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Abstract

With the end of the bipolar world order and the retreat of the American power, the Mediterranean has become one of the most unstable areas of the world. It is up to Europe to fill the power vacuum that has formed at its borders, by initiating permanent structured cooperation in the areas of security and defence even among a small number of countries. Without security, it is not possible to launch a development plan for Africa and the Middle East or to support the democratic impetus of the Arab Spring. These are tasks that the EU cannot deal with on its own, but what it can do is promote the convening of a Conference for security and cooperation in the Mediterranean – on the example of the Helsinki Conference that started the East-West détente – with the participation of all the countries active in the region and of the great powers.

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The Retreat of American Power in the World and the Need for a European Security System

It seems that mankind has learned nothing from the tragic events of the last century. History repeats itself: in the same way as the First World War was followed by the Wall Street Crash in 1929, fascist dictatorships and the Second World War, now the exit from the Cold War has been succeeded by the global financial and economic crisis, a wave of populism, xenophobia, nationalism, anti-Europeanism and by the widespread violence of civil wars raging at Europe's periphery and by the growing aggression of international terrorism. Syria, Iraq, Gaza, Yemen, Libya and Ukraine are sending us a single message: "war returns". This was the title of a farsighted article published in 1933 by Carlo Rosselli¹ after Hitler came to power. In the first half of last century, Germany's rising power and its world policy determined the end of the international order which the British Empire had kept in check by its domination of the seas and by playing the role of needle of the scale of the European balance of power. The consequence is well known: Fascism, the Great Depression of 1929 and the World Wars.

The historical crisis of the nation states and the partition of Europe by the two superpowers that won the Second World War put Western Europe's fate in the hands of the United States, who assured for their allies two fundamental public goods: money, with the Bretton Woods system which assigned to the dollar convertible into gold the role of international currency, and security through NATO.

The cost of hegemony (and particularly of the wars against Korea and Vietnam) led the United States to put a growing amount of dollars into circulation. This enabled Americans to consume more than they produced, getting their debts paid by countries with a solid real economy and the propensity to save. Obviously this system could not keep going for long since doubts were emerging in the world about the solvency of the US. General de Gaulle began to ask for the dollars held by the French central bank to be converted into gold. Other countries did the same. The situation soon became untenable and, on 15 August 1971, President Nixon decided to put an end to the Bretton Woods agreements by suspending dollar convertibility to gold.

The US nonetheless managed to perpetuate its financial primacy, securing the agreement in 1973 that oil-exporting countries (OPEC) would peg this commodity – essential to the functioning of all economies – to the dollar. However, the fluctuation of exchange rates, following Nixon's decision of 15 August 1971, would have broken up the European common market had the member states of the European Community not planned the single currency that, starting from the Werner Plan (1968) led to the creation of the Euro (1999).

The world is evolving towards monetary multipolarity: the retreat of the dollar is being offset by the rise of the euro and renminbi. This means that the remedy to monetary turmoil does not lie simply in a new economic policy. The international economic order needs to be re-founded by replacing the dollar with the special drawing rights (SDR, a basket that includes the major currencies) issued by the International Monetary Fund².

A similar evolution to that underway in the monetary area is taking place at a political-military level and shows how the US is no longer capable of ensuring security in Europe³. As we gradually move into the globalisation era, we realise that we have come to the end of an historical cycle: the bipolar world order that formed at the end of the Second World War. The most visible signs of it are the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc and the retreat of American power in the world, as shown by the failure of military interventions

in the last 40 years, from Vietnam to Iraq. However, the end of the bipolar balance of power has not led, for the time being, to the formation of a new world order, or the establishment of new rules of international coexistence, or even of a real leadership role in international politics by the new protagonists of the world economy and politics, the BRICS countries.

Since Europe is at the centre of the most unstable area in the world, it is up to her to take the initiative to start the construction of a new world order: it is in its vital interest. The European Communities were formed within the context of the Cold War, with the intention to overcome it. The Schuman Declaration begins with these words: "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations".⁴ The European Communities were established not only to ensure irrevocable peace between Member States, starting with the Franco-German reconciliation, but also to contribute to peace in the world by introducing into the system of States a new element, a peacebuilding force able to change the balance of power in the world, to ease the tension between the US and the Soviet Union and to overcome the Cold War.

The world has been waiting for 65 years for Europe to unify the foreign and security policies of its Member States and to become able to compete with the macro-regional states that already operate in global society. After the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, Europe preferred to pursue economic integration and to rely on the American protectorate for its security. The institutional edifice which made it possible to govern European unification was based on two pillars, which guaranteed peace and security in the continent: the convergence between the national interests of individual governments and US hegemony. The second pillar has now become so weak that the regions located at the eastern and southern edges of Europe are falling into chaos. It is a geopolitical space whose stability and security has been entrusted to NATO and to the European Neighbourhood Policy towards adjacent countries

that are either not yet ready to become part of the EU or belong to regional organisations whose centre of gravity is located outside Europe. The EU does not have the means to face the threats gathering at its borders.

If the violence of war and terrorism takes root on Europe's borders to the south (Africa and Middle East) and to the east (Ukraine), security becomes a top priority. Without peace, the developing of European unity is destined to end, overwhelmed by the wave of violence and growing international disorder.

If a region like Europe, which, owing to its economic system, its social model and its advanced scientific and technological achievements, plays a vanguard role in the world does not provide itself with the means to ensure its own security, it is destined to be subordinate to the old and new protagonists of world politics and to decline. What happened to the city-states of ancient Greece which were unable to join forces against the might of the Macedonian Empire and later the Roman Empire, or to the dominions of the Italian peninsula in the 15th century that were also unable to unite to counterbalance the large territorial states (France and Spain) that had formed in Europe, can happen today to the nation states of the old continent faced with the emerging system of states of macro-regional dimensions.

To meet this challenge, the first action to take without having to initiate a review process of the Treaty of Lisbon, is what is known as “permanent structured cooperation”, which would also allow a small number of member states of the EU to build effective corps of European armed forces. In 2003 when Iraq was attacked by the US, the first steps in this direction were taken by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. However they were immediately hampered by divisions in the EU since the UK, Italy and Spain, together with a large group of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, supported the United States, which undermined the initiative of the four countries by representing it as a manoeuvre hostile to NATO and to Atlantic solidarity. The current growing disorder at Europe's borders demands, with the urgency of a matter that cannot be deferred, that Europe resumes that project.

The Turbulent Transition to a Multipolar World Order

We must recognise the special responsibility of the US, but also of the European Union, in having helped worsen world disorder owing to a misperception of the new balance of power that was forming after the collapse of the bipolar order: the dream of having won the Cold War, coupled with the unreasonable purpose to isolate and knock down Russia. The wars against Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya removed hateful dictatorships but generated failed nations, fertile terrain for rampant tribal and religious conflicts, terrorism and organised crime. The terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York turned radical Islam into the new enemy for the Western world, in the same way as Nazism and Communism were the enemy to the democratic powers of the West last century. Considering that Al Qaeda was just a small group of terrorists which got protection from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, we can assert that this new enemy was a creature of George Bush Jr. to justify his megalomaniac dream of transforming the United States into a world empire and to nurture the illusion that democracy would arise from the ruins produced by his military intervention. The danger gradually began to gain consistency only after the war in Iraq which first caused resentment among the Islamic masses, then turned into terrorism and ultimately produced the Islamic State. That disastrous war – started on the basis of fabricated evidence about a non-existent nuclear arsenal in Iraq – opened the way to the growing influence of jihadist groups which have gained ground in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria, etc.

The advance of ISIS shows that Bush's project of US military action to evolve the entire Middle East towards democracy has proved a total failure. It is a childish idea to believe that democracy can be established through elections held in countries without a government, i.e. without an authority able to enforce the law and to curb violence and organised crime.

The barbaric and obscurantist nature of Islamic radicalism does not just reflect the division of followers of the Koran into ethnic and religious groups fighting each other but is also the poisoned fruit

of wrong policies by the West which opted for the shortcut of using military violence, fuelling a climate of hatred and widespread hostility in the Middle Eastern and African populations. It is a reactionary movement that opposes the processes of economic development, social modernisation and secularisation, which were the drivers of the Arab Spring.

ISIS aspires to become the Caliphate, the union of all believers of Islam in the name of the nihilistic cult of death. This is a character that ISIS has in common with fascism. It will be remembered that, in 1936, a follower of Francisco Franco, General Millán-Astray, during an altercation with Miguel de Unamuno, the rector of the University of Salamanca, in front of an assembly of students exclaimed: “*Abajo la inteligencia!*” “*Viva la muerte!*”. Nihilism flourishes where a civilisation collapses, sweeping away institutions and their system of values, and is not replaced by a new civilisation.

The current leadership vacuum in the world ensures that some of the pressing and long-term global problems, such as climate change, rising military expenditure, the lack of rules for governing globalisation, and international monetary disorder, continue to worsen without any effective attempts being made to remedy them. World leaders are burdened by immediate security problems, such as in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Libya, which are addressed by half measures and poorly coordinated international responses. We are living in a world in which no power, or more precisely, no group of powers wants or can express that coordinated global leadership that would be needed to deal with the increasingly serious international challenges.

Unlike previous cycles of world politics, in which dominance organised around the hegemony of a single major power (first Britain and then the United States) assured the world order, today there is an ongoing process of distribution of power among a plurality of global players. A lesson that can be drawn from the history of international relations is that the proper functioning of a system of rules depends on the balance of power among the players in the system of nations: if a dominant power forms, it can allow itself to not respect the rights of the other nations.⁵ The evolution of world

politics shows that, after the bipolar system of the Cold War and the unipolar system – which formed after the collapse of the Communist bloc – the world balance of power is moving towards multipolarism. The only alternative to the chaos into which the world is sliding is to construct a multipolar world order without hegemonies and to look to the existing international organisations – primarily the United Nations – for agreed solutions to the crisis. This is the premise for founding international order on law and for constitutionalizing international relations.

The Era of International Organisations and the Search for New Forms of Statehood

The response of governments to regional integration and globalisation processes has been to construct international organisations (both regionally and globally), not by choice but because of a lack of alternatives. There is no national answer to problems of a regional or global dimension. In other words, the international organisations are the response of governments to problems that they are no longer able to resolve on their own. To appreciate the significance of the phenomenon it is sufficient to consider the incredible speed with which the number of such organisations has grown in the last century: in 1909 there were just 37 but by 2011 this number had increased to 7608⁶.

They reflect the need for national governments to ensure cooperation and a minimum of rules for the orderly development of international relations without the support of an organised government: in other words “governance without government” to use the formula coined by Rosenau⁷.

This approach, which considers unchangeable the organisation of the world into national states and relies on cooperation between governments for a solution to international problems, does not address the crucial problem of establishing higher levels of government at the regional and global levels. Although international organisations represent a step towards the peaceful governance of international relations, they have two serious limitations. On the one hand, they are ineffective, lacking enforcement powers able to

make binding decisions at the international level, and, on the other, they are hampered by the power of veto available to member states for most intergovernmental decisions and procedures that, save for a few exceptions, exclude the democratic principle that requires decisions to be passed by majority vote.

Even in times past, huge empires were formed that included large regions. Unification of such large spaces was the result of military expansion which did not meet sufficient resistance from the conquered populations. The trend in progress in our time is the result of an extensive network of economic and social relationships which develop beyond national borders, forming transnational societies and markets. The proliferation of international organisations is the result of the search for a new form of statehood: after the birth of the city-state at the time of agricultural mode of production and of nation-states that formed when the industrial mode of production asserted itself, today, at the time of transition to the knowledge society and globalisation, new forms of federative style statehood, structured on a macro-regional and global level, are required. The big political problem of our time is to strengthen international organisations, bringing the principles of rule of law, democracy and federalism where they do not exist and the destiny of peoples is decided. Since the EU is the most advanced experiment of constitutionalisation and democratization of an international organisation, it can play the role of model and engine for constructing a new world order.

The EU: Laboratory of a Post-Westphalian Political Order

The reason for the slowness of the EU's constitutionalisation process and the consequent delay in providing effective responses to the challenges it faces do not just lie in the well-known and often stigmatized and censured resistance opposed by national governments against the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the European institutions. It also lies in the difficulty of building a new form of post-national statehood that is unprecedented in history. This process does not yet have a universally agreed name. It could be defined as a federative process, but this label is generally rejected because all existing Federations have experienced a centralisation process, which is the result of the world's division

into antagonistic sovereign States. The founders of the federalist movements were inspired by the American institutional model.⁸ In other words, they looked more to the past than the future, thinking that the answer to the contemporary world's challenges could be found ready-made in the tried and tested institutional formulas. The innovations introduced by the European institutions show that the legacy of the past can only partially be used today.

The problem now facing the world is different and new: giving an answer to the historical crisis of the nation state, redistributing powers and responsibilities upwards (the macro-regional and world organisations) and downwards (the regional, provincial and local territorial communities). The first priority is to strengthen and democratize the international organisations that aim to regulate international relations. Without easing governments' responsibilities for foreign policy, the push towards power centralisation will continue to be invincible. In other words, the first priority of our time is starting the constitutionalisation process of international relations. The model of European institutions, built on the ruins of the Second World War, shows the way that leads to peace. The EU is the most advanced and innovative laboratory of this experiment. European institutions have assured peace for 70 years among a group of nations that has expanded from the six founding members to the current 28. The European Parliament is the first supranational Parliament in history. However, the European Union is an unfinished project, which suffers from a constitutional deficit and a democratic deficit.

That the European project represents an attempt to build a form of post-Westphalian statehood is confirmed by the objectives that, according to the Lisbon Treaty (Articles 42-43), the security and defence policy must pursue. The purpose is not to make war but to maintain peace, to prevent conflicts and to strengthen international security.

At the basis of the EU and its fragile institutional structure there is the choice of being a "civil power"⁹ that, without giving up military deterrence, pursues security mainly through interdependence, international cooperation and by entangling the relations between

the European countries in a close network of rules and institutions. Starting with this political choice, an EU that endows itself with the means for acting as a global player can nurture a trend able to transform the world around it, beginning with the regions located at its southern and eastern borders. This seems to be the way, certainly long and tortuous, but which leads to the realisation of Kant's plan of universal and perpetual peace.

The stages of the European unification process are also stages of the construction of peace. The first, the formation of a European Community, marked the ending of the period of world wars. The second, the unification of Western Europe with Central and Eastern Europe marked the end of the Cold War. The third, the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean Community, is a failed project that requires a complete overhaul and then to be immediately put back on the agenda. Migration flows are determining an enlargement of the EU: the spontaneous response of refugees to the failed achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean Community that the governments were unable to create.

The Lack of a European Migration Policy

The shipwrecks taking place daily in the Mediterranean and the tens of thousands of refugees that move on foot to the centre of Europe along the Balkan route describe the drama of growing masses of unfortunates who have lost family members, their homes and property and flee from places where the collapse of the State has regressed society to the "state of nature" in which, according to the description by Hobbes, everyone is in danger of "violent death" and life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"¹⁰.

The desperation of those men and women is so great that they choose to leave even though they know they run the risk of being repelled and even of dying. These are tragedies that are not to be ascribed to bad luck but are the result of the lack of a European immigration policy and of a selfish attitude towards the dramas those populations are experiencing.

Even though the EU has, in theory, pursued the design of a

Euro-Mediterranean Community, in practice it has not created the conditions for its achievement.¹¹ The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, launched in 1995 in order to create a free trade area and cooperation in various fields, has failed in its purpose. The EU has not promoted a plan for the development of North African and Middle Eastern countries and did nothing to support the Arab Spring. The only visible manifestation of the EU policy in the region was Frontex, the agency that has the task of patrolling the EU's borders but which, owing to the insufficiency of means at its disposal and to its intergovernmental structure, is very far from effectively performing the duties of a European border guard, particularly those of rescuing survivors from shipwrecks and identifying those having the right to asylum.

The fact is that the immigration emergency has been dealt with almost exclusively as a security problem. No country can hope to cope alone with the challenge of migration from Africa or Asia, or any of the other global challenges of the 21st century. Notwithstanding this, to stem the increasing migration flows, everywhere new walls have been raised, marking a return to the Europe of nation states that excludes and repels. If the individual countries resort to the only type of security they believe they can guarantee – border control – then the values that inspired the European project are at stake.

This direction leads to questioning one of the greatest achievements of European unification: the free movement of people within the Schengen area. The Schengen agreements were limited to promoting a "negative integration", i.e. the abolition of borders between EU member states without, at the same time, building an external border under the supervision of an EU police force. Without any effective control of the external border, it is inevitable that controls at the national borders return. Border control has remained a national prerogative. When reception capacities are saturated, some states have closed their borders to halt the rising tide of migration flows, a decision that Chancellor Merkel has called "repugnant", deploring the increasing xenophobia and populism of political forces and governments that have chosen to repel migrants. Announcing that Germany is ready to welcome 800,000

Syrian refugees, Merkel has gone beyond the Dublin regulations that require registration in the country of destination where the displaced person has to ask for refugee status without being able to proceed to another member state even if wanting to. But for this project to be successful, it is necessary to have the support of the other member states. Being realistic it is necessary to recognise that, in the context of globalisation, national borders are a remnant of the past and that the migration flows are unstoppable. We are faced with a movement of peoples of biblical proportions, similar to what was known as the “barbarian invasions” that the more careful historians have more appropriately called the “migration of peoples”. It is a movement that is transforming and will increasingly transform European society, creating a multinational people, which can only find its complete fulfilment in federal institutions.

The EU believes it is making a massive effort in accepting 160,000 refugees, but this is only a modest figure when compared to the number of refugees that have found shelter in Turkey (2 million), Lebanon (1.2 million) and Jordan (600,000). And yet the dispute about allocating the refugees has brought about a deep rift between member states and months of paralysis in the Union’s decision-making process. It is not just the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have joined forces for rejecting immigrants but also Denmark, the Netherlands and Britain have reacted the same way and even France has only belatedly accepted the proposal of binding quotas. Whether countries that have erected walls or left their borders open or closed them after initially opening them, all have shown that the Schengen and Dublin rules that govern free movement of people within the EU have ceased to function.

In reality, such a massive flow of migrants represents a tremendous opportunity for Europe. As stated by the German Vice-Chancellor Gabriel, the difficulty encountered in receiving refugees is not primarily in their number but the speed at which they arrive. This is exactly the outcome of failing to put in place a serious reception plan for bringing order and organisation to migration policies. Migrants can fill the vacuum left by the declining birth rate and ageing population and save Europe from an inevitable

demographic, economic and political decline. Europe needs the contribution of a growing number of young people, which can only come from immigration. According to a projection of the European Commission, while at the moment in Europe there are about four people of working age for every pensioner, in 2060 there will only be two¹². It therefore follows that the EU will need 42 million immigrants by 2020 and about 257 million by 2060¹³.

Europe is a magnet to the populations of the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean, subjected in their own countries to the unbearable pressures of war, terrorism, dictatorships, poverty and unemployment. Without the contribution of the work by young people from the periphery of Europe, who can guarantee the recovery and competitiveness of the European economy? Who will pay the cost of the Welfare State in Europe? Who will provide the resources necessary for paying pensions and social security? When Chancellor Merkel announced her readiness to host 800,000 Syrian refugees, she proved to have the far-sighted vision of a statesman faced with changes of historic proportions. What is happening today are the first signs of a phenomenon bound to last a long time: for as long as the tensions and conflicts throughout the Middle East and Africa find no solution and the population explosion in those regions is not curbed.

This is a challenge that can be won. Great migrations are our future. Building a large multinational community is the only alternative to the return of the barbarism of nationalism, fascism and the clash of civilisations, of which ISIS is the harbinger. The Maastricht Treaty defined European citizenship as an institution that goes alongside – does not replace – national citizenship, and recognised that certain constitutional rights, such as the right to vote at local and European level, can be exercised by all European citizens in their place of residence. This has been a step towards separating nationality from citizenship. In other words, those who were considered foreigners according to the criteria of national thought have become (fellow) citizens of a multinational community. We must expect that the mass immigration now underway will give a strong push to extending European citizenship also to non-EU citizens.

A European immigration and asylum policy requires allocating substantial resources to constructing reception centres not just in European countries where arrivals of immigrants have reached record numbers (Greece, Italy, Germany) but also in the countries neighbouring Syria where the inhuman conditions of refugee camps run by the UN induce refugees to flee to Europe. The new resources necessary for this emergency must be added to those that the Juncker Plan must release for absorbing unemployment, which remains at the level of 10%. This confirms the urgent need to substantially increase the EU's budgetary resources, starting with the Eurozone countries. At the same time, it is necessary to open humanitarian corridors to protect the emigrants from the dangers facing them during their journey, including those coming from human traffickers.

The Internal Challenge: Living Together with Muslim Communities

There is also an internal front where Europe must fight to defeat the jihadist challenge: that of relations with the increasingly large Muslim communities in Europe. Considering that, in 2060, about half the population in our continent will be of origin outside Europe, it is necessary that the EU's focus is on an integration project that primarily pursues the "inclusion of the other"¹⁴. To achieve consent of these populations, it is necessary to develop institutions, already present in rudimentary form in the EU, based on principles of equality of rights for all religious faiths and all cultures (rule of law and constitutionalism) and of peaceful co-existence and solidarity between nationalities (federalism).

Only politics can banish violence from social relations, putting the old demon of intolerance and religious fanaticism under State control and making peace and the rule of law prevail. The West's glory lies in the separation of religion from politics, which is a concept foreign to the Islamic culture. This principle has opened the way for mutual tolerance and to peaceful coexistence between the various religious convictions and national affiliations. Unfortunately, there is no universal consensus on these principles, and even though the Arab Spring has rekindled a

hope that obscurantism could be defeated, in many Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, apostasy continues to be punishable with the death penalty.

Nearly all terrorists who have struck our countries are European citizens, sons of immigrants, to which the EU has been unable to convey a sense of belonging or identity. This explains why many of these young people are seduced by Islamic fundamentalism and become 'foreign fighters'. This is one of the most serious problems to be addressed given that the two main models of integration adopted in Europe – assimilation in France where the accent is on unity, and multiculturalism in the UK, an approach that favours diversity and separation – have failed. The right balance between these two extremes can be found in the federal model, which allows unity to be combined with diversity, helping overcome the squint of viewing globalisation as a process that erases all differences and localism as a category that emphasises the idea of exclusively belonging to local communities. While the nation states have lost power and legitimacy, necessary requisites for establishing a model of peaceful life built on the constitutional principle of equality of citizens regardless of their religion and nationality, the EU is not yet a federal union. For the moment, it is primarily a market, unable to promote the values of a true multinational community of destiny.

Security: Condition for Sustainable Development and Democracy in the Mediterranean

It is therefore urgent that the EU overturns its intolerant attitude inspired to the "fortress Europe" model and makes an effort to address the problem at the root, with a plan aimed at promoting peace, sustainable development and democracy in Mediterranean countries.

In the Middle East and North Africa there is a war in progress for hegemony over the Islamic world.

ISIS aspires to become the protagonist of a big game which involves the regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Israel) and the global powers (primarily the permanent members of the UN Security Council). Its strength lies above all in the fragmentation of

interests and political strategies of the regional and global powers participating directly or indirectly in the conflict. But in an increasingly fragmented world without any leadership, there is no military response to the global disorder. This is proved by the ineffectiveness of the action by the coalition formed to fight ISIS. The end of the Cold War and bipolar world order was followed by growing disorder. The EU has a special responsibility since it is located in the centre of the storm. Working for political unification, even at the slow pace that characterises the evolution of the European integration process, would help change the expectations of the players in the region and fill the power vacuum opened at its borders by the withdrawal of the United States.

While the EU unquestionably has responsibility for taking the initiative, it is clear that it does not have the necessary influence to stabilise the region on its own. Rebuilding the international order in the Mediterranean requires the opening of a multilateral negotiation. The negotiating formula (P5 + 1), which paved the way to the agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, shows the road to follow.

The first objective to be pursued is to begin political negotiations in which all countries active in the region and global powers participate. A conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean must be convened, in line with the model of the Helsinki Conference which, in 1975, brought about a new course to East-West relations and started détente.

We must learn the lesson from the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, whose goal was to create a free trade area by 2010. We must reverse the order of priorities, placing security at the top of the list. Without security, no plan for economic cooperation can be achieved. But it must be borne in mind that security is not only achieved by military and civil means for maintaining peace but that plans for economic integration and development aid are equally effective.

A high priority issue for Europe is energy security. The EU imports 53% of its energy resources. 77% of natural gas is imported from Russia, Norway and Algeria, and 53% of oil imports come from Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia. These figures very clearly illustrate the challenge facing the EU for reducing its energy dependence on

external sources. In very simple terms, there are two tasks: the first is to combine efforts, within the framework of the “European Energy Union” proposed by the European Commission, to accelerate the transition towards renewable energy according to the “20/20/20 Plan” which strives, by 2020, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 20%, raising the share of energy produced from renewable resources by 20% and to increase energy savings by 20%, with the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gases by at least 80% within 2050 compared to 1990 levels.

The second objective is to develop economic cooperation with countries on which the EU depends for energy supply – Russia and the countries of North Africa and the Middle East – considering that oil and natural gas will remain indispensable for feeding the European production system during the transition to renewable energies. Of course, this goal can only be pursued if an end is brought to the violence and tensions rampant on Europe’s borders considering the vulnerability of the energy infrastructures, thousands of kilometres long, to the threat of terrorism. It is worth remembering the ambitious “Desertec” project for generating renewable energy in the Sahara Desert, which stalled due to the lack of the security conditions necessary for its implementation. This plan would have put the EU at the vanguard of the ecological revolution which promises to be a turning point in production systems and lifestyles, permitting to redirect investments from the financial sector to the real economy, and more specifically towards the most innovative sectors.

It is important to remember that the problem of the transition from power politics to a world order based on law had received a significant impulse from Gorbachev’s *perestroika*.¹⁵ Engaged in the very difficult task of changing the Soviet Union’s regime with a top-down revolution, Gorbachev realised that his design required a new vision of international relations. As a result, he pursued the goal of “leaving the United States without an enemy” and the development of this perspective produced the NATO-Russia Partnership for Peace. He thus promoted the progress of the world towards to a post-Westphalian order, asserting new strategic

concepts – those of mutual security and non-offensive defence – which made it possible to eliminate entire categories of weapons of mass destruction. These concepts have now been forgotten because they have been swept away by the disastrous political cycle of American unipolarism, but they should be put back on the political agenda. Globalisation and the erosion of sovereignty of the nation states pose to Europe problems that go beyond the task of building peace in just one region of the world. If the EU provides itself with the means to speak with one voice and to act as a global player, it can start a new cycle of world politics, beginning with the Mediterranean. If it does not do so, it will have failed in its historic mission.

A security community – which the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had started in the large geo-strategic space occupied by Europe, Russia, republics of the former Soviet Union, the US and Canada – should be created in the Mediterranean to pursue the reduction of weapons, the creation of a nuclear-free space in the Middle East, the formation of a Palestinian state which develops federative relations with Israel within the framework of the Arab League, the rebuilding of failed states and the dismantling of criminal bands that hold the monopoly on transportation of emigrants to Europe. Most of these objectives have been on the political agenda for decades, with no significant progress. The starting point can only be the creation of a climate of trust between all parties involved, as happened when the Helsinki process started. The agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme can be interpreted as the first success of an unprecedented political will to negotiate to find a solution to the puzzle of the Middle East.

A Marshall Plan for Africa and the Middle East

Political stability must be understood as the necessary condition for mobilising economic resources to allocate to a sustainable development plan for Africa and the Middle East. It is therefore indispensable to link the goal of security with the goals of economic cooperation and sustainable development. In this perspective, after the monetary crisis of 1971 and the oil crisis of 1973 – a situation which has strong similarities to the current crisis – Spinelli

formulated a visionary proposal in 1978 which should be brought back at the centre of the political debate: “developing countries [...] are [...] that enormous reserve of potential demand from the economies of developed countries, which can progressively be converted into real demand”. It is a particularly attractive idea if considering the need to view from a new perspective the current problem of the recovery of the European economy and finding a way out of the financial and economic crisis. “The North”, wrote Spinelli, “should make to the South the great proposal of transferring – year by year, for free or under facilitated conditions – monetary means to be employed not to meet the needs of hungry populations (which remains in the realm of charity), but to achieve development plans, prepared by the countries of the South themselves and, if necessary, with technical assistance provided by developed countries [...]. The only condition that should be asked”, continued Spinelli, “is that ‘open economy development plans’ should be proposed”. The realistic nature of the proposal lies in the fact that the plan must help to promote development both in countries of the South and those of the North. Advanced countries will have to implement “austerity” policies “so that it is possible to allocate for many years a considerable fraction of the income saved to investments in development plans for the countries of the South. [...] If the operation succeeds, these countries will begin to not only increasingly make use of investment and consumption goods but also to create modern industry and agriculture. Their demand for goods, first of all of machine tools and technologies, addressed to the industrialised countries will increase, and the Western economy will recover not because it has abstractly decided to increase production (which is what it is currently trying to do) but because more has to be produced to meet growing demand which is not likely to dry up soon”¹⁶.

The Marshall Plan is an historical precedent, a model and a source of inspiration of Spinelli’s grand design. In fact, the US financed the reconstruction of the European economy and, at the same time, the conversion of the American armament industry through export to the European market revenues. The EU, which is the world’s leading trading power, has a vital interest in maintaining

open relationships with the world economy and in developing economic cooperation with the rest of the world, particularly with its neighbouring regions. It should be noted that the model of EU enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cannot be replicated as regards relations with the Mediterranean countries which belong to a different regional organisation – the Arab League – that can become the seat of a regional integration process. The same applies to Russia and the Eurasian Union. Neither region is able to compete with the EU but they need the European market. At the same time, stimulating growth in Europe after the financial and economic crisis requires the impetus of a third stage of development of the European market. After the creation of the Common Market in the 1950s and the enlargement to the former communist countries in the first decade of this century, now is the moment to enlarge the European market to the neighbouring regions, without this having to hamper the regional integration projects underway between the countries of the Arab League or between those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly belonging to the Soviet Union)¹⁷.

Apart from generating renewable energy in the Sahara desert, the defining aspects of the development plan should be to construct major infrastructures for distributing oil, natural gas, water and electricity, for transportation (motorways, high-speed railways, ports and airports), for digital communication and satellite navigation. Along similar lines is being developed the huge Chinese project of investments for reactivating the “Silk Road” with a view to industrialising the boundless spaces of the Eurasian continent. Today, emerging markets ask for international institutions to be created to foster the development of poor countries, such as the Asian Bank for infrastructure investment promoted by the Chinese government. It is therefore a question of channelling public spending towards the production of international public goods.

Imports by the European Union from Africa and the Middle East should be oriented not only to oil and natural gas but also agricultural and craft products and raw materials, but with the proviso that these goods should not be imported in their ‘raw’ state but should receive the first work on site so as to make

these products semi-finished, in order to prevent the farmer or raw material producer from being deprived of all the added value of production; new employment could thus be created in Africa, with the consequence of rooting the population in the territory. The story of coffee and cotton imports from Africa shows that the major European companies have always and continue to act in a monopolistic way as regards the purchase, relegating Africans to the mere manual action of sowing and harvesting the agricultural products, forcing on them the minimum payments for the trade, barely at subsistence levels. A similar situation is found in raw materials trade.

An Interregional Institution for the Mediterranean

The Cold War was over when the two superpowers gave up trying to prevail over each other and began looking for a new idea of international order in response to the need to construct a system of peace. The main challenge was to prevent the large regional organisations – that are taking shape in those parts of the world where the states have not yet acquired macro-regional dimensions – became a container of organised violence and a vehicle of war, as were the nation states. The undoing of the institutions of the Cold War shows that the world is becoming ungovernable and that the direction the change should take is to build new institutions that make it possible to try out new security models internationally. The role of regional organisations is to become an intermediate level between the nation states and the United Nations.

The large regions of the world are not isolated entities but develop close relations between themselves in the context of the globalisation process. Interregional organisations, which include two or more large regions of the world, are gaining significant importance. Their architecture reflects the need to organise and govern the relationships between the regional organisations.

The OSCE, which is the institution initiated out of the need to give shape to Gorbachev’s design of a “European common home”,¹⁸ can be considered the interregional organisation prototype and the model for the construction of a similar institution in the

Mediterranean. The pivot of the public discussion on the future of the Arab world revolves around the relationship between security, economic cooperation and democracy, which are precisely the so-called “three baskets” of the Helsinki process. I have previously developed arguments seeking to show that economic development and international cooperation require security and political stability: it should again be made clear that starting the transition to democracy needs both of these conditions of security and economic development to be met.

Here lies the difficulty that the so-called “third wave”¹⁹ of the democratisation process – which began at the end of the last century with the fall of the communist and fascist regimes in Europe – meets in the Arab world. Since then about a hundred countries have embarked on the road to democracy. The Arab Spring has rekindled the debate on the transition to democracy in North Africa and the Middle East and has shown the existence of the old division between town and country, between the progressive front represented by the urban, educated masses and the reactionary front which is the expression of rural populations. For the moment, only in Tunisia does the democratic revolution seem to withstand the reactionary counter-offensive, which is based on the preponderance of the peasant masses. European history, from the French Revolution on, shows how long and tortuous is the path that leads to the consolidation of democracy. There is a similarity between the restoration of the monarchy after the defeat of Napoleon and the waning of the Arab Spring. In the same way as the industrial revolution in 19th century Europe led to an increased social and political influence firstly of the bourgeoisie, then of the middle classes and lastly of the working classes, opening the way to constitutionalism, democracy and social reforms, also the drive of industrialisation in North Africa and the Middle East that could come from a European development plan is the objective condition that can bring the democratic elites to power. However, despite the insufficiency of the economic and social conditions necessary for victory, the Arab Spring would have been able to prevail if it would have benefited from outside help from democratic countries and especially from Europe, but this was entirely lacking.

Interregional institutions such as the OSCE or the ACP-EU partnership which bring together different regions of the world are the institutional tools for facing an unprecedented historic challenge for which the rules of the Cold War can no longer apply. The problems to be solved are highly complex and have never been dealt with jointly in such a large and heterogeneous international space. The American century is over. This thus leads the way to the real possibility of forcing the US to share its power with the emerging powers of the multipolar system currently in the making.

Notes

- 1 C. Rosselli, *Scritti dell'esilio (1929-1934)*, in *Opere scelte*, Torino, Einaudi, 1988, vol. II, pp. 250-258.
- 2 The system, originally proposed by Robert Triffin (R. Triffin, *Gold and the Dollar Crisis. The Future of Convertibility*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960) was put into effect in 1970. The quantity of SDR now in circulation amounts to 0.5% of total world non-gold reserves, but the fading of the world supremacy of the dollar is strengthening the SDR alternative. See also A. Iozzo and A. Mosconi, "The Foundation of a Cooperative Global Financial System", *The Federalist Debate*, XIX, 2006, n. 2, pp. 6-11.
- 3 Within the wide literature on the decline of the American power and the transition toward a multipolar international system, I quote P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York, Vintage Books, 1987; E. Todd, *Après l'empire*, Paris, Gallimard, 2002; C. A. Kupchan, *The End for the American Era, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, New York, Knopf, 2002; I. Wallerstein, *The Decline for the American Power*, New York-London, New Press, 2003; N. Ferguson, *Colossus of the Price of America's Empire*, New York, Penguin Books, 2004.
- 4 R. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, Paris, Nagel, 1963, p. 202.
- 5 See L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, London, Longmans, 1905, vol. I, p. 13.
- 6 *Yearbook of International Organizations*, Leiden-Boston, Brill-Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, vol. I, pp. 32-35.
- 7 J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel, *Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- 8 A. Spinelli, *Il modello costituzionale americano e i tentativi di unità europea*, in *La nascita degli Stati Uniti d'America*, ed. by Luciano Bolis, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1957, pp. 209-225.
- 9 F. Duchêne, *Europe's Role in World Peace*, in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow. Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London, Fontana, 1972; M. Telò, *L'Europa potenza civile*, Bari, Laterza, 2004.
- 10 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904, p. 84.
- 11 M. Asseburg, P. Salem, *No Euro-Mediterranean Community without Peace*, Barcelona, IEMed, 2009.
- 12 European Commission, *The 2015 Ageing Report*, 2014, p. 2.
- 13 L. Bershidsky, *Europe Doesn't Have Enough Immigrants*, Bloomberg, 4 September 2015.
- 14 J. Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1998.
- 15 M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, New York, Harper Collins, 1987.
- 16 A. Spinelli, *PCI, che fare? Riflessioni su strategia e obiettivi della sinistra*, Torino, Einaudi, 1978, pp. 51-53.
- 17 I developed the proposal of a dual membership of Ukraine to the EU and to the Eurasian Union in L. Levi, *Stop the Dismemberment of Ukraine*, Centre for Studies on Federalism, Policy Paper No. 5, April 2014.
- 18 See *Address given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe (6 July 1989)* in www.coe.int; see also M. Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, New York, Doubleday, 1996, chap. 19.
- 19 S. P. Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

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