of this perspective, as evidenced later in the paragraph dedicated to Europe, are present in both the programs of individual parties and movements – for example, the *Fryske Nasjonale Partij* (FNP, Frisian National Party: <http://www.fnp.nl/>), the *Union Valdôtaine* (autonomist and federalist party of the Aosta Valley, <http://www.unionvaldotaine.org/>), the *Volksunie* (Fleming Popular Union) or, after the party's breakup, its main heir with a progressive line *Spirit* – the acronym of *Sociaal* (Social), *Progressief* (Progressive), *Internationaal* (International), *Regionalistisch* (Regional) *Integraal-democratisch* (Completely democratic) *Toekomstgericht* (Future oriented), that in its Fundamental Charter defines itself “a party of free democrats, Fleming, European, Worldist” and in 2008 took the name Flemish Progressive (Vlaamsprogressieven) ceasing to exist in 2009 after joining to Groen!, the Flemish Green Party (now Groen) – and in the Statutes and other official documents of organizations, associations or political groups like the FUEN (Federal Union of Europe's Nationalities, <http://www.fuen.org>) and the ALE-EFA (European Free Alliance: <http://www.e-f-a.org>), on which we will deal later on.

comprehensive political and cultural change, aiming to overthrow both the conditions of ‘cultural alienation’ and those of ‘political and economic colonization’¹³.

The frequent reference to the need to ‘decolonize oneself’ – mentioned for example with regard to the theoretical works and the political initiatives by Occitanians, Sardinians, Bretons and Friulians – testifies to another peculiarity of these movements, or a significant part of them. It is their collocation on centre-left and mostly left political positions, to which is to be referred their ideal relationship, in particular in the 1960s and 1970s, with Socialist, libertarian and anti-capitalist thinking currents; the attention they historically have been paying to anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia, that is renewed today in terms of an attention to the political, economic and social dynamics between Europe and the rest of the world; their ties, in the content and in the forms of struggle, with other multi-faceted expressions of that social and political protagonism that in those years was taking place in the European society and concerned many aspects of the political, social and economic life.

It is on issues like political participation and administrative decentralization, but also the family, labor, health and the environment¹⁴, that we can observe an interesting convergence of interests and aspirations between these organizations, although with sometimes quite diverging inspiration (nationalitarians, ethnicists, regionalists) and scopes (autonomists, federalists, independentists, pro-Europeans), and groups of various kinds and interests that

¹³ This is the sense of the Occitanian slogan “*la lenga es la clau*” (“language is the key”: the key to interpret ‘colonization’, the key to get out of ‘colonization’). See on this matter, with references to several realities in Western Europe, Giuliano Cabitza, *Sardegna. rivolta contro la colonizzazione*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1968; Union Démocratique Bretonne, *Bretagne = Colonie. Avec l’UDB pour que ça cesse*, brochure, 1974; Zorz Cavallo, Andrian Cescje, *La nazione Friuli*, Vol. 1, Udine, Centro editoriale friulano, 1980; Pier Carlo Begotti, Andrian Cescje, *La nazione Friuli*, Vol. 2, Udine, Centro editoriale friulano, 1980; Robert Lafont, *Décoloniser en France. Les régions face à l’Europe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1971; Federico Francioni, Giampiero Marras (a cura di), *Antonio Simon Mossa. Dall’utopia al progetto*, Cagliari, Condaghes, 2004; Alain Touraine, François Dubet, Zsuzsa Hegedus, Michel Wieviorka, *Les pays contre l’État. Lutttes occitanes*, Paris, Seuil, 1981; Sergio Salvi, *Patria e patria*, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1978. See also Melucci, Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etnico-nazionali in Occidente*, cit.; Salvi, *Le nazioni proibite. Guida a dieci colonie “interne” dell’Europa occidentale*, cit.; Gérard Tautil, *Robert Lafont et l’occitanisme politique. Petite contribution à une pensée moderne*, Gardonne, Federop, 2011 (see the book review: Jean-Pierre Gouzy, *Robert Lafont and Political Occitanism*, in “The Federalist Debate”, Year XXV, No. 1, 2012, <http://www.federalist-debate.org/index.php/current-issue/books-reviews/item/765-robert-lafont-and-political-occitanism>).

¹⁴ About these matters, see the next paragraph devoted to the territory.

somehow overlap and ‘contaminate’ each other: for example, sectors of feminism, of trade unions¹⁵ and – the element of major interest in our case – of ecologism.

4. The territory

The territory, in its various connotations, is certainly a subject of interest for environmentalists and ecologists. The territorial dimension has also a great importance for the ‘regionalists’ we are dealing with here. First of all, it constitutes the geographic and human space where and for which (one could even say ‘in the name of which’ and ‘on behalf of which’) each ‘regionalist’ group, movement or party wants to act. The specific territory for these groups is ‘their own’, ‘regional’, ‘historical’, ‘national’, and it has simultaneously a symbolic and identity-related value, and a material one as an economic and social resource.

The territory, in this sense, is a synthesis of nature and human presence, of culture and landscape, of historical and architectural values: it is, in one word, environment, ‘what is around us’¹⁶. In the ‘regionalist’ political platform there is therefore the presence of a broadly environmentalist component that represents the basis for a convergence with ecologist claims and perspectives. This manifests itself in the ‘regionalist’ struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, but also, in more recent times, against various forms of ‘expropriation’ and ‘colonization’ of the territory-environment, such as military ranges, the exploitation of natural and mineral

¹⁵ There are also since long ago – or were formed just between the end of WWII and the 1970s – ethnic and nationalist trade unions. The SAVT (*Syndicat Autonome Valdôtain des Travailleurs*, <http://www.savt.org/>), founded in 1952, on the occasion of its thirtieth anniversary in 1982, invited in Aosta the representatives of the trade unions of the European minorities: thus was born the CPSN, the permanent committee of the nationalist trade unions, which in its constitutive document recalls the primary importance of the economic problems, contradicting a widespread opinion that considers the nationalitarian movements as bearers of a linguistic and cultural claim only. Belong to it, among others, the SAVT, the South-Tyrolean ASGB (*Unione sindacati autonomi altoatesini – Autonomer Südtiroler Gewerkschaftsbund*, <http://www.asgb.org/>) and the Slovenian SSS, the Occitanian, Friulian and Sardinian trade-union collectives (the latter will officially form after a few years a trade union: CSS). There is to underline that the SAVT claims as its priority objectives “the protection and promotion of the economic, professional, moral and cultural interests of the Valle d’Aosta workers, and the improvement of their living and working conditions; the overcoming and radical transformation of the economic and political structures in anticipation of integral federalism; the cooperation with the Trade Unions of the so-called ethnic minorities and with the European ones”. A note explains the meaning of integral federalism as “a federalism based on the commitment to build a peaceful and democratic society that allows every people to establish itself and fully develop, institutionally organizing itself according to its needs in a context where each individual can also develop in solidarity with other individuals, in a spirit of tolerance: a democratic society characterized by an historical, cultural, geographic and economic homogeneity”; and then “federalism becomes, therefore, the strategy for harmonizing so different situations in a new society that conceives the relations among peoples and the balance of their interests and their identities on the basis of cooperation”: <http://www.savt.org/Chi%20siamo.htm>.

¹⁶ This is the etymological meaning of both the Italian word *ambiente* and the French and English word *environment*.

resources, the real-estate speculation for touristic purposes and the great logistic infrastructures, whose benefits are enjoyed outside and whose costs are borne inside the individual territorial community which each regionalist organization wants to give a real voice to.

Examples of theoretical elaboration, political action and social mobilization are many. In the Occitanian region, both in the South of the French State and in the North-West of the Italian State, one can register in several occasions actions of nationalitarian nature addressed to various aspects of the territory: from struggles against military ranges, as in the case of the opposition to the project of enlarging the training compound in the Larzac area in 1973, to the support to the local viticultural production in Montpellier between 1967 and 1970, in the wake of the historic strikes of the *vinhairons* of 1907, up to the initiatives in the Piedmont's Occitanian valleys in favor of the environmental and economic mountain resources¹⁷. Military ranges, the environment and economic development are some of the key issues of the political struggle waged in Sardinia by the most dynamic component of Sardism, which in fact will be later identified as neo-Sardism, splitting up with the traditional current of the *Partito Sardo d'Azione* (Sardinian Action Party)¹⁸. In this context, we can mention anti-military demonstrations like the occupation of the Pratobello pastures, in the Orgosolo district, in 1969, or those against the plans of indiscriminate expansion of the chemical and petro-chemical 'colonial' plants, of which they were challenging not only the negative environmental impact, but also the presumed potential economic fall-out on the territorial community, like that carried out successfully at Lula between 1968 and 1975 by the local population and the local

¹⁷ About these mobilizations, see Joan-Daniel Esteve, *Occitanisme et luttes sociales*, 2004, http://gardaremlaterra.free.fr/article.php3?id_article=11. See also Touraine, Dubet, Hegedus, Wieviorka, *Les pays contre l'État. Luttes occitanes*, cit. and the following notes 23, 25 e 26.

¹⁸ I refer to the emerging independentist current in the PsdAZ starting from the mid 1960s and to its later developments in the following decades up to the present (for example the Sardinia Nazione Indipendente, iRS – Indipendèntzia Repùblica de Sàrdigna and ProReS – Progetu Repùblica parties: <http://www.sanatzione.eu/>, <http://www.irsonline.net> e <http://progeturepublica.net/>). In this context, there is to highlight the figure of Antonio Simon Mossa (1916-1971): see Francioni, Marras (ed.), *Antonio Simon Mossa. Dall'utopia al progetto*, cit.; Salvi, *Le nazioni proibite. Guida a dieci colonie "interne" dell'Europa occidentale*, cit.; Id., *Patria e matria*, cit.; Antonio Simon Mossa, *Le ragioni dell'indipendentismo. Il Partito sardo d'azione e la lotta di liberazione anticolonialista*, Edizioni S'Iscola Sarda, Sassari, 1984; Salvatore Cubeddu, *Sardisti. Viaggio nel Partito sardo d'azione tra cronaca e storia: testimonianze, documenti, dati e commenti*, Sassari, Edes, 1996.

administration¹⁹. The issue of military bases is felt also in Friuli, until two decades ago a veritable 'military-barracks region', due to its borderline geopolitical position between the two sides of the old bipolar world; there, the nationalitarian movement reinforces its positions in the course of the 1970s, when it matures a greater awareness also in regard to other issues focusing on the territory as an economic resource and cultural heritage of the community, and takes a line against land reform when it upsets the landscape and jeopardizes traditional relations between man and the territory, like those connected to traditional productions, city services and collective and community properties²⁰. Military occupation, nuclear danger and territory exploitation are issues also felt in the Basque Countries: Tudela, Deba and Lemoniz are the names of places where the State government (both Francoist and that come out of the ballots in 1977) wants to build some plants. The decision is opposed through a staggering and creative series of mobilizations, among which the oceanic demonstration in Bilbao in August 1976, that continue until 1983, when the Gonzales government decides to abandon completely even the last project, that of the Lemoniz plant²¹. In those same years – remember the famous anti-nuclear day of Seva, on November 6, 1979, marked by the slogan 'Visca la Terra i mori el mal govern' ('Long live the Earth and Down with bad government') – the issue has some importance also in the agenda of the Catalan nationalitarian movement, beside representing an important aggregation element for the emerging political ecologism in Catalonia²². Another problem is that of infrastructures – the building of the huge railroad-yard in Friuli's plane at the

¹⁹ See Giampiero Marras, *Antonio Simon Mossa, cavaliere delle lotte dei popoli oppressi e delle nazioni senza stato*, in Francioni, Marras (eds.), *Antonio Simon Mossa. Dall'utopia al progetto*, cit., pp. 37-72.

²⁰ A picture of the theoretical elaborations and popular initiatives carried out by Friuli's nationalitarian autonomist movement is given by the magazine *In Uaite*, born in 1977 after the earthquake that hit most of Friuli, where one can read about the struggles against military bases, among which we can mention the episode of the reorganization of the military presence at Osoppo in 1979, or the initiatives to protect the territory and its resources, including both the opposition to land reform, and the positions taken against nuclear plants and weapons and the prospect to create plants on Friuli's territory: "... they continue to use Friuli for aims that have nothing to do with it. One could say that that has already been done in the past for military ranges, communication roads, economic choices: but the fact that injustice is historical makes it a lesser injustice?" (*Una ragione tutta nostra per dire NO alle centrali*, in *In Uaite*, year III, n. 1, February 1980, p. 1).

²¹ See Giovanni Giacomuzzi, Angelo Miotto, Roberta Gozzi, *Storie basche. Democrazia partecipata sotto processo in Euskal Herria*, Rimini, NdA Press, 2005, pp. 67-79.

²² See *Ecocronologia* in *Userda*, n. XII, July 2005, p. 2:

<http://www.userda.com>;

<http://homepage.mac.com/xavierborras/WEBUSERDA/PDFANTERIORI/200506/juny200502.pdf>.

About the ecologist struggles in Spain, see Giorgio Grimaldi, *Movimenti ecologisti e partiti verdi in Spagna tra difesa del territorio e affermazione dell'autonomia e delle nazionalità*, in Alfonso Botti (ed.), *Le patrie degli spagnoli. Spagna democratica e questioni nazionali (1975-2005)*, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2007, pages 224-254.

beginning of the 1980s, the high-speed train today – which regionalists and ecologists oppose not so much because they are struck by the NIMBY (Not in my Backyard) syndrome, but based on environmental and economic impact analyses, both from a territorial viewpoint (the advantages/disadvantages for the local communities, the awarding to them of the mere, passive function as a passing-through-platform, the violation of peculiar eco-systems), and as a result of a more far-sighted vision (the transportation strategy of goods and people in Europe)²³.

An issue common to different realities is also that of water management and usage, which is the object of political struggle in, for example, the Piedmont's Occitanian valleys²⁴. More in general, property and the use of natural resources, hence the necessity to acknowledge to the individual communities, through adequate and autonomous territorial powers, their legitimate competences in managing and planning, are indeed the elements that represent a constant in the 'regionalist' political platform²⁵. To all that there is to add their strong concern for the human dimension in social and territorial relations, and for the coexistence principle.

In these and other similar cases, in the timeframe we are considering, such questions are dealt with by the emerging or re-emerging 'regionalist' forces; those issues are intercepting a greater environmental sensitivity present in our society and become issues of primary interest for ecologists. For the 'regionalists' we are considering, as well as for ecologists, the issues concerning the territory and hence the environment are not only a subject to take care

²³ In the new international scenario, Friuli is changing from a border region and a 'military-barracks region' into something else: there is who would like to make it a 'bridge region', a logistic platform at the center of Europe, crossed by high-speed railways and four-lane highways. The position of (nationalitarian) 'regionalists' and ecologists is rather oriented towards the idea of a 'point region', meeting point more than merely one of passage, reference point for an economically, socially and culturally sustainable development, democratic, multi-lingual and inter-cultural.

²⁴ In the first years of the new century, just on this issue the movement *Paratge* was founded in Piedmont's Occitanian Valleys. This experience definitely ceased in 2009. See Marco Stolfo, *La mè lenghe e sune il rock (e no dome chel) Friùl, Europe*, Udin, Informazione Friulana, 2011, pages 104-105 and 236-237.

²⁵ See, for example, *Europa, federalismo, autonomie*, supplement no. 2 to *Le Peuple Valdôtaine*, n. 19, 11 May 1979. It is a political manifesto of the coalition of nationalitarians and regionalists in the Italian State promoted by the *Union Valdôtaine* on the occasion of the first European elections in 1979. Among the program points there are the protection and development of territorial autonomies, the concern for linguistic and cultural diversity, the perspective of an ethical and eco-compatible development, the managing of natural resources, the centrality of the human dimension against consumerism, pollution and violence and in support to a distributive social justice at man's measure. More recently, the Internet site of the Breton Democratic Union (UDB, *Unvaniezh Demokratel Breizh*: <http://www.udb-bzh.net/?lang=fr>) lists among the goals of that political force the realization of a plan for Brittany which shall define objectives of lasting development, of social justice and of environmental protection.

of or to issue declarations about, but represent some of the key elements on which they articulate a different and alternative vision both in their analyses and in their perspectives of change, of the needs of local communities and of the relations between those and the State they live in. There ensues the ‘global’ approach that the ‘regionalists’ always have to the territory, as they place it as a whole at the centre of their political struggle.

Each ‘regionalist’ group, movement or party intends to be the most authentic and credible representative of its own territorial community, because it knows and understands its problems and aspirations better than others. This greater competence is the cause of a clear distinction between the ‘regionalists’ and the traditional political forces, which instead are rigidly tied to a State-centered and nationalist vision, and brings with it the need to link more tightly, with regard to both legitimation, and competences and action, power and the territory. Thus, all the ‘regionalists’, albeit with differing words which go from the attainment of sheer independence to more or less advanced forms of territorial autonomy, often citing explicitly the subsidiarity principle, make their political platform turn around the need for each territorial community to self-rule, i.e. to autonomously give itself rules, structures and instruments as adequate to build and develop their own economic, social and cultural future, to manage their territory and its resources, to ensure fundamental rights to its population, to keep and improve positive relations with the outside²⁶.

To that we can also add that such a global vision of the territory, which in these terms goes as far as to include the other two key questions – rights and Europe –, represented and represents a point of convergence between ‘regionalists’ and ecologists, as may be observed, for example, in the theses of the Catalan ‘eco-nationalism’ and Friuli’s ‘eco-autonomism’, or in

²⁶ On this aspect, see Melucci, Diani, *Nazioni senza stato. I movimenti etno-nazionali in Occidente*, ibid., and the documentation (Statutes, electoral programs, newspapers, web sites) worked out by ‘regionalist’ parties and movements, where beside the classical mention of the self-determination right, there appear autonomy and the international recognition of the community to which each of them intends to give an ‘authentic voice’. This aspect is evident, for example, in the case of the Occitanian Party (*Partit Occitan*), which defines itself as an “*autonomist progressive movement*”, it is present mostly at the local level, it fights for “*the recognition and the autonomy of the Occitanian country*” and defines its political action as an active presence “*in the economic struggles or against the threats to the territory*”, “*in the struggles for jobs, against an extreme touristification, against nuclear energy, for the safeguard of the natural patrimony*” and “*in the actions to protect the Occitanian language and identity*”.

the activity of the ecologist, pro-Occitanian and for-a-different-world movement *Gardarem la Terra*²⁷.

The claims to ‘self-determination’ and ‘decolonization’ of the territory expressed in the past decades and reformulated in more recent times by the ‘regionalists’ together with politics and the economy, concern also the cultural dimension, not only for what regards the recognition and the appreciation of linguistic peculiarities – a matter we deal with here in the framework of the issues connected to rights – but more in general from the viewpoint of the possibility for each community to avail itself of instruments of cultural elaboration and development, like schools and universities. In this sense, it is exemplary, for its strong ‘territorial’ value, the struggle waged in Friuli for the creation of a University, seen as a key instrument for freeing the territory from under-development and for forming a new leading class; it ended with success and is regarded as one of the most important results accomplished by Friuli's autonomist movement²⁸.

5. Rights

The issue of the recognition and safeguard of fundamental rights and liberties and of ‘new’ civil and social rights constitutes another point of convergence between ‘regionalists’ and ecologists, because it is definitely present, in general, in the programmatic platforms of both of them, with interesting convergences and overlaps in some details. As far as the ‘regionalists’ are concerned, the question, although unitary, is articulated in several aspects, on which has a significant influence, among other things, the overall historical context. A first aspect, tightly connected to the overall ‘territorial’ dimension mentioned above, is the

²⁷ On this, refer respectively to Santi Vilanova, Jaume Oliver i Puigdomènech, *L'econacionalisme: una alternativa catalana dins una Europa ecològica*, Barcelona, Blume, 1981, to the article *Friül cence autonomie?*, in *In Uaite*, an X, n. 3, avril 1987 and to the website *Gardarem la terra*: <http://gardaremlaterra.free.fr>.

²⁸ See Roberto Meroi, *Il professor Petracco*, Pasian di Prato, Leonardo, 2006; Tarcisio Petracco, *La lotta per l'università friulana*, Udine, Forum, 1998; Clara Rossetti, *L'Università di Udine: eventi e personaggi della nascita di un ateneo*, Padova, Il poligrafo, 1994; Gianfranco Ellero, Raffaele Carrozzo, *L'università friulana*, Udine, Grafiche Fulvio, 1967; Gianfranco Ellero, *L'università del popolo friulano*, Udine, Arti grafiche friulane, 1974; Id. (ed.), *Simpri pal Friûl e la sô int : scrits e discors uchi e in parlament di Arnalt Baracêt, 1976-2003*, Zompicchia di Codroipo, Istitût ladin-furlan “Pre Checo Placerean”, 2003.

recurring reference to the right of self-determination and self-rule²⁹ to be exercised by the regional, ethnic or national community whom each group or party wants to give voice to. It is an important issue, very debated in particular in the 1960s and 1970s, which in the decades closer to us has been proposed again, even in terms of assuring conditions of full citizenship for all the individuals belonging to the ethnic or national community under consideration. In the statutes and programmatic documents of the individual parties, as well as in those of the European Free Alliance (EFA), the European grouping of 'regionalist' parties we deal with here, references abound to self-determination, parliamentary democracy and human rights, and 'the protection of man's and peoples' rights' is the first declared objective³⁰.

Another question of considerable importance is the attention to the protection of ethnic minorities and the guarantee of linguistic rights (the recognition of one's own language, the granting to it of a positive social and juridical status in the media and in institutions, in public services and in the social and economic context)³¹. This is an element that starts from the acknowledgment of the restrained conditions of the territorial, ethnic, national community

²⁹ It is a right explicitly recognized in the two international Agreements of 1966, respectively on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights, but exercising them is difficult because there is a lack of a univocal, clear and commonly accepted definition of the holder of such right, 'the people', and also of an international authority which the peoples willing self-determination could apply to for asserting their reasons. Beside the 'ultimate' claim to self-determination and independence, the 'regionalists' we are considering contemplate other forms of self-rule and international recognition. See the previous Note 11 and the following Note 30.

³⁰ It is one of the programmatic points proclaimed in Art. 1 of the EFA Statute. See ALE-EFA: <http://www.e-f-a.org>. That topic is also present in the statute of the individual parties. For example, in the PNC (*Partitu di a Nazione Corsa*, Party of the Corsican nation) statute, at Art.3 there is 'the triple claim' of the juridical recognition of the Corsican people as a European nation, of the access to increasing parts of sovereignty for Corsica in the framework and according to the models of European integration, and of making the Corsican language official in its territory. Similarly, for the UDB (*Unvaniezh Demokratel Breizh*, Breton Democratic Union) the first programmatic objective is "the recognition of the Breton people by France and the European Union", <http://www.udb-bhz.net>. The *Partit Occitan* supports "the peoples' right to self-determination" and "the peoples' right to protect their political, economic and cultural rights", <http://www.partitoccitan.org>.

³¹ See Fernand De Varennes, *Language Rights Standards in Europe: The Impact of the Council of Europe's Human Rights and Treaty Obligations*, in Susanna Pertot, Tom M. S. Priestly, Colin H. Williams (edited by), *Rights, Promotion and Integration Issues for Minority Languages in Europe*, London, Palgrave, 2008, pp. 23-32; Henri Giordan (sous la direction de), *Les Minorités en Europe. Droits linguistiques et droits de l'homme*, Paris, Kimé, 1992. Giordan, in his introduction to the book, observes at page 16 that "to jeopardize the liberty to use a language is to somehow make an attempt on the integrity of a person". Such a liberty includes both the manifestation of thought regarding the individual's will to consider himself as part of a community, a culture, a nationality different from the one the majority of the citizens of a State belongs to, and the liberty to declare and live such a belonging without suffering any limitation or discrimination, as the Italian jurist Alessandro Pizzorusso (see Alessandro Pizzorusso, *Minoranze e maggioranze*, Torino, Einaudi, 1993, pp. 195-197) explains. On the issue of linguistic rights, see also Marco Stolfo, *Lingue minoritarie e unità europea. La "Carta di Strasburgo" del 1981*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2005, pp. 96-124 and the *International Declaration on linguistic rights* promoted by the Ciemen (Escarré International Centre for Minorities and Nations): <http://www.ciemen.cat>. All of the 'regionalist' forces show a clear attention towards language and linguistic rights, from the Esquerra republicana de Catalunya to the Plaid Cymru to the small Occitanian, Corsican, Breton and Friulian forces.

which each 'regionalist' organization makes reference to, is connected to both the general appeal to democracy and human rights and to an attention to sustainability, humanitarian behavior and cultural, biological and hence ecological diversity, and on those bases is linked to the general principle of a neat opposition to any form of racism. All these aspects come up among the fundamental principles that inspire the 'regionalists' we are dealing with, as one can observe in the programmatic documents, the statutes and the informative and promotional material they produce. An example is given by the federation of the European nationalitarian and regionalist democratic movements, the European Free Alliance (EFA), which places among its cornerstones human rights, social cohesion, equal opportunities, democracy, democratic participation, liberty and pluralism in the information sector, fight to racism and xenophobia³².

This comprehensive approach places the 'regionalists' among those showing a more concrete and open attitude towards the new immigration, which is often of a significant interest for the territorial communities they want to give voice to, as appears from the Catalan idea of the *nació inclusiva*, from the practice of intercultural dialogue developed in those contexts and from statutes, documents, declarations, initiatives and standpoints³³. A third

³² See EFA official website: <http://www.e-f-a.org>. The mention of man's fundamental rights and the protection of minorities is already present in EFA's founding document, the *Brussels Declaration* of July 1, 1981 (Alliance libre européenne, *Déclaration de la convention de Bruxelles*, 1er Juillet 1981, ALE, Bruxelles-Strasbourg, 1981). The adhesion to those principles is a constant datum of all of the parties and movements we are considering, from *Playd Cymru* to *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* to the Cornwall Party (*Mebyon Kernow*: <http://www.mebyonkernow.org>) and the Flemish Party *Spirit*. For instance, in the document approved in its founding Congress (Antwerp, November 9-10, 2001), at point 14 the clear position is proclaimed against "any prejudice and any discrimination based on race, color of the skin, religion, philosophical belief, age, sexual orientation and handicap", "open or hidden ethnic and cultural intolerance in the Flanders and in the world" and in favor of pluralism and tolerance, which "imply an active behavior of respect of diversity, being aware that the encounter with other cultures and other values generates enrichment".

³³ EFA official website and those of the individual parties and movements give ample documentation of that. On the tolerant, respectful and inclusive approach of the 'regionalist' parties and movements, with regard to the Basque Country reality, see Giacomuzzi, Miotto, Gozzi, *Storie basche. Democrazia partecipata sotto processo in Euskal Herria*, cit., pp. 219-221. A theoretical contribution to these questions is to be found in Claudio Magnabosco, *Indipendentismo sostenibile, nazione inclusiva, moltiplicatore. Tre teorie tra storia del federalismo e attualità del dibattito sul micronazionalismo*, January 2001: <http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/vda/identi-pro.html>. See also other articles on the Associazione per i popoli minacciati – Sudtirolo (Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker – Südtirol/Lia por i popui manacês – Society for Threatened People) website: <http://www.gfbv.it>. As to Friuli, an historical land of emigration become in recent decades a land of immigration, we can mention their slogan "Nô o sin blancs ma la nestre lenghe e je nere" ("We are whites, but our language is black") and the fact, which is not directly related to a 'regionalist' political organization, but testifies to a strong 'regionalist' and 'nationalitarian' sensitivity, that one of the first broadcasting stations in Italy to air radio programs prepared and run by immigrants in their own languages, was *Radio Onde Furlane* (<http://www.ondefurlane.eu/>), a community radio characterized by the prevailing use of the Friulian language in its programs: see Max Mauro, *Un Friûl difarent. I 90 Mhz di Radio Onde Furlane*, Montereale Valcellina, Il Menocchio, 2004.

fundamental aspect is that concerning social rights – labor, equal opportunities, welfare – and the so-called ‘new rights’, among which there are the right to good health and the right to the environment, tightly connected to a general approach to many questions regarding the territory and ecological and economic sustainability.

The convergence on these issues by ‘regionalists’ and ecologists is realized both on the local and the continental plane (the EFA/Greens group in the European Parliament). The common lines worked out by EFA and the Greens, as can be seen for example in the Protocol of Understanding for the establishment of the EFA/Greens group in the European Parliament in July 1999, cover all of those matters with a shared approach. The declared common project, in fact, consists in pursuing these objectives at the continental level: “build a society respectful of *fundamental human rights and environmental justice* including the rights to self-determination, to shelter, to good health, to education, to culture, and to a high quality of life; increase *freedom* within the world of work, not only by tackling unemployment but also by widening people's choices, releasing human creative potential; deepen *democracy* by decentralisation and direct participation of people in decision-making that concerns them, and by enhancing openness of government in Council and Commission, and making the Commission fully answerable to Parliament; build a European Union of free peoples based on the principle of *subsidiarity* who believe in *solidarity* with each other and all the peoples of the world; re-orientate the European Union, which currently over-emphasises its economic conception at the expense of *social, cultural and ecological values*”³⁴.

The common action by the Greens and EFA is thus aimed to realize, by establishing a yearly political program in phase with the EP sessions, several political changes: “economic and social reforms to *make development sustainable* for both human beings and the natural world; a democratic process linking trade, security, economic and social issues to *environmental*,

³⁴ The Greens/European Free Alliance, *Protocol of Understanding*,
<http://www.greens-efa.eu/about-us/48-who-we-are.html>.

See also *Statutes of the Parliamentary Group 'The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament* (adopted in Brussels on 8 November 2006 and changed on 22 June 2009),
http://archive.greens-efa.eu/cms/default/dokbin/168/168507.statutes_of_the_parliamentary_group_the@en.pdf.

cultural and democratic rights; high ecological, social and democratic standards to ensure the *quality of life*; solidarity, guaranteed human and citizen's rights for everybody, including people who have come from non-EU countries; a foreign policy designed to resolve problems by *peaceful means* rather than by military force; improved structures for *democratic participation in political decision-making*, involving NGOs, Trade Unions, citizens and civic authorities at all levels, with measures to ensure equal participation of women; *guaranteed equal rights and opportunities*, as well as cultural and linguistic diversity; a policy of *employment and redistribution of work* with special attention to gender issues, in order to end the existing unbalanced division of labour and share the workload more fairly between women and men, ensuring that women are fully able to take part in the formal labour market as well as in political life; the *involvement of the relevant elected authorities* that have constitutional powers in the decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to matters that fall within their competence”³⁵.

6. Europe

The Greens/EFA common group at the European Parliament is only one of the elements highlighting the ideal and operational convergence between ‘regionalists’ and ecologists about the European dimension. For some aspects, it can be considered as the final point of a parallel journey. In fact, the parallel evolution of their attitude in regard to the continent's integration process and the community's institutions represent a meeting-point between ‘regionalists’ and ecologists³⁶.

As far as the ‘regionalist’ movements and parties are concerned, it is possible to draw an itinerary divided into three distinct, chronologically successive and logically consequential stages³⁷. In the first phase – between the early 1960s and the end of the following decade –,

³⁵ The Greens/European Free Alliance, *Protocol of Understanding*, <http://www.greens-efa.eu/about-us/48-who-we-are.html>.

³⁶ It can be said that ‘regionalists’ and ecologists strode a parallel path from euro-skepticism to the most convinced and credible pro-European attitude. As to the course followed by the Greens, I refer to Giorgio Grimaldi's contributions. See also Giorgio Grimaldi, *Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, pp. 135-170.

³⁷ On this issue see also Lieven De Winter, Margarita Gomez-Reino, *European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties*, in “Party Politics”, Vol.8, No.4, 2002, pp.483–503; John McGarry, Michael Keating (eds.), *European Integration and the Nationalities Question*, London, Routledge, 2006; Seth Kincaid Jolly, *The Europhile Fringe? Regionalist Party Support for*

the ‘regionalists’ place themselves mostly on critical positions towards what appears as “the Europe of States and capitals” only. The theoretical foundations of such an attitude are, very concisely, the following: the European Communities are considered as mere international organizations of a purely economic character, where attempts are made at harmonizing the national States’ political and economic interests; those interests are different from and opposite to those of the territorial communities which the regionalist and nationalitarian parties and movements want to give voice and representation to, that find themselves in a marginalized and subordinated condition with respect to the State’s power centers; this situation is even worse with respect to the Community’s institutions, that are considered as even more distant centers than the State’s, and at least equally hostile. At the same time, the attention to the European dimension is growing, as the opportunity is seen to give origin in it to cooperations and alliances between parties and movements to strengthen their critical and antagonistic common position, as testified for example by the European relations developed by many nationalitarian movements of Marxist inspiration. They are political forces active in those years in Ireland (IRM, *Irish Republican Movement*, i.e. *Sinn Féin* and the official IRA), Wales (CG, *Cymru Goch*, the group born to the left of *Plad Cymru*), Brittany (UDB), Basque Countries (EHAS, the Socialist Party of the Basque people, born in North Euskadi following the ban on *Enbata*, and HASI, the Socialist Party of the Basque people active in South Euskadi), Catalan countries (ECT, Catalan Left of the workers, a small party born in the ‘French’ Roussillon; and PSAN-P, Socialist National Liberation Party-Provisional, active in ‘Spanish’ Catalonia), Galicia (UPG, Union of the Galician People) and Sardinia (MPS, *Moimentu de su Populu Sardu*), whose representatives underwrite on February 3, 1974, the Brest Charter.

The document, later revised between 1976 and 1977, denounces the situation of cultural, economic and political ‘colonization’ of each community and suggests the perspective of a ‘national liberation’ struggle and the building of a “socialist Europe founded on the equality of

European Integration, in “European Union Politics”, vol. 8, no. 1, 2007, pp. 109-130; Anwen Elias, *From Euro-enthusiasm to Euro-scepticism? A Re-evaluation of Minority Nationalist Party Attitudes Towards European Integration*, in “Regional and Federal Studies”, Vol.18, No.5, pp.557–581; Anwen Elias, *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration. A Comparative Study*, Abingdon, New York, Routledge, 2009.

the peoples composing it”³⁸. In the same period other centre and centre-left nationalitarian and ‘regionalist’ forces, like the Autonomist Liberation Front of Alsace and Lorraine, the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV), *Strollad ar Vro* (Breton National Party, of federal orientation) and *Plaid Cymru*, promote the opening in Brussels of a “permanent Office of the European nations without State”³⁹. The project is presented in an announcement distributed on June 25, 1975, in which, “in the hour when the debate on the construction of Europe is at its height”, the awareness is affirmed that “it shall not be based on today's European States only, which in the course of the history of the last centuries have conquered, annexed or shared out between themselves our nations”, which “form the natural realities of our continent”, and the conviction that only upon them “could a Europe be firmly built which is respectful of the diversities and rights of all citizens and all of its peoples, small and large”⁴⁰. The document, in addition, denounces the fact that “within the State-formations in which we have been, unwillingly, enclosed, our peoples and our nations. do not fully enjoy the political, administrative, economic, cultural and social rights, inseparable from the exercise of any degree of true democracy”, and warns that “Europe must not perpetuate the injustices, disparities and oppression towards us which stain, to a different extent, the States with a centralizing structure and ideology that are participating today or are willing to participate in its constitution”⁴¹. Finally, it makes clear which objectives the opening of the Office wants to pursue: to operate “with the aim to put in place juridical and institutional mechanisms able to drive the centralist European States to change their structures, so as to respect and fully ensure collective – political, economic and cultural – rights peculiar to our peoples”; to maintain “a permanent connection between European institutions and our nations”; to collect and spread “information and reports about our peoples' struggles”; to take action “before

³⁸ See Salvi, *Patria e patria*, cit., 1978, pp. 164-171. The ‘Charter’, signed on February 3, 1974, is updated and gets more adhesions following the meetings in Mur de Bretagne (April 18, 1976) and Paris (July 19, 1977).

³⁹ See Maria Mercedes Costa, *Le minoranze etniche e l'Europa federale*, in *Sardegna Europa*, Year I, n. 3-4, August-September 1977.

⁴⁰ See Salvi, *Patria e patria*, cit., p. 161.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

European institutions whenever it seems necessary in order to protect the interests of any of us”⁴².

With no discontinuity, the second phase starts in which a growing attention emerges towards the European dimension, and a clear pro-European tendency develops. In this new scenario, the Community institutions are no longer an instrument of the States' political, economic and cultural centralism, but appear as an opportunity at least to give European-wide voice and relevance to claims that at the State level could hardly be heard. The European dimension becomes alternative to the State's, and therefore more in favor of the regions, as becomes partly apparent at the institutional level – suffice it to remind the permanent Conference of local and regional powers of the Council of Europe – and in an even more accomplished way at the theoretical level with the widespread maturing of an approach inspired to federal principles and tendencies. A contribution in that direction is given by the first European elections in 1979, in which several regionalist and nationalitarian political groups participate, reaping significant results.

Consequently, a third phase opens up, institutional and fully ‘European’ (at least to the extent it is so for the main political families in Europe)⁴³, which starts on July 1, 1981, with the signing of the *Declaration of the Brussels Convention* by the representatives of a few nationalitarian and regionalist movements of a democratic inspiration and a federalist or autonomist tendency, whose main promoter is the Flemish democratic party *Volksunie*, which already in 1979 participates in the European ballot with a program oriented to a democratic European federalism, based on regions and nationalities and proposing to constitute an alliance between political organizations of similar inspiration (the European Free Alliance, precisely, to which it already makes reference in the name of its own electoral list: *Volksunie in de Vrije Europee Alliantie*)⁴⁴.

⁴² See *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁴³ See Simon Hix, Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 1997.

⁴⁴ Among the founders of EFA there are also: *Plaid Cymru* (Wales' National Party), Autonomist Liberation Front of Alsace and Lorraine, Belgium's German-speaking Party (PDB), Frisian National Party (FNP), *Convergencia Democrática de Catalunya*, Federalist European Party of Alsace and Lorraine, *Unione di u Populu Corsu*, *Union Valdôtaine* (UV) and Youth Movement of the South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP).

Also on those grounds, both at the local and the continental level, the parties that joined the Alliance have a meaningful part of their programs in common with the ecologist movements. This is so in particular in the European Parliament, where between 1984 and 1989 nationalitarians, Danish euro-skeptics, regionalists and Greens form the Rainbow group (however, quite non-homogeneous on several matters) and where later in 1999 they give origin to the Greens/European Free Alliance group⁴⁵. EFA's institutional profile consolidated in 1994, when it officially established itself as a federation of political parties with the denomination EFA/DPEP (Democratic Party of European Peoples), and finally gave itself the profile of a veritable European party, officially recognized on October 13, 2004⁴⁶.

Another aspect that 'regionalists' and ecologists have in common with regard to the European dimension and the continental unification process concerns the issues and the perspectives of a political character. The European context is acknowledged as the most adequate for finding answers and solutions to the problems, the claims and the needs of which both the 'regionalists' and the ecologists are the bearers; they converge on definitely pro-European positions with a predominantly federal tendency, or at least potentially so, because they give a strategic value to the subsidiarity principle, and their peculiar feature is to challenge the national State, 'colonizer' and 'polluter' and simultaneously too big and too small. Whence derives their sharing of a thrust in favor of the building of European unity, 'different' from the present one, which looks too unbalanced in favor of economics and finance and too distant from the citizens. Other key-elements are peace and solidarity in Europe and in the world, for

⁴⁵ In the 2009-2014 term current seven EFA MEPs in the Greens/European Free Alliance Group in the European Parliament are from Catalunya (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya replaced by one member of Bloque Nacionalista Galego in 2011), Corsica (Partitu di a Nazione Corsa – PNC), Flanders (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie – NVA), Latvia (Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā – PCTVL, For Human Rights in a United Latvia), Scotland (Scottish National Party – SNP, two members) and Wales (Plaid Cymru – The Party of Wales); cf. *An Introduction to the EFA Group in the European Parliament*,

<http://www.greens-efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Publications/Introduction%20to%20EFA%20Group%20in%20the%20EP.pdf>.

⁴⁶ See ALE-EFA: <http://www.e-f-a.org>. See also the European Free Alliance Youth's site <http://europeanfreeallianceyouth.wordpress.com/>; EFA, European Free Alliance (EFA) Manifesto for the June 2009 European Elections. *Visions for a People's Europe (not a populist Europe)*, Barcelona, March 2009, <http://www.e-f-a.org/efaactive.php?id=124>.

achieving and maintaining which the European unity that regionalists and ecologists aspire to represents a strategic instrument⁴⁷.

Another common point, concerning the European dimension and the European 'institutionalization' of 'regionalists' and ecologists, and connected to the already-mentioned Europeanization of both of them, consists on the one hand in the concrete benefits of an economic and organizational (resources and structures) nature that derive from their belonging to a European party which is present with a group of its own in the European Parliament, and on the other in their growing authoritativeness at the local level and their visibility at any level. For 'regionalists', in particular, this means to be able to gain credit as 'those who bring to Europe' the claims of their respective communities and interpret them with a strong tie to the territory, and with an approach that is not 'localist' but credibly 'European'⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ About these issues, in addition to the documents produced by the individual 'regionalist' parties and movements (independently of their adhesion to the European Free Alliance), it is interesting to read the interview to Nelly Maes, a prominent figure of *Volksunie* and later of *Spirit* and *Flemish Progressist*, taken in 2005 and published in the review '*Alkartasuna*', edited by the Basque progressive party *Eusko Alkartasuna*: *Entrevista con Nelly Maes, Presidente del partido político EFA* in "*Alkartasuna*", no. 35, pages 7-9:

http://www.euskoalkartasuna.org/upload/revista_alkartasuna/alkartasuna35.pdf.

⁴⁸ See Lieven De Winter, *The Impact of European Integration on Ethnoregionalist Parties*, Working Paper 195, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2001; Lieven De Winter, Huri Türsan (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, London, Routledge, 1998; Pascal Delwit Pascal (ed.), *Les partis régionalistes en Europe. Des acteurs en développement ?*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2005; Lieven De Winter, Margarita Gomez-Reino, Peter Lynch (eds.), *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*, Barcelona, ICPS, Barcelona, 2006; Régis Dandoy, Giulia Sandri, *I programmi elettorali dei partiti regionalisti europei: un'analisi comparata*, in "Quaderni dell'osservatorio elettorale", n° 59, 2008, pp. 63-94, http://dev.ulb.ac.be/sciencespo/dossiers_membres/sandri-giulia/fichiers/sandri-giulia-publication17.pdf; Régis Dandoy, *Ethno-regionalist Parties in Europe: A Typology*, in "Perspective on Federalism", vol. 2, issue 2, 2010, pp. 194-220, http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/074_download.pdf. The 'regionalist' parties thus credit themselves as those who are at the same time closer to the local dimension and have a more European approach than the traditional parties, more connected to the national State dimension (and in this sense truly 'localist' and 'provincial') than to the European, which is always subordinated. On the project 'Europe of Regions' and the territorial strategies of parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia see Eve Hepburn, *The Rise and Fall of a 'Europe of Regions'*, in "Regional and Federal Studies", vol. 18, no. 5, October 2008, pp. 537-555. For an analysis of the EU's impact on trans-national and regionalist movements in reconfiguring their action and their relations with State powers, see Devashree Gupta, *Nationalism Across Borders: Transnational Nationalist Advocacy in the European Union*, in "Comparative European Politics", vol. 6, issue 1, April 2008, pp. 61-80. See also Jürgen Mittag, Claudia Hülsken, *Regionalismus als politische Grundströmung auf europäischer Ebene? Die transregionale Parteienkooperation der Europäischen Freien Allianz*, in Jürgen Mittag (ed.), *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*, Essen, Klartext Verlag, 2006, pp. 639-665; David Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State. Parties in the Era of European Integration*, chapter 7 *Defending the Periphery, Protecting the Environment: The Regionalist Family and the Greens*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. On ethnoregionalist parties in Europe see Maximilian Strmiska, *Regional Parties and Party Systems. Concept and Typology of European Regional Parties and Regional Party Arrangements*, Mgr. Anton Pasienka, Brno, 2005; Peter Lynch, Lieven De Winter, *The Shrinking Political Space of Minority Nationalist Parties in an Enlarged Europe of the Regions*, in "Regional and Federal Studies", vol. 15, no. 5,

7. Conclusions

The above presentation of facts, ideas, activities and documents confirms the validity of the assumption we started from, i.e. that there is a relationship between ‘regionalists’ and ecologists⁴⁹. This link finds its highest operational manifestation in the Greens/European Free Alliance common group in the European Parliament, and becomes visible in many struggles carried out together at the local and the European level, where it is often difficult to distinguish between ecologist aims and regionalist aims. That can also be observed in the field of ideals, with reference to the theoretical arguments of the Catalan eco-nationalism and the Friulian eco-autonomism, as well as in parties and movements: the political ecology issues, from the end of the 1970s onward, are always present in the regionalist political agenda, and several ‘regionalist’ questions, like linguistic rights, self-government, cultural diversity, subsidiarity, are part of the Greens' patrimony of ideas and initiatives.

Such encounter and overlapping become evident on issues like the territory, rights and Europe, and the European dimension is ever more acknowledged as the one where also the issues of the territory, self-government and citizenship can find room to be debated. To all that we can still add some considerations concerning political participation, the crisis of the national State, the crisis of traditional parties and of the ideologies of the 20th century, all aspects that support the birth, development and convergence of the ‘regionalist’ and ecologist claims and are influenced by them.

From the ‘regionalist’ viewpoint it is important to mention that the ‘ethnic revival’ represented, when it first emerged, one of the many expressions of the needs for change in the cultural and political plane that were circulating in the Western society in particular in that

2008, pp. 583-606; Filippo Tronconi, *I partiti etnoregionalisti. La politica dell'identità territoriale in Europa occidentale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009.

⁴⁹ We can thus say that Maurits Coppieters' sentence cited in the beginning is well founded, but we can also observe that the *Volksunie*'s leader has somehow quoted a statement by Denis de Rougemont (“*Ecologists, regionalists and federalists are united in a common struggle against economic, social and environmental disequilibrium, and in favor of a society in tune with nature*”); many traces of his theoretical works can be found in EFA's foundation and programmatic documents, as well as in those of many ‘regionalist’ organizations. As to De Rougemont, we refer in particular to Bruno Boissière, *Le fédéralisme de Denis de Rougemont. Toujours d'actualité, en regard de la crise européenne d'aujourd'hui?*, “Le Taurillon”, 24 June 2007, <http://www.taurillon.org/Le-federalisme-de-Denis-de-Rougemont>, http://europe-federale.asso.fr/modules/downloads/221207_NOTE_UEF_17_DE_ROUGEMONT.pdf.

period. The issues raised by those groups, parties and movements are still today topical in many aspects, albeit they should be redefined and brought up to date; this is testified by the activity at the local and European levels of many organizations and new subjects that make reference to those political experiences and theoretical elaborations, and come across and are contaminated again by the new emerging needs of democratic participation.

Also today, as a few decades ago at the time of the ‘ethnic revival’ proper, the fact that the key questions proposed at that time, suitably updated – by re-discussing their interpretative ideological keys and passing from a materialist approach to a post-materialist one, or trying to compound both of them⁵⁰ –, come up again contributes to delineate the crisis of the national State, which more and more appears to be too small and too big at the same time, and in any case, given the complexity of the relations, belongings and problems concerning the life of each individual, of a non-exclusive nature.

⁵⁰ See Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1999 (Italian translation *Le democrazie contemporanee*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001); Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Republics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.



CENTRO STUDI SUL FEDERALISMO

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e didattica



Contributors

Roberto Burlando is Associate Professor of Political Economics at the University of Turin and editorial member of “Journal of Socio-Economics”.

Personal web page:

<http://www.de.unito.it/web/member/burlando/personal-CV.htm>

Robert Delort, PhD and a Doctorat d’Etat in medieval history, has lectured at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, at the Sorbonne, the University of Paris VIII and at the University of Geneva. Biographical profile by Wikipedia (in French)

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Delort.

Giovanni Finizio is research fellow at the University of Turin and researcher at the Centre for Studies on Federalism (CSF), Turin:

<http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/idw/structure/researchers-team/62-giovanni-finizio>

Giorgio Grimaldi is research fellow and adjunct professor in History of International Relations at the University of Valle d’Aosta/Université de la Vallée d’Aoste and researcher at the Centre for Studies on Federalism (CSF),

<http://www.csfederalismo.it/index.php/en/research/researchers/1377-giorgio-grimaldi>.

Franco Livorsi is professor of History of Political Thought at the University of Milan, Italy and member of the Association Française des Historiens des Idées Politiques. Personal web page :

<http://www.giuripol.unimi.it/persone/Livorsi.htm>

Alberto Majocchi is professor of Finance at the Faculty of Economics, University of Pavia.

Personal web page: <http://www-5.unipv.it/webdesed/ept/docente.php?id=majocchi>.

Giorgio Nebbia, chemist, was Professor of Science of Commodities in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Bari from 1959 to 1995 and he is now Professor Emeritus. He was Deputy (1983-1987) and then Senator (1987-1995) of the independent Left. Personal web page:

<http://www.dgm.uniba.it/Docenti/Nebbia/nebbia.htm>

Giovanni (Nanni) Salio assistant professor of History of Physics at the Department of Physics, University of Turin and former secretary of the Italian Peace Research Institute (IPRI), is president of the Centro Studi Sereno Regis (<http://serenoregis.org/>).

Laura Scichilone is researcher in History of European Integration at the Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sull'Integrazione Europea (CRIE) at the University of Siena (Italy). Personal web page: <http://www.gips.unisi.it/dassegnisti/76/laura-scichilone>.

Marco Stolfo is honorary fellow in History of Political Doctrines and research assistant at the Department of Law and at the Interdepartment Centre of Research on Friulian language and culture of the University of Udine.

Selva Varengo graduated in Philosophy at the University of Milan (Italy) with a dissertation in History of Contemporary Political Thought is author of articles and essays on social ecology, anarchism, environmental issues.

Luigi Zanzi, professor of Methodology of Historical Sciences at the University of Pavia, is author of many books and essays in the field of natural history and history of science and is also Vice President of the International Association for Alpine History based in Lucerne.
<http://www.arc.usi.ch/en/index/aisa.htm>





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Research Paper
Centro Studi sul Federalismo
Via Real Collegio, 30
10024 Moncalieri – Torino
Tel. +39 – 011 670 5024
Fax. +39 011 670 5081
info@csfederalismo.it